M1A2 vs Merkava MK4
- Thread starter Scorpius
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I am getting a little tired of these this vs that threads and it is especially frustrating when the user opening the threads does not provide ANY personal input (technical or and outline of how user understands the weapon system) on the topic whatsoever.
I guess we need rules on "this vs that" threads? Yup, only on DefenceTalk!
Here it goes, when opening "this vs that" thread, keep this in mind:
I will add these to the rules page and more if I think of any. Enjoy!
I guess we need rules on "this vs that" threads? Yup, only on DefenceTalk!
Here it goes, when opening "this vs that" thread, keep this in mind:
- -Provide YOUR OWN input, detail it and show that you've studied both (this and that) extensively
- -tell us WHY you think one is better than the other...
- -Use references to support your argument, if you can't find a reliable source then use wikipedia. Sorry. Don't merely rely on the references to make up your post.
- -Ask questions and put forth a detailed argument so that others are forced to reply to your opinion
I will add these to the rules page and more if I think of any. Enjoy!
long live usa
New Member
i think that the merkava carries 8 people some combat ready,so are you talking tank vs tank or can the infantry inside get involved also?
SEP would be the SYSTEM ENHANCEMENT PACKAGE (SEP)Scorpius said:
read about it here:
http://www.army-technology.com/projects/abrams/
PlasmaKrab
New Member
Considering mobility, it looks like the Mk4 runs a 1500hp Teledyne Continental V12 diesel for 65 total (metric) tons, which puts it on the same level as the M1A2. The Abrams has had a 1500hp gas turbine from the beginning, and that was a huge step forward on the 55-ton M1 model 1979, but the M1A2(SEP) is also reaching 63-65 tons. In that respect, theoretical mobility is the same.
Max speed must be equivalent. Possibly, the Abrams' gas turbine gives it a better acceleration and cold start ability, but that's not even sure. What is sure, on the other hand, is that the Abrams guzzles fuel nearly twice as fast (545lt/100km against 280lt/100km).
So the advantage in mobility may not even be that great anymore, as it was twenty years ago.
Max speed must be equivalent. Possibly, the Abrams' gas turbine gives it a better acceleration and cold start ability, but that's not even sure. What is sure, on the other hand, is that the Abrams guzzles fuel nearly twice as fast (545lt/100km against 280lt/100km).
So the advantage in mobility may not even be that great anymore, as it was twenty years ago.
Ozzy Blizzard
New Member
Abrams has to be a bitch logistically. That thirsty turbine engine. So if you went with the M1 you would also need all the extra logistical assets to feed them. Often these things are more important than a few extra kph, especially if the Mekreva's still on the battlefield when the Abrams is at the pump. The massive strain on logistical systems has to be the Abrams achillies heal.
A
Aussie Digger
Guest
The cross-country mobility of an armoured vehicle is dependant on it's suspension and track type, not the power of it's engine or weight of the overall vehicle.PlasmaKrab said:
To truly compare the off-road performance of these respective vehicles, extensive trialling would have to be conducted. There is simply no other way to accurately tell (known to me at least). Certainly paper statistics offer no hint as to their real capabilities...
What the turbine provides is extremely low noise levels (compared to conventional diesel engines) and a vast power output for the size and weight of the overall engine.
The Australian Army in particular requires vehicles that possess outstanding range, due to the vastness of our Country. It is quite obviously satisfied with the range available from the Abrams and as further proof of this, has not massively invested in supporting capabilities though it has increased in numbers and in capability that which was provided for the Leopards (in terms of refuelling trucks, transporters etc).
PlasmaKrab
New Member
I follow you on matters of real mobility, Digger, that's why I was speaking of theoretical mobility. At least on even ground, the sheer engine power and gear ratios have their say too. As far as suspension is concerned, the Merkava may have a slight upper hand too, with heavy-duty creep srings as opposed to torsion bars on the Abrams.
I don't think that makes much difference (we're not talking hydromneumatic or anything), but it may have a slightly better handling on rough terrain. The payoff comes in wear and maintenance, as often, particularly with external springs and rubber-less road wheels.
The stealth headlong given to the Abrams by the gas turbine and performant tracks is undeniable though.
Now about the matter of the range of the Abrams, most quotes don't go above 350km with max fuel for the A2. I'd hardly see that fitting to cross Australia on your own. But that's not what the Aussie Abramses are supposed to do, is it?
