The turret-mounted mortar on AFV as direct/indirect fire support unit

[Firn]

I totally agree that a MBT class vehicle causes more maintenance requirements than a wheeled class of vehicle like for example all the incanrnations of the Piranha family of vehicles.

This difference is not nearly as big when one looks at the maintenance requirements of a modern tracked IFV and a MBT. There the difference actually is quite small.

While I'm out of my line here it depends where and in which numbers the AFV are operated. The large fleet of the LAV III has not only intrinsically a smaller infootprint but the various elements also reach faster the critical mass (6-8) which makes the maintenance even in medium bases efficient. A tracked IFV might have only a slightly smaller footprint per platform than a MBT, but once again the critical mass is more easily achieved.

So I would adopt two families of vehicles. One being a lighter wheeled vehicle (Like the Piranha III or IV) and one a heavy IFV or even a MBT as a base for different kinds of vehicles (Puma as a minimum or Merkava Mk.IV/Namer).

This would give an army the ability to deploy all the needed assets without causing too much strain on the logistical chain as there are basically just two families of vehicles. According to the area of operations and the mission the army could deploy the ideal mix of heavy and light vehicles.

Yes. Let us say we have a LAV III with a NEMO mortar (with a coaxial HMG) and a light RWS. 3 or better 4 men crew it. It exceeds the capabilities of the LAV Mortar carrier in many an aspect and overlaps and partly exceeds the capabilies of the LAV Mounted Gun System (or Stryker 105 mm). For a light, highly dispersed force it is an invaluable asset in COIN, but it can also give heavier forces heavy, rapid and mobile area and point/HVT firesupport.

In COIN it might be part of the bronagruppa which we also see nowadays in Afghanistan and in intimated contact with the insurgents, shooting often canister, HESH, Illumination and HEAT. In a high-intensity operation it would all but used to support with the various HE, Cluster, FireBall, Strix etc and the occasional Smoke, Illumination, HESH, HEAT or canister. Roughly the same goes for a heavier vehicle So it is a very flexible asset

But in the end such an approach is only possible for bigger (richer) armies out there while the small ones have to work with what they have.
And a MBT with attachable MOUT packages beats every opponent in it's versatility when one just has the money and manpower for one vehicle of this class.

Very small armies like the Sovenian might also discard MBT completely to focus on one or two wheeled AFV (Pandur and AMV) using them for a great deal of tasks (APC, IFV, MFV, Ambulance etc). But of course the MBT is in many aspects a class of its own and irreplacable for many situations.

 

[Waylander]

While I'm out of my line here it depends where and in which numbers the AFV are operated. The large fleet of the LAV III has not only intrinsically a smaller infootprint but the various elements also reach faster the critical mass (6-8) which makes the maintenance even in medium bases efficient. A tracked IFV might have only a slightly smaller footprint per platform than a MBT, but once again the critical mass is more easily achieved.

While I agree that in theaters like Iraq or A-stan lighter wheeled vehicles naturally form the bulk of the vehicles I don't agree with your idea of tracked IFVs achieving critical mass much faster.
A tracked IFV is as complicated to transport as a MBT. It either goes by ship and train or one needs a heavy transport plane.
And modern IFVs tend to be nearly as expensive as MBTs these days.

Because of that I want I also would want to have a whole family of heavy tracked vehicles be it for IFVs, MBTs, or heavy fire support vehicles.
The mentioned Merkava and Namer vehicles are an example. With these vehicles using a common chassis it is also not really important how you mix up your heavy assets in theater as the critical mass is not linked to MBT or IFV but to light and wheeled or heavy and tracked.

Very small armies like the Sovenian might also discard MBT completely to focus on one or two wheeled AFV (Pandur and AMV) using them for a great deal of tasks (APC, IFV, MFV, Ambulance etc). But of course the MBT is in many aspects a class of its own and irreplacable for many situations.

That is IMHO only possible if one totally relies on other for the defense of the homecountry. Not an option for most countries out there and IMHO not a wise one for the countries which are already on this path.

 

[Firn]

While I agree that in theaters like Iraq or A-stan lighter wheeled vehicles naturally form the bulk of the vehicles I don't agree with your idea of tracked IFVs achieving critical mass much faster.
A tracked IFV is as complicated to transport as a MBT. It either goes by ship and train or one needs a heavy transport plane.
And modern IFVs tend to be nearly as expensive as MBTs these days.

