Royal Australian Air Force [RAAF] News, Discussions and Updates

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
For those of you who are interested here is the link to the above conference, it contains speeches from the CAF regarding RAAF and how they will approach future Amphibious Operations
Conference Videos | RAN Seapower Conference 2010
interesting, considering we are still developing the CONOPs for their role.

please note that Conferences such as SeaPower (and I also attended in a work capacity) are usually aspirational in message intent.

I can tell you now and unequivocably they they are theatre command assets, amphib is not a primary role even though they is a core capability.

role and capability are 2 different beasts in this case.

in absolute terms, we have a Blue Ridge equiv with amphibious capability. They are an extension of the Joint Forces command vehicle, they are there to manage all assets in the battlespace - be it military and supporting govt agencies and are being outfitted for said role.
 

aussienscale

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
interesting, considering we are still developing the CONOPs for their role.

please note that Conferences such as SeaPower (and I also attended in a work capacity) are usually aspirational in message intent.

I can tell you now and unequivocably they they are theatre command assets, amphib is not a primary role even though they is a core capability.

role and capability are 2 different beasts in this case.

in absolute terms, we have a Blue Ridge equiv with amphibious capability. They are an extension of the Joint Forces command vehicle, they are there to manage all assets in the battlespace - be it military and supporting govt agencies and are being outfitted for said role.
There were many aspirational undertones in most of the speeches, what I thought was interesting was the 3 service chiefs we trying to portray a unified ADF front in the use and operation of these assets, but each service still had undertones jockying for the best interest outcome for each individual service. As one speaker said (From memory LT COL Houben from the Netherlands) the biggest thing to overcome is the inherent cultural attitude of each individual service (or words to that effect, not an actual quote), Was also funny during Q&A sessions the Navy League of Australia asked the same question 2 or 3 times regarding the
F35B, they are trying but it won't happen. I still think if it ever was going to happen, they would make up a part of the RAAF order and be operated and maintained by the RAAF. The cost for the Fleet Air Arm to operate is not pratical. Some good insights into UK and US thoughts and progression in their amphib ops. Also some good info on how to liase with NGO's etc for humanitarian relief
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
There were many aspirational undertones in most of the speeches, what I thought was interesting was the 3 service chiefs we trying to portray a unified ADF front in the use and operation of these assets, but each service still had undertones jockying for the best interest outcome for each individual service.
each service has an involvement with what they bring to the amphibs - but they are a purple asset. make no mistake about that. none of the service chiefs are in "service" mode.

As one speaker said (From memory LT COL Houben from the Netherlands) the biggest thing to overcome is the inherent cultural attitude of each individual service (or words to that effect, not an actual quote),
unsure how the Netherlands exp relates to the purple attitude in Oz. Culturally difficult 4 years ago - now? I don't think so. Sure there are diehards, but the CDF and the Chiefs are pretty clear on it. Service people would push back at their peril - and I have seen people shorten their careers by not being purple

Was also funny during Q&A sessions the Navy League of Australia asked the same question 2 or 3 times regarding the F35B, they are trying but it won't happen.
The Navy League and the SIA (as another example) can say what they like. To paraphrase VAdm Trippovich. They're welcome inside the tent, however it ends there. their job is not to tell ADF how to design the force, or what to bring to the force. They are not current and they don't have expertise. Enthusiasm is not enough. Hence why everyone telling RAN to buy nukes or "brand specific" subs are wasting their time.

I still think if it ever was going to happen, they would make up a part of the RAAF order and be operated and maintained by the RAAF. The cost for the Fleet Air Arm to operate is not pratical.
Its NOT happening. I'm not sure how many times we need to say this. It aint happening in any of the 2030 visions.

