A take on Guerilla warfare - admired by Lenin and adopted by Mao

[Palnatoke]

I am not sure my german skills would make reading such an old geezer a pleasant experience... Anyway there exists a fine translation by Colonel Niels Berg into danish.

I give you that you have choosen an interesting, and often overlooked subject at Clausewitz, which has it's applications to f.ex. Mao's concept of war, which - and that might be a personal oppinion - I would categorise as a "Revolutionary war" (Mao uses that term, or something to that effect, himself) while I think that styling it as an "guerilla war" (perhaps except the first phaze) is to me a product of "revolutionary romantismn" which goes even more for the socalled russian revolution, which in the part that Lenin plays the lead role in, is more a coup d'etat followed by a crotesquely brutal civil war of the variant "subversive".

Vis a vis modern guerilla war and clausewitz I would personally stress the, uniquely clausewitz, viewpoint that war is a social process dominated by arbitary events (friction) and as such not a rational process even more difficult to decern by a rational methology. And I think that exactly the social dimension of Clausewitz concept of war does provide a tool to understand the fundamentally irrationel in several of the conflicts that marres this world (f.ex. the palestinian conflict, and in 20 years when we are probably still fighting in Afgh. also that conflict). It is also the social process that ultimately can lead to the failure of the supreamely strong against the weak, while most know the "war is the continuation of politics with other means" stressing the interdependence, Clausewitz, to my understanding, also makes clear that a war cannot be understood outside it's social context and it's couppled and part of the overall social process of the given socities.

 

[Firn]

Mao was certainly an utopian with a brutally pragmatic touch - a combination which led to the suffering and death of countless people. I guess that his fascination with the "Revolutionary war" had to do with the simple fact that such an approach has worked for a very small band of intellectuals. His mental drive would have led others most likely to the gallows or torture chambers but under the favorable circumstances, great personal capabilites and due to great luck he was able to pull it off just as Lenin did.

I agree broadly with you on the second part.

For Clausewitz war was intrinsicly politkal, full of the interactions of rational and emotional actors and groups. The Napoleonic war and the constant scheming, the frantic diplomatic manuevers inside and between the states, the importance of the mood of peoples and leaders, the play of chance in some many instances made him come to an important conclusion. Leaving out politics, chance and emotions by all various agents would make for a "pure scientific" view, but would be mockery of the real wars.

This approach allows him also to explain the manyfold limiting factors influences the war, which are counteracting the intrinsic reinforcing ones.

An example:
The dictatorship and will of Napoleon led to an escalation of warfare because he was the undisputed commander&chief in the state and on the battlefield and could rely on the revolutionary fevor of the French population.
In some way the spirits that he summoned came back to haunt him as large parts of Spain, Russia and later Germany were engulfed by the same zeal. Napoleon was seen by the rest of Europe as a danger which had to be utterly defeated and made harmless. There could be no compromise on that issue.

The weak public support of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, especially in Europe is quite understandable. Many simply ask what the point of this long, bloody and expensive war is. It is not a key issue for them and they wonder if things would not be the same for them with the Talibans back in power. Ironically that weak support and the delicate mission results in a usually careful ROE and gentle hands by ISAF. This high standards are necessary but make for ideal targets by the Afghan government in search of votes and an NGOs. Far more brutal and cruel wars and factions in the past and the present have received far less criticism. In this context the noble ideals and standards of the West are a great weakness. A weakness, which one the other side helps to prevents or contains aggressive wars by the same nations.

So much in a nutshell.

BTW: This is my last day for some time here, so I will only respond today

 

[Palnatoke]

In this context the noble ideals and standards of the West are a great weakness

Yeah, if ony we could bring back good old Stalin.... See, that was a man who knew how to get things done and trouble makers out of the way, infact far out of the way - if not beneth it..

Though there is also the old heros: Paul Aussaresses and Roger Trinquier.

Since the end of World War II, a new form of warfare has been born. Called at times either subversive warfare or revolutionary warfare, it differs fundamentally from the wars of the past in that victory is not expected from the clash of two armies on a field of battle. This confrontation, which in times past saw the annihilation of an enemy army in one or more battles, no longer occurs.

Warfare is now an interlocking system of actions-political, economic, psychological, military-that aims at the overthrow of the established authority in a country and its replacement by another regime. To achieve this end, the aggressor tries to exploit the internal tensions of the country attacked-ideological, social, religious, economic -any conflict liable to have a profound influence on the population to be conquered. Moreover, in view of the present-day interdependence of nations, any residual grievance within a population, no matter how localized and lacking in scope, will surely be brought by determined adversaries into the framework of the great world conflict. From a localized conflict of secondary origin and importance, they will always attempt sooner or later to bring about a generalized conflict.

