OT You know the poms should be looking at this option of selling the QE to India seriously... They could sell it for a couple of billion pounds, claim delays and refits need another 5-6 billion pounds and then finally hold out on the delivery of the ship until they receive a final installment of a couple of billion pounds.:Just responding to Jaffo4010 about his suggestion on getting the three Invincible class carriers’ at a reduced price, but it would be nice getting a Queen Elizabeth carrier on the cheap, if it is sold to India as the scuttle bug suggests to help with the budget.
Dear agc33e,From ausairpower.net:
"Very important ship and aircraft modification may be required if the ADF is to embark the MRH90. Will the RAN modify its MRH90 for RAST? Or will its RAST fitted ships be modified for probe and grid and a wire-based traversing or some other system? Both questions could drive procurement risk and therefore costs and schedule down the familiar path followed by the RAN’s previous aviation projects. Both possibilities have the potential to affect the RAN’s ability to operate with the USN.
My fast comment:
In case they prefer mhf90 helo its "rast" system, already in service in many ships, it says, should be able to fitted in new awd´s or frigates, the norwegians also have a different system to rast or a different rast system than f100, i dont remeber what helo they have.
Antisubmarine detection capacities it is very important, then weaponry-air electronics, because bothh have automatic folding, floating capacities, secure linked for landing system.
Interoperability with usn crossing deck it is not really important... datalink and comms should be nato standars, f100 is thought for the sikorsky but should be adaptable, any more issues on iinteroperability? Does that mean that netherlands helos have less interoperability with usn?
The land projection capability can be filled by both helos with some minor ranges, plus the tigers and chinooks etc.
I could say american helo is more thought for a fleet utility than the nfh90 just for their experience etc..
Australia might need helos for two fleets!
Good luck!
I did warn we would see these worthless 'articles' appear in the mainstream press again. The standard of journalism in Australia is so low right now it is shameful. It's not even worth paying attention too (unless you want to give them a 'gold star' for stating the obvious).In todays "The Age", there is an article reporting that HMAS Rankin has been inoperable for two years, and will be so for another 3 years. HMAS Sheahan has been out of action for two years, and will be for another 2 years. HMAS Farncomb has been recalled after suffering generator problems. HMAS Collins is restricted due to engine problems, HMAS Dechaineux is undergoing maintenance, and HMAS Waller is actually operational. This does not look good for our submarine fleet, but is the Journo exagerating things?
Id argue with what you said and all, but its been a long shitty week at sea and id rather just laugh at your free time to dribble...so so jealous, but ill get you back soon enough.See Icelord I told you I could talk more crap than you! :dbanana
Thank you very much. I have to say that with issues regarding rast system, issues about the certified capacities of various types, plus the dedicated experienced capability of the sikorsky in fleet task, plus the more technical issues on interoperability with usn, plus they are our allies the usa (big brother)...i would go for the sikorski despite theoretical or practical minor capacities in secondary roles like land projection, it they would be.Dear agc33e,
You raise some interesting and very important points. First , my comment is directed to the NFH90 (or NFH) as one of the contenders for the ADF Project Air 9000 Phase 8 (Future Naval Aviation Combat System) and not the MRH90. Until quite recently the MRH90 and NFH90 were represented as being "identical platforms". That is no longer the case. And the Netherlands for example has baselined its intended fleet on the NFH configuration rather than have a mix of TTH (MRH90) and NFH as was first planned. This change is reported to be due to the significant differences between the two configurations. The MRH90 was originally seen as a "one fleet fits all " solution by our Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO). Perhaps that is no longer the case. The NFH and MRH are now represented as being about 80% the same.
The choice of ship restraint and traversing system should the NFH90 be procured has not been widely discussed. But last wekk I heard a representative of Eurocopter's Australian agent state that if procured by the ADF the NFH90 would be modified for RAST. RAST is the system currently fitted to all of our aviation capable frigates. The representative stated the modification required was "minor". The new information was interesting because the RAST and the "Probe and Grid system presently fitted to NFH90 are substantially different (as you correctly imply). The differences apply to both aircraft and ship equipment and the function of these items. I am not sure that the NFH has been certified for operation with RAST. And that is an important consideration. The AWD is another potential complication because I understand that it is planned to have ASIST which is a system similar to RAST and from the same OEM. But there are differences-as you probably are aware.
