Witness Argentinas response after the Belgrano was sunk during the Falklands conflict.One of the things that subs excel at is keeping the red team locked up and/or nervous. A disproportionate amount of effort is needed to keep track of subs, a disproportionate amount of effort is needed to protect the principle capital assets (or any valuable assets) - and merchant shipping is a whole lot more nervous and vulnerable about subs than skimmers...... bang for buck, fright for fight, subs outpunch above their weight.
Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates
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Is it worth spending billions on 12 subs?. We will never be able to man that number or even just the ones that are serviceable like we currently do. For the majority of people in the navy we just do not like the idea of 6 hours on 6 hours off (if you are very very lucky) constantly for weeks/months at a time in a cramped steel tin without being able to go on the upper deck for a bit of fresh air and to get away from your stinky shipmates, no matter how large the huge amounts of money and extra conditions the "Boys in Black" get. Trust me I not jealous of them, they deserve the money and extras they get, I just would never do it (I like the idea that I can just jump overboard if something goes seriously wrong onboard a "Skimmer" and have a decent chance of survival ) and you cannot make the secret service compulsory.
There is a joke going around at the moment "The Navy is going to have twelve Subs.......One for each Submariner!".nfloorl:
By the way 12 Subs (If we COULD man them )with no AWDs and no LHDs as some here seem to be advocating is an incredibly unbalance force.
There is a joke going around at the moment "The Navy is going to have twelve Subs.......One for each Submariner!".
nfloorl:By the way 12 Subs (If we COULD man them )with no AWDs and no LHDs as some here seem to be advocating is an incredibly unbalance force.
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Good point. As well as the Australian experience you refer to elsewhere in your post, the anti-LHD advocates should consider the experience of other navies.Consider the role of Ocean in the Sierra Leone intervention, the "armed rescue" tasks performed by (among others) French & Italian ships, the use of amphibious ships as "mother ships" for anti-pirate actions, & disaster relief operations in which LPDs & LHDs of various navies have been extremely useful. These may not be the primary roles of such ships, but they add to the arguments for possessing them.
Just a quick nit pick their were T-21 but no lenders were on the gun line the T-21 were mostly joined by the obsolete Roysesay class and the counties.
as the Lenders sent south were the gun less Excoset and the Gun less Broad Beamed Leander with Sea Wolf.
But to back up you point cheap obsolete ships are desired as shore bombardment one of the most dangerous role for a ship
Ozzy Blizzard
New Member
Sorry guys for butting into your discussion, this is just an interesting one…
(I hope I did more than simply repeat you there mate…)
As for the one for one replacement, well clearly the limitations of a 6 boat fleet have become apparent. It limits the Collins’ massive capability to DOA operations when there is a major threat when she could be out causing all sorts of mayhem to an enemy. This significantly reduces the deterrence factor because you know if you press us we can’t send boats out to your neck of the woods. Not so with a 12 boat fleet, we can do both.
However if the worst case arises and we find ourselves in a real war between the major powers within the region, you would be crazy to think the LHD’s would not be used to deploy forces in order to secure SLOC and forward area’s within the Sea/Air gap.
Defene White Paper 2009, Section 7.6: “While our approach requires principally a maritime strategy, the nature of our strategic geography is such that we will also have to use conventional land forces to control our approaches, to secure offshore territories and facilities, to defeat any incursions onto Australian territory, to protect bases from which our naval and air forces operate, and potentially to deny the adversary access to staging bases.”
Thus the ADF would likely be deploying battalion groups (or even a brigade) into our northern approaches (probably an island) in order to prevent an enemy using it as a staging area for operations further south or to interdict Australia’s SLOC. So how do you think we would be deploying those forces in a littoral environment? Seems like the LHD’s are tailor made for those sorts of operations, even if that was not their originally envisaged role.
For anyone who is interested the article we are referring to can be found here: Security Challenges Journal
This is the abstract:
Fruehling puts forward a valid argument, and while I agree that the RAN’s SSK/G fleet will be the critical element in any war with a major power I disagree with some of the larger assumptions he makes. First of all he completely discounts the value of local sea control in a high end scenario, both for projecting land forces where necessary and attaining control over specific points. Geography is such that achieving sea control over a few geographical bottlenecks will not only deny an enemy the use of said area or access to the Timor Sea (the land/base denial strategy outlined in S7.6) but allow ADF forces to operate further north. Only high end surface combatants are able to achieve local sea control in such an environment.
