Merkava 4

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Firn

Active Member
Feanor said:
Russians. We would bomb everything flat into saw-dust, and then repeat if anything is still moving, a lá Second Chechen War. :D

But seriously, I agree. In my opinion Hezbollah has brought back the concept of irregular forces and gave it a new life in the modern world. I think that it's their ability to break up the overall war into a number of smaller engagements from tactically superior positions on their part that made it possible for them to inflict the damage that they were able to deal.
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As a matter of fact the bombing everything into saw-dust became quickly part of the standart tactic of the particularly the Soviets when faced with determined defenders armed with well hidden guns and Panzerfausts in complex terrain. The "Fausters" took a immense toll on Soviet armor, even if the engineers lead the way in MOUT and infantry with submachineguns work very closely with the tanks and very heavy firepower from the ground and the air was both indirectly and directly available. But then again the defense is the stronger form in warfare.

The ATGMs of NATO caused also great concern in the WP countries. This threat caused both tactical and technological changes, but this should be discussed in other topics.

To some extent one could say that the tactical lessons of 2006 were both nothing new and truly new. Hezbollah took time-honored concepts and adopted them sometimes well and sometimes less so to specifc circumstances. That we are discussing here the performance of the Merkava shows that they got the AT-defense and public campaign partly right.


While I do think that armour will always have trouble in complex terrain there are some interesting technological developments. Combined with the right combined tactics and training integrated into a overall sensible strategy they might decrease the vulnerability of the AFV and increase the stakes for the AT-teams.
 
A

Abraham Gubler

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
Firn said:
To some extent one could say that the tactical lessons of 2006 were both nothing new and truly new. Hezbollah took time-honored concepts and adopted them sometimes well and sometimes less so to specifc circumstances. That we are discussing here the performance of the Merkava shows that they got the AT-defense and public campaign partly right.
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I think this is hugely wrong and another case of searching for a historical analogy for no good purpose.

The Hezbollah did not invent the ATGM or the use of them in small teams and in concentrated bombardments. But they were the first insurgent force to use ATGMs in this kind of scale. The difference between fighting an insurgent force and a conventional force is hugely significant.

For a conventional conflict a forward screen of ATGMs can just be suppressed and driven through by the tanks. Sure they suffer a few losses but they motor on and soon find themselves in the supply lines of those ATGM teams and cut them off. But insurgents don't have supply lines or fronts in the conventional sense and are ready to live of the land. So you can't defeat them with maneuver in a physical sense. Also after being suppressed they just displace and because of the non linear nature of the campaign always have a new target.

Also the 2006 Lebanon campaign was not an urban campaign. While there were some vicious fights over a couple of villages it was in effect a hilly, rural counter insurgency campaign.
 
W

Wooki

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
In terms of COIN warfare, the 2006 Lebanon conflict reinforced that tanks are viable and ironically enough (after examination of the conflict) it ensured the survival of the Merkava.

All this despite an educated enemy exploiting the Merkava's perceived weaknesses.

As to the references that the M1A2 would have performed worse then the Merkava? Who knows? It comes down to Situation Awareness and design differences. As I recall at the time; the Merkava being taken out from the rear was cited by those in the pentagon as validation (vindication) for the rear-engined configuration of the M1A2 as being superior to the Merkava in a COIN environment.

It really is 6 of one and a half dozen of the other as both designs priority is crew survivability and both achieve the objective through different survivability suite philosophies.

What is outstanding about the Merkava (and should be copied by a nation wishing to develop its own armor platform) is that is was designed from the outset for large growth potential and that has been the main indicator to come out of 2006 that the Merkava is a great tank. Post conflict it has been (or is being ) adapted with relatively little cost in time , manpower and dollars to the program as a whole.

The worst thing that Israel could do today is cancel production of the platform (IMHO).

cheers

w
 
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F

Firn

Active Member
Abraham Gubler said:
I think this is hugely wrong and another case of searching for a historical analogy for no good purpose.

For a conventional conflict a forward screen of ATGMs can just be suppressed and driven through by the tanks. Sure they suffer a few losses but they motor on and soon find themselves in the supply lines of those ATGM teams and cut them off. But insurgents don't have supply lines or fronts in the conventional sense and are ready to live of the land. So you can't defeat them with maneuver in a physical sense. Also after being suppressed they just displace and because of the non linear nature of the campaign always have a new target.

Also the 2006 Lebanon campaign was not an urban campaign. While there were some vicious fights over a couple of villages it was in effect a hilly, rural counter insurgency campaign.
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Well I think I have to disagree and state once again that the historical analogies show some very important concepts and allow as to compare the specific tactics in this specific campaign. What I pointed out is that we can see that determined infantry in complex terrain (urban, mountains, swamps, thick forests, villages) with suited AT-weapons pose a serious threat to tanks, even if well supported by infantry and artillery.

On a tactical level "conventional" and "unconventional" ATGM-teams are used in delaying actions and ambushes, and it is actually hard to argue that Hezbollah was especially innovative in this regard. Surprising was mostly that they had all this ATGMs and used them in a sensible way often togheter with mines, mortars and machineguns.


Anyway there are two large technological growth areas which might considerably increase the survivability, SA and ADS which are both linked.

(i) Situational Awerness has witnessed an exponentional growth, allowing to far faster TA, making it more dangerous for OPFOR to engage the tank.

