The Royal Navy Discussions and Updates

[Moonstone]

I think a who dares wins culture is fine in grand heroic theory, but no Navy would choose to accept dead sailors if they had the option of building better survivable ships. You cant always cater for the unexpected but most losses are entirely predictable. It was no secret at the end of the 1970's that much of the RN fleet was becoming obselete but in 1982 under armed old ships with brave crews did their duty and took a hammering. But you could have found numerous sources warning that those ships were not suitable.
Just as there were well publicised criticism of the T42 programme. The Navy recieved technologically advanced ships but it was widely seen that they were too small and under armed through budgetary constaints. The RN got 14 Type 42's , but the question with no answer would have been whether an RN with 8 bigger and more expensive T43's would have fared any better in 1982. We sent, I recall 5 Type 42's in total , losing 2 with one damaged. A smaller navy with better ships might have sent 3 Type 43. Would an 8000 tonne twin ended Sea Dart/ Sea Wolf ship provided better air defence than more numerous single ended 4000 tonne Sea Dart ships? We will never know, but for numbers sake we went cheap (er) and in the end had to pair a Type 42 with a Type 22 just to try and rectify the shortcomings.

The County was a fine looking ship, I think we built 8, and although the overall armament was ancient, the concept of a big tough solid ship with point and area defence missiles was a good one, in fact we will come full circle if T45 gets some CAMM to complement Aster, so personaly I would accept fewer , more potent ships. I think a cheap ship is a dead ship, especially as weapons are getting more and more sophisticated. I dont see any major navy abandoning the bigger ship in favour of smaller ones. None of us are privvy to data from wargames or weapon simulations, but the fact is the US,Spain, holland, germany, uk, italy, france, korea, japan have all invested in vastly expensive air warfare assets, at a time when the "experts" are telling is that afghan type rebuilding is the future.Im no expert but that says to me that all the major navies conclude that you need a high end, mega bucks air umbrella and anything outside that umbrella is stuffed.
I think the RN is going along the right lines. If we get the carriers and F35 we will have a mighty big stick, a vast improvement on A2A, finally able to protect the surface group. If we ever get CEC this will be a true force multiplier. A decent AEW platform will add to the blend. With those assets a smaller fleet in numbers is still more potent. If we can keep around 20 surface units, with CV and F35, we will be streets ahead of what we have now, so I cant see the benefit of building cheaper units, but thats just me. Personally I would rather the SSN fleet was expanded than trying to fund a class of cheaper single role ASW frigates.

Thank you for a most interesting and thoughtful reply .

The point I was trying to make (in my own poor way) was not that the RN should needlessly waste mens life's but rather that the RN has always intrinsically understood that in wartime ships must be risked in order to achieve the desired results . With the future most definitely 'not ours to see' this is a lesson that's worth remembering in my opinion .

Re the Falklands War & the Type 42 - I'd say that looking back on the distinctly minimalist T42's as they come to the end of their long service careers that this most contraversal of ship types has ultimately proved to be a rather successful design that has served the navy well . The true ancestor of the T42 was not the old 'County' class but the one-off Type 82 (HMS Bristol) - if you compare the 6000t T82 with the 4000t T42 it's hard not to conclude that the smaller ship was not only more affordable (and hence built in relatively large numbers) but also a rather better ship . The subsequent history of HMS Bristol was to show that just because a destroyer has a large hull that may well be suitable for rearming this does not necessarily mean that any such refit will ever actually happen .

The problem with the T42's was (as you say) that our ever present budgetary problems led to them being completed with obsolescent radar systems and with no adequate short range AAW defences . Had the Phalenx CWIS been fitted to these ships earlier (they were available from around 1980 and the ships are just about large enough to take them) then both Sheffield & Coventry may well have been saved .

Having seen an illustration of the proposed 'Type 43 Destroyer' (and remembering that I'm no navel architect ) I still must say they looked like an absolute 'dogs dinner' of a destroyer - too big , too expensive and with horribly awkwardly helo arrangements . Woodward didn't need the T43 in 1982 (even if they could have been built in time) what he really needed was the properly equipped T42 the RN got after the conflict ended . The cases of HMS Bristol & the Type 43 show that larger is not necessarily the same as better .

Building a ship - or a whole navy - is a question of striking the right balance between numbers and capability and cost . With the mysterious 'C2' design apparently pushed right back into the MOD'S 'long grass' (for all I know never to emerge again) I fear the RN is in danger of losing its balance entirely .

 

[Hambo]

Thank you for a most interesting and thoughtful reply .

The point I was trying to make (in my own poor way) was not that the RN should needlessly waste mens life's but rather that the RN has always intrinsically understood that in wartime ships must be risked in order to achieve the desired results . With the future most definitely 'not ours to see' this is a lesson that's worth remembering in my opinion .

Re the Falklands War & the Type 42 - I'd say that looking back on the distinctly minimalist T42's as they come to the end of their long service careers that this most contraversal of ship types has ultimately proved to be a rather successful design that has served the navy well . The true ancestor of the T42 was not the old 'County' class but the one-off Type 82 (HMS Bristol) - if you compare the 6000t T82 with the 4000t T42 it's hard not to conclude that the smaller ship was not only more affordable (and hence built in relatively large numbers) but also a rather better ship . The subsequent history of HMS Bristol was to show that just because a destroyer has a large hull that may well be suitable for rearming this does not necessarily mean that any such refit will ever actually happen .