On so vast a field of action, traditional armed forces no longer enjoy their accustomed decisive role. Victory no longer depends on one battle over a given terrain. Military operations, as combat actions carried out against opposing armed forces, are of only limited importance and are never the total conflict.

This is doubtless the reason why the army, traditionally attracted by the purely military aspect of a conflict, has never seriously approached the study of a problem it considers an inferior element in the art of war.

A modern army is first of all one that is capable of winning the conflict in which its country is engaged. And we are certainly at war, because we run the risk of being finally defeated on the ground (as at Dien Bien Phu in May, 1954) and because, in case of such a defeat, we shall have to cede vast territories to our opponents.

The struggle we have been carrying on for fifteen years, in Indochina as well as in Algeria, is truly a war. But what we are involved in is modern warfare.

If we want to win, it is in this light that we must consider it from now on.

Studies have been made in many countries of what is called subversive warfare. But they rarely go beyond the stage of guerrilla warfare, which comes closest to the traditional form.

Mindful of the Allied victory in World War II, and perhaps because it is more appealing to study successful combat methods than to dwell upon the reasons for a defeat, only the offensive use of the guerrilla has been considered. But the study of effective countermeasures has been neglected. Some authors have stressed the inadequacy of the means employed against the guerrilla; others have simply counseled reacting against the guerrilla-confronting him with the counterguerrilla to beat him at his own game.

This is to wish to resolve a problem quickly without having duly weighed it.

The subtlest aspects of modern warfare, such as the manipulation of populations, have been the subject of recent studies. But only some of the methods employed by an enemy to consolidate his hold over conquered populations in peacetime have been investigated, in particular the working of psychological action on the masses.

But the rallying of opposition and the study of effective means of protection have been neglected. More exactly, when the enemy's methods and their application have been recognized, propaganda and pressures have always been powerful enough to influence a poorly informed public and to lead it systematically to refuse to study or use the same methods.

We know that the sine qua non of victory in modern warfare is the unconditional support of a population. According to Mao Tse-tung, it is as essential to the combatant as water to the fish. Such support may be spontaneous, although that is quite rare and probably a temporary condition. If it doesn't exist, it must be secured by every possible means, the most effective of which is terrorism.

In modern warfare, we are not actually grappling with an army organized along traditional lines, but with a few armed elements acting clandestinely within a population manipulated by a special organization.

Our army in Algeria is in excess of 300,000 men supplied with the most modern equipment; its adversary numbers some 30,000, in general poorly equipped with only light weapons.

If we were to have an opportunity to meet this enemy on the traditional field of battle, a dream vainly pursued for years by many military commanders, victory would be assured in a matter of hours.

The war has lasted more than six years, however, and victory is still uncertain. The problem is more complex.

In seeking a solution, it is essential to realize that in modern warfare we are not up against just a few armed bands spread across a given territory, but rather against an armed clandestine organization whose essential role is to impose its will upon the population. Victory will be obtained only through the complete destruction of that organization. This is the master concept that must guide us in our study of modern warfare.

chap 2 Modern Warfare. Trinquier

 

[Firn]

As the article you posted is very interesting I will be still there this day.

Yeah, if ony we could bring back good old Stalin.... See, that was a man who knew how to get things done and trouble makers out of the way, infact far out of the way - if not beneth it..

As I said it the liberal democracy is a great weakness in such military operations in seemingly unnecessary wars - but it is also a great strenght. It tends to oppose - in the modern context - the attack unless as an part of the strategic defence. In this case the identification of the people with the state and the moral advantage at home and abroad usually greatly helps the war effort.

 

[Palnatoke]

Trinquier argues something like this:

The object of the modern war is not territory or positions etc. Instead the object is the populance. To win the populance [it follows that modern war does not include the old style of war of two armies that clashes on a battlefield - something that trinquiet sees as a thing of the past ].

What the revolutionary does, is that he wins the population by terror. The terror is the key weapon of war by the revolutionary. The terror displays the impotence of the "forces of Order" (state, police, army etc) in protecting the individual, who then defacto flip side to be protected by the terrorists, that terrorise him(!), at first hand it seems illogical, but when you think about it... that's the unbrave reality of the world, easely seen, today in our rich peacefull cities, in suburbs where you have gang or mafia activity running out of hand.

In the crisis (when you are caught off feet) You, respond to this terrorismn by brutallity. Your aim is to meticulously "destroy" the enemy, (which is a or many clandestine organisation(s)) , not being nice or win a popularity contest, because the people is in a double sense swayed by fear; The revolutionaries engage in terror first aimed at civil authorities, then the people,
If the state/army cannot provide security, it's a failure and the civilians can only seek protection by the enemy. It is not about who the populance like, it's not about their hearts, it's about rounding up and destroying the enemy organisation from root to top and do it in prober time - before the enemy has won the populance and then the war.