Do you have something about the actual Abrams doctrine of the AA? Are they supposed to be runners like the old Leos?
I'd rather see them used as infantry support in a mobile defence against some hypothetical Indonesian/Chinese/whatever landing, or more realistically, being shipped integrated in a US/NATO/UN peacekeeping effort (and according logistics) and hold more or less the same role as their US counterparts had back in Kosovo.
I don't think that makes much difference (we're not talking hydromneumatic or anything), but it may have a slightly better handling on rough terrain. The payoff comes in wear and maintenance, as often, particularly with external springs and rubber-less road wheels.
The stealth headlong given to the Abrams by the gas turbine and performant tracks is undeniable though.
Now about the matter of the range of the Abrams, most quotes don't go above 350km with max fuel for the A2. I'd hardly see that fitting to cross Australia on your own. But that's not what the Aussie Abramses are supposed to do, is it?
Do you have something about the actual Abrams doctrine of the AA? Are they supposed to be runners like the old Leos?
I'd rather see them used as infantry support in a mobile defence against some hypothetical Indonesian/Chinese/whatever landing, or more realistically, being shipped integrated in a US/NATO/UN peacekeeping effort (and according logistics) and hold more or less the same role as their US counterparts had back in Kosovo.
A fully combat loaded M1A1 or A2 weighs in at 67 tons when fully combat loaded, it takes close to five gallons of fuel just to turn the motor over. This has been a deciding factor with many countries wanting to purchase tanks. As far as the suspension goe`s, the M1A1 or A2 utilizes torsion bars with rotory shocks. The Merkava was designed around the type of terrian that it would fight in thus not needing the speeed factor. I know the Merkava 1 had the same speed as a M60A1, I would really be interested in knowing the speed of a 3 or 4 model. Every way that you look at it they are booth excellant armored fighting vehicles, but I would place my bet on the M1A2 to win a gun fight. (Crew training, Technology).
A
Aussie Digger
Guest
We use our armour in battlegroups with supporting mechanished infantry a cavalry screening force (using ASLAV's) supported by artilllery fires, which aresoon to be upgraded with new SPG's and possibly "other" systems (Australia is VERY keen on the NLOS-LS system for instance).PlasmaKrab said:
Our Abrams will mainly be used in the infantry support role as you suggest, but I guess if we ever actually faced another force with a tank capacity or at least an armoured capacity of any kind they would go head to head with them...
I just can say that the difference in some tons while using a 1500hp engine is not really big.
If you take the Leo IIA4 and the Leo IIA5/A6 as an example than you see that our drivers just talk about a feeling of not accelerating that fast and being a little bit nose heavy but nothing really interesting.
The under-carriage is much mich more interesting than just the power-weight ratio for the mobility of an AFV.
And you only find out the difference by heavy testing both contestans in difficult terrain.
If you take the Leo IIA4 and the Leo IIA5/A6 as an example than you see that our drivers just talk about a feeling of not accelerating that fast and being a little bit nose heavy but nothing really interesting.
The under-carriage is much mich more interesting than just the power-weight ratio for the mobility of an AFV.
And you only find out the difference by heavy testing both contestans in difficult terrain.
Xeon_Laura
New Member
abrahams vs merkava
Both M1A2 and Merkava are heavily armoured. But their Design Conditions are quite different.
M1A2 was designed primarily for Tank warfare[offensive]. but it can take immense Firepower & protect the crew from danger. But repeated Rocket Barrages can seriously damage the tank.
M1A2 are better when they go in more than 2 with infantry fighting vehicle in urban warfare.
M1A2 is an Global tank. with very little modifications it can be battle ready for any climate and terrain.
on the contrary Merkava series was designed and developed primarily for defending Israel and its terrain.It does not mean that they are not reliable in other parts of the world.One major advatage of merkava is that its design consisted of Combat tank crews who took part in the different israeli wars.one thing in merkava that you wont find in any other tank is the space for the tank crew.The tank is very spacious[why? the crew may have to live within the tank for days].To destroy a single Merkava 6 tank ,the enemy has to fire multiple rounds of anti tank weapons but still the crew are well protected.[Their first design parameter was what ever happens the crew must survive.]
Both tanks are gone be fitted with Anti Tank protection systems
Trophy for merkava which was tested successfully against rpgs,anti tank missiles, heat rounds, tank rounds.