Because of that I want I also would want to have a whole family of heavy tracked vehicles be it for IFVs, MBTs, or heavy fire support vehicles.
The mentioned Merkava and Namer vehicles are an example. With these vehicles using a common chassis it is also not really important how you mix up your heavy assets in theater as the critical mass is not linked to MBT or IFV but to light and wheeled or heavy and tracked.
.

When I said "critical mass" for maintenance/support I meant that the tracked platform of the IFV will usually be present in larger numbers (and in different moduls) in the theater of operation than the platform used by the MBT. Among other things this makes it easier or more efficient to maintain.

A heavy platform as the IFV Puma offers a great chassis for a heavy MFV for a wide number of reasons. But using the Leopard chassis could also make sense. It largely depends how well the whole asset fits into the whole system aka armed forces. From an Israeli point of view a heavy MFV on the base of the Merkava would be most likely the best solution.



MFV in (training) action


[ame="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QXN7FZN0j1g"]AMOS[/ame]

The AMOS , a little brochure with some nice pictures. It looks out of place on the old Sisu Pasi, but seems to "fit" the CV90 well.


[ame="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I4YIFuPwnnE&feature=related"]AMOS II[/ame]

That is IMHO only possible if one totally relies on other for the defense of the homecountry. Not an option for most countries out there and IMHO not a wise one for the countries which are already on this path.

As said above, in the case of Slovenia it can make very good sense, as their ressources are very much limited. For a larger military the MBT is usually more important. A military of a country like Germany and France could be able to operate MFVs/Mortar carriers in various forms (heavy MFV (Leopard or Puma), medium MFV (Boxer), light MFV (Wiesel 2).


[ame="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xxBFUNk2dHo&feature=related"]NEMO[/ame]


[ame="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TSzCuVtk5CQ&feature=related"]AMV with NEMO and Tank gun[/ame]

A much more sensible choice for a light MFV and chassis like the LAV III and AMV.


[ame="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qln3hVoe8qA&feature=related"]Wiesel 2 LePzMrs[/ame]

An excellent choice for mountain, marine and para units.



.... I will give also an overview over the RWS, an integral part of a MFV

 

[Firn]

The brave new world of the RWS


The market seems to have exploded in recent years, with a many variants, a lot of capabilites and a myriad combinations. Read first the concepts and the discussion LAV III: RWS or turret by professionals which were partly on the ground.

a) Situational Awerness and Quick Reactions

Fit every MFV with a sniper detection system like the Boomerang or muzzle flash detector. Add a seperate periscope/light RWS with an MG or HMG for the commander with good optics and IR. The seperate wide-view optic is imporant to allow an assistent gunner to get SA and search for the targets

Every shot taken at the MFV will get automatically geolocalized with the help of the GPS. Feed the information into the BMS (Battle management system) and into the sighting systems of the RWS and the commander. This helps to get the eyes on the sources of fire really quick.

A highly sensible "sniper location system" which relies on the acoustic signatures should also be able to detect other sounds. The humming of a tank engine, the quick moving rotor of an helicopter or the rattle of the tracks on hard ground should all be sensed by it when the MFV stands still. The directional microphones should get at the least a rough bearing on it and enable the user to rapidly investigate likely point of origine. This could help a lot to get helicopters down from the sky, as such a system could pinpoint with far greater ease than most sound emitters. This would be the time to throw a LAHAT in the mortar or to activate the RBS 70. Then scan the suspect segment of sky a keep the laser brush ready to paint the target.


b) Hunter-Killer or RWS-Mortar

The MFV should be equipped with the a high quality RWS atop of the turret with two main configurations, GMG or HMG. It should have excellent optics (IR and day) with good optical zoom (4-16), Laser range finder and the ability to geolocate the target and mark it at night with IR and a laser beam.

With a ballistic computer providing an accurate firing solution, possibly even while driving already the first round should be spot on. This way you will be able to acquire, identify and engage the target speedily, call in arty and air really fast and easily mark the target for CAS or fire support at night. The direct laser painting allows for great precision against directly visible and moving targets with mortar rounds like the Fireball.

(i) The GMG RWS is ideal for quick and deadly suppression. Plenty of different rounds available for that one, so something for all the tastes. It has also some indirect capability too. It might be a bit over the top in combination with a 120mm mortar, so a HMG or MG might be the better choice.