The problem with the T42's was (as you say) that our ever present budgetary problems led to them being completed with obsolescent radar systems and with no adequate short range AAW defences . Had the Phalenx CWIS been fitted to these ships earlier (they were available from around 1980 and the ships are just about large enough to take them) then both Sheffield & Coventry may well have been saved .

Having seen an illustration of the proposed 'Type 43 Destroyer' (and remembering that I'm no navel architect ) I still must say they looked like an absolute 'dogs dinner' of a destroyer - too big , too expensive and with horribly awkwardly helo arrangements . Woodward didn't need the T43 in 1982 (even if they could have been built in time) what he really needed was the properly equipped T42 the RN got after the conflict ended . The cases of HMS Bristol & the Type 43 show that larger is not necessarily the same as better .

Building a ship - or a whole navy - is a question of striking the right balance between numbers and capability and cost . With the mysterious 'C2' design apparently pushed right back into the MOD'S 'long grass' (for all I know never to emerge again) I fear the RN is in danger of losing its balance entirely .

Moonstone, Dogs dinner is a bit harsh! though I accept it looks a bit odd, but it could according to DK Brown would have taken Aegis in some form.

What Adm Woodward actually needed was AEW, not any combo of ships or armament. In my opinion losing the fleet carriers effectively lost the ability to effectively protect a task group, an in the absence of AEW and proper air cover, either provided by the RAF or from a ship, loses would be inevitable. and RN sailors paid a heavy price. Despite the unbelievable heroism of the personel, the fleet that sailed in 1982 was one of floored concept, one where politicians and accountants (and the RAF) pulled a flanker and almost castrated the navy, in short a disgrace.

Type 42, as I understand it was built cheaply and in numbers because the carriers were going, because a carrier , fighters and AEW is by far the most effective defensive system. Had the carriers stayed the Navy would have never got (or maybe needed )14 airwarfare destroyers, probably 6 or 8 at the most, or maybe just 4 Type 82. The T42 was far cheaper than the T82 so post carriers it had to be T42. The T82 seems underarmed, but remember that it would sail close to the carrier and it itself would be protected by Phantom and Gannet AEW, a Type 82 could then concentrate on leakers or shooting an Ikara at a sub contact. The Phantom/AEW is the key to survival, not the escort, post carrier it was reversed, people started to believe that these technologically advanced missiles on ships were infallible, they clearly arent.

Sharkey Ward, though only one author drops a massive bombshell in his book, saying that in the years between the carriers going and the Falklands, the FAA or some of them lost the knowlege or belief that aircraft could effectively protect ships, by aggressive CAPs to drive off and destroy threat aircraft. There is a lot of ego in his book, but you do the impression that a SHAR or a phantom is far more effective than a sea dart at downing an etendard.

Due to the Cold war, politicians drove a navy that as we all know was ASW orientated, able to operate in the north Atlantic, but a fleet that was probably seen as short lived once the shooting started. An Ikara leander probably wouldnt have lasted long in the face of the soviet bombers. The Sea Harrier was by some miracle pushed forward, 5 on an Invincible just to shoot down shadowing Bears, but it was never a match for a fleet carrier or CVA01. Sea Harrier hasnt the speed for rapid intercepts, nor the legs despite its fantastic record in the history books.

Lets just assume a hypothetical fleet in 1982. HMS Eagle was Phantomised, and sailed with 14 Buccs and 12 Phantom, plus 5 Gannet AEW. HMS QE had 18 Buccs and 18 Phantoms, plus 5 Gannet AEW. The Escort fleet is 3 Type 82 and 3 of the remaining Counties, The frigates of the same type a mix of Leanders, Type 21s. Type 22 may have been different, with less emphasis on independent operation (?).

Even the ancient Gannet radar could supposedly pick up a low flyer at 40 miles, dependent on sea conditions. We wouldnt have needed the 3 Type 42s on picket 30 miles away, left out on a limb with no CIWS. In 1982 we just couldnt pick up the raids early enough. The group could have been tighter. Each carrier would have maintained a CAP, each CAP would have kept the attackers at arms length with Sparrow, each carrier could have remained further east because of the legs of the Bucc and still bombed targets. You cant rule out loses, but in my opinion we would have taken far fewer loses.

Once the carriers went the concept of naval projection becomes flawed, because once you sail out of RAF aircover, it becomes extremely difficult to operate unless you have AEW and against a decent enemy that will result in terrible loses.

Of course the RN tried to make up ground with Sea King AEW and making a gem of a plane in FRS2, but of course the latter has gone. Now I fear politicians will make a monumental mistake, we are potentially on the verge of the biggest leap in RN capability. IF we get QE and POW and F35B (or a proper fighter) we are back in the big time. Able to deploy a small task force centred on a carrier or two, if needed, that will out class and out punch most other navies on earth. HOWEVER, what I really fear is that if the Policticians swallow the call for more, but cheaper escorts for an endless list of missions, it will be at the cost of the carriers or its airgroup, and if that happens we will continue the trend of the last 35 years, ie a flawed naval policy that might one day get found out at great cost.