Quick kill for M1A2 which is still under testing.partial testing was successful.
When both the tanks are fitted with these systems only more than half ton of ied can stop them.
Both have Joint Battle Management Systems which share datas automatically with each other(even with air defenses==>apaches,f-35s,f-22 etc)
Against each other there is a saying
A Tank is only as Good as its CREW
Both M1A2 and Merkava are heavily armoured. But their Design Conditions are quite different.
M1A2 was designed primarily for Tank warfare[offensive]. but it can take immense Firepower & protect the crew from danger. But repeated Rocket Barrages can seriously damage the tank.
M1A2 are better when they go in more than 2 with infantry fighting vehicle in urban warfare.
M1A2 is an Global tank. with very little modifications it can be battle ready for any climate and terrain.
on the contrary Merkava series was designed and developed primarily for defending Israel and its terrain.It does not mean that they are not reliable in other parts of the world.One major advatage of merkava is that its design consisted of Combat tank crews who took part in the different israeli wars.one thing in merkava that you wont find in any other tank is the space for the tank crew.The tank is very spacious[why? the crew may have to live within the tank for days].To destroy a single Merkava 6 tank ,the enemy has to fire multiple rounds of anti tank weapons but still the crew are well protected.[Their first design parameter was what ever happens the crew must survive.]
Both tanks are gone be fitted with Anti Tank protection systems
Trophy for merkava which was tested successfully against rpgs,anti tank missiles, heat rounds, tank rounds.
Quick kill for M1A2 which is still under testing.partial testing was successful.
When both the tanks are fitted with these systems only more than half ton of ied can stop them.
Both have Joint Battle Management Systems which share datas automatically with each other(even with air defenses==>apaches,f-35s,f-22 etc)
Against each other there is a saying
A Tank is only as Good as its CREW
Ananda
The Bunker Group
If this true, than the Israel Debacles in South Lebanon show that much less sophisticated enemy can cripple Merkava without much salvo needed.
Don't get me wrong, Merkava is a good MBT, and I know the Mk4 already put some lessons fromn south lebanon. However if we stick on the topic and put M1A2 as comparissons, then the result of M1 during Urban warfare in Iraq show the advantages of M1 still hold compared to other MBT on it's relative comparisson. This an area where Merkava supposedly show superiority compared to M1.
I know the design supposdely only cater Israel need and maximize crew protections. However if the design really show considerable advantageous, then everybodey else will coppied it. As it stands now, nobody else using this design except Isarel on latest MBT.
In short, the design show merits, but however it does't proved to be decisive in the area where Merkava should hold advantages.
what??
in 2006 there is documented evidence of one Merk4 surviving 7 x rippled Kornet14 strikes. Israeli tank commanders have indicated that a Merkava 3 could not have survived those attacks. They obviously spiral develop effectively. ref "The Battle of Wadi Saluki". http://www.combat-diaries.co.uk/images/lebanon_2006.htm
The Merkavas are designed for Israeli tank and combined arms doctrine - in the area that they have to fight in, they're more than suitable. The Merkavas weren't designed for export, they were designed based on requirements and actual warfighting experience.
cut and paste from the above link:
The Battle of Wadi Saluki
This battle will be remembered as one of the fiercest fights of the second Lebanon War, one in which Merkava IV proved its mettle in its first, but ultimate combat test.
It was during the push to the Litani River - a few hours before the UN-brokered cease-fire went into effect - that a column of Merkava tanks from 401 Armoured Brigade began crossing Wadi Saluki in the face of fierce Hezbullah resistance. The battle order described the canyon like Saluki as the "gateway to the Litani river", an essential objective in the hurried sweep across southern Lebanon placed before the brigade, before the cease-fire went into action- a fateful decision by the political decision-makers, which would have crucial repercussions after the war.
Military experts criticised the "Battle of the Saluki" as a microcosm of all the mistakes that were made during the war in Lebanon. Soldiers waited for a week, like sitting ducks, for orders that were twice received and twice cancelled, reflecting a total lack of clarity and confidence within the General Staff, and the political echelon directing the war.
Crossing the Saluki meant the troops and tanks had to climb a steep hill while exposed to attack from mountains on every side. Understanding the risk to his tanks, Brig-Gen Guy Zur, commander of Division 162, deployed Nahal Brigade infantrymen on the high ground outside the villages Andouriya and Farun, to provide cover for the armoured
column advancing below.