(ii) The HMG version is the "sniper" and can reach out a long way. It has the same "basic" package. A interesting addition might be here not an ATGM but the BOLIDE of the RBS-70. It is a Mach 2 laser beam riding SAM which could be guided by the already mostly existing hardware and some (complicated) software updates. Alternatively - and perhaps far better - the whole manpad kit could be used as the sensor suite for the RWS.​

Of course this SAM works bests as integrated node of a larger AD network. However it should already be alone a great danger to any CAS support in the vicinity. An alternative would be both the Stinger and the Mistral. But in the current environment it is an unnecessary addition


Overall the "hunter-killer" capability of the hunting RWS with some teeth and the killing twin-mortar. The networked sensor and FCS should enable to get rounds very fast downrange following external or internal input, indirect or direct fire.


c) Protecting this golden goose

Look into an active defense suite, like the AMAP-T, as it may be just a matter of time unitil the MFV has a nasty encounter with a modern AT missile or round. It seems to be likely and sensible addition of almost any AFV. It may also increase SA by helping to detect the source of the incoming fire. In this context a smoke launcher unit could be useful. Perhaps a softkill system also might be of interest, but is also pricey.

Overview of the modern RWS


Capabilities sometimes already are:

• Detached Line of Sight (DLOS) enables the gunner to keep his sights on target, independent of ballistic solution for the weapon/ammo in use.
• Fully stabilized system provides unmatched observation and engagement capabilities.
• Thermal Imager with dual field of view, autofocus and e-zoom.
• Color Daylight camera allows a wide field of view up to 45 degrees while observing, and more than 30 times optical magnified close-up view of the target area when identifying and engaging a long distance target.​

I especially like the camera, sounds pretty close to what I imagined above.


Links and Links

Lemur

[ame="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xwJwOKbGML8"]Lemur[/ame]


Qimek


Samson


M151

[ame="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jtUpLwUvqvQ"]SeaProtector[/ame]


Amorak


OWS 25R


CROWS

[ame="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rv2tPNdEfL0&feature=related"]CROWS[/ame]


Arrows



Options consist of things like:

- Stabilisation for firing on the move
- Ballistic protection Level 1 STANAG 4569
- Laser range finder and ballistic computer for hit probability improvement
- Cooled Thermal camera
- Sight system with cleaning and de-icing / de-fogging
- Remote operation - system can be controlled from sheltered location, up to 30m from vehicle
- Networkable system linked through vehicle comms
- Links ans cases collector
- Smoke Grenade Launchers
- Interface with LASER Warning Receiver or Small Arms Detection and Localisation System​

The last one is also very interesting because it already seemed to me wise to spend (conservatively) 50000 € to greatly increase the SA and responsivness of a million € AFV and the rest of the network. Some background:


Locating Shots by Sound

[ame="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hzmXY-heGKY"]Boomerang[/ame]

Another video which shows a bit the idea:

[ame="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CKYO6oyCWVg"]SLS[/ame]

 

[Firn]

A question which might shed further light on the utility of such a MFV. What are the usual combat ranges of tanks in recent exercises? What are were they, are they in recent wars and conflicts? In WWII?

 

[Waylander]

In Desert Storm they plinkered tanks up to 4 klicks away with long range engagements being more likely but Eckherl should be able to get deeper into this conflict.

During Iraqi Freedom the fighting distances were much smaller with the second brigade of the 3rd ID having a tank fight inside a town (something with M...) where their gunbarrels nearly touched the enemy T-72s and BMPs.

During my training experiences in the north german plain we seldomely had engagements at more than 1km with some training days seeing no engagement at more than 1 klick at all.
And the north german plain is said to be one of the better tanking areas in europe.

 

[Firn]

The Soviet Tanker Experience, Source

I focused on encounters with Tanks, AT-guns and "fausters".


Fights in MOUT:

We suffered heavy losses in Berlin, primarily from the “fausters” [Panzerfaust-armed infantry – Transl.]. Our combat formation during the city battles was as follows – first the sappers, then the tanks, then SMG infantry behind the tanks. The sappers defused mines, while the tanks shot up the buildings from which the Germans were firing with HE shells, and the infantry mopped up. But the “fausters” hid a lot, waiting for a chance to ambush a tank.