Give me 2 carriers with a proper airgroup of fighters and AEW and I will accept 15 escorts, because I dont actually care about drug interdiction in the carribean or disaster relief or "constabulary" work, I want a proper warfighting navy, that can deliver a short sharp punch.

Another example of how the carriers going shaped the RN was in anti ship missiles, The Bucc was a supreme ship killer, when the bucc went, and when task groups wouldnt be centred on a carrier, we started to stuff exocet onto ships, rebuilding some (leanders) and compromising the weapon fit of others, eg only on sea cat on a Type 21. That idea itself is floored in my opinion, sinking ships should be done by aircraft, yes some of your task group may be rolled for surface action, but if we had kept the carrier we would never need to get that close.

I find it annoying now that the Type 45 knockers continually bemoan the fitted for but not with point about Harpoon, but it shouldnt go anywhere near an enemy surface vessel, it will or should be glued to the carrier, and the F35 should have sunk that vessell at long range, or the SSN should have bagged it.

Just my thoughts anyway, we are major economic power, we should have a navy to reflect that. Not a massive navy but one that goes for high end over cheap and cheerful.

 

[1805]

Hi 1805
Just a few questions and comments on your recent post’s.
Were you inferring that SSN’s are a waste of time and money when you said “I guess they are the modern equivalent to a battleship; very expensive and virtually defenceless against air attack”?



While the type 23 is a very capable ship a larger vessel with an equivalent outfit would be more versatile and probably more fuel efficient providing greater stability for aircraft operations so I continually fail to understand your desire to make the Type 26 smaller which is so at odds with what is actually happening in most navies. A 4.5” is essential capability and should preferably be replaced by a 155mm on cost and compatibly of ammunition grounds alone, without going into the advantages of extended range and/or guided rounds and If the SDSR cuts the number of AS90 equipped regiments there may be some reuse of the guns/parts/ammo stocks to be had. As has been pointed out by others the larger size allows full size VLS of which ever brand is selected (SYLVER or Mk41 or both) which allows versatility in weapons fit.
ANZAC is a bad “example” not a bad ship and demonstrates the flaws in the arguments you present for small ships. Listen to Hambo he is correct on many occasions I particularly associate with his comments about the counties and recall the arguments he presented being had prior to the Falklands. Glamorgan actually engaged the incoming Exocet with Seacat it was however, inside the arm range of the missile and many of the GWS22 mod2 fitted ships had success against the Argentine aircraft a number of which had to ditch having used afterburner to escape the venerable Seacat.
I do agree that the RN needs to increase numbers of escorts and a way to do so would be to roll the patrol mine warfare survey functions into one hull type around hundred meter size (lets call it C2/3) and the outfit for that would be the source of much debate but largely fitted for not with in my view. It could perhaps be built in the north east on a similar drumbeat basis to that planned for the Type 26 or possibly combined with an order for replacements for the RFA if some joined up thinking is applied to the cost comparisons with foreign yards and account is taken of the costs to the UK of sending the work abroad against the benefits of local employment and taxation.
I do urge that as you appear to have the ear of one of our politicians that they and you need to appreciate that poor decisions on procurement such as that on CVA01 the under arming and shortening of the 42’s and the cutting of the helicopter budget more recently do end up in dead sailors and soldiers.

I do regard SSNs as useful but they are not the modern battleship, the arbiters of naval power. I think there was a tendency to view them as such (and still is) almost in consolation after the devastation caused by the loss of fixed wing carriers.

I remember a neighbour of my Parents who had been a Bucc navigator and had left to join BA, as many did, rather than join the RAF; saying at the time the impact of their loss was huge. Almost the entire RN had been built around them and oftern quite under appreciated the heavy impact on morale at all levels in the RN. The RN is not the complete victim here, it shared some of the blame for not handling the Carrier Crisis well.

So if I was creating a hierarchy of needs: CVs are top of the tree. I would be prepared to sacrifice almost everything to get them back (with aircraft we don’t want another HMS Glorious). If we have to accept: 6 SSN (hopefully only till times improve), a cut down escort just capable of drag TAS and carrying a helicopter/SAMs, no TacTom, even a cheap T45, less this less that, then so be it. But my point through my posts is the RN needs to control its own destiny, if it just say “ we need everything and its all expensive” they run the risk of repeating the mistakes of the past.

There is a mistaken view that if everything is in planning or on order that ok. You have to provide for Admiralty now and in the future; as in the 70s there are wide gaps in capability, where if we had accepted a lesser standard we would have adequate cover. Fleet air defence is still solely the responsibility of 5 T42 and no fighter (actually can someone say something good about these ships that have served so long/well).

As for NGS I do think this should be regarded a specialist role and we need to move on. It is beginning to look like the way most Navies pursued the ram in the 1880s long after all evidence pointed against them being of any value.

 

[riksavage]

I do regard SSNs as useful but they are not the modern battleship, the arbiters of naval power. I think there was a tendency to view them as such (and still is) almost in consolation after the devastation caused by the loss of fixed wing carriers.