Another concern I have is the notion that only LPH type vessels will be needed in south pacific peace enforcement missions, when INTERFET clearly illustrated the significant need for improved sea lift capacity. We can not count on all peace enforcement missions being as benign as the Solomon’s. Additionally the author claims that the ANZAC is more than capable enough for the variety of missions it currently undertakes, such as participating in anti piracy or anti smuggling missions or “fly the flag” visits to friends and allies. However the current ANZAC is not even capable of defending itself adequately from the Iranian threat in the rather benign Operation Catalyst. In the future threat environment with the proliferation of significantly more capable anti-ship weapons systems lightly armed ~3,000 ton vessels are going to be increasingly vulnerable. So even in these very limited (essentially peacekeeping) roles the ANZAC class (and their brethren) is going to be less and less able to operate effectively.
But perhaps the largest issue I have with Fruehling’s plan is the lack of flexibility it allows the ADF in expeditionary operations. The ORBAT put foreword essentially limits the RAN’s options to operating in only the types of missions envisaged i.e. that RAN would be very capable at interdicting shipping in a high intensity conflict, but nothing else, and only be able to project power in very low threat scenario’s. Anything in else and the ADF lacks the flexibility to react effectively, and the number of options decision makers have in any mid threat (or even high threat) scenario is drastically limited.
Imaginary scenario: What if in 2030 Fiji has another coup and Australian hostages are taken to ensure no interference (and this one turns out to be bloody)? We have our impressive 18 boat SSG fleet, 8 ANZAC Mk2’s and 2 LPH’s. We are facing a couple of battalions of reasonably well trained and equipped regulars on their own ground several thousand kilometres from ADF logistical bases. Problem one is Fiji doesn’t have a navy, so all that ship killing power is useless. The sight of a couple of 3,000 ton frigates is not going to have a significant psychological impact, and we would lack the ability to move enough combat power to intervene with conventional military forces (with a sufficient level of capability overmatch). Our options are, 1) SAS raid to rescue the hostages, 2) lob a few Tomahawks from an SSG. Hardly inspiring. However with AWD’s and LHD’s, we can deploy 2 mechanised battalion groups with all their supporting elements (significantly more combat capability than 2 LPH’s can move) which gives us the option to deploy forces on shore with the regime change as the objective. Tomahawk equipped AWD’s sitting off Suva will have a much greater impact than a couple of frigates interdicting shipping, and could secure the hostages release without a shot. Now decision makers have significantly more options, including regime change. That alone might be enough to prevent the Fijian leaders from taking hostages in the first place.
Insert second scenario here… In virtually any plausible scenario Fruehling’s ORBAT provides significantly less flexibility to the RAN, through a reduced number of credible options, even if in it allows for more tons of enemy shipping to be sent to the bottom. Basically this is because the RAN’s ORBAT will be massively unbalanced.
The same goes for global power projection, ANZAC’s bring us goodwill, TACTOM equipped AWD’s with destroyer escorts have the ability to really influence events on other continents. An AWD centred task force (destroyer flotilla) provides significant AAW, AShW and ASW capability in addition to strike, and can sit off someone’s shore indefinitely (with rotation). That means credible and capable combat power throughout the spectrum that we can deploy almost anywhere, in power projection terms it’s the next best thing to carrier air power. It is that sort of military capability that underpins the soft power which legitimises diplomatic relations, and if Australia is a true middle power with global interests we need the strategic weight to support that status.
Anyway sorry for the book fella’s, I was bored at work!
Well I’m not sure you can automatically assume other Defence projects will suffer because of our new SSK/G fleet. The rather large investment in the LHD’s and AWD’s has not, to my knowledge, come at the cost of other smaller systems needed to plug capability gaps. The funding came from outside of defence, same for the F-35’s, (it just means I wont get a healthcare rebate ect). I don’t see why our next gen subs would be any different.AD said:
If I’m not mistaken RAAF strategic lift has enjoyed significant investment already (and there are productions lines open with off the shelf options ala C-17A), GBAD can be bought off the shelf quickly and easily if the need truly arises, and the DoD is already investing in SEAD through the F/A-18F airframe and a E/A-18G conversion which should be on line well before our first Collins replacement enters sea trials (in any case we can buy HARM for our Rhino’s with very little lead time). There might be capability gaps but its not like actions are not being taken to rectify those deficiencies, or they could not be rectified quickly if need be. A world class SSK/G fleet on the other hand you can not just buy off the shelf if the threat level rises. Once you build your fleet you can’t just add a few more on after the production lines have shut down. In a sub 5 year period you go to war with what you have, and if things get ugly in East Asia a capable SSK/G fleet is going to be our most valuable tool. Doubling our SSK/G fleet is a reflection of the heightened chance of a major power conflict in our region; this was clearly stated in the white paper. 12 boats are an insurance policy as well as significantly improved deterrent. None of the investments to plug the current “capability gaps” you outlined above do much to achieve greater insurance or deterrent. As Brett so aptly put it; “Additionally they provide strategic weight rather then mere tactical weight (as important as that can be on operations/in war).”…
(I hope I did more than simply repeat you there mate…)
As for the one for one replacement, well clearly the limitations of a 6 boat fleet have become apparent. It limits the Collins’ massive capability to DOA operations when there is a major threat when she could be out causing all sorts of mayhem to an enemy. This significantly reduces the deterrence factor because you know if you press us we can’t send boats out to your neck of the woods. Not so with a 12 boat fleet, we can do both.