The German artillery was second to the “fausters” but still bothersome. The Germans had converted every sewer manhole into a gun pit and mined the streets around them. So it was difficult to move forward, the attack progressed very slowly. Think about it – we were fighting in Berlin from April 21 to May 5. That’s when we had the idea to rig up nets out of bedsprings on our tanks. I held a meeting of the brigade technical chiefs, and that’s where the suggestion was brought up, seeing as there were a lot of bedsprings around.

Did you lock your hatches during combat in built-up areas?

- We absolutely locked our hatches from the inside. In my own experience, when we burst into Vienna, they were throwing grenades at us from the upper floors of buildings. I ordered all the tanks to be parked under the archways of buildings and bridges. From time to time I had to pull my tank out into the open to extend a whip antenna and send and receive communications from my higher commander. On one occasion, a radio operator and driver-mechanic were doing something inside their tank and left the hatch open. Someone dropped a grenade through the hatch from above. It struck the back of the radio operator and detonated. Both were killed. Thus we most certainly locked our hatches when we were in built-up areas.

- The primary defeating mechanism of HEAT (hollow-charge) ammunition, of which the panzerfaust was one type, is the high pressure in the tank, which disables the crew. If the hatches were kept slightly open, would this not provide some degree of protection? A special order was issued before our forces entered Germany.

- This is true, but just the same we kept our hatches locked. It might have been different in other units. The panzerfaust gunners most often fired at the engine compartment. If they were able to set the tank on fire, like it or not the crew had to get out. And then the Germans shot at the crew with a machine gun.

My tank was hit on 19 April 1945 in Austria. A Tiger put a round straight through us. The projectile passed through the entire fighting compartment and then the engine compartment. There were three officers in the tank: I as the battalion commander, the company commander Sasha Ionov (whose own tank had already been hit), and the tank commander. Three officers, a driver-mechanic, and a radio operator.

Forests and difficult terrain:

The thick forest masked the Finnish emplacements. Something had to be done – headquarters ordered suppressive fire over open sights from all available weapons. We complied with the order, of course. The shells literally obliterated the woods, and then we saw the Finnish defenses. These were egg-shaped, and constructed in a checkerboard pattern. Just imagine – concrete, two-storied structures. We later determined that each floor had eighteen heavy machine-guns, and there was also an artillery position at the top of each emplacement. After the war I found out that the Finns had been constructing these positions for twenty seven years across the entire Karelian Isthmus. And back then, we couldn’t even approach them. The tanks would bury themselves in deep snow, or else be stymied by concrete-lined ditches or all the trees cut down by our shellfire.

Fights in intersected country:

Not every time, but it did happen. I don't remember the Henschel; perhaps there was such an airplane. Sometimes we were able to avoid bombs. You could see them coming at you, you know. We opened our hatches, stuck out our heads, and instructed our drivers over the intercom: "The bomb will fall in front of us". But in general there were cases when tanks were hit and set on fire. Losses from these attacks did not exceed 3-5 tanks in the battalion. It was more common for a single tank to be damaged or destroyed. We faced much greater danger from panzerfaust gunners in built-up areas.

The main source of tank losses was German artillery. Losses to aircraft were fairly small – maybe 10%. The tank could only be knocked out with a direct hit, otherwise the bomb fragments would just bounce off harmlessly. During the Kursk battles, 76% of our losses were due to enemy guns, the rest due to mines and aircraft. When we first ran into the “fausters” during the Visla-Oder offensive, they didn’t account for more than 10% of our losses.

We changed direction there and headed towards Dvinsk. We did not attack. It was very rare that we had to advance in a classical manner against organized defense lines. The Germans usually arranged some ambush, where they used “ArtStorms", sort of self-propelled artillery equipped with 75 mm guns. They moved quietly, had low-profile construction and easily disguised, were extremely hard to detect. We advanced in a march column order, as an advance point, a few tanks in front, the others at some distance. If the Germans arranged an ambush that meant that advance point would be knocked out surely. Those alive would get out, remaining tanks would open fire. However where to shoot? God knows! Germans already disappeared. After some shooting, we would fold up into a march column again and be after them. Once caught up with the enemy we would annihilate them.

Once we came across such an ambush. Two tanks, which were ahead of us, were burnt, the third one was retreating firing back. They stuck a billet right under the turret bed and it caught fire. Meantime we turned away from the road, the engines died, ran out of fuel. That is why we heard people scream inside the burning machine.