Some good insights into UK and US thoughts and progression in their amphib ops. Also some good info on how to liase with NGO's etc for humanitarian relief
We have people already attached to various Navies looking at how they do expeditionary work (not amphib ops as commonly touted. They are not the same thing.) Ditto for how we work with the NGO's and other non military Govt agencies.
 

parvas24

New Member
each service has an involvement with what they bring to the amphibs - but they are a purple asset. make no mistake about that. none of the service chiefs are in "service" mode.



unsure how the Netherlands exp relates to the purple attitude in Oz. Culturally difficult 4 years ago - now? I don't think so. Sure there are diehards, but the CDF and the Chiefs are pretty clear on it. Service people would push back at their peril - and I have seen people shorten their careers by not being purple



The Navy League and the SIA (as another example) can say what they like. To paraphrase VAdm Trippovich. They're welcome inside the tent, however it ends there. their job is not to tell ADF how to design the force, or what to bring to the force. They are not current and they don't have expertise. Enthusiasm is not enough. Hence why everyone telling RAN to buy nukes or "brand specific" subs are wasting their time.



Its NOT happening. I'm not sure how many times we need to say this. It aint happening in any of the 2030 visions.



We have people already attached to various Navies looking at how they do expeditionary work (not amphib ops as commonly touted. They are not the same thing.) Ditto for how we work with the NGO's and other non military Govt agencies.
EF 2000... RAAF maybe can try it out and get a deal from the UK - Commonwealth
 
A

Aussie Digger

Guest
EF 2000... RAAF maybe can try it out and get a deal from the UK - Commonwealth
It was rejected by RAAF back in 2002. So was Rafale, Gripen, F-15, F-16 and Super Hornet (for the long term replacement).

Next!
 
A

Aussie Digger

Guest
Wouldn't surprise me, still if we actually see the potential EA capability of the baseline BII Rhino and F-35A realised it shouldn’t be a problem.
True and let's face it, how many air forces actually operate a dedicated, offensive AEA capability anyway?

I'd prefer RAAF to gain a dedicated SEAD/DEAD capability with it's Supers plus AARGM before worrying about a Growler capability anyway...
 

t68

Well-Known Member
How are you going to maintain an AAR capability if your fighters are operating from STOVL-only operating areas? Remember you don't just have to get tankers there, you have to maintain tanker coverage in order for the AAR to be significant. How long is it going to take tankers to get there? How long can they stay in the area before they have to return to base? Do you have sufficient tankers to maintain a presence in the region sufficient to support sustained fast jet operations? Will the loss of a single tanker significantly limit overall tanker coverage?

I don't mean to shoot questions at you, but if you're talking AAR capability over areas without the infrastructure to support it, they're important issues. :)

I mean I see what you're getting at, but the question is this: why would you want to deploy your most expensive, most capable air assets outside of your capacity to support them completely? I don't know that there would ever be a need for such a thing... if you're talking deployment outside of Australia's immediate region you're very likely to be talking deployment as part of a coalition with the US (which opens up many basing options), in which case is there really a need for STOVL?

Again I hope the tone of this doesn't come off as aggressive, I just think one could make a stronger case for the CTOL variant in general, and that there are questions around the benefits offered by a STOVL variant (for Australia).

Sorry should have explained myself better,

AAR is only required when the F35B is on long ferry flights or long combat missions, but Super Hornet would more than likely fill that role.

Looking at the flexibility what the F35B can bring to the table in regards to the RAAF,f35B could be operated from remote secure locations such as roadways or large truck parking areas with access for road tanker’s for POL needs and munitions’ or brought forward by Chinook helicopters with bladders for fuel and other supplies . i believe in the future the RAAF will not always have the luxury of operating from fixed airfields with out compromising its ability to bring all its assets to bear in an effective solution.

This is from a paper study on the CV-22 osprey impact on special operations doctrine; it has a section on early harrier conops

THE SPECIAL OSPREY:

Quote taken from study,
The ability to operate from remote, austere, and temporary locations allows for a significant increase in mission flexibility. Both the Osprey and the Harrier have unique capabilities in this regard. One significant difference is that the Harrier takes advantage of this ability primarily at takeoff from its base, whereas the Osprey will primarily take advantage of it at the target. The ability of the Harrier to hover allows it to be based and operated from ships or remote areas, whereas the ability of the Osprey to hover allows it to land and insert or extract forces or equipment from remote sites at or near the target. Regardless, the increase in capability may allow for new and more effective ways to accomplish certain missions, and may allow for the accomplishment of new missions.

