I found it really, really interesting to know so much about the SAF. That`s not something we hear about in Brazil, and it gave me (and hopefully, everyone else reading it) a great insight about your armed forces...
6. Are you also aware of the role of Thai and Singaporean military in Timor-Leste? After a UN-sponsored vote for independence in 1999, Timor-Leste (formerly East Timor) was engulfed by conflict — an estimated 75% of the population was displaced and nearly 70% of all buildings, homes, and schools were destroyed by an orchestrated campaign of violence carried out by pro-Jakarta militia groups. This conflict was halted by an international peacekeeping force that led to the transfer of authority to the UN, and the establishment of a UN mission in Timor-Leste. In September 1999, Australia was desperate for an ASEAN partner to deploy into East Timor. Thanks to Dr. Mahathir's prior political stance, Malaysian troops were seen by the locals, Australia, NZ and the US as taking a pro-Indonesian or non-neutral position with regards to events in Timor-Leste (eg. The
NY Times reported that Ramos-Horta was opposed to Malaysia being given command of UN troops and that such a move would anger the East Timorese). Thailand was the first ASEAN country to volunteer, followed by Singapore and the Philippines. Thereafter, Thai and Singaporean military and ships deployed in support of the Australia and New Zealand-led international stabilization force were instrumental in maintaining ASEAN's credibility, at a difficult time — with the then
Malaysian Prime Minister Dr Mahathir casting aspersions on the lead country conducting peace-enforcement operations in East Timor. The SAF deployed to conduct UN peace-enforcement patrols at Cova Lima, in south-western Timor-Leste with a mandate under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. These combat peacekeeping deployments:-
(i) started in May 2001 with 70 Singaporean combat peacekeepers stationed at Cova Lima in Operation Blue Heron. The deployment of this enlarged platoon lasted for a period of one-and-a-half years till November 2002. The conduct of these border patrols, intelligence gathering efforts, and presence of a quick reaction force enabled the SAF to disarm militia-men and criminal elements in their assigned sector, to stop the cycle of violence;
(ii) continued in November 2002. The number of Singaporean combat peacekeepers deployed to Cova Lima was enlarged to a company sized force of a 160 troops as reports of groups terrorizing the villages between the border and Dili grew in number till early 2003. Singapore's combat peacekeeper company was supported by a RSAF helicopter detachment comprising four Huey helicopters, with a Singaporean Major General taking command of UNMISET forces of 3,300 peacekeepers from August 2002 to August 2003. The Singapore combat peacekeepers operated as part of THAIBATT with responsibility for half of the border between West Timor and Timor-Leste — AUSBATT having responsibility for the other half. The increase in numbers and the insertion of Singaporean long-range recce patrols by RSAF Huey helicopters into the jungle to track hostile elements crossing the border was instrumental in stopping the cycle of violence. 17 reservists and 10 full-time National Servicemen (NSFs) were among those who volunteered and were deployed for the combat peacekeeping mission (see the photo exhibition,
In the company of Peacekeepers and the
ebook); and
(iii) lasted till December 2012 (at a lower level), with the end of the UN mandate. At early stage of the peacekeeping mission under INTERFET, Singapore Navy's 3 LSTs provided up to 50% of all sea-lift to support the UN peacekeeping mission via a continuous ferry service between Darwin and Dili (for details see: '
Strength through Diversity: The Combined Naval Role in Operation Stabilise'). Thereafter, Singapore has consistently provided troops for deployment to Timor-Leste and only ending these small deployments in December 2012.