Commanded by Colonel Moti Kidor, 401 Armoured Brigade Merkava tanks had been waiting for the push to the Litani for close to a week. Twice, they had received the word to go, but were immediately ordered to stop, as soon as they started rolling. At last, on August 11, just before 1500 hours, orders came, but made no sense to the brigade staff: 'why push to the Litani hours before the UN was set to approve a cease-fire? However, orders were firm and by 20,00 Hours the tanks began to move.
The problem was, that during the passing week Hezbullah fighters were waiting, watching every step that Kidor's forces made. Knowing the ground, the guerilla commanders realised that the only way westward would have to cross the
steep wadi slopes, where they had deployed their advanced Russian-made AT- 14 Kornet anti-tank missiles en-masse in excellent firing positions.
Hezbullah had prepared well for this kind of warfare. On 22 November 2005 when Hezbollah attacked the village of al-Ghajar in an attempt to capture IDF soldiers. The then commanding general Udi Adam said in his after action report, that " it was the first time that Hezbollah used its entire tactical arsenal", revealing that one of his Merkava tanks
received no less than seven hits from different anti-tank missiles, none of which penetrated its armour and all the crew escaped unhurt. Iranian instructors had taken the al-Ghajar incident very seriousely and reacted by sending antiarmour specialists from Tehran to their training base located in the Lebanese Beka'a valley. Iranian tank experts examined Hezbollah video shots from the action at al-Ghajar, clearly displaying hits on the Merkava tank, carefully studied these displays by looking for "blind" spots in which Merkava could be vulnerable to AT- 14 Kornet and RPG-29V fire, which they wished to introduce in future engagements.
As the tanks started moving downhill into the Wadi, two tanks of the leading company were immediately hit, one of the tank commanders mortally wounded, caught in the sights of scores of Kornet anti-tank missiles with their lethal tandem laser-beam warheads penetrating the advanced armour of the Merkava Mk 4. It was the first engagement this tank had faced. A reserve commander rushed to the rescue with six tanks leading them to climb up sheer slopes to the top of the gorge, an ascent angle few other tanks, than Merkava Mk 4 could navigate. By now all hell was breaking lose from the
high ground as hundreds of missiles were pouncing on the advancing tanks, now moving up the far slope. In all. two companies, some 24 tanks, participated in the operation. and 11 were hit by anti-tank missiles.
The Hezbullah fighters were firing missile after missile from vantage positions at the
vulnerable points in the armour. Tank commanders were frantically calling for air and artillery support, but because of the large number of Nahal infantrymen present, Northern Command refrained from calling for assistance from artillery or helicopter gunships, fearing to hit friendly forces. The tanks were left to fend for themselves until they reached the top and stormed the Hezbullah anti-tank positions. When this was achieved, the brigade commander making his rounds, found to his surprise, that in all, only four crewmen were killed, but scores wounded, fortunately most of them suffering minor
wounds. Later summing up the battle of Saluki, Colonel Kidor said that it had been "an unqualified triumph of his Merkava Mk 4. Had those tanks been of an earlier generation, not equipped with state-of-the-art technology and active self-protection mechanisms, 50 crewmen might well have perished", the colonel emphasised with satisfaction.
Two rather remarkable incidents happened in the heat of battle and are worth recounting: one Mk 4 tank was hit by a tandem missile which penetrated into the rear compartment, hitting a stored HEAT round setting it on fire, which activated the automatic fire suppression system, but wounding two of the turret crew, who were evacuated and replaced by a reserve crew - the tank then continued to fight. Another tank had its main armament 120mm barrel blown off by a "lucky" shot, but the crew managed to drive it back to the border, where a field ordnance repair team exchanged the barrel and sent the tank back into battle within hours.
An overall assessment of Merkava in the second Lebanon War 2006
Four types of Merkava tanks were in action in Lebanon 2006, including Merkava Mk 4, the Merkava Mk 2D (with its distinctive sloped turret), the standard Mk2 (mostly with reserve units), and Merkava Mk3 Baz.
Towards the end of the fighting, Brigadier General Halutzi Rodoi, the chief of IDF Armoured Corps was asked to assess the performance of his tank force and especially the lessons drawn from the fighting against advanced anti-tank missiles fired by Hezbollah on the coveted Merkava. Mk4, which saw its first combat engagement in Lebanon. According to General Rodoi, the Merkava proved to be well protected and designed to minimize the risk even when it was penetrated.
