EADS is unlikely to be able to put up a better bid going alone. NG has the access to the suppliers. Even if NG were to provide the source links to the suppliers (which they are unlikely to do so), EADs is unlikely to be able to negotiate a better price. I'm sure EADs would have considered this possibility at the negotiations stage. That will affect the base production and critics of overseas outsourcing will be given extra ammo.
An EADS bid won't change the fundamental basis either. No additional points for additional capability not needed = the sole offset for higher cost disappears.
Even if EADS subsidised the bid, it won't change the decision matrix that disadvantages the bigger aircraft.
The problem is that if the DoD had given points for more tanker offload, Boeing is now in a position to roll out the KC-777 which would have trumped the A330 in offload capacity. And the DoD would have been stuck with a mega white elephant, paying for capabilities that the air force doesn't need.
For me, the critical error for EADs was not contesting the GAO decision when it was being deliberated. They could have financed studies that may have influenced the outcome but the approach was on hindsight too passive. EADs could have studied how a larger tanker might improve tanker ops that challenges the historical offload data. Without any challenge, the historical offload data pointed to a conclusion that forced the af to re-conduct the bid and for the new RFP to contain provisions that did not provide any incentive for a larger tanker.
Its a logical conclusion. It is also clear that the DoD is now also prepared for a sole-source bid.
I'm only surprised the republicans haven't jumped on Obama's no-bid contracts promise yet.
I agree that EADS is unlikely to be able to put together a sufficiently advantageous bid in two months to win the contract without NG's help.
I am not so sure that EADS made a mistake in not contesting the GAO decision by funding additional studies. As I had mentioned above the USAF already operates a larger tanker for refueling, the KC-10 Extender. The USAF should therefore already have a pool of operational data showing the effects of being able to carry/deliver differing amounts of fuel in-flight. With that information, I would have expected the USAF to base any RFP characteristics upon US in-flight refueling needs. From what I can remember, the suggestion was that the USAF was looking for an aircraft comparable to the current KC-135R, not something appreciably smaller or larger.
If the above is true, then perhaps a MRTT version of the A300 would have been a better candidate than the A330.
The various aircraft dimensions are:
KC-10 ~L: 55m, W: 50m, H: 18m
KC-135 ~L: 41m, W: 40m, H: 12m
KC-767 ~L: 48m, W: 48m, H: 16m
A330 MRTT ~L: 60m, W: 60m, H: 18m
A300 ~L: 54m, W: 45m, H: 16m
As one can see, the KC-135 is the smallest of the current or potential jet-powered tanker aircraft, and the A330 is the largest, being nearly 50% longer, wider (wingspan) and higher. It is possible that the USAF just did not want such a large replacement aircraft.
If the KC-X programme was also to provide a replacement for the KC-10 Extender, then the A330 MRTT would have made more sense IMO.
-Cheers