The interoperability question remains an open question until we see what "system configuration" has been proposed for the ADF's A9K phase 8. This is made a little complex because there are a number of different configurations. And all of these are yet to reach IOC..Presently the Duthch and Italian NFH, although the initial aicraft have been delivered, they have yet to achieve full in-service status. The subject NFH90 are said to providing a Meaningful Operational Capability (MOC) which appears (and I might be wrong here) to be a developmental status that is some way short of IOC and even further back from the fully effective Full Opearational Capability (FOC). The ADF's Defence Capability Plan (DCP) does not presently stipulate an FOC date for A9K Phase 8. Traditionally the ADF allows systems to operate for their entire life in-service as "fitted for not with" . So an IOC system may be the outcome sought. . But the IOC date specified in the DCP is challenging enough given that there are I understand just short of 600 NH90 of various configurations on the order books. The "build it in Australia" approach proposed by Eurocopter would perhaps be seen to present some considerable risks given the ADF's experience with earlier helicopter procurments. But everything is possible I guess.
Sorry that this does not really answer any of your questions very well. It seems to me that the picture is still quite cloudy. And I too look forward to clarification.
Regards
Sping
I did warn we would see these worthless 'articles' appear in the mainstream press again. The standard of journalism in Australia is so low right now it is shameful. It's not even worth paying attention too (unless you want to give them a 'gold star' for stating the obvious).
They just love jumping on the "bash the Collins class" bandwagon. The other aspect to keep an eye on is the fact it is an election year. There will be plenty more 'stirring the pot' in the coming months not just in the defence portfolio but across the board.
There is another article today or yesterday about the 'ADF pay system in crisis' or some such garbage (yes its not ideal but I would hardly call it a crisis). Sure there is a element of truth to all these articles but they are, by and large, beat up hyperbole designed to fish for broader political turmoil.
I am a big supporter of the Sea 1000 project (being a humble RAN grunt) and where they want to head with regard to that - including working with the US (on our own unique design). However I wonder whether there isnt a window of opportunity to at least do some "due diligence" on the Astute.
Whilst we cant buy a carrier we could help out the Brits by locking in a forward contract for 3 or 4 Astutes. Particularly if they themselves are struggling to fund a production run of 7 or 8. Perhaps they could have the first 4 and we could have the last 3 or 4.
These might be available in say 2017,2018,2019 and 2020 and represent our more conventional sub fleet (the last of the 20th century sub design). These Astutes would compliment the Collins class in the last phase of their operational life. This would also bring forward the onus on the ADF to lift the pipeline of human capital into the sub branch ahead of the implementation of the Sea 1000 design. During this phase we might have 6 or 7 fully operational subs in our fleet (3 Astutes and 4 Collins).
This would also take the pressure off the Sea 1000 project to 'rush' its design and/or production. We want the Sea 1000 project to get it right. We want them to explore design and technological possibilities fully and we want them to re-define submarine warfare as the definitive drone warfare 'command and control' platform. We could lose the opportunity to achieve this if we place too much pressure on the project to replace Collins on an annual one for one basis from 2025.
During this critical transition phase (2025-2030) our 4 Astutes would act as the backbone of the sub force allowing the Collins to be retired at their own pace (either for training purposes or given to NZ for free). With the Astute 'security blanket' our own Sea 1000 build is free to focus in on itself and reduce the amount of exogenous pressures which may come to bare otherwise.
Once the Collins are retired we will be left with a powerful and diverse sub branch that is split across two platforms - the 20th century Astute design akin to a more traditional approach to sub warefare and the Sea 1000 (Collins Mark II) which could focus more heavily on a more asymetrical approach to sub warfare and effectively re-write the role subs play in drone warfare in the 21st century.
The downsides to all of this are obviously many and varied. Dual platform sub branch alone might be a pain in the arse to manage logistically (but surely not an insurmountable challenge). The other key issue is the nuclear reactors. As a general rule I am 100% against nuclear power in Australia. But given these reactors are married to the operational lifecycle of the asset then I am far more comfortable this would not represent a step towards a growth in domestic nuclear industries. All maintenance can be performed in UK in accordance with their existing support structures and relevant maintenance contracts we might sign. Yet another downside is the personnel required to man these subs (100 or so). This is problematic for us but given we must move in the direction of increasing our numbers in the sub branch anyway (to meet the needs of Sea 1000) it might be feasible. Lastly - do we want the hassle of haggling with the Brits? If its in our national interest to put up with them whining at us then I can handle that!