It is generally accepted amongst most militaries that a modern SSN fleet will keep all but the most sophisticated of Navies in port during a shooting war. The assets required to track, detect and hunt down such a threat in an unrestricted warfare environment is only possessed by a handful of nations, compounded by the fact that those limited AsW Frigates are themselves potential victims of the very asset they are there to hunt. We are not talking about a single Frigate vs one SSN. The carnage a heavyweight torpedo can do to a carrier/LHD/LPD means an entire fleet of AsW's escorts will be dedicated to protecting such critical assets if a submarine alert is sounded, this combined with innumerable helo's (dropping sonar buoys like confetti) demonstrates the huge amount of assets required to mitigate the threat represented by a single submarine. Nothing short of a tactical nuclear strike causes so much fear amongst flag officers, modern submarines remain the hardest and most technically difficult asset to destroy.

Don't lets forget when the Belgrano was hit, its escorting destroyers dropped a few token depth charges and ran for the hills, they had NOTHING credible in their armoury to deal with such a sophisticated subsurface threat.

1805's comments about them being 'vulnerable to air attack' in the same way a battleship was/is, is at best childish ignorance and worst blind stupidity. However please don't stop posting I need a laugh every now and again!

 

[StingrayOZ]

It is generally accepted amongst most militaries that a modern SSN fleet will keep all but the most sophisticated of Navies in port during a shooting war.

Yes, but only the most sophisticated navies own SSN's of quality and quantity.

Carriers project power everywhere. SSN's are the ultimate defensive weapon.

I don't know why you guys are worried. The RN will have sufficent SSN's and potent carrier power (the only viable carrier power outside of the US). You will have those carriers for the next 50 years. While the SSBN fleet is a big question mark, the UK will operate full sized carriers and SSN's, both the most capable outside of the US..

 

[Hambo]

Yes, but only the most sophisticated navies own SSN's of quality and quantity.

Carriers project power everywhere. SSN's are the ultimate defensive weapon.

I don't know why you guys are worried. The RN will have sufficent SSN's and potent carrier power (the only viable carrier power outside of the US). You will have those carriers for the next 50 years. While the SSBN fleet is a big question mark, the UK will operate full sized carriers and SSN's, both the most capable outside of the US..

Dont forget the French, hopefully they do build a second carrier. The Rafale/Hawkeye combo is an excellent asset , along with a decent mix of surface vessels and SSN.

 

[AndrewMI]

Yes, but only the most sophisticated navies own SSN's of quality and quantity.

Carriers project power everywhere. SSN's are the ultimate defensive weapon.

I don't know why you guys are worried. The RN will have sufficent SSN's and potent carrier power (the only viable carrier power outside of the US). You will have those carriers for the next 50 years. While the SSBN fleet is a big question mark, the UK will operate full sized carriers and SSN's, both the most capable outside of the US..

Hmmm - i am not so sure. I would have said it the other way around! SSBN are safe (no viable alternative other than cutting the deterrent which is highly unlikely).

8 SSN would be great, there was an initial requirement for 10 and i suspect there will be 7.

The potential of an SSN is huge, as is stated above. One SSN can give effective control/denial of vast areas of ocean and can cause huge damage. The more they are able to be hooked up to satelite feeds etc, the more dangerous they will become.

 

[1805]

I do regard SSNs as useful but they are not the modern battleship, the arbiters of naval power. I think there was a tendency to view them as such (and still is) almost in consolation after the devastation caused by the loss of fixed wing carriers.

It is generally accepted amongst most militaries that a modern SSN fleet will keep all but the most sophisticated of Navies in port during a shooting war. The assets required to track, detect and hunt down such a threat in an unrestricted warfare environment is only possessed by a handful of nations, compounded by the fact that those limited AsW Frigates are themselves potential victims of the very asset they are there to hunt. We are not talking about a single Frigate vs one SSN. The carnage a heavyweight torpedo can do to a carrier/LHD/LPD means an entire fleet of AsW's escorts will be dedicated to protecting such critical assets if a submarine alert is sounded, this combined with innumerable helo's (dropping sonar buoys like confetti) demonstrates the huge amount of assets required to mitigate the threat represented by a single submarine. Nothing short of a tactical nuclear strike causes so much fear amongst flag officers, modern submarines remain the hardest and most technically difficult asset to destroy.

Don't lets forget when the Belgrano was hit, its escorting destroyers dropped a few token depth charges and ran for the hills, they had NOTHING credible in their armoury to deal with such a sophisticated subsurface threat.

1805's comments about them being 'vulnerable to air attack' in the same way a battleship was/is, is at best childish ignorance and worst blind stupidity. However please don't stop posting I need a laugh every now and again!

I did say I regarded them as very important assets which we should have, just not the top of the tree in the projection of naval power, which I personally reserve for the Aircraft Carrier. You’re quite right a SSN is a huge problem to a sophisticated navy, as would to a lesser extent a conventional AIP sub. Additionally SSNs are also a very valuable anti submarine asset to protect a fleet.

However to nearly all the threats we now face they have very little impact. Most of these states if they are even a state, lack any serious navies that would not be neutralized by a few Lynx with Skuas. As is often the case for the RN, subs are more of a problem to us than to our enemies.