No you’re right, the LHD’s were acquired to provide the ADF with the ability to operate effectively in the high end peace enforcement mission, where you need to deploy 2 mechanised battalion groups with all their supporting elements. East Timor was a great example of asset and logistical limitations almost preventing the Australian government from achieving its aims in a relatively minor operation just off Australian shores.
However if the worst case arises and we find ourselves in a real war between the major powers within the region, you would be crazy to think the LHD’s would not be used to deploy forces in order to secure SLOC and forward area’s within the Sea/Air gap.
Defene White Paper 2009, Section 7.6: “While our approach requires principally a maritime strategy, the nature of our strategic geography is such that we will also have to use conventional land forces to control our approaches, to secure offshore territories and facilities, to defeat any incursions onto Australian territory, to protect bases from which our naval and air forces operate, and potentially to deny the adversary access to staging bases.”
Thus the ADF would likely be deploying battalion groups (or even a brigade) into our northern approaches (probably an island) in order to prevent an enemy using it as a staging area for operations further south or to interdict Australia’s SLOC. So how do you think we would be deploying those forces in a littoral environment? Seems like the LHD’s are tailor made for those sorts of operations, even if that was not their originally envisaged role.
I read that one too.battlesign said:
For anyone who is interested the article we are referring to can be found here: Security Challenges Journal
This is the abstract:
Fruehling argued that as the three major strategic considerations for the RAN (as outlined in the 2000 white paper) were the defence of Australia, promotion of stability in the south pacific and the common defence of SEA, the current RAN ORBAT, and planned acquisitions (AWD & LHD), are not suited to achieving those strategic objectives. Fruehling instead put foreword an alternative 2030 ORBAT consisting of 18 next gen submarines and 8 3~4,000 ton ANZAC replacements with two LPH type vessels. The crux of the argument is that in a high intensity war with a major Asian power our SSK/G fleet will be the RAN’s primary means of waging said war through a sea denial strategy (of course in concert with the RAAF). According to the author the AWD and LHD would not be particularly useful in such a scenario, and thus not do much to achieve the first and third strategic objectives. While promoting stability in the south pacific the RAN would not need high end area defence and smaller LPH vessels have proved adequate up to this point (if you forget about INTERFET). Thus, Fruehling argued, the current and planned RAN ORBAT was not aligned with the strategic objectives outlined in the 2000 white paper.Security Challenges said:
Fruehling puts forward a valid argument, and while I agree that the RAN’s SSK/G fleet will be the critical element in any war with a major power I disagree with some of the larger assumptions he makes. First of all he completely discounts the value of local sea control in a high end scenario, both for projecting land forces where necessary and attaining control over specific points. Geography is such that achieving sea control over a few geographical bottlenecks will not only deny an enemy the use of said area or access to the Timor Sea (the land/base denial strategy outlined in S7.6) but allow ADF forces to operate further north. Only high end surface combatants are able to achieve local sea control in such an environment.
Another concern I have is the notion that only LPH type vessels will be needed in south pacific peace enforcement missions, when INTERFET clearly illustrated the significant need for improved sea lift capacity. We can not count on all peace enforcement missions being as benign as the Solomon’s. Additionally the author claims that the ANZAC is more than capable enough for the variety of missions it currently undertakes, such as participating in anti piracy or anti smuggling missions or “fly the flag” visits to friends and allies. However the current ANZAC is not even capable of defending itself adequately from the Iranian threat in the rather benign Operation Catalyst. In the future threat environment with the proliferation of significantly more capable anti-ship weapons systems lightly armed ~3,000 ton vessels are going to be increasingly vulnerable. So even in these very limited (essentially peacekeeping) roles the ANZAC class (and their brethren) is going to be less and less able to operate effectively.