The IDF employed several hundred tanks in combat. According to official reports, about ten percent were hit by various threats. Less than half of the hits penetrated. In over-all assessment, the potential risk to crewmen would have been much higher, if the tank had been of a conventional design. A colonel commanding an armoured brigade which bore the brunt of battle, mentioned in an interview that during the war that hundreds of antitank missiles were fired on his unit, and in total only 18 tanks were seriously damaged. Of those, missiles actually penetrated only five or six vehicles and according to statistics, only two tanks were totally destroyed, however, both by super-heavy IED charges.
The unique Merkava design uses special aims to minimize the risk of spall (flakes coming off the inside of the turret), generated by the shaped charge plasmajet. All Merkava types use fire retardant containers to store ammunition preventing high-lethal secondary explosions. Furthermore, tanks are equipped with rapid fire extinguishing system that eliminates sympathetic detonation of ammunition. As result, only few tanks encountered catastrophic fire hazards after suffering penetrating missile attacks on ammunition, but substantially reducing lethal burn casualties to crew members.
Some of the tanks, especially those outfitted with the LIC urban combat kit are equipped with bottom hull plates to protect against heavy mines and belly charges. Several Merkava tanks and heavy AFVs encountered a number of these charges, some weighing over 150 kg. While heavily armoured vehicles can hardly be expected to survive such an attack, the upgraded vehicle types demonstrated effective protection for the crew, which, in some cases, even managed to survive such attack with only minor injuries. In one instance, a Merkava tank was hit by a belly charge weighing over 150kg of explosives, killing one crew member and wounding the remaining six., (some travelling in the rear compartment). Despite the loss of one crew member, this incident is considered proof of the effective protection of the new Merkava 4. To reduce this threat the heavily armoured D-9 bulldozer was employed to precede the tanks over high-risk tracks in order to cause IEDs to blow up with minimum damage and clear the way for the following tanks.
The IDF Armoured Corps has traditionally invested considerable effort in examining hit after-battle statistics on its tanks, in order to establish new tactics and techniques. The founder of this procedure was Major General Israel Tal, "Father of the Merkava" and one of the leading tank experts of worldwide recognition.
After the 1973 Yom Kippur War General Israel Tal led a development team which took into consideration Israel's unique battlefield characteristics and lessons learned from previous wars. On General Tal's orders a special team of experts examined every single tank hit, while still on the battlefield and on the findings an in-depth investigation was made to develop effective means for crew protection, which formed the basis of the unique Merkava project. A similar investigation team has already recorded all hits on tanks received during the Lebanon crisis and a full report was made available for further detailed assessment team of experts which is already examining these reports in detail, in order to make the necessary amendments without delay, pending the resumption of the conflict, should the presently fragile ceasefire fall apart.
Assessing Hezbollah anti-armour tactics and weapons Hezbollah fighters used the heavier, more capable missiles, including Metis M and AT- 14 Kornet to engage Merkava 4. The Konkurs, Fagot and RPG-29 were mostly used against less protected Merkava 3 and 2 while non-tandem weapons, such as Tow, Fagot and RPG were left to engage other targets, such as AIFV. The least used were AT-3 Sagger and non tandem RPGs, which are considered obsolete, but proved quite lethal against troops seeking cover in buildings.
Overall, almost 90% of the tanks hit were by tandem war-heads. In general, Hezbollah militants prioritized Merkava Mk 4 over Merkava Mk 2 and 3, and in general, targeted tanks over AIFV. At the beginning of the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict, the main Israeli concern was a report that Hezbollah possessed Russian Kornet antitank missiles. However, it also saw the RPG-29 Vampir with a tandem HEAT that had stolen the show. There were even rumours that Hezbollah had received the notorious TBG-29V thermobaric rounds, but these could not be confirmed in action.
An estimated 500 to 600 members of their roughly 4,000-strong Hezbollah fighting strength in South Lebanon were divided into tank-killer teams of 5 or 6, each armed with 5-8 anti-tank missiles, with a further supply stored in small fortified well camouflaged bunkers, built to withstand Israeli air attacks. In another tactic, Hezbollah tank-killer teams would lie in wait in camouflaged bunkers or houses, having planted large IEDs on known approach routes. Once an Israeli tank would detonate one of these, Hezbollah would start lobbing mortar shells onto the scene to prevent rescue teams rushing forward, also firing at outflanking Merkava tanks by targeting the more vulnerable rear zone with RPG. The IDF tried to respond with heavy artillery fire, smoke and advancing special MEDEVAC Merkava tanks, to evacuate casualties. It took some time, until the Merkava crews could change tactics and lower losses from Hezbollah tactics. This included having dismounted infantry advancing over suspected high-risk ground and take out the enemy bunkers with close-in fighting and using heavy armoured D-9 for recovery action under fire.
