Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

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stoker

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I found the detail on the procurement methodolody, very interesting, particulalry as it uses the AWDs as a practical example.

from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute Report (linked previously) pages 5-7:
Would it not save Australia a lot of time and effort, to use the Astute class hull as a basis for our Collins class replacement.

It is most probably a tad larger than we need, ( 7800t x 97m x 10.4m ) but to quote that mythical Brirish Admiral - steel is cheap and air is free.

Austute has already been designed to accommodate Tomahawk Block IV ( Tactom )

Austatute has been designed around the Rolls Royce PWR2 nuclear reactor, so there should be plenty of room for a conventional diesel/aip/electrical propulsion unit and X shaped tail planes as per Collins class hull.

We would have a proven hull with plenty of room for crew, weapons systems and propulsion system.

We could even get the hull segments fabricated over in the BAE Marine Barrow Yards and shipped over here for final assemble in South Australi, it would save us a small fortune.
 

Sea Toby

New Member
Would it not save Australia a lot of time and effort, to use the Astute class hull as a basis for our Collins class replacement.

It is most probably a tad larger than we need, ( 7800t x 97m x 10.4m ) but to quote that mythical Brirish Admiral - steel is cheap and air is free.

Austute has already been designed to accommodate Tomahawk Block IV ( Tactom )

Austatute has been designed around the Rolls Royce PWR2 nuclear reactor, so there should be plenty of room for a conventional diesel/aip/electrical propulsion unit and X shaped tail planes as per Collins class hull.

We would have a proven hull with plenty of room for crew, weapons systems and propulsion system.

We could even get the hull segments fabricated over in the BAE Marine Barrow Yards and shipped over here for final assemble in South Australi, it would save us a small fortune.
The same could be said of a US Navy's Virginia class submarine. Replace the nuclear plant with a conventional diesel electric plant plus possibly an AIP system....
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
I found the detail on the procurement methodolody, very interesting, particulalry as it uses the AWDs as a practical example.

from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute Report (linked previously) pages 5-7:
Being someone who actually has to comply with the Kinnaird process, I can tell you that ASPI's view of it is not from the operators perspective and completely ignores the legion of problems that we have with it.

thats without a doubt an academic document with no comprehension of how it works in the real world.
 

PeterM

Active Member
Being someone who actually has to comply with the Kinnaird process, I can tell you that ASPI's view of it is not from the operators perspective and completely ignores the legion of problems that we have with it.

thats without a doubt an academic document with no comprehension of how it works in the real world.
I have no doubt that it would be a challenge to work within the framework. The theory sounds great with more rigorous analysis and evaluation process to substantially reduced risks to prevent catastrophic problems such as Seasprite. As always, these extra layers of analysis and scrutiny will have substantial cost implications in both time and money.

I simply found it an interesting look behind the scenes into the Defence procurement processes and explains some of the rationale behind decisions.

I am not saying I necessarily agree with it and from my project management background it seems that it would be a very convoluted process in practice. I can understand the idea of meeting capability, but the idea of buying systems for platforms seems backwards, I am not sure how much extra risk mitigation it actually produces.

I am curious, what is the operater's general perspective (or is that classified)

I guess the real question is whether it has real improved results for defence procurement.
 
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PeterM

Active Member
The same could be said of a US Navy's Virginia class submarine. Replace the nuclear plant with a conventional diesel electric plant plus possibly an AIP system....
It has been mentioned before by people in a position to know, the ADF is looking at a propulsion system other than either nuclear or air independant propulsion.

Presumably this (or other systems) could be used in either the Astute or Virginia hull if we opted to go down that path. With the substantial problems the RAN has had with both the Collins and ASC, this is probably reasonable for consideration as a possible option for comparision with an enlarged Collins or some other other design.

It will be interesting to see how this unfolds.
 

Sea Toby

New Member
It has been mentioned before by people in a position to know, the ADF is looking at a propulsion system other than either nuclear or air independant propulsion.

Presumably this (or other systems) could be used in either the Astute or Virginia hull if we opted to go down that path. With the substantial problems the RAN has had with both the Collins and ASC, this is probably reasonable for consideration as a possible option for comparision with an enlarged Collins or some other other design.

It will be interesting to see how this unfolds.
Maybe we don't agree with the definition of air independent propulsion. In my mind this term includes all forms of propulsion that doesn't use air.....
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
I am curious, what is the operater's general perspective (or is that classified)
yes and no. to explain would get into classification issues - but on top of that its a CLM (career limiting move)

I guess the real question is whether it has real improved results for defence procurement.
It has undoubtedly helped in some areas - but in modern fast moving systems (esp ewarfare, comms and ITC) its a complete WOFTAM as it ignores the need for speed and technology change.

there is a greater push to get staff credentialed in PM skills, abd there is a push to get nn amount of people credentialed up every year - but that also will be a 5-10 year process.

of greater concern however is that kinnaird does not adequately cover off the issue that as a project evolves, invariably the demands of the users have to change as the battlefield reqs and operational issues change in structure - and hence the capability needs to mature to stay relevant. Its a bit complex to discuss in an open forum (and not intending to appear paternal) but as you've indicated that you've done project management, then you've probably worked out why defence capability PM is different in a number of areas to non govt.
 