(ii) Active defense suites incorporating hard and soft-kill systems are making huge strides, increasing greatly the difficulties to defeat a tank.​

I'm pretty much convinced that the Merkava will have a place on the battlefield for a long time to come..
 
S

Saxon-Thor_74

New Member
totach said:
IDF ARMOR
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The Merkevah is a very interesting piece of equipment. Anyone know how well the Mk IV armor stood up to the 2nd generation anti-tank RPG in southern Lebanon '06? Also, the chain curtains that hang on the aft of the turret: are those designed to detonate the RPG round before it makes contact with the adjoining of the turret and body? Or is it visual obfuscation to confound high caliber API rounds (.50 calibre, 20mm)???? Thanks.
 
S

Saxon-Thor_74

New Member
Firn said:
Well I think I have to disagree and state once again that the historical analogies show some very important concepts and allow as to compare the specific tactics in this specific campaign. What I pointed out is that we can see that determined infantry in complex terrain (urban, mountains, swamps, thick forests, villages) with suited AT-weapons pose a serious threat to tanks, even if well supported by infantry and artillery.

On a tactical level "conventional" and "unconventional" ATGM-teams are used in delaying actions and ambushes, and it is actually hard to argue that Hezbollah was especially innovative in this regard. Surprising was mostly that they had all this ATGMs and used them in a sensible way often togheter with mines, mortars and machineguns.




Anyway there are two large technological growth areas which might considerably increase the survivability, SA and ADS which are both linked.

(i) Situational Awerness has witnessed an exponentional growth, allowing to far faster TA, making it more dangerous for OPFOR to engage the tank.

(ii) Active defense suites incorporating hard and soft-kill systems are making huge strides, increasing greatly the difficulties to defeat a tank.​

I'm pretty much convinced that the Merkava will have a place on the battlefield for a long time to come..
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Wow, very interesting thread. Highly knowledgeable posters indeed!! If I may offer an amateur contribution, the tank will always be best suited for open plains, maneuver battles, no? The fact that the tank will always be vulnerable to ATGM, in complex terrain, will probably be in perpetuity until a specific purpose platform is developed to counter the threat. This will lead to other, mutually exclusive vulnerabilities IMHO.

The greatest problem for the IDF revolves around political considerations vis-a-vis world opinion. If the IDF were free to launch a campaign that would have truly been able to deal a long lasting, impacting blow to Hezbillah (sp?), they would have encircled the lower half of the country and cut off Syrian logistical support and a hammer/anvil operation would have ensued. Alas, domestic and international outcry prevents IDF strategists from using their assets to maximum effect. Lets not forget all the M-1's that were obliterated in Iraq due to roadside bombs (essentially, ATGM). A highly motivated, fanatically suicidal unconventional force is hard to deal with in any circumstance given the right equipment, terrain, and advantages. I think the full advantages of the Mk IV Merkevah vs. contemporary adversaries will be hard to appreciably deduce until the IDF engages on a full scale level (a la '67, '72). Regardless, it's hard discount the conceptually innovative technological designs that went into its development despite any political motivations one might have to disregard the IDF, or its incursion into S. Lebanon '06.
 
T

totac7

New Member
what next?

Saxon-Thor_74 said:
Wow, very interesting thread. Highly knowledgeable posters indeed!! If I may offer an amateur contribution, the tank will always be best suited for open plains, maneuver battles, no? The fact that the tank will always be vulnerable to ATGM, in complex terrain, will probably be in perpetuity until a specific purpose platform is developed to counter the threat. This will lead to other, mutually exclusive vulnerabilities IMHO.

The greatest problem for the IDF revolves around political considerations vis-a-vis world opinion. If the IDF were free to launch a campaign that would have truly been able to deal a long lasting, impacting blow to Hezbillah (sp?), they would have encircled the lower half of the country and cut off Syrian logistical support and a hammer/anvil operation would have ensued. Alas, domestic and international outcry prevents IDF strategists from using their assets to maximum effect. Lets not forget all the M-1's that were obliterated in Iraq due to roadside bombs (essentially, ATGM). A highly motivated, fanatically suicidal unconventional force is hard to deal with in any circumstance given the right equipment, terrain, and advantages. I think the full advantages of the Mk IV Merkevah vs. contemporary adversaries will be hard to appreciably deduce until the IDF engages on a full scale level (a la '67, '72). Regardless, it's hard discount the conceptually innovative technological designs that went into its development despite any political motivations one might have to disregard the IDF, or its incursion into S. Lebanon '06.
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Israel’s objectives were not met. Hezbollah’s military capability was temporarily diminished but not destroyed, and its political stock rose in the eyes of Lebanese, including in the eyes of Christians who had previously opposed Hezbollah. Syria and Iran have reportedly restocked Hezbollah’s arsenal of missiles. Hezbollah’s boycott of the Lebanese government, which is Western-backed, has created a political stalemate, but also strengthened Hezbollah’s hand as a force in Lebanon’s future.

The 2006 Lebanon War, in sum, killed many, destroyed much, but advanced neither Israel’s objectives nor Lebanon’s. Only Hezbollah seemed to emerge from the conflict stronger than before it began, even though Lebanese army troops are now deployed in south Lebanon. With tensions still high between Israel, Syria and Hezbollah, the immediate future is uncertain. Within Lebanon, where presidential elections are slated for the latter part of 2007, the future is even more uncertain as murmurs of civil war, should the election fail to break the current stalemate, have been echoing in most ears



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