Obviously the Sea 1000 would be scaled back to 8 subs (to fund the purchase of Astutes) so that at some stage around 2030 we will have a sub force of 12. Four of these would represent the very best of British sub tech and 8 of which would represent the very best of US and Australian sub tech.
I realise I have probably overlooked numerous considerations so feel free to pick this apart. I am just thinking out loud.
See Icelord I told you I could talk more crap than you! :dbanana
The journalism is not always the problem. The great thing about the ADF spin machine is that they have gone down to a state where all media defence writers have been given such little info, they normally dont find out till well after the fact, and with all their free time start to write anything and nothing, but hey beats 'navy news'I did warn we would see these worthless 'articles' appear in the mainstream press again. The standard of journalism in Australia is so low right now it is shameful. It's not even worth paying attention too (unless you want to give them a 'gold star' for stating the obvious).
They just love jumping on the "bash the Collins class" bandwagon. The other aspect to keep an eye on is the fact it is an election year. There will be plenty more 'stirring the pot' in the coming months not just in the defence portfolio but across the board.
Thats a great idea and all, but if we operate both conventional and nuclear, some genius government in there "right mind" would demand one class to save money. And most likely we would go back to conventional, because nuclear is "dangerous".I am a big supporter of the Sea 1000 project (being a humble RAN grunt) and where they want to head with regard to that - including working with the US (on our own unique design). However I wonder whether there isnt a window of opportunity to at least do some "due diligence" on the Astute.
Whilst we cant buy a carrier we could help out the Brits by locking in a forward contract for 3 or 4 Astutes. Particularly if they themselves are struggling to fund a production run of 7 or 8. Perhaps they could have the first 4 and we could have the last 3 or 4.
These might be available in say 2017,2018,2019 and 2020 and represent our more conventional sub fleet (the last of the 20th century sub design). These Astutes would compliment the Collins class in the last phase of their operational life. This would also bring forward the onus on the ADF to lift the pipeline of human capital into the sub branch ahead of the implementation of the Sea 1000 design. During this phase we might have 6 or 7 fully operational subs in our fleet (3 Astutes and 4 Collins).
Another problem is that they would have extreme security implications in sydney harbour like any nuclear vessel that enters(which is sweet FA). While adding on orders to Astute classes is a nice plan, the risk factor is extensive. Another possibility is awaiting barracudda class for nuclear option, but this could lead to a million other possibilitiesThis would also take the pressure off the Sea 1000 project to 'rush' its design and/or production. We want the Sea 1000 project to get it right. We want them to explore design and technological possibilities fully and we want them to re-define submarine warfare as the definitive drone warfare 'command and control' platform. We could lose the opportunity to achieve this if we place too much pressure on the project to replace Collins on an annual one for one basis from 2025.
During this critical transition phase (2025-2030) our 4 Astutes would act as the backbone of the sub force allowing the Collins to be retired at their own pace (either for training purposes or given to NZ for free). With the Astute 'security blanket' our own Sea 1000 build is free to focus in on itself and reduce the amount of exogenous pressures which may come to bare otherwise.
Once the Collins are retired we will be left with a powerful and diverse sub branch that is split across two platforms - the 20th century Astute design akin to a more traditional approach to sub warefare and the Sea 1000 (Collins Mark II) which could focus more heavily on a more asymetrical approach to sub warfare and effectively re-write the role subs play in drone warfare in the 21st century.
BINGO!The downsides to all of this are obviously many and varied. Dual platform sub branch alone might be a pain in the arse to manage logistically (but surely not an insurmountable challenge). The other key issue is the nuclear reactors. As a general rule I am 100% against nuclear power in Australia. But given these reactors are married to the operational lifecycle of the asset then I am far more comfortable this would not represent a step towards a growth in domestic nuclear industries. All maintenance can be performed in UK in accordance with their existing support structures and relevant maintenance contracts we might sign. Yet another downside is the personnel required to man these subs (100 or so). This is problematic for us but given we must move in the direction of increasing our numbers in the sub branch anyway (to meet the needs of Sea 1000) it might be feasible.
Obviously the Sea 1000 would be scaled back to 8 subs (to fund the purchase of Astutes) so that at some stage around 2030 we will have a sub force of 12. Four of these would represent the very best of British sub tech and 8 of which would represent the very best of US and Australian sub tech.
once its here, we'd increase working with the Poms, and would create more trips for subs to the UK along with stops along the way...never a downside im sure, that is until you get to see the british weather first hand.Lastly - do we want the hassle of haggling with the Brits? If its in our national interest to put up with them whining at us then I can handle that!
two birds...one return stone:gunI realise I have probably overlooked numerous considerations so feel free to pick this apart. I am just thinking out loud.