But perhaps the largest issue I have with Fruehling’s plan is the lack of flexibility it allows the ADF in expeditionary operations. The ORBAT put foreword essentially limits the RAN’s options to operating in only the types of missions envisaged i.e. that RAN would be very capable at interdicting shipping in a high intensity conflict, but nothing else, and only be able to project power in very low threat scenario’s. Anything in else and the ADF lacks the flexibility to react effectively, and the number of options decision makers have in any mid threat (or even high threat) scenario is drastically limited.
Imaginary scenario: What if in 2030 Fiji has another coup and Australian hostages are taken to ensure no interference (and this one turns out to be bloody)? We have our impressive 18 boat SSG fleet, 8 ANZAC Mk2’s and 2 LPH’s. We are facing a couple of battalions of reasonably well trained and equipped regulars on their own ground several thousand kilometres from ADF logistical bases. Problem one is Fiji doesn’t have a navy, so all that ship killing power is useless. The sight of a couple of 3,000 ton frigates is not going to have a significant psychological impact, and we would lack the ability to move enough combat power to intervene with conventional military forces (with a sufficient level of capability overmatch). Our options are, 1) SAS raid to rescue the hostages, 2) lob a few Tomahawks from an SSG. Hardly inspiring. However with AWD’s and LHD’s, we can deploy 2 mechanised battalion groups with all their supporting elements (significantly more combat capability than 2 LPH’s can move) which gives us the option to deploy forces on shore with the regime change as the objective. Tomahawk equipped AWD’s sitting off Suva will have a much greater impact than a couple of frigates interdicting shipping, and could secure the hostages release without a shot. Now decision makers have significantly more options, including regime change. That alone might be enough to prevent the Fijian leaders from taking hostages in the first place.
Insert second scenario here… In virtually any plausible scenario Fruehling’s ORBAT provides significantly less flexibility to the RAN, through a reduced number of credible options, even if in it allows for more tons of enemy shipping to be sent to the bottom. Basically this is because the RAN’s ORBAT will be massively unbalanced.
The same goes for global power projection, ANZAC’s bring us goodwill, TACTOM equipped AWD’s with destroyer escorts have the ability to really influence events on other continents. An AWD centred task force (destroyer flotilla) provides significant AAW, AShW and ASW capability in addition to strike, and can sit off someone’s shore indefinitely (with rotation). That means credible and capable combat power throughout the spectrum that we can deploy almost anywhere, in power projection terms it’s the next best thing to carrier air power. It is that sort of military capability that underpins the soft power which legitimises diplomatic relations, and if Australia is a true middle power with global interests we need the strategic weight to support that status.
Anyway sorry for the book fella’s, I was bored at work!
Ozzy Blizzard
New Member
Just a silly question but was the RAN facing manning issues in 1985? I've got a feeling that there are significant cyclical factors in the RAN's manning issues.Is it worth spending billions on 12 subs?. We will never be able to man that number or even just the ones that are serviceable like we currently do. For the majority of people in the navy we just do not like the idea of 6 hours on 6 hours off (if you are very very lucky) constantly for weeks/months at a time in a cramped steel tin without being able to go on the upper deck for a bit of fresh air and to get away from your stinky shipmates, no matter how large the huge amounts of money and extra conditions the "Boys in Black" get. Trust me I not jealous of them, they deserve the money and extras they get, I just would never do it (I like the idea that I can just jump overboard if something goes seriously wrong onboard a "Skimmer" and have a decent chance of survival ) and you cannot make the secret service compulsory.
There is a joke going around at the moment "The Navy is going to have twelve Subs.......One for each Submariner!".
Thus it may not be best practice to build your long term procurement plans around cyclical issues such as manning rather than capability needs.
I don't see the white paper as unbalanced. I think its pretty extensive, and there is lots of improved capability everywhere. We have six submarines, we were going to build 8. The manning requirements aren't unsurmountable. Say crewing stays the simular to collins, 12 x 2 x 45 = 1080 personel on a 2 crew system. A 3 crew system, 1620 personel. Out of 2030 population of ~30 million. We can do this. Sure, things need to be improved in terms of sub crew management and job satisfaction, but these are solveable.
The only thing I think the white paper is difficent in is AWDs.
The only thing I think the white paper is difficent in is AWDs.