The Harrier fit this doctrine very well. The RAF planned to use the Harrier from roads and fields within ten or twenty miles of the front. Throughout the later Cold War years, two of the three operational Harrier units were based in Germany. The infrastructure required during combat consisted of only fuel trucks, ammunition, and a small maintenance capability at the forward loiter area. The advantage of the Harrier was that it could sit on the ground and loiter indefinitely until it was needed, and then start engines and respond in a matter of minutes to the ground forces in trouble. There were trade-offs to for these advantage such as sucurityat dispersed locations and the need for more support equipment and personnel. However, the RAF never attempted to expand the Harrier role because it fit so well into their existing doctrine. The Harrier was only a small part of RAF airpower, but it filled a unique and specialized role in their doctrine.


Flexibility is the key with the purchase of a limited number of F35B, with the rising uncertainty of when and how much F35A will be, as Aussie Digger points out the cost of Super Hornet to the likely cost of F35A will be the margin between the two, would having a mixed fleet of Super’s and F35B bring more flexibility to the RAAF than a complete one horse stable of F35A.
 

Bonza

Super Moderator
Staff member
Sorry should have explained myself better,

AAR is only required when the F35B is on long ferry flights or long combat missions, but Super Hornet would more than likely fill that role.

Looking at the flexibility what the F35B can bring to the table in regards to the RAAF,f35B could be operated from remote secure locations such as roadways or large truck parking areas with access for road tanker’s for POL needs and munitions’ or brought forward by Chinook helicopters with bladders for fuel and other supplies . i believe in the future the RAAF will not always have the luxury of operating from fixed airfields with out compromising its ability to bring all its assets to bear in an effective solution.

This is from a paper study on the CV-22 osprey impact on special operations doctrine; it has a section on early harrier conops

THE SPECIAL OSPREY:

Quote taken from study,
The ability to operate from remote, austere, and temporary locations allows for a significant increase in mission flexibility. Both the Osprey and the Harrier have unique capabilities in this regard. One significant difference is that the Harrier takes advantage of this ability primarily at takeoff from its base, whereas the Osprey will primarily take advantage of it at the target. The ability of the Harrier to hover allows it to be based and operated from ships or remote areas, whereas the ability of the Osprey to hover allows it to land and insert or extract forces or equipment from remote sites at or near the target. Regardless, the increase in capability may allow for new and more effective ways to accomplish certain missions, and may allow for the accomplishment of new missions.

The Harrier fit this doctrine very well. The RAF planned to use the Harrier from roads and fields within ten or twenty miles of the front. Throughout the later Cold War years, two of the three operational Harrier units were based in Germany. The infrastructure required during combat consisted of only fuel trucks, ammunition, and a small maintenance capability at the forward loiter area. The advantage of the Harrier was that it could sit on the ground and loiter indefinitely until it was needed, and then start engines and respond in a matter of minutes to the ground forces in trouble. There were trade-offs to for these advantage such as sucurityat dispersed locations and the need for more support equipment and personnel. However, the RAF never attempted to expand the Harrier role because it fit so well into their existing doctrine. The Harrier was only a small part of RAF airpower, but it filled a unique and specialized role in their doctrine.


Flexibility is the key with the purchase of a limited number of F35B, with the rising uncertainty of when and how much F35A will be, as Aussie Digger points out the cost of Super Hornet to the likely cost of F35A will be the margin between the two, would having a mixed fleet of Super’s and F35B bring more flexibility to the RAAF than a complete one horse stable of F35A.
Ah I get what you mean - but If the F-35B is on a long combat mission and its deployed in the manner you describe, how are you going to provide it with AAR? The tanker will have to take off from somewhere... and if you have a conventional airstrip available, wouldn't you (generally speaking) be better off with operating CTOL Lightnings and consolidating your logistics chain instead of distributing it over several makeshift runways? I realise you mentioned that you don't believe fixed runways will necessarily be available, I'm just not sure how you then operate tankers in that environment with the necessary persistence to maintain fast jet operations.