I tend to avoid the personal language; I am surprised about your last comment, are not SSNs vulnerable to air attack from Helicopters /LRMPs but unable to strike back?

 

[AndrewMI]

I did say I regarded them as very important assets which we should have, just not the top of the tree in the projection of naval power, which I personally reserve for the Aircraft Carrier. You’re quite right a SSN is a huge problem to a sophisticated navy, as would to a lesser extent a conventional AIP sub. Additionally SSNs are also a very valuable anti submarine asset to protect a fleet.

However to nearly all the threats we now face they have very little impact. Most of these states if they are even a state, lack any serious navies that would not be neutralized by a few Lynx with Skuas. As is often the case for the RN, subs are more of a problem to us than to our enemies.

I tend to avoid the personal language; I am surprised about your last comment, are not SSNs vulnerable to air attack from Helicopters /LRMPs but unable to strike back?

I believe that there are such things as torpedo launched anti-air missiles?

Agree that the Aircraft Carrier is the most potent weapon to have in a navy, albeit a potentially vulnerable one, but nothing creates the same fear of the unknown/uncertainty of an SSN.

 

[1805]

I believe that there are such things as torpedo launched anti-air missiles?

Agree that the Aircraft Carrier is the most potent weapon to have in a navy, albeit a potentially vulnerable one, but nothing creates the same fear of the unknown/uncertainty of an SSN.

Agreed, its all about a balanced fleet and SSN have their role as do Carriers. Lets kill this debate, we are all agreeing with each other.

 

[AndrewMI]

The Good news is that the debate on the SDR seemed to turn out very favourably for the RN. Quite what this means is anyones guess, although you would hot it means that the major projects remain, and there is (at least) no reduction in hull numbers.

 

[citizen578]

Andrew, are the details of the SDSR Debate available online, or was it only broadcast live (on BBC Parliament or whatever)? I'd be interested to see it's full content. Cheers.

 

[AndrewMI]

Andrew, are the details of the SDSR Debate available online, or was it only broadcast live (on BBC Parliament or whatever)? I'd be interested to see it's full content. Cheers.

House of Commons Hansard Debates for 21 Jun 2010 (pt 0008)

Enjoy.

There is certainly a lot to digest.

 

[1805]

House of Commons Hansard Debates for 21 Jun 2010 (pt 0008)

Enjoy.

There is certainly a lot to digest.

RT Hon member for Portsmonths North maiden speech is very good, made at 8.05pm.

 

[Moonstone]

Moonstone, Dogs dinner is a bit harsh! though I accept it looks a bit odd, but it could according to DK Brown would have taken Aegis in some form.

What Adm Woodward actually needed was AEW, not any combo of ships or armament. In my opinion losing the fleet carriers effectively lost the ability to effectively protect a task group, an in the absence of AEW and proper air cover, either provided by the RAF or from a ship, loses would be inevitable. and RN sailors paid a heavy price. Despite the unbelievable heroism of the personel, the fleet that sailed in 1982 was one of floored concept, one where politicians and accountants (and the RAF) pulled a flanker and almost castrated the navy, in short a disgrace.

Type 42, as I understand it was built cheaply and in numbers because the carriers were going, because a carrier , fighters and AEW is by far the most effective defensive system. Had the carriers stayed the Navy would have never got (or maybe needed )14 airwarfare destroyers, probably 6 or 8 at the most, or maybe just 4 Type 82. The T42 was far cheaper than the T82 so post carriers it had to be T42. The T82 seems underarmed, but remember that it would sail close to the carrier and it itself would be protected by Phantom and Gannet AEW, a Type 82 could then concentrate on leakers or shooting an Ikara at a sub contact. The Phantom/AEW is the key to survival, not the escort, post carrier it was reversed, people started to believe that these technologically advanced missiles on ships were infallible, they clearly arent.

Sharkey Ward, though only one author drops a massive bombshell in his book, saying that in the years between the carriers going and the Falklands, the FAA or some of them lost the knowlege or belief that aircraft could effectively protect ships, by aggressive CAPs to drive off and destroy threat aircraft. There is a lot of ego in his book, but you do the impression that a SHAR or a phantom is far more effective than a sea dart at downing an etendard.

Due to the Cold war, politicians drove a navy that as we all know was ASW orientated, able to operate in the north Atlantic, but a fleet that was probably seen as short lived once the shooting started. An Ikara leander probably wouldnt have lasted long in the face of the soviet bombers. The Sea Harrier was by some miracle pushed forward, 5 on an Invincible just to shoot down shadowing Bears, but it was never a match for a fleet carrier or CVA01. Sea Harrier hasnt the speed for rapid intercepts, nor the legs despite its fantastic record in the history books.

Lets just assume a hypothetical fleet in 1982. HMS Eagle was Phantomised, and sailed with 14 Buccs and 12 Phantom, plus 5 Gannet AEW. HMS QE had 18 Buccs and 18 Phantoms, plus 5 Gannet AEW. The Escort fleet is 3 Type 82 and 3 of the remaining Counties, The frigates of the same type a mix of Leanders, Type 21s. Type 22 may have been different, with less emphasis on independent operation (?).