Inadequate combat training in tank crews and short-sighted funding priorities
During the last six years, in which the bulk of the IDF was constantly engaged in low intensity urban counter terrorist warfare in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, all regular forces, including tank crews were retrained for small unit infantry policing activities, which was mostly dismounted action. This proved extremely painful, when young conscripts, who make up the bulk of the regular IDF were rushed into battle, after hasty retraining. It soon turned out to their commander's dismay, that tank combat in Lebanon, fighting a highly prepared and equipped enemy was a totally new "ballgame" for those youngsters, courageous as they proved themselves in battle. As result, Israeli tankers had to quickly re-adapt old-new procedures during combat. At the beginning of the war, several tanks lost tracks due to driver's inexperience, especially when travelling in the mountainous and rugged terrain trying to avoid the heavily mined paved roads and tracks.
Moreover, during the Intifada, the armoured corps did not receive top priority among senior defence establishment officials. Short-sighted budget cuts took a heavy toll on annoured units. As result, at the beginning of the war, tanks were lacking basic countermeasures such as instantaneous smoke canisters, laser warning detectors and infrared jammers. While some of these devices were urgently supplied later during the war, the damage was already done. "Money kills" was what several senior Armoured Corps officers blamed authorities after the war, expressing their frustration over the defense establishment's refusal to fund the installation of a rocket defense system on Israeli tanks and claiming that soldiers were paying the price with their lives. The officers were referring, among others, to the Trophy a new and unique, locally developed active protection system that creates a hemispheric protected zone around armoured vehicles such as the Merkava 4 tank.
The Trophy design (video report) includes four flat-panel antennas and a search radar mounted on the vehicle. When properly mounted, the combined radar view is a full 360 degrees. When a weapon is fired at the vehicle, the internal computer uses the signal from the incoming weapon as an approach vector. Once the incoming weapon is fired, the computers calculate the optimal time and automatically fire the neutralisers. The response comes from two launchers installed on the vehicle, one on each side. The
launchers have a pivoting/rotating ability and thus are able to fire in any direction the computer requires. The launchers fire the neutralizing agents which are usually small metal pellets like shotgun shot.
If those measures would have been available, Merkava. tank crews would have fared a much better survival chance against even third-generation weapons thrown at them.
Summing up the performance of Merkava tanks, especially the latest version Merkava Mk 4, most tank crews agree that, in spite of the losses sustained and some major flaws in tactical conduct, the tank proved its mettle in its first high-saturation combat. The overall consensus was that with less well-armored tanks, the toll would have been much higher.
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Ananda
The Bunker Group
gf, like I said in my comment, Merkava is a good MBT. But in the contects on comparing it with M1A2, all I'm said was as all round performance M1 show advantages to Markava, since during Iraq urban warfare it's also show same survivability capacity with Merkava. This area (urban and close range warfare) was the area that Merkava with it's design should show advantages (in comparison with contemporary other modern MBT). In short M1 show it has the same advantages in the area where Merkava should be more superior..while still maintain leads in other area.
I also said Merkava was build to cater Israel need. However the terain that Israel facing more and more also faced by everyone else. Cleary current environment show more and more scenarios where MBT has to faced urban and close combat warfares. The contemporary clasic design of M1 and Chalangers show their survivebility thus neglected the need to mimic Merkava design. In sense if the Merkava design show superiority on clasic MBT design on the area of urban and close warfare...I'm sure somewhere in the western world or even eastern world already come out with products which mimic Merkava design.
again I'm not saying Merkava was a failed design. It's a good design that cater for the purpose it was build for. However the design do not show that it has the significant advantages compared to clasic MBT design in the area where (according to the builders) should show the superiority from other design...which are urban and close range warfare environment.
ps: I'm failed to obtain the clips from one interview that I saw from Al Jazzera on how the Hizbullah fighters managed to syop a Merkava with only 2 missiles. Perhaps it was a luccky shot...I'm sure the Merkava's mentioned was not a MK4..Also i'm not going to debated which claimed was more correct the Isreaeli or Hizbullah...what i'm suggesting that no matter how good merkava is..as MBT it's also show weaknesess that also happen to other leading clasic design MBT (M1 or Challangers) in the close range combat environment.