I think many people are over esitimating the manpower issues in the ADF and basing information on current manning situation.
The Government has a comprehensive range of initiatives (either planned or under way) to resolve these issues. This includes chapter 14 in the white paper.
for example:
exported_kiwi
New Member
This just in from China
Hi guys, this just in from China in a forum I visit. Would you please care to comment as to the veracity of this as well as to the true state of the Collins class subs?
Thanks in advance, Kiwi.
"SUBMARINE woes have hit a new low with just one of six Collins Class craft fit for service.
Experts differ on the security risk this poses for the nation, but they agree that having just one boat available to defend the nation is a terrible return on a $10 billion taxpayer investment.
With HMAS Waller tied up at the Henderson shipyard south of Perth for urgent battery repairs, the only seaworthy sub is HMAS Farncomb.
The other four boats are either out of active service (HMAS Collins) or out of the water for major maintenance known as full cycle docking (HMAS Sheehan, Rankin and Dechaineux).
The latest submarine crisis comes just a month after the navy released a damning report into the management of the submarine force and its overworked crews with a solemn promise to fix the problems.
It also coincides with a $20 billion-plus push to equip the navy with 12 new generation submarines over the next 20 years.
Despite having just one operational vessel, the navy has promised the Government the subs will be available for an extra 160 days of duty next year.
Documents released with the Federal Budget show that the navy plans to increase the number of "unit ready days" for the fleet next year from 762 to 914 or more than 300 days each for three boats.
"There is less docking maintenance scheduled for FY09/10 hence the URD forecast is higher," it said.
Military expert at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute Andrew Davies said many issues needed to be sorted out before the nation invested $20 billion in a new submarine fleet.
"Do we spend more time thinking about buying new things than we do looking after what we have got?" he asked.
When they are working the Collins boats are the Australian Defence Force's most important strategic weapon. However, the subs have been dogged by major technical problems including leaky welds, excessive noise, and unworkable combat systems.
Waller's battery problem, the second inside a year, is reportedly so serious it could cost more than $3 million and take months to fix.
The navy denies any problem with Waller and says the maintenance stop was "scheduled.
Source; copy & pasted by a Chinese person from;
Only one submarine left to defend Australia | PerthNow
Hi guys, this just in from China in a forum I visit. Would you please care to comment as to the veracity of this as well as to the true state of the Collins class subs?
Thanks in advance, Kiwi.
"SUBMARINE woes have hit a new low with just one of six Collins Class craft fit for service.
Experts differ on the security risk this poses for the nation, but they agree that having just one boat available to defend the nation is a terrible return on a $10 billion taxpayer investment.
With HMAS Waller tied up at the Henderson shipyard south of Perth for urgent battery repairs, the only seaworthy sub is HMAS Farncomb.
The other four boats are either out of active service (HMAS Collins) or out of the water for major maintenance known as full cycle docking (HMAS Sheehan, Rankin and Dechaineux).
The latest submarine crisis comes just a month after the navy released a damning report into the management of the submarine force and its overworked crews with a solemn promise to fix the problems.
It also coincides with a $20 billion-plus push to equip the navy with 12 new generation submarines over the next 20 years.
Despite having just one operational vessel, the navy has promised the Government the subs will be available for an extra 160 days of duty next year.
Documents released with the Federal Budget show that the navy plans to increase the number of "unit ready days" for the fleet next year from 762 to 914 or more than 300 days each for three boats.
"There is less docking maintenance scheduled for FY09/10 hence the URD forecast is higher," it said.
Military expert at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute Andrew Davies said many issues needed to be sorted out before the nation invested $20 billion in a new submarine fleet.
"Do we spend more time thinking about buying new things than we do looking after what we have got?" he asked.
When they are working the Collins boats are the Australian Defence Force's most important strategic weapon. However, the subs have been dogged by major technical problems including leaky welds, excessive noise, and unworkable combat systems.
Waller's battery problem, the second inside a year, is reportedly so serious it could cost more than $3 million and take months to fix.
The navy denies any problem with Waller and says the maintenance stop was "scheduled.
Source; copy & pasted by a Chinese person from;
Only one submarine left to defend Australia | PerthNow
battlensign
New Member
Well, yes and no.
Yes it is probably true that there is only one at sea, but I think you can rest assured that Waller would be able to put to sea fairly quickly if necessary. Not to mention that the other three in full cycle docking would be at various stages in maintenance and likely one would be near-enough to ready if it were needed. I cannot see the current cycles being a strategic issue at this stage. I think it is likely that towards the end of next year you will see 4 working submarines and an RAN working towards its 4th crew of 58.