Position that we held was not good, in a centre of a swampy depression covered with short shrubs and trees. There was a settlement about one kilometer ahead, and to the right there was a road leading to it. When I was watching the settlement I noticed a “Tiger” in between the dwellings and the plantings, however could not aim at it properly, the line of fire was obstructed by tree branches. I then approached my Platoon Leader Lieutenant Velikov, to try to swap the German of his tank. His tank stood somewhat at an angle to that village in an open spot. Velikov slept in a tank. I climbed up his turret, there was his tank-driver Sergeant Moiseenko there. We woke Velikov up. I said:
“Have a look over these houses, there is a “Tiger” there.”
“No, that can not be. It looks like a barn.”
“No, there is a square there, and something black in the middle.”
We looked up once again through binoculars, seemed like a tank. Decided to smack it with a shell.


As soon as Velikov started to turn the turret around I saw a flash and shouted to Sergeant:
“Jump off!”
I myself jumped off behind the tank, and Moiseenko fell off the other side facing the enemy. The billet hit the side of the tank, rebounded and took his scull off. The German second shot hit the ball machine-gun turret, and the third shell struck the turret itself, however did not breach the amour. Velikov jumped out of the tank:
“Need to withdraw, where is the driver?”
“Lies over there.”

He might have known the circumstances there however did not tell me anything. We went by a few kilometers, got up the next hillock, and suddenly I saw a tank across the road about 500 meters ahead, firing towards the woods, to our left. What the hell was that? I stopped. There was some dwelling on the right side of the road, behind which hid two or three other tanks. The one on the road, which was firing, caught fire as I was looking at it. I approached tanks behind the dwelling:

“What’s happening boys?”
They already had some men wounded, bandaged each other.
“There are some Tigers or self-propelled guns it appears.”
“And what is the tank burnt on the road?”
“Hell knows.”
I got back, climbed up the amour and looked around through the binos, saw these ArtStorms in the woods about 800 meters ahead. Ivatulin described later:
“They kept firing at our tank, and my Commander got up the turret and watched them through his binos!”
I needed to know the disposition though. They ceased fire. I felt that I had been taken to aim, but they hesitated to fire. What should I do?
“Zhdanov, as soon as Ivatulin takes off, you turn the gun around and fire. Ivatulin, you go around and hide behind this dwelling.”
We had hardly managed to turn around when they hit us in the side. Tank caught fire and we all jumped off into the right, farthest from the enemy ditch. Lost view of Zhdanov at this moment. Started looking for him, could not find in our ditch. Crawled over on the other side. Our tank in flames, shells are firing, however no detonation. Started searching the ditch and found Zhdanov dead, his clothes all burnt. We retreated and I reported to Battalion Commander that I lost the machine burnt and Zhdanov dead.

Captured Shipen, crossed a railway Memel-Tilsit and advanced towards Tilsit. On the 11th October I was wounded. On that day I was moving fourth as part of an advance unit. The Germans had a gun and something else in the ambush there. I saw the gun when I got out of the tank after it was hit in the right-hand side by a billet. At first I felt that something hit me in my hip and saw flames underneath. I got out and then knew I was wounded, some debris shot me in the hip and the anklebone. I ran off into the ditch on my right hand side. Together with me a gunner jumped out which I had in my crew in the place of a signalman-gunner, whom I did not have. The rest of the crew hid in a left-hand side ditch. I noticed the German trenches about 30 meters ahead of us.

I leaned out of the hatch. I noticed a German (Gerry) about 30 meters away from us holding a grenade launcher, popping out from behind a dwelling. I fired at him from my handgun, making sure he could not aim properly. He managed to make a shot, however the grenade blew off hitting the ditch parapet in front of the tank. I said to my crew:
“Get out, or else we’ll get burnt in here. All of us got out and scattered around quick. I had a warm German pants on me equipped with straps, which I wrapped around my waist. When I was getting out, I caught something on there and hung up on these straps, as a sausage.
“Well, I thought, I’m finished.”
Meantime the German jumped out from behind the house and ran towards our tank holding his grenade launcher, apparently thinking everybody scarpered. I got my handgun out and shot him.