And as far as operating the F-35B from distributed locations such as roadways and parking lots, how relevant do you think this capacity is going to be in an age of prevalent standoff weapons, precision guided munitions, and increasingly persistent surveillance capabilities? Does the utility outweigh the vulnerability? Does the significant worth of the asset (millions upon millions of dollars per plane) affect the consideration?

Also I would think if one wanted to destroy an LO asset, the smart money would be on doing it on the ground where it isn't going to light you up with an AESA and kill you - so I'd want the ground from which LO assets were operating to be as far from enemy lines as possible. However as before these are just questions, I don't have the answers but those are the questions in my mind.

I take your points about the opportunities offered by STOVL aircraft but I wonder how relevant they are to Australia's needs and capabilities. But as ever, that's just my opinion - your mileage might vary. And thankyou for the link, I haven't had a chance to get through the whole thing yet, but it's an interesting read. :)
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Also I would think if one wanted to destroy an LO asset, the smart money would be on doing it on the ground where it isn't going to light you up with an AESA and kill you
you'd be spending your money wisely.

the priority is to kill air and its sustainment and support elements on the ground asap - be it via PGM's, special forces or any other suitable and available process.

rendering reds C3/C4ISR/I3 deaf blind and dumb is part of that process.

atypically referred to as "delamination"
 

t68

Well-Known Member
you'd be spending your money wisely.

the priority is to kill air and its sustainment and support elements on the ground asap - be it via PGM's, special forces or any other suitable and available process.

rendering reds C3/C4ISR/I3 deaf blind and dumb is part of that process.

atypically referred to as "delamination"

would you consider this to be an advantage with F35B being able to use remote secured area’s or old thinking for a time gone buy in another era,IE cold war thinking. Or simple not needed in Australia case.
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
would you consider this to be an advantage with F35B being able to use remote secured area’s or old thinking for a time gone buy in another era,IE cold war thinking. Or simple not needed in Australia case.
Broadly speaking. could it provide an advantage? only if all the supporting systems were available and could be rapidly deployed throughout the battlefield.

STOVL fixed wing aircraft are not like helos, they do require a degree of support to be effective. In australias case, I can't see any justification to disproportionately expend money on a capability which isn't warranted or evidenced in the warfighting scenarios that get detailed in planning.

in short, not needed and if implemented would take money away from other force elements which are far more useful.
 

aussienscale

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
C17

Just had a C17 buzz my house this morning, what and awsome piece of kit ! Just a question for anyone that may know. I live in Ballina Northern NSW and we have had many visits from the
C17's over the last 5 or so months. They appear to be doing touch and go's at the local airport, power around doing some very impressive banking manouver's and having another go. Does anyone know why they are doing this down here at the moment ? I have lived here since 98 and have never seem this level of activity here before. Previously we would see a C130 every now and then, plus the usual glimpse of the FA18's to and from Evans Head. Any info would be appreciated, certainly not complaining though, was an amazing site to see these guys low over my house :D
 

fretburner

Banned Member
Australia impressed by Super Hornet performance

"It's a little bit embarrassing for me," says Gp Capt Steve Roberton, commander of 82 Wing. "It is fair to say the jet has proven to be more robust and exceeded what we thought."

Roberton pointed to what he considers the aircraft's singular ability to simultaneously track air and ground targets using an array of sensors, including the Raytheon APG-79 active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar.


I wonder if the Brazilians and Indians will start talking to the folks down under :)
 

swerve

Super Moderator
The Brazilians & Indians have tried out the F-18E/F. They've also tested other types, & been able to compare it with them.
 
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