Brett.
So whats the go with this 58 crew thing.
Does it mean you only take 46 of the 58 crew on the water? with the 12 as backup or on rotation?
Does it mean you only take 46 of the 58 crew on the water? with the 12 as backup or on rotation?
A
Aussie Digger
Guest
Agreed...
Well 10% in savings per year for the next 10 years is sure as hell going to have an effect on capability and these savings are the "pre-requisite" before any expansion is going to occur.
Whilst a few hundred million might come from land sales, a few perks cut (day travel for officers etc) the majority of the billions can ONLY come from ADF capability. Training and support activities, POL's, ammunition, ordnance stock, legacy platforms being axed etc. All of these generate real capability and will be what is "slashed" to make way for the promised" high end" capability.
The bigger capabilities such as F-35, subs etc have yet to be truly funded. The payments required for the largest chunk of these projects have yet to arrive and they will be staggering, $16b for F-35 and up to $30b for the subs.
Whilst these costs are being spread out over many years, they are already impacting on ADF platform numbers in my opinion.
Previous DCP's talked about "up to 4x batteries of SPG's" for artillery. Now we're down to 2.
A 4th AWD has been ruled out at present.
Global Hawk has been delayed at least 5 years.
P-8A has been reduced from a mooted 12x platforms to 8x.
C-130H replacement amounts to 2cx C-130J-30 when 6-8x were previously mooted.
Up to 14x Battlefield airlifters were to be acquired. Now it is 10.
A 5th C-17 was mooted. Now it's gone.
The list of capability reductions (in numbers) has been extensive over what was previously announced.
Personally I think the costs of these future platforms is already eating into ADF capability...
In overall tonnage yes. In concurrent operations, no.
The White Paper seems to have ruled out any further investment in strategic lift for RAAF.
Yes, but there is a lack of institutional knowledge of long ranged GBAD operations, BMD and C-RAM capability. Simply buying "systems" does not generate capability.
ADF has not operated a long ranged GBAD system since the 70's and can you see us just ordering 2x Patriot batteries (for example) without ANY modification, to suit our "IADS" network?
I can't...
It is also no small investment acquiring Patriot PAC-3 or some other modern medium/long ranged SAM system...
Ah, but we're not actually getting Growler capability either, only the wiring. There is significant doubt as to whether the full capability will even be released to us, with even RAAF admitting recently that neither ALQ-99 nor NGJ has been released for export to us as yet.
There is no inherent SEAD capability on our SH aircraft, beyond their normal A2G and strike capabilities and no dedicated SEAD weapon system acquired for RAAF as yet.
Whilst we could probably acquire HARM at some point, the doctrine and tactics will take quite a while to be operational and the capability practised extensively before it will become a useable "capability".
There are gaps and in my opinion only a few are being addressed in any manner whatsoever.
Don't mistake me, I don't doubt the utility of a submarine in wartime, nor the RAN need for a good Submarine force, simply the size of our proposed fleet and the resources that will be provided to Defence to build their future force, acknowledging that the subs are only ever going to be one component of this force.
If Government had proposed a doubling of RAAF's air combat fleet, I'd be arguing just as strenuously as I am now against it.
Well I think you are rather ignoring the surge effect that IS employed in wartime scenarios and I'm not against a larger force, just one that seems to be disproportionately capable when compared against the rest of ADF.
The White Paper still regards the chance of state on state conflict as low and if the sub's main role is only for these circumstances, then it becomes a very questionable overall acquisition...
My preferrences for naval combat forces then would be:
1. An increased submarine capacity of at least 8, but no more than 10 submarines.
2. A 4th AWD.
3. The 8 future frigates as suggested in the WP.
4. TLAM capability for all subs and major surface combatants.
5. A dedicated maritime counter-mine capability, ie: Huon class +.
6. The existing plan for offshore combatant vessel, with anti-surface, air/missile/torpedo self defence systems, littoral strike and helo capabilities.
7. 3x LHD's.
8. A fleet of maritime warfare helos able to at least equip every major surface combatant with a single helo, plus attrition, training and "surge" capability (ie: operated from LHD's) helos.
Cheers.
Granted that I know little about the inner workings about the ADF and the political leadership of Australia, but isn't than there an appearent contradiction between the poltical analyses and the military plans outlined in the WP when it comes to the Submarine force? Or do the authors of the WP believe that a high-intensity confrontation in which a large Submarine force is more likely than they want do make public?