Next to Topiau my tank got burnt off again. We needed to cross over a high embankment, which was in a line of fire. The Company Leader ahead, I was behind him. Behind me was Levin, Lyashenko followed him. Kept moving. I noticed that the canvass covering transmission on the first tank went off. At that time I had some water frozen into ice inside my periscope and could not use it. I did not have time to look after it then. We did not even have time to eat, just had some chocolate. I kneeled on my seat and stuck my head up trying to recognize where they shooting from. There was a usual winter weather: cloudy and still air looked hazy with some hoarfrost.

The Germans camouflaged in the woods and clearly saw us moving on the road against the sky background, they had all the options to pick and choose a target. I saw a black billet flashing by against white snow. I yelled to my driver:
“Get in the gear quick, we under fire.”
I looked back to see if Levin was hit by a billet and saw my own transmission in flames. I ordered my crew to jump out of the tank one by one. I knew that if we stop the road would be blocked. That is why I wanted to pull the tank down by the side of the embankment. I went on the side of the tank to show my driver what to do, but he could not understand me. We went up a little bit and he stopped the machine behind another smashed tank.

Most of the quotes are from a seemingly very lucky Soviet tanker...


General:

The Sherman had its weaknesses, the greatest of which was its high center of gravity. The tank frequently tipped over on its side, like a Matryoshka doll (a wooden stacking doll). But I am alive today thanks to this deficiency. We were fighting in Hungary in December 1944. I was leading the battalion and on a turn my driver-mechanic clipped a curb. My tank went over on its side. We were thrown around, of course, but we survived the experience. Meanwhile the other four of my tanks went ahead and drove into an ambush. They were all destroyed.

On the one hand this rubber-coated track was a big plus. In the first place, this track had a service life approximately twice that of steel track. I might be mistaken, but I believe that the service life of the T-34 track was 2500 kilometers. The service life of the Sherman track was in excess of 5000 kilometers. Secondly, The Sherman drove like a car on hard surfaces, and our T-34 made so much noise that only the devil knows how many kilometers away it could be heard. What was the bad side of the Sherman track? In my book, Commanding the Red Army's Sherman Tanks, there is a chapter entitled "Barefooted". There I wrote about an incident that occurred in August 1944 in Romania, during the Jassy-Kishinev Operation. The heat was fearsome, somewhere around 30° C. We had driven approximately 100 km along a highway in a single day. The rubber linings on our support rollers got so hot that the rubber separated and peeled off in long pieces. Our corps paused not far from Bucharest. The rubber was flying around, the rollers had begun to jam up, the noise was terrible, and in the end we had been stopped. This was immediately reported to Moscow. Was this some kind of joke, an entire corps had halted?

I don't know why, but one shipment of tanks arrived with machine guns, and another without them. We used this machine gun against both aircraft and ground targets. We used it less frequently against air targets because the Germans were not fools. They bombed either from altitude or from a steep dive. The machine gun was good to 400-600 meters in the vertical. The Germans would drop their bombs from say, 800 meters or higher. He dropped his bomb and departed quickly. Try to shoot the bastard down! So yes, we used it, but it was not very effective. We even used our main gun against aircraft. We placed the tank on the upslope of a hill and fired. But our general impression of the machine gun was good. These machine guns were of great use to us in the war with Japan, against kamikazes. We fired them so much that they got red hot and began to cook off. To this day I have a piece of shrapnel in my head from an antiaircraft machine gun.

Notes

Note again that this are only the fights in which at least a German tank, AT-gun or "fauster" was present or mentioned. There were a good deal of instances when infantry without the means to defeat tanks were overrun. One knocked out German tank (Stug III) is found, but the situation in which it was defeated is not reported.


Conclusions

This stories have of course the survivor bias, as the men who told them went sometimes through a couple of tanks, were wounded and lost crewmembers. The longest shot comes from a tiger 1 klick away, the shortest from 10m. With the hatches close the SA was usually very limited so almost all crews drove with open ones as long as the tactical situation permitted. In MOUT for example they were mostly forced to close them due to the ambushes from very close distances.

The Germans seemed to have been very adept at ambushes and camouflaged their AFV and Gun positions very well, and shot usually when a hit was very likely. The Stug III and the AT-gun were very dangerous in almost all situations. In MOUT or thick vegetation Panzerfausts and also handgranades were most feared. The ranges in this cases were often very very short. Massed artillery was also be used against concentrated attacks and proved very effective.

Surprise seems truly to be beside numbers the only advantage of the attacking side. In such cases the shock of the sudden concentrated assault could wreak havo, see the example of the SP tanker in the German village. However the same attack against prepared defenders the day after would result in the destruction of all attacking AFV bar one.