7. Singapore's annual defence budget, at about US$9.7 billion have transformed the way the SAF used as a strategic tool in four areas of military engagement, which includes:-
(i) working with other naval powers in the maritime domain in policing the global commons in:-
[nomedia="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uecbDdItsxM"]Defending our Everyday - YouTube[/nomedia]
(a) the Malacca Straits joint patrols with other littoral states (namely, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore) to reduce the incidents of piracy in the region;
(b) Operation Blue Orchid for the seaward defence of Iraq from 2003 to 2008; or
(c) Operation Blue Sapphire in support of CTF-151's counter piracy mandate in the Gulf of Aden;
(ii) using air power enabled operations in support of Singapore, UN or such other coalition efforts, such as, in Operation Blue Heron (Timor Leste), in Operation Blue Ridge (Afghanistan) and in Operation Crimson Angel (Cambodia), as follows:-
(a) in paragraph 6 (ii) of this post, the use of helicopters to insert long-range recce patrols in Operation Blue Heron is explained;
(b) in Operation Blue Ridge, Singaporean imagery analysts provide a niche ISR capability to aid coalition decision making in RC South. Click
here, to learn more about the the deployment of a UAV Task Force to Tarin Kowt, Oruzgan from October 2010 to January 2011. For details see: [nomedia="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ghoKjKEkSrc"]Ep 3: Eagle Eye (Ops Diaries - SAF in Afghanistan) - YouTube[/nomedia]; and
(c) in Operation Crimson Angel, the SAF using air power is able to rescue hundreds of Singaporeans over a 1,000 km away from Singapore. This capability was demonstrated on 9 July 1997, when six flights of C-130 aircraft flew over 1,132 km (611 nautical miles) to evacuate 450 Singaporeans and foreigners out of the Phnom Penh, Cambodia, in the middle of a civil war;
(iii) integrating operations and intelligence with the
inauguration of the SAF's C4I Community, under the command of a two-star rear-admiral (holding the same rank as the three Service Chiefs), holding the dual appointment of Military Intelligence Organisation (MIO) director and chief of the C4I community. Rear-Admiral (two star) Joseph Leong's appointment and promotion to two star, signals the importance of the roles of the MIO director and chief of C4I community. Singapore was the first country in Southeast Asia to uncover the existence of a robust al-Qaeda-linked
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network. In December 2001, Singapore’s Internal Security Department (ISD) informed Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines and Australia of the existence of JI on their soil. Inter-governmental collaboration at counter-terrorism efforts in Southeast Asia has resulted in a mixed bag of notable successes in stopping JI linked attacks with some prominent failures; and
(iv) returning to their role as military advisers for other armies and governments, if required (including providing institutional trainers for the Afghan Army in the areas of counter-IED training and setting up their school of artillery). Further, as part of the overall commitment to the ADMM-Plus process, Singapore will co-chair the EWG on Counter-Terrorism with Australia in the next cycle of Expert Working Groups from 2014 to 2017. Counter-terrorism planning has seen a sea of change, since 9-11, the 2002 and 2005 Bali bombings, the 2003, 2004 and 2009 Jakarta Hotel/Embassy Bombings, the London 7/7 bomb attacks in 2005, and the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks. The special forces of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand have conducted unilateral, bilateral and multilateral counter-terrorism exercises of greater and greater complexity. Counter-terrorism exercises not only to raise awareness of special forces capabilities in local officials, they also iron-out any chain-of-command issues that may occur, should the need arise. Further, I note that Afghanistan is not the only operational deployment of Singapore's ISR assets. Tentara Nasional Indonesia and the SAF also worked together in hostage rescue operations in West Papua in 1996. An SAF Remotely Piloted Vehicle detachment worked closely with the Indonesian special forces in Timika in West Papua, providing surveillance which proved crucial in facilitating the successful rescue of Indonesian and foreign hostages (from the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Germany) taken by the Organisasi Papua Merdeka or Free Papua Movement. The RSAF's then Tactical Air Support Command (now renamed Air Defence and Operations Command) received a campaign streamer for that.
8. If I may, I would also like to share five additional points on Singapore in Q&A format, written in 2009, to set the greater context for Singapore's defence spending levels.
When I talk about military strategy, I mean the use of military power to achieve political and/or military ends. It is clear from the prior posts that Singapore has some military power. However, our ability to be seen in exercising this power is constrained by current geo-political reality.
Q1: Why is Singapore so reluctant to use military power as a strategy?
Ans: We use the SAF to achieve political ends but usually not to conduct war (because war in of itself is a blunt policy tool). The SAF is usually used by Singapore to win friends and influence other countries (and not to fight with them). An example of the SAF in non-combat roles is all the humanitarian relief deployments (eg. the Dec 2004 Tsunami) or peace support ops. And the SAF contributes to peace support ops too. If we can achieve the same political goal by negotiations or diplomatic efforts:- Why not? Further, the mere presence of the SAF deters potential aggressors from using force. So ironically, the presence of military power, may reduce the necessity of using military power.
Q2: Why does Singapore focus so much attention on air power?
Ans: Singapore lacks strategic depth and our forces cannot retreat from the city into the jungle. Therefore, it is crucial for us to at least maintain air parity, or if possible, win air superiority so that we can protect the city from aerial bombardment and employ our air power to our tactical advantage to enable us to establish
local superiority in battles.
Q3: Why build the Singapore navy, when you have air power?
Ans: We are not self sufficient in food (over the long term) and we need trade to ensure that our city does not starve in a naval blockade. It is no good if we can defend Singapore island but cannot import food because of a naval blockage. In fact, just an increase in insurance rates will affect the price of goods imported into Singapore. Being able to defend Singapore island itself is meaningless if we cannot keep our SLOCs open. Further, air power can have a multiplier effect on the RSN's capabilities and gives us a greater choice of
tactics in
any naval battle.
Q4: Singapore has a strong but small* air force and navy, why do you need an army?