Like you I am not expert, I believe this is viewed as the most effective way to protect our sea lanes of communication and be able to project a credible long range naval prescence.
Perhaps this may provide a clue: Sub fleet should be doubled: Beazley | The Australian
and
from Navy 'to invest $15b' on Australian subs
battlensign
New Member
Ah, but AD:
1) On the list of capability losses as a result of funds diverted to submarine and F-35 programs:
a) 'Up to 14 aircraft' to replace Bous is fine but only 4-6 (at best) are working at any one time and therefore the 'up to' part was never going to happen. 10 c27Js would provide far more capability.
b) 'Up to 4 batteries of SPGs and 6 batteries of towed' was more about being able to pick the numbers from each type from within those brackets rather than gain 4 and 6 batteries (we were never getting 10 batteries of Arty). On another note, can anyone actually imagine Aus deploying a sufficiently large number of ground forces over such a large area to create a scenario where SPGs were out of range?
c) Nowhere have I ever seen RAAF discussions of a 5th C-17 as an actual possible acquisition.........
d) 14 C-130J-30 isn't so bad when there are also 10 C-27s and 4 C-17s. How many concurrent deployments are you anticipating? Anything that is big and regular could probably be done the RAN sealift ship or chartered (if it is non-hostile environs).......although I agree that two Squadrons of 10 makes more sense (with each sq. having two deployable flights of 4). The basic issue here is that in the defence of Australia and the region land forces are just not going to play a large role. If PNG etc goes pear-shaped and stability missions are required I am sure that sealift will play a significant role.
e) 9.12 of the WP leaves the door open on the 4th AWD issue......although I recognise that the actual option negotiated for a 4th as part of the contract expires in June or July this year. This probably less of a binary 'yes or no' issue and more of a 'if we had placed combined advanced orders it would have been cheaper'.
2) On a broader note I would point out that, as I stated earlier, 12 submarines is the 'magic number' for several reasons and the idea of 8-10 is good but it does not allow us to take the strategy forward properly in the event of war for which the enlarged submarine force was intended. If there is anything worse than letting other aspects of the ADF fall behind in the pursuit of a 'focused-force' then that would have to be allowing the same in pursuit of an option for 80% of the cost that doesn't even allow the 'focued-forced' strategy to be employed properly. 12 are needed - technically 15 to do it right (i.e be able to take the inevitable casualties).
3) The government did not propose a force of 12 submarines on its own. There are those AEW&Cs, AARs, 100 F-35s for the RAAF. So it is, at worst, a two-pronged strategy. This despite our seeming inability to maintain the numbers of fast jet pilots for those fighters.
4) If we really want Growler capability. then we will get it. The US has a basic principle - it does not oppose capability increases in allies unless it makes them independent to the point of being a problem or if there are security or fairness issues (a la F-22).
Brett.
1) On the list of capability losses as a result of funds diverted to submarine and F-35 programs:
a) 'Up to 14 aircraft' to replace Bous is fine but only 4-6 (at best) are working at any one time and therefore the 'up to' part was never going to happen. 10 c27Js would provide far more capability.
b) 'Up to 4 batteries of SPGs and 6 batteries of towed' was more about being able to pick the numbers from each type from within those brackets rather than gain 4 and 6 batteries (we were never getting 10 batteries of Arty). On another note, can anyone actually imagine Aus deploying a sufficiently large number of ground forces over such a large area to create a scenario where SPGs were out of range?
c) Nowhere have I ever seen RAAF discussions of a 5th C-17 as an actual possible acquisition.........
d) 14 C-130J-30 isn't so bad when there are also 10 C-27s and 4 C-17s. How many concurrent deployments are you anticipating? Anything that is big and regular could probably be done the RAN sealift ship or chartered (if it is non-hostile environs).......although I agree that two Squadrons of 10 makes more sense (with each sq. having two deployable flights of 4). The basic issue here is that in the defence of Australia and the region land forces are just not going to play a large role. If PNG etc goes pear-shaped and stability missions are required I am sure that sealift will play a significant role.
e) 9.12 of the WP leaves the door open on the 4th AWD issue......although I recognise that the actual option negotiated for a 4th as part of the contract expires in June or July this year. This probably less of a binary 'yes or no' issue and more of a 'if we had placed combined advanced orders it would have been cheaper'.