 

[Firn]

SP Tankers

Our losses during a typical “special” operation ran at about 50%. In this particular case, however, we understood that we were about to be sent on a suicide mission. Why else would Leljushenko himself be trying so hard to raise our spirits…Anyway, after all the theater, they ordered us to take a small German village, saying that only our “all-terrain” assault guns could get to it through all the mud…


So here we were, sitting in our vehicles, waiting for the order to attack. There was a minefield between our positions and the village. They sent in 5 T-34 tanks with mine-clearing attachments ahead of us. The mine-clearing tanks are pretty slow, and the Germans immediately destroyed three of them…seeing this, we all rushed forward, hoping to get lucky…the minefield was made up of massive anti-tank mines, each with 100-200 kilograms of explosives. Any crew that drove over one of these went straight to heaven, their assault guns just disintegrated. A third of our assault guns blew up then and there…After fifteen minutes we reached the now-empty German village. Aside from those who died in the minefields, we had no losses. Most of the crews dismounted and began scavenging for “trophies”, but my guys stayed in the assault gun. I always thought it was a bad omen to take something that doesn’t belong to you. All of a sudden I saw a friend of mine named Topkasov carrying a new pair of leather boots, and instantly got the feeling that something bad was about to happen…

And then it did. A counterattack by German tanks! Topkasov’s assault gun was hit right in the fuel tank. You can imagine what happens when 200 liters of aviation gasoline light up, especially if the vehicle is carrying a full combat load of 80 shells…All that was left of my friend was one leg in a new leather boot…We managed to repel the German counterattack with great difficulties, but the regiment was bled dry in the process.

How did I manage to fire the gun? Before that first fight we did have some run-ins with the Germans, some long-range firing but nothing more substantial. During that time I rigged up an empty ammo crate to serve as a platform on which I could stand while firing the gun. The regiment’s commander later nicknamed me “gunner with a lectern”.

I got my second Medal of Valor – for destroying a German tank – in another battle later on. We were behind the Dniester River, when that bridgehead was already somewhat enlarged. The assault guns were standing in prepared positions, then the infantry told us that there are German tanks in such and such a place. We moved out, I let off a few shots and hit him in the side, I think. Then I heard shouts “he’s burning up!” It’s like this – you move out, then you start maneuvering. The assault gun commander moved us forward, I fired my shots and he immediately moved us back and to the side as he knew that the Germans would aim at the spot from which we had opened fire. In any case, I was credited with a kill – meanwhile, I’m still not really sure whether it was my target that was burning back there.

A.B.: How many shells did you fire?

I can’t say exactly. It’s like this – typically, you start by firing a few aiming shots with high explosive shells – once you’ve zeroed in on the target, then you hit it with an armor piercing round. You have to fire aiming shots first though. On the other hand, if you’re firing over open sights and can actually see the target in front of you, then you can use an armor piercing shell straight away. We were also issued specially made sub-caliber shells, 5 per combat load. I only ever got to fire one of those, for some reason they all had to be accounted for. Now regular high explosive or armor piercing rounds – they gave us lots of those.

The German attack was repelled in the end, but there was only one assault gun left out of the six that were there. When I got my commander to the medical station the sun began to rise, and our IL-2 Shturmoviks began to arrive. I decided I had to go back to my assault gun – I had no right to leave the frontline. I thought – if I were to go back to the rear areas, they’d ask me what was I doing there. So I went back to my assault gun.


My vehicle had completely fallen apart, I only remember the gearbox; it had been thrown clear and was burning with a blue flame. Our assault gun was on one side of the street, while right across from it stood a German tank. With a tanker half-fallen out of one of the hatches. My crew told me: we were standing right there, the German tank came up and got hit right in the side at point blank range, at most from 10 meters away. So that’s what happened in the Dniester bridgehead.

Then we saw a German village, and some defensive positions just behind it. There was infantry, of course, plus at least one gun battery and some mortars. And then…we managed to sneak right up to the German positions, then suddenly burst into them firing at point blank range. I could see the terrified faces of the enemy soldiers the moment before they were crushed by the tracks of my vehicle. The Germans ran. We really massacred them!..and then, the German artillery came alive all along the frontline. There was tremendous shelling, they were firing indiscriminately on us and on their own men. We barely managed to avoid the enemy fire – I drove into the village, rammed an iron gate with my assault gun and took cover in the courtyard of a stone house. Later on, with incredible difficulty we made it back to our lines, all under enemy fire. And the next day they told us – “yesterday’s mission was only partially fulfilled. We’re going to have to do another combat reconnaissance today!” I just sat down at the driver’s station and told the guys who were staying behind: “write to my mother about how her son had died…” The feeling was that we were doomed…the Germans were waiting for us.