 

[Firn]

I have to read it more carefully before I will be able to formulate an adequate response.

 

[Palnatoke]

La Guerre Moderne

MODERN WARFARE: A French View of Counterinsurgency


It's a short read.

 

[Firn]

I read it. As I said before, interesting.

Overall what I see the two three major driving forces which let to the newest forms of guerrilla warfare as seen in Iraq. The list does not imply a ranking.



a) Technology (intertwined with Education):

Two hundred years ago a semi-organized milita and numbering 15000 men (skirmishers, sharpshooters, militia) could still stand up in favorable conditions in an open and large battle against well-trained and led line infantry numbering 15000 supported by artillery See the battle of the Battle of Bergisel.

The Uprising of Warsaw then showed well the futility to stand up against well-equipped forces in a prolonged defence even under partly favorable circumstances (urban combat, popular support). The suffering of the frienly population was immense.


Technology has reinforced greatly the initial trends of guerilla warfare outlined by Clausewitz. The quick and rapid attacks of concentrated forces which usually are dispersed are ever more characteristic, the prolonged defence ever more futile. The awesome firepower and precision of modern forces with their combined and networked arms makes a steadfast defence for Guerilla forces senseless. The IED and portable ATM, mortars and automatic weapons on the other hand make a violent and sudden assault and ambush more attractive.

Technology has however made the shift in the phases of the popular War and the combination of guerilla war with large formations more difficult . Mao could smoothly transition from light dispersed guerilla fighters to large light regular forces with simple, towed artillery against a badly trained foe consisting mostly of light infantry with artillery support and low morale. However how can the insurgents in Iraq ever hope to create and operate sophisticated aircrafts and AFV capable to stand up to the USA in open battles?

This also increases the incentive to directly address, use, attack or terrorize the populations. It is far less dangerous to rough up civilians than a military force like NATO.



b) International support for revolutionary uprisings

The successful revolutions of the past have shown that a initially weaker faction can overthrow or outlast even very powerful states. The relative new element here is that this factions can access an international network which provides according to its capabilities political support, training, manpower, weapons, and money. Combined with relative attractive political aims, nowadays often flavored with religion this result in a novel strategic depth. Togheter with the often strong will power of the extremists this helps to recruit locals locally an abroad.



c) Liberal democracy and ideals, Human rights

This form of goverment restrains the political goals, will and means of one side. Less ambition to conquer and suppress, less brutality and less will to hold to goals even at high costs in an seemingly useless and futile war. While brutality in warfare is also counterproductive, history has sadly shown that sufficient power combined with boundless brutality does often work. A colonial power in the late 19th century could use far more brutality with far less interference from home to put down insurgents.

Nowadays the methods of COIN must be aligned to the image of the helping hand, because it is done - or at least said so - for the good of the (foreign) people. In this context every slap, even if unintentional, of the helping hand will be condemned harshly at home and abroad.



Perhaps later I will add more.

 

[Palnatoke]

This also increases the incentive to directly address, use, attack or terrorize the populations. It is far less dangerous to rough up civilians than a military force like NATO.

I think the key insight our frenchman wants to show us is that the insurgent force doesn't "resort" to terror against the civilian population, because it can't fight the regular army in proper battle, like armies should do battle.
No, the insurgent force attacks the population because terror is it's principle weapon of war. It is the terror that destabilises the forces of order and compell the civilians to more or less directly to surport the insurgent force. The insurgents do not have to meet the forces of order in battle, they can just await the political collapse as chaos engulfs order.

 

[Firn]

No, the insurgent force attacks the population because terror is it's principle weapon of war. It is the terror that destabilises the forces of order and compell the civilians to more or less directly to surport the insurgent force. The insurgents do not have to meet the forces of order in battle, they can just await the political collapse as chaos engulfs order.

Isn't terror (or violence as puts it Clausewitz) the element of war per se?

Provocatively said, isn't the relative recent "Western" "Humanitarian" "Hearts-and-Minds" way of fighting a war is significant "disgression" from the usual central theme in war?

 

[Palnatoke]

Isn't terror (or violence as puts it Clausewitz) the element of war per se?

Provocatively said, isn't the relative recent "Western" "Humanitarian" "Hearts-and-Minds" way of fighting a war is significant "disgression" from the usual central theme in war?

Well that depends on one's definition of terror.
A political definition of terror could be that terror is the act of affecting/influencing the public by the use of violence either in lanquage or act - or something to that effect.

The terror of Clausewitz's battles was ofcourse very real, though not calculated to terrorize, or sway, the public, rather to win a battle. After victory the vanquished nation's public would be swayed by "force" or "power" etc.