In such..like other MBT's it also need other suport to succed in that kind of warfare environment..which I believe the original idea from the builders was that Merkava should proved more reliable in that kind of environment thus can work more independently compared to classic MBT design.
@Ananda, honestly there are some parts of your posts in this thread that I totally don't understand and I would not have bothered to reply to new forum members like Xeon_Laura (as he has not even bothered to post an intro about himself).
Even for the SAF and the TNI-AD, we share this concern of training for urban warfare. On 24 November 2009, both parties successfully completed Exercise Safkar Indopura 2009 which was held at the Murai Urban Training Facility (MUTF). Around 600 soldiers from the 3rd SIB and 5th SIR, as well as TNI-AD's 13th Infantry Brigade/KOSTRAD and 100 Raider Battalion/KODAM I-BB participated in the exercise. Soldiers from both armies were able to leverage on the high-tech instrumentation system of the MUTF and the Tactical Engagement System. This was also the first time that the exercise integrated the Bionix Infantry Fighting Vehicle and a Counter-Mine Vehicle in the mission. 1SG Hady P.N. from the 100 Raider Battalion, TNI-AD shared:
I'm sure 1SG Hady P.N. had a good time in our training facility, as the instrumentation system gives great feedback to the individual solider about what he is doing right/wrong. In this exercise, TNI-AD soldiers were also given a chance to work with Singapore armour and our armoured engineers.
[ame=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dSww8vkjGIM]Merkava tank Mk4 interior[/ame]
BTW, I'm still at a loss at what you are saying...
[ame=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LRePg43EafM]God's Chariot - Episode 1 - Part 1[/ame]
The most dangerous thing about Al Jazzera propaganda is that they try very hard to entertain while pushing a point of view. They are quite happy to 'edit' and use 'facts' (sic) in a manner to suit their particular agenda - I'll just see this sort of video as an Arab attempt at disinformation.
Yes, in context, there is a re-invigoration of infantry and tank tactics for urban warfare in contrast to the cold war era. And the Americans and Israelis are obviously experts and leaders in the field having conducted recent operations in urban areas.
Even for the SAF and the TNI-AD, we share this concern of training for urban warfare. On 24 November 2009, both parties successfully completed Exercise Safkar Indopura 2009 which was held at the Murai Urban Training Facility (MUTF). Around 600 soldiers from the 3rd SIB and 5th SIR, as well as TNI-AD's 13th Infantry Brigade/KOSTRAD and 100 Raider Battalion/KODAM I-BB participated in the exercise. Soldiers from both armies were able to leverage on the high-tech instrumentation system of the MUTF and the Tactical Engagement System. This was also the first time that the exercise integrated the Bionix Infantry Fighting Vehicle and a Counter-Mine Vehicle in the mission. 1SG Hady P.N. from the 100 Raider Battalion, TNI-AD shared:
"...The MUTF is a very good training area and this exercise has been a better than great experience!"
I'm sure 1SG Hady P.N. had a good time in our training facility, as the instrumentation system gives great feedback to the individual solider about what he is doing right/wrong. In this exercise, TNI-AD soldiers were also given a chance to work with Singapore armour and our armoured engineers.
Amongst other unique features, the Merkava tank can also carry troops, has an engine compartment in front and even has a 60 mm internal mortar, which is unlike all other MBTs... Here's a future weapons video for your viewing pleasure:
[ame=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dSww8vkjGIM]Merkava tank Mk4 interior[/ame]
BTW, I'm still at a loss at what you are saying...
I'll just say that Al Jazzera doe not intend to be objective in it's reporting on this conflict as they represent the Arab point of view (with factual errors). Here's a link to the video you referred to in your post:
[ame=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LRePg43EafM]God's Chariot - Episode 1 - Part 1[/ame]
The most dangerous thing about Al Jazzera propaganda is that they try very hard to entertain while pushing a point of view. They are quite happy to 'edit' and use 'facts' (sic) in a manner to suit their particular agenda - I'll just see this sort of video as an Arab attempt at disinformation.
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