Even the ancient Gannet radar could supposedly pick up a low flyer at 40 miles, dependent on sea conditions. We wouldnt have needed the 3 Type 42s on picket 30 miles away, left out on a limb with no CIWS. In 1982 we just couldnt pick up the raids early enough. The group could have been tighter. Each carrier would have maintained a CAP, each CAP would have kept the attackers at arms length with Sparrow, each carrier could have remained further east because of the legs of the Bucc and still bombed targets. You cant rule out loses, but in my opinion we would have taken far fewer loses.

Once the carriers went the concept of naval projection becomes flawed, because once you sail out of RAF aircover, it becomes extremely difficult to operate unless you have AEW and against a decent enemy that will result in terrible loses.

Of course the RN tried to make up ground with Sea King AEW and making a gem of a plane in FRS2, but of course the latter has gone. Now I fear politicians will make a monumental mistake, we are potentially on the verge of the biggest leap in RN capability. IF we get QE and POW and F35B (or a proper fighter) we are back in the big time. Able to deploy a small task force centred on a carrier or two, if needed, that will out class and out punch most other navies on earth. HOWEVER, what I really fear is that if the Policticians swallow the call for more, but cheaper escorts for an endless list of missions, it will be at the cost of the carriers or its airgroup, and if that happens we will continue the trend of the last 35 years, ie a flawed naval policy that might one day get found out at great cost.

Give me 2 carriers with a proper airgroup of fighters and AEW and I will accept 15 escorts, because I dont actually care about drug interdiction in the carribean or disaster relief or "constabulary" work, I want a proper warfighting navy, that can deliver a short sharp punch.

Another example of how the carriers going shaped the RN was in anti ship missiles, The Bucc was a supreme ship killer, when the bucc went, and when task groups wouldnt be centred on a carrier, we started to stuff exocet onto ships, rebuilding some (leanders) and compromising the weapon fit of others, eg only on sea cat on a Type 21. That idea itself is floored in my opinion, sinking ships should be done by aircraft, yes some of your task group may be rolled for surface action, but if we had kept the carrier we would never need to get that close.

I find it annoying now that the Type 45 knockers continually bemoan the fitted for but not with point about Harpoon, but it shouldnt go anywhere near an enemy surface vessel, it will or should be glued to the carrier, and the F35 should have sunk that vessell at long range, or the SSN should have bagged it.

Just my thoughts anyway, we are major economic power, we should have a navy to reflect that. Not a massive navy but one that goes for high end over cheap and cheerful.

Thanks again Hambo - good stuff .

In championing the value of a proper aircraft carrier (with a balanced air group) you will get no argument from me , you're preaching to the converted as they say . Canceling CVA 01 was a tragedy for the RN & the UK generally , a tragedy it has taken a whole generation to recover from . Had she been built (in the face of fierce RAF opposition) I suspect that the Falklands could have been retaken at far less cost (in both ships & brave men) or quite possibly this formidable ship(s) would have deterred the Argentines from ever 'chancing their arm' in the first place . The lesson is a old one - if you want peace then prepare for war .

I'm also in agreement with you re the Type 45 , I can see why they are the size they are (principally the substantial hull allowing for the main radar to be mounted as high as possible) I'm sure we can both agree that it's a great shame we will only get 6 of them . I'm less convinced however 15 or so destroyers and frigates will prove to be enough in some future conflict , a potential conflict of a length and intensity that are quite unknowable . But as we are both now well aware of each others point of view on this matter there seems little advantage in labouring the point further .

You obviously find the Falklands as eternally fascinating as I do .The same questions keep troubling me - what did we get right , what did we get wrong ? could we have done better ? were our ships good enough ? I can recall word-for-word the moment the loss of the Sheffield was announced on TV , and the memory of my old dad's (ex RN WWII veteran) distinctly unimpressed reaction to the apparently pitiful amount of AA fire the fleet could put up over San Carlos Water will live with me always .

What really matters about the Falklands now is that we won , and those few months back in 1982 were without a doubt the finest moment in the RN's post 1945 history .

ps - The shocking realization that it all happened nearly 30 years ago can start to make a chap feel old you know :rel

 

[1805]

Thanks again Hambo - good stuff .

In championing the value of a proper aircraft carrier (with a balanced air group) you will get no argument from me , you're preaching to the converted as they say . Canceling CVA 01 was a tragedy for the RN & the UK generally , a tragedy it has taken a whole generation to recover from . Had she been built (in the face of fierce RAF opposition) I suspect that the Falklands could have been retaken at far less cost (in both ships & brave men) or quite possibly this formidable ship(s) would have deterred the Argentines from ever 'chancing their arm' in the first place . The lesson is a old one - if you want peace then prepare for war .

I'm also in agreement with you re the Type 45 , I can see why they are the size they are (principally the substantial hull allowing for the main radar to be mounted as high as possible) I'm sure we can both agree that it's a great shame we will only get 6 of them . I'm less convinced however 15 or so destroyers and frigates will prove to be enough in some future conflict , a potential conflict of a length and intensity that are quite unknowable . But as we are both now well aware of each others point of view on this matter there seems little advantage in labouring the point further .

