Ozzy - Busted! Guilty as charged. Keep a weather eye out
AD -
1) The argument about the LHD and its relevence to a discussion of RAN combat power is the fundamental cognitive dissonance evident in the argument that the LHDs are never going to be used in a high threat environment but for some reason require AWDs for something more than simply a basic point missile defence. IF not envisaged, why the Air Defence ships? ANZACs can be upgraded for CEC cuing (for US CBG integration) and its not as if there are other roles that the AWDs provide that ANZACs couldn't cover in concert with other platforms (such as submarines for TLAM lobbing etc).
Who said anything about the environment? I was talking about the heavily opposed amphibious assaults, that vocal anti-LHD advocates seem to think is the ONLY operational tasking for these vessels, not whether they can or will be used in a high threat environment.
It seems to me that the vocal anti-LHD advocates, cannot or will not accept the utility of these ships for anything other than the opposed amphibious landing style of operation I was referring to earlier.
Yet recent history of existing amphibious assets, shows this as the untrue situation that it is. HMAS Manoora operated in the Gulf in 2003. It did require air defence protection, most obviously shown by the 16 AD Regt RBS-70 SAM launchers deployed on the boat, yet we did not perform opposed or indeed any sort of amphibious landing operations (beyond CDT's anyway).
The ANZAC escort self defence capability has long been known to be deficient in some aspects even for THAT threat environment, let alone anything more strenuous.
2) In relation to the argument that the ANZACs have never had to defend other ships from threats is really a good point. However, in GW2 their 5inch shells were effective and their presence important in the support of RMs on Al Faw (due to RN 4.5s) despite coalition warships providing air cover, The point being that we remain aware of our limitations and stick to it. ANZACs are only really a problem in global expeditionary operations. If Defence of Australia and S.E. Asia is the objective then AWDs are unnecessary.
I agree ANZAC was useful, but then so would ANY vessel, equipped with a 127mm Mk 45 gun in that scenario. An interesting point you've overlooked is that there were 2 british frigates alongside ANZAC firing their 4.5inch guns at exactly the same targets...
The AWD's are most definitely necessary wherever we wish to operate surface forces. The ANZAC was only able to operate in the Gulf in 2003 and since, because it, itself was protected by higher capability AEGIS class vessels and land and naval based air power.
Any engagement we become entangled in, HAS to involve ASM's in the modern environment. The ANZAC upgrade (WIP is an OLD term, no longer used) gives a hint as to the current capability's inadequacies, termed Project Sea 1448 - Anti-Ship Missile Defence.
Even the full CEA-FAR/CEA-MOUNT capability inherent within this project, will only provide a self-defence capabiity for that ship. It's area air warfare capability is and will remain deficient. I've never heard of a strategy of simplying fending off attacks and not engaging the delivery system of these attacks, as being a particularly effective strategy...
3) On the issue of an expanded submarine capability generally and the allocation of funds that might have been diverted from other deserving areas - I note that all of the capabilities you have listed could be procured in short order should a sufficient threat emerge that requires our possession of them. AWACs and Submarines are the sorts of things that require long lead times to design, acquire and proficiently operate. Additionally they provide strategic weight rather then mere tactical weight (as important as that can be on operations/in war).
Brett.
The way we HAVE procured subs and AEW&C requires long lead times, but in a time of crisis you "fight with what you have" and your unbalanced force, focussed as DoA was, on so-called "high end" capabilities, leaves the capabilities that actually ENABLE us to fight, out of the budget. Timor showed us the folly of that approach and the Minister has stated he has "recognised" the problem, with the Blackhawk helo EW issues, being the focus, but the WP seems to me, to be somewhat of a return to the old ways of thinking, ie: "get the platforms first and we can worry about making them deployable when we need to."
This is where the idea of "strategic weight" as opposed to "tactical weight" falls down. Strategic weight is only relevant if it can be deployed and used. Can the current submarine squadron provide a high-end warfighting capability, right now?
Can navy as a whole, in fact? Not without significant risk, I would suggest.
The capabilities I referred to earlier, whilst not requiring the build times that subs do, still take years to introduce into service, unless you want off the shelf purchases, soley. Subs could in fact be acquired far sooner if we were prepared to simply order a fleet of in-production vessels, such as Scorpene or whatever. They don't fit our requirement, some might say, but thankfully I can only imagine how quickly requirements change in warfighting scenarios when you've suffered a loss or 2...
To make way for this massive fleet of subs, we are reducing capability in other areas.
1. Our helo fleet was planned to be 27x helos to serve 12x surface combatants. Now it is being cut back to the point where we will have less maritime helos (24x), than we will helo capable maritime platforms (31x unless further maritime capable helos are ordered and there is no mention of such within WP09).
Maritime capable helos can't simply be built overnight either and such a plan doesn't factor into account, situations such as the current F model Chinook scenario, where SO many users want new-build Chinooks, that the production facilities simply can't keep up with orders.
Other elements of ADF capability are being reduced, numbers-wise too.
P-8A is being selected. 8x examples to replace 19x AP-3C Orions. GH will be ordered too, but it is not an ASW asset, rather a surface surveillance asset, whereas each and every Orion is ASW capable.
This choice in particular is strange, IF the submarine threat to Australia is as great, as the Government is stating it is. I would suggest that an ASW threat, would require greater ASW capability, than now, but I can't see that being achieved with the current plan, notwithstanding the individual capability enhancement of each platform. A sub is a great ASW asset, but can only be in one place at a time and can only search relatively limited areas. They have to be supported by a robust aerial ASW capability and I don't see our capability in this area being massively improved under WP09.
As I keep saying, it seems that more than some unspecified sub threat is behind the idea of building so many...