Ans: Because without an army we cannot hold physical ground (we would have to give up the possibility of using forward defence as a potential tactic, if we cannot hold ground) and it would create a force imbalance, that can be easily overcome by a capable aggressor. Further, we are not a true island like NZ or the UK (where they are separated by miles and miles of water), as we are physically connected by 2 land bridges to Malaysia (and therefore physically connected to the rest of mainland Southeast Asia). In WWII, the causeway was demolished by the British but the Imperial Japanese Army (
IJA) were able to cross it in a few hours and bring over their troops, tanks and supplies. So IMHO, a strong army component is essential in any land battle (keeping in mind that the IJA invaded Singapore by a land route). Our army components include recce elements (like LRRPS), armoured battle groups, infantry, artillery, combat engineers and so on.
Q5. What do you mean when you say that Singapore is capable of hybrid warfare?
Ans: Just as insurgent commandos can set off bombs at
Orchard Road and at the former Ambassador Hotel (during the '
Konfrontasi'), conventional armies are capable of unconventional attacks. For example, Operation Rimau carried by the Z Special Unit in WWII. Singapore's own SOF last saw action in the 1991, at the SQ117 hijack (see
video on the hostage rescue) and our NDU have undergone deployments in Iraqi waters for the last 5 years. So it is important to understand that the SAF (while it is not designed as a guerrilla warfare organisation) has well trained
unconventional forces that will be employed as part of our
concept of operations in any battle (which is often called
hybrid warfare**). Please remember, that conceptually, the same or similar tactics are available to both the aggressor and the defender. Our investment in training, technology and organization are but tools in an attempt to stack odds in our favour. That is why we don't ever intend to fight fair or only conventionally. So please do not assume that the SAF will cede any area of specific competence to any potential aggressor (like unconventional warfare). While warfare is inherently unpredictable, our army is not small in numbers and our defence of Singapore will be considered, dynamic and robust. Let me end with a quote from Clausewitz:
"Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult... the difficulties accumulate... so that one always falls short of the intended goal... [and this] distinguishes real war from war on paper."
Footnote:
*Small being a relative concept when compared to regional powers (the RSAF has the best trained and largest combat aircraft fleet amongst the ASEAN countries). The RSN has arguably the most capable naval fleet amongst the ASEAN countries (in terms of force balance).
**Hybrid warfare or swarming are only tactics. Our country's strategy is to live in peace with our neighbours and try to get along with the regional powers, if possible.
9. Doctrinally, the SAF does not intend to defend Singapore at the gates of the city, as it were and is capable and resourced for 'forward defence' of our country. Our thinking on defence is something that is not well understood by casual observers and often leads some misunderstanding. The SAF's declared mission statement is to "enhance Singapore’s peace and security through deterrence and diplomacy, and should these fail, to secure a swift and decisive victory over the aggressor". And I believe the SAF is resourced to carry out the mission statement (see: [nomedia="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1CCnoX9yADc"]The SAF - A Force In Transformation - YouTube[/nomedia]). Further, let me list 7 examples of Singaporeans who have been
of service to the nation. In July 2013, the SAF Medal for Distinguished Act was awarded to Second Lieutenant (2LT) Kamalasivam S/O Shanmuganathan, who used his body to protect his recruit and his action averted more serious injury to the recruit during a hand grenade live throwing exercise on 8 March 2013. While 2LT Kamalasivam was only slightly injured in that incident, it is the story of one citizen doing his duty. The SAF Medal for Distinguished Act had previously been awarded to 6 SAF personnel and 1 from the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF):-
(i) Lt. Colonel Toh Boh Kwee, First Warrant Officer (1WO) Mohinder Singh, First Sergeant (1SG) Teo Boon Hong and Lieutenant Leroy Forrester from the NZDF for risking their lives to help injured soldiers immediately after an in-bore explosion of a 155mm artillery round in the barrel of an FH2000 howitzer occurred during a live firing exercise in New Zealand in 1997.
(ii) Lt. Colonel Lo Yong Po for remaining behind in an area that was overrun by insurgents to see to the safe extrication of UN officials after extensive fighting broke out during his participation in UNSMA in 1998.
(iii) Captain (NS) Kok Yin Khong for administering first aid, while exposed to hostile fire, to a UN military observer who was shot by an unidentified gunman in a fire fight, when he was serving in the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) in 1998.
(iv) 2LT Kok Khew Fai for his act of courage to save a recruit's life during a hand grenade live throw exercise in Mar 2008. 2LT Kok threw himself on top of the recruit to shield him from the blast when the explosive slipped from the recruit's hand during the throw and landed on the ground behind them.
10. As you seem to be interested in the military of other countries, may I suggest that you have a look at the thread: "
ASEAN (and ADMM Plus) Military Exercises", which has some pictures and videos embedded on regional military exercises. For context on some of the latest developments in Asia, you can take a look at the discussion in this thread: "
US, Japan to establish military bases in the Philippines."
Have fun reading and posting. Cheers.