You obviously find the Falklands as eternally fascinating as I do .The same questions keep troubling me - what did we get right , what did we get wrong ? could we have done better ? were our ships good enough ? I can recall word-for-word the moment the loss of the Sheffield was announced on TV , and the memory of my old dad's (ex RN WWII veteran) distinctly unimpressed reaction to the apparently pitiful amount of AA fire the fleet could put up over San Carlos Water will live with me always .

What really matters about the Falklands now is that we won , and those few months back in 1982 were without a doubt the finest moment in the RN's post 1945 history .

ps - The shocking realization that it all happened nearly 30 years ago can start to make a chap feel old you know :rel

Now you mention it, I wonder what happened to that guy with the slow delivery from the MOD who did the announcements of losses, quite a shock when it first came out about the Sheffield.

In the 70s I would have liked to have seen the Counties given big refits with Sea Dart and a decent hanger, they where fine ships lacking a role, and some of the Leanders given lighter ones? I think they should have put the Ikara on the 41/61s would have made for an interesting ship. I had a discussion with a friend who felt we should have taken a small amount of heavy armour down, I have mixed views on if it would have been possible with all the other transports so busy. I wonder if with hindsight San Carlos was such a good place to land?

 

[Moonstone]

Now you mention it, I wonder what happened to that guy with the slow delivery from the MOD who did the announcements of losses, quite a shock when it first came out about the Sheffield.

In the 70s I would have liked to have seen the Counties given big refits with Sea Dart and a decent hanger, they where fine ships lacking a role, and some of the Leanders given lighter ones? I think they should have put the Ikara on the 41/61s would have made for an interesting ship. I had a discussion with a friend who felt we should have taken a small amount of heavy armour down, I have mixed views on if it would have been possible with all the other transports so busy. I wonder if with hindsight San Carlos was such a good place to land?

I fear that had we sent Chieftain MBT's down to the Falklands they'd probably still be there - entombed forever under 40 ft of mud .

Everyone loves the old Leander class - but I think the Australians modernised them far more effectively than the RN did in all honesty . Or do any of our Aussie contributors know better ?

As for the Counties we probably did the right thing in disposing of them early , IIRC they were built around their enormous (horizontally stowed) Sea Slug magazine and to do anything worthwhile with them would have meant virtually gutting the whole ship . Electronic and missile development seemed to moving at such a rate back in the 50's & 60's that these impressive ships were almost semi-obsolescent before they were even commissioned .

Strangely although the 'experts' are forever claiming that the rate of technological progress is ever increasing I'm quite confident that the modern day equivalent of the 'Counties' (the T45's) will in practice lead much longer services life's . Today's aircraft and warships may cost a fortune to design & build but at least they do seem to last .

 

[Hambo]

Thanks again Hambo - good stuff .

In championing the value of a proper aircraft carrier (with a balanced air group) you will get no argument from me , you're preaching to the converted as they say . Canceling CVA 01 was a tragedy for the RN & the UK generally , a tragedy it has taken a whole generation to recover from . Had she been built (in the face of fierce RAF opposition) I suspect that the Falklands could have been retaken at far less cost (in both ships & brave men) or quite possibly this formidable ship(s) would have deterred the Argentines from ever 'chancing their arm' in the first place . The lesson is a old one - if you want peace then prepare for war .

I'm also in agreement with you re the Type 45 , I can see why they are the size they are (principally the substantial hull allowing for the main radar to be mounted as high as possible) I'm sure we can both agree that it's a great shame we will only get 6 of them . I'm less convinced however 15 or so destroyers and frigates will prove to be enough in some future conflict , a potential conflict of a length and intensity that are quite unknowable . But as we are both now well aware of each others point of view on this matter there seems little advantage in labouring the point further .

You obviously find the Falklands as eternally fascinating as I do .The same questions keep troubling me - what did we get right , what did we get wrong ? could we have done better ? were our ships good enough ? I can recall word-for-word the moment the loss of the Sheffield was announced on TV , and the memory of my old dad's (ex RN WWII veteran) distinctly unimpressed reaction to the apparently pitiful amount of AA fire the fleet could put up over San Carlos Water will live with me always .

What really matters about the Falklands now is that we won , and those few months back in 1982 were without a doubt the finest moment in the RN's post 1945 history .

ps - The shocking realization that it all happened nearly 30 years ago can start to make a chap feel old you know :rel

In looking at what went wrong in the Falklands, there is one answer and an entirely understandable answer in hindsight. That was the cold war, There was a great deal of fear and paranoia about the Soviets and their weaponry, both conventional and nuclear. History has shown that many of their conventional weapons that bred fear turned out to be pretty poor, but the 200 megatons of nuclear payload aimed at the UK was real. So from a politicians point of view, it was perhaps forgivable that they looked at something like the Ark Royal with just 12 Phantoms and came to the conclusion that it wouldnt last 2 minutes in the north atlantic once the nukes started to be lobbed. We invested heavily in SSN probably because they had more chance of surviving.
Unfortunately the cash wasnt there, nor was the political will to think of anything wider than the third world war, even the fleet that sailed south had just finished the Springtrain exercise, probably facing soviet style threats, but what they faced was a good old fashioned air arm willing to fly low level and drop bombs. Sea Slug and Sea Dart were as we know, designed to shoot down medium to high altitude threats, cos thats what we faced, so I suppose if there is limited money, you go for the threat at the time.