2) On a broader note I would point out that, as I stated earlier, 12 submarines is the 'magic number' for several reasons and the idea of 8-10 is good but it does not allow us to take the strategy forward properly in the event of war for which the enlarged submarine force was intended. If there is anything worse than letting other aspects of the ADF fall behind in the pursuit of a 'focused-force' then that would have to be allowing the same in pursuit of an option for 80% of the cost that doesn't even allow the 'focued-forced' strategy to be employed properly. 12 are needed - technically 15 to do it right (i.e be able to take the inevitable casualties).
3) The government did not propose a force of 12 submarines on its own. There are those AEW&Cs, AARs, 100 F-35s for the RAAF. So it is, at worst, a two-pronged strategy. This despite our seeming inability to maintain the numbers of fast jet pilots for those fighters.
4) If we really want Growler capability. then we will get it. The US has a basic principle - it does not oppose capability increases in allies unless it makes them independent to the point of being a problem or if there are security or fairness issues (a la F-22).
Brett.
The RAAF has done well, airlift is what 50% more in tonnage and simular in terms of airframes. With better aircraft, faster aircraft, more reliable aircraft. Fighters Australia is still talking up 100 F-35's, we are getting 24 SH with EW packages as a real option. Aircraft numbers can be easily increased as production is going to be open. Short term leases are also possible.
The RAA got its goodies mostly before and outside of this WP as well. With tanks, arty, increase in troop numbers, equipment upgrades, bushmasters. No doubt more to come, but again, shot lead times on most of the "still to come" stuff.
The RAN got most of its goodies in the WP. These assets are needed and will go hand in hand with the other upgrades. The AWD (we NEED 4) will replace the DDG that haven't been replaced in how many decades? The LHD replace the two carriers (but with a obviously different function) we have lost how many decades ago? (and the RAAFies complain about getting short changed!!) The sub force should have always been bigger than 6 boats. Building 12 might accutally cost less because 12 boats is enough that countries like Singapore, Canada etc might jump on board as a purchase, in terms of $'s per useful force is much better. ASC (to the right customers) will sell for a decent price.
Having useable patrol boats (corvette sized) is going to be the most valuable upgrade as they are going to save lives (both sides) and do a much better job at securing our permeable boarders. The larger frigates are going to save money by being a decent size instead of trying to deal with the weight issues like the ANZACs and hopefully build off our AWD experience.
I just think about why china is making less steel but buying massively more iron ore and think, something is happening that the general public isn't aware of yet. People are stockpiling.
Australia as a middle power needs to step up to secure our region and our own boarders.
The RAA got its goodies mostly before and outside of this WP as well. With tanks, arty, increase in troop numbers, equipment upgrades, bushmasters. No doubt more to come, but again, shot lead times on most of the "still to come" stuff.
The RAN got most of its goodies in the WP. These assets are needed and will go hand in hand with the other upgrades. The AWD (we NEED 4) will replace the DDG that haven't been replaced in how many decades? The LHD replace the two carriers (but with a obviously different function) we have lost how many decades ago? (and the RAAFies complain about getting short changed!!) The sub force should have always been bigger than 6 boats. Building 12 might accutally cost less because 12 boats is enough that countries like Singapore, Canada etc might jump on board as a purchase, in terms of $'s per useful force is much better. ASC (to the right customers) will sell for a decent price.
Having useable patrol boats (corvette sized) is going to be the most valuable upgrade as they are going to save lives (both sides) and do a much better job at securing our permeable boarders. The larger frigates are going to save money by being a decent size instead of trying to deal with the weight issues like the ANZACs and hopefully build off our AWD experience.
I just think about why china is making less steel but buying massively more iron ore and think, something is happening that the general public isn't aware of yet. People are stockpiling.
Australia as a middle power needs to step up to secure our region and our own boarders.
Glad to see I wasn't the only one with that thought after those graphs displayed on the business report on the ABC news last night. Could just be chinese producers stocking up whilst ore prices are low, or it could mean that maybe they forsee a time when trade will be interrupted...
Blas de Lezo
Member
This picture is dedicated to stingray, ( you asked for it) I got it thanks to Santi who found it in a forum about the Spanish Armada. I hope you like it.
http://s3.subirimagenes.com/otros/2590908lhddesdepopa11414x12.jpg
http://s3.subirimagenes.com/otros/2590908lhddesdepopa11414x12.jpg
StevoJH
The Bunker Group
I just saw an interesting news article posted to another forum, i've provided the link below.
Japan to relax arms export ban: report
Could this mean a Collins class replacement co-developed with Japan?
Japan to relax arms export ban: report
Could this mean a Collins class replacement co-developed with Japan?
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