See Icelord I told you I could talk more crap than you! :dbanana
Sorry this is a bit of a silly idea when a helecopter can do all of this with greater operational flexiblity (speed, reactivity, multitasking and load out options) and less of the sea state restictions for both deployed and employing such a light 'small boat' system.Linking to what i said before about having special vehicles (small jet boats, etc) in the heavy deck, we can army them with missiles or with sensors, imagine a small jet boat, automatic that is non-manned, that can go at +100kmh, and has magnetic anomalies detector, a passive sonar and high quality "ear", they could be very useful for the submarines battle (increase perimeter, close the gap), fleet task, etc, we can use them dinamically (searching in movement) or quiet (with some floating system for stealth against subs..), with their small size we can keep many of them in the heavy or light load deck.
Always playing!
Regards.
Sorry this is a bit of a silly idea when a helecopter can do all of this with greater operational flexiblity (speed, reactivity, multitasking and load out options) and less of the sea state restictions for both deployed and employing such a light 'small boat' system.
I suspect you underestimate the weight involved in such a system given it most cover stowage, transfer, deployment and recovery as well as the mass of the craft (plural) and their associated stores .............. all above the CoG.
agce33
before you respond again to alexsa it might be worth your while to be aware that alexsa is more than aware of the technical and practical limitations of vessel design.
I suggest that you ratchet it back a bit and take the opportunity to learn from people who do actually have an operational and technical clue about these issues.
He does it for a living. He knows a great deal about it.I disagree, alexsa is not so aware of the practical limitations of the ship...
I am surprised how logistical issues are rated as so importante or conditioning, sometimes you have to cope with those issues if you want more capabilities.
Thanks.
With all due respect, if you don't understand the importance of logistics then I'd suggest it's you who is unaware of the practical limitations of the ship... particularly in light of this comment:I disagree, alexsa is not so aware of the practical limitations of the ship...
I am surprised how logistical issues are rated as so importante or conditioning, sometimes you have to cope with those issues if you want more capabilities.
Thanks.
How much room do you think these ships have, exactly? With all those platforms on board where the hell are you going to put the ammunition, fuel, and maintenance resources (crews/parts/facilities) to operate them all? How will you accommodate useful sortie rates and operational tempo with limited expendables on board, the flight deck operating helos, tilt wing, fast air and uavs, and your maintenance/hanger facilities packed like sardines? And that's just addressing the needs of the platforms themselves - what about the support structures and crew required to operate them?We cant say things like "associated stores" are going to forbid these items, you dont know like i dont know, the only thing true is that the lhd is very big, i would like to see it with: soldiers plus equipment, aircrafts (helos, jets, ospreys), vehicles ( motorbikes, sidecars, lorries, hummers, tanks), uavs, undersea detection drones (jet, hovercraft, by lips), sea vehicles, that´s even more "total fleet-army-air force" than ever!
Is this true ??TWO of Australia's six trouble-wracked Collins class submarines will not return to sea until they have been of action for a total of at least nine years.
The revelation is another blow to the reputation of Australia's multi-billion dollar submarine fleet, which has been dogged by problems since HMAS Collins was launched in 1996.
It was also revealed yesterday that the federal government is demanding $5 million in compensation from the Australian Submarine Corporation over defects that have kept HMAS Collins incapacitated.
Under the contract with the government, which is worth $170 million a year to the corporation, that is the maximum compensation payable, a senate estimates committee heard.
Questioned by the Coalition defence spokesman, David Johnston, the Chief of Navy, Russ Crane, admitted that HMAS Rankin had been inoperable for two years and would be for another three years. Similarly, the sister ship HMAS Sheean had been laid up for two years and would not put to sea for another two years, Vice-Admiral Crane said.
HMAS Farncomb was recalled to port last week after a generator failure, while HMAS Collins is on restricted operations because of problems with its diesel engine.
Of the remaining two submarines, HMAS Dechaineux is undergoing maintenance and is supposed to be operational next month, while HMAS Waller is the only operational submarine, and will set sail tomorrow from the HMAS Sterling naval base in Western Australia.
Vice-Admiral Crane said the navy hoped to have three operational submarines in the water by mid-year, with HMAS Collins slated to set sail with HMAS Farncomb's crew in May.
(Sydney Morning Herald)