In hindsight it could be argued that the Uk carried too high a burden, some of our european allies should have spent more per GDP, perhaps allowing us to have kept something back, eg The Ark and Eagle. At one point we possessed something like 60% of the Nato ASW frigate force. We could afford 20 squadrons in RAF Germany (that were just as likely to be vapourised) but not a few FAA squadrons for "emergencies". Such as shame.

I dont think we could look too harsly at the missile systems of the Falklands, ours were comparable to those of our allies, I doubt the Tartar.Terrier or early Standard would have been much better, Sea Sparrow probably would have faced problems locking on in San Carlos water, the electronics have come a long way since, true the americans had aegis in the pipeline but as far as already deployed assets went, ours werent bad for the time, just too focused on the soviets. Again what went wrong was simple, lack of AEW and lack of a suiable fighter that could win air superiority at ranges far out from the landing areas. Maybe 20 more SHARS and a few early sea king AEW if available may have made a meaningful difference to loses?
It wasnt a tough trick to learn, ships without aircover get sunk, think Malta, think Force Z, yet the navy was forced by politicians to to rely to a large part on the RAF for aircover.

The dour announcer was Ian Macdonald by the way, an exciting man as I recall as a ten year old..not.

Unfortunately some want to repeat the same errors, the army would have you believe that afghanistan is the image of future wars. However I think that Brazil, India, China and others desire for carriers, SSN's etc says that we may well get involved in another naval war, not necessarily with them, but others will follow suit and up-arm.

 

[1805]

I fear that had we sent Chieftain MBT's down to the Falklands they'd probably still be there - entombed forever under 40 ft of mud .

Yes and likely to have broken down before they reached the mud not the most reliable engine... it was built by Leyland

Everyone loves the old Leander class - but I think the Australians modernised them far more effectively than the RN did in all honesty . Or do any of our Aussie contributors know better ?

As for the Counties we probably did the right thing in disposing of them early , IIRC they were built around their enormous (horizontally stowed) Sea Slug magazine and to do anything worthwhile with them would have meant virtually gutting the whole ship . Electronic and missile development seemed to moving at such a rate back in the 50's & 60's that these impressive ships were almost semi-obsolescent before they were even commissioned .

Strangely although the 'experts' are forever claiming that the rate of technological progress is ever increasing I'm quite confident that the modern day equivalent of the 'Counties' (the T45's) will in practice lead much longer services life's . Today's aircraft and warships may cost a fortune to design & build but at least they do seem to last .

Yes I think the experience with the Leander refits and their short service lives and a few other high profile refits (Tiger & Blake) moved the RN away from heavy rebuild/refits. I wonder how effective a ship is when it is 8-9 years old, taking a very simple example look at our personal 5 year old mobile phone or laptop/PCs. I am sure ships are getting new software releases and hardware upgrades all the time, but there must be limits.

 

[Systems Adict]

... I am sure ships are getting new software releases and hardware upgrades all the time, but there must be limits.

Hmmm...

In your role within the procurement world, do you ever stop & wonder about how the equipment you're buying actually works ? :unknown

Do you have an understanding of the time spent in initial development, fixing the bugs in software so that the product operates correctly ?

....& do you understand the problems with modern procurement, forcing suppliers to provide stuff that they say is COTS, while it is in actual fact, a development model of new software in an old product, so they can get the software to a reasonable state, before fitting it to some new / similar hardware that's in the pipeline ??

That, is the modern model for software in military equipment, & by the time it's actually fitted to a ship, the supplier wants to do diddly-squat to fix any inherent bugs. :smooth

...Unless of course, the procurement people have actually negoatiated a contract that's got 'bells & whistles' & states they MUST, if it doesn't do exactly what it says in the contract.

..& how many times have these 'bells & whistles' been trimmed & whittled away by the procurement project manager, so that he looks good & the cost is low / looks cheap ?? :nutkick

Modern naval equipment really only gets software updates in a couple of ways....

#1.If it's written into the contract that in the warranty/support period, the supplier has been paid to fix all / any problems, so he must support it.

#2. There's a problem / bug in the software & the supplier has to fix it, but gets paid to do it !

#3. The supplier has designed the software so that it can grow thru the life of the equipment, but expects to renegotiate the contract every 3-5 years, so he constanly makes money.

#4. There is an operation requirement for a piece of equipment to be modified to cover off a newer role, which is an addition to the role it was initially bought for.


The Type-23 was / is a classic example of such an act, with the UK govt not fronting up for costs for thru life support of software(as it was too expensive to fix it) & only getting an update by default (at a discounted rate), 15years down the line after buying the 1st sets of equipment, due to a-n-other customer actually paying for the same software to be corrected, as it was full of bugs... :grab

So....

Do you think that suppliers are feverishly working away in little dark, back rooms, updating software for kit that's over 5 years old on ships that are in service, or are they actually just sitting back, waiting on the navy to pay for the privilage ??


Your thoughts..... :type


SA