Provocatively said, isn't the relative recent "Western" "Humanitarian" "Hearts-and-Minds" way of fighting a war is significant "disgression" from the usual central theme in war?

Yes and no. We accept the classical terror of war. It's OK to bomb a village as long as there is a fight - we call that collateral damage, even though that hides the small babies in a "difficult to spell word". But it's not OK to line up insurgents and hang them - as a reminder to would-be-insurgents - that's terror!.

Generally speaking I think the "Hearts-and-Minds" approch is based in "revolutionary romance". We have misunderstood the defeats in most of the de-colonisation, and the like, wars. We didn't loose because some mountain peasants had a "socialistic idea" and were likeable. We lost because our armies could not offensively conqueror AND defend the (conqurored) people: We fought for land, the querilla fought for humans and they won. Because humans were the real objective, the war aim, the victory condition: The thing to be taken.

 

[Firn]

Well that depends on one's definition of terror.
A political definition of terror could be that terror is the act of affecting/influencing the public by the use of violence either in lanquage or act - or something to that effect.

The terror of Clausewitz's battles was ofcourse very real, though not calculated to terrorize, or sway, the public, rather to win a battle. After victory the vanquished nation's public would be swayed by "force" or "power" etc.

I can right now only answer the first part.

Without quoting him directly I guess that the "very real" violance was mostly directed at the enemy soldiers, but there have a great many instances in the "civilized" Napoleonic wars alone where it was directed against civilians. Keep in mind all the nasty insurgencies, the mutilated french soldiers and spanish civilians speak volume of the violence in Napoleonic war and COIN. And remember that the modern use of "terror" stems from a Republican state where the political actors in resorted in the very unstable political situations to state "terrorism".

 

[Palnatoke]

I can right now only answer the first part.

Without quoting him directly I guess that the "very real" violance was mostly directed at the enemy soldiers, but there have a great many instances in the "civilized" Napoleonic wars alone where it was directed against civilians. Keep in mind all the nasty insurgencies, the mutilated french soldiers and spanish civilians speak volume of the violence in Napoleonic war and COIN. And remember that the modern use of "terror" stems from a Republican state where the political actors in resorted in the very unstable political situations to state "terrorism".

I am not claiming that (political) terrorismn or COIN is a new, let alone 20th century, "innovation". the guillotine processes in early revolutionary france is a clear example of the state conducting terror against segments of the socity There is this famous Goya Los Fusilamentos del 3 de mayo en Madrid in which we clearly see how Clausewitz's "God of war" dealt with insurgents. The surpression of religious heracies are early examples in europe, in which the weak european states quite succesfully subverted socio-religious uprisings. Though I don't have early examples of the weak part terrorising the population as a matter of strategy...?


Anyway we have to make a distinction between: social uprisings; para-millitary/irregulars ressisting occupation etc.; The subversion of these And then groups that work with terror against civil population to make it conforme to their policies as f.ex. ETA, RAF, FLN, Al Queda in Iraq etc. I think those are new "innovations", spawned from the cruel de-colonisation and revolutionary wars of the 20th century and not a subject Clausewitz deals with - to my understanding.

 

[fixdeluxe1]

Guerilla Warfare

I personaly train for guerilla warfare alongside a few trusted compatriats.We want to be able to leverage power.There is nothing wrong with unrested citezens having a crack at any form of govermental administration/authority.I think many westerners just love peace,tranquility,stillness,calm and saftey/security and out of this we get capatalists and people oriented on wealthy,luxuriois self-preserving life styles.All this promotes is weakness.But talking about guerilla warfare,yes it is very efficent and proven over the years.But historicaly you had more direct confrontatios(e.g spartacus) now days its more oriented to stealth,clever tactics and being able to stike hard,with the element of surprise and hit and run.Being able to cause the most amount of damage with as little cost in lives,weapons,rescources and vital information(e.g training camps,weapons caches locations,plans and strategys etc).I belive this is because guerillas are usually facing enemys who are superior in almost any way(technologicaly,numericaly,moral,capability and strength).That is why the genius mind is the best weapon guerillas have.

 

[Firn]

Anyway we have to make a distinction between: social uprisings; para-millitary/irregulars ressisting occupation etc.; The subversion of these And then groups that work with terror against civil population to make it conforme to their policies as f.ex. ETA, RAF, FLN, Al Queda in Iraq etc. I think those are new "innovations", spawned from the cruel de-colonisation and revolutionary wars of the 20th century and not a subject Clausewitz deals with - to my understanding.

Certainly such groups have in the new global context due to geopolitical, technological and social change new qualities. While violence or the threat of it is still their primary mean it form has changed. And while power might be their ultimate aim the advertised political goals of some also seem to have a new qualitiy.


I will leave DF for a week or longer because of an eventful period of time ahead.