PeterM

Active Member
It has undoubtedly helped in some areas - but in modern fast moving systems (esp ewarfare, comms and ITC) its a complete WOFTAM as it ignores the need for speed and technology change.

there is a greater push to get staff credentialed in PM skills, abd there is a push to get nn amount of people credentialed up every year - but that also will be a 5-10 year process.

of greater concern however is that kinnaird does not adequately cover off the issue that as a project evolves, invariably the demands of the users have to change as the battlefield reqs and operational issues change in structure - and hence the capability needs to mature to stay relevant. Its a bit complex to discuss in an open forum (and not intending to appear paternal) but as you've indicated that you've done project management, then you've probably worked out why defence capability PM is different in a number of areas to non govt.
I think I have a pretty good idea of some of the issues and compexity involved; combined with the political implications and priorities this would be a challenging framework to operate within.
I am sure it must be frustrating at times.

I have a better understanding of the process and why it takes alot longer than some people expect.

WIth the long lead time for alot of programs, I am surprised we are not hearing more discussion about various options and platforms. Does the volume of new platforms being introduced in the next 10 years hinder the project development, particularly with all the layers involved in each using the Kinnaird methodology?
 

StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
The same could be said of a US Navy's Virginia class submarine. Replace the nuclear plant with a conventional diesel electric plant plus possibly an AIP system....
How likely is this? Both Virginia and Astute as large (even for SSN) submarines. And changing size of subs can cause all sorts of problems/issues/costs (see Collins). Plus these boats were designed for entirely different purposes. And while modern, are they what we need to be building in 2020+.

I would like to see the next gen of subs in this size class (6000-8000t) using SSN US/UK systems (or atleast simular level).
 

Bonza

Super Moderator
Staff member
How likely is this? Both Virginia and Astute as large (even for SSN) submarines. And changing size of subs can cause all sorts of problems/issues/costs (see Collins). Plus these boats were designed for entirely different purposes. And while modern, are they what we need to be building in 2020+.

I would like to see the next gen of subs in this size class (6000-8000t) using SSN US/UK systems (or atleast simular level).
In my opinion, not likely at all. Basing a 4,000 ton conventional boat intended for deployment in the 2020s on a nearly 8,000 ton nuke boat that's already been deployed for years? I don't see any benefit to it. Surely the two submarines will be, in terms of design and construction, worlds apart.
 

agc33e

Banned Member
the magazine is in spanish but many words are similar to english, also in the web in the revista there is an article about charactiristics of the submarine s80 and fuel cells.. there are nice videos in youtube about the f100 and f300 norwegians..
 
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ThePuss

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
Something I have been wondering for a while is what happened to the 6 LCM's built for the army by ADI's (Thales) Newcastle yard. I can't remember why they where lemons but I do know they were not strong enough to take the Abrams MBT.

Can anybody enlighten me to their fate?. Were they scraped, sold to civilian service or are they still sitting on a hard stand somewhere.

Cheers :confused:
 
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kato

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
I can't remember why they where lemons but I do know they were not strong enough to take the Abrams MBT.
Might have to do with the fact that they weren't bought for the Abrams, but for the Leos (50 tons max load). When the Abrams order was announced, trials of the delivered LCMs were extended by multiple years more or less "suddenly" and they took two years to find convenient "structural failures" in the craft...
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
There is an interview with VADM Russ Crane (CoN) on DefenseNews.

He states quite clearly that we aren't getting fixed wing combat aircraft on the fat ships.
 

battlensign

New Member
There is an interview with VADM Russ Crane (CoN) on DefenseNews.

He states quite clearly that we aren't getting fixed wing combat aircraft on the fat ships.
Obviously just part of the political machinations of deception and double-bluff........I wouldn't be too concerned by the denials........ ;):D

Brett.
 

Sea Toby

New Member
Obviously just part of the political machinations of deception and double-bluff........I wouldn't be too concerned by the denials........ ;):D

Brett.
Why would Australia buy F-35B aircraft for their new LHDs being built? Their LHDs won't have the fuel and/or bomb bunkerage to operate them for long. On the other hand Australian Air Force bases have both aplenty. Any shore close air support for the troops can easily be done with a few Tiger helicopters aboard the ship. I seriously doubt whether Australia needs a carrier, with the Australian Air Force having force multipliers.

And outside Indonesia, I don't see much of an air threat in the Southwest Pacific either. From an Air Force point of view, they would be better off striking Indonesian air bases than attempting to provide a CAP above the fleet. I would rather be downing Indonesian aircraft over their air bases than over the Aussie fleet.

Frankly, I don't see any Australian landings in the Southwest Pacific without air superiority. The Aussie Air Force would eliminate the threat before the Aussies engage in any opposed landings. To do otherwise would be foolish....
 
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