The moment we moved out they destroyed one of the T-34s…I don’t know how, but we almost made it back to the village. At that point, we were the only ones left, every other machine that went in with us was already burning…About 100 meters away from the village, we were ordered back to the starting positions. The German fire was so dense that I could only think – enough, kill me already! The ground shook from explosions, and on the way back we were finally hit…The assault gun began to burn, but we had enough time to bail out and take cover in a nearby ditch…then I felt something hit me in the leg. Shrapnel…we wound up crawling the two kilometers back to our lines under incessant enemy fire.

Well, there was this episode in the beginning of 1945. We were supporting some infantry, shelling the Germans for about an hour. There was an escarpment about 150 meters to our right. Suddenly, we saw our infantry running from that direction. Tanks!..So we turned around to face the escarpment and waited. The first tank appeared – well, first his gun barrel, and only then the rest of him. I aimed the gun and took him out with a sub-caliber shell. There was just this sigh of relief…and then the second enemy tank crawled out into sight. It was a duel – who will manage to fire first? There was so much adrenaline in the bloodstream then…you can’t think of death, you don’t even have time to get scared. I just aimed and fired. Got him. And then the infantry finished off the enemy crews with a squad machine gun. After a fight like this, you’re just glad that you got lucky again…

G.K. – What is your view of the quality of German tankers?

V.V. – Their training was very thorough. The Germans were a very serious opponent. To be honest, their equipment was also a lot better. The German tank guns had a higher muzzle velocity and much better sights, which of course had very unfortunate consequences for us. But by the end of the war, the Germans didn’t really take risks very often. This one night we were parked in a column of march, in a single file, actually, with all the motors shut off. Suddenly, several German Panther tanks rushed past us at high speed. We never understood why they didn’t just shoot up our column at point blank range, we wouldn’t have had any time to turn our guns towards them…

V.V. – During the last year of the war, less than 25% of our crewmen survived. You see, assault guns – they’re really designed to provide artillery support for the infantry. And instead, we were often used in frontal assaults. A light assault gun just doesn’t have the armored protection, and its gun traverse is very limited. Plus, by the end of the war tanks as a whole became much more vulnerable. But – no-one ever spared us. Who has ever spared the common soldier?

The German Panzerfaust detachments were very active against us from February to April of 1945. These were mainly put together from German penal units and Vlasov’s men [Russian defectors who fought on the German side under General Andrei Vlasov, who had been captured in 1942 – Transl.]. One time, they destroyed an IS-2 tank standing a few dozen meters away right before my eyes. Our regiment was lucky enough to enter Berlin from the Potsdam side, and we never had to fight through the center of the city, where the Panzerfausters were just running wild…

Comment:

Look at the conclusions in the first post. The panzerfausts seems to have really made a big difference, especially in MOUT. I really wonder how nowadays things could turn out in MOUT against a determined with decent equipment.

 

[Firn]

The American experience


As every wartime material this has to be taken with a pinch of salt


German AT-tactics in North Africa

German tanks and tactics

Recent Developments in (Tank) Tactics, 1943

Employing tanks with infantry

British Do's and Don'ts

German tactics in Italy

British view on German Tank tactics

AT-weapons


Comments:

Once again most encounters were no mobile battles between tanks. The Germans usually tried to fight with all combined arms. Once again the AT-guns were the main tank killers, pushed agressively forward or very well camouflaged and dug in as far as the situation allowed. Even the 88 could only eliminate a tank out to 1200 m (according to one tank commander). In this case technology was the limitating factor.

The great allied superiority in firepower and the accumulated German experience and thinking led to an sophisticated use of terrain. Up to four slopes were incorporated in an elastic defense in depth which would allow camouflaged AT-guns to shot from close distances against skylined tanks driving over hills into unobserved terrain. They had to lead the assault as dispersed infantry defended the lightly held first slopes with delaying actions. It seems that they at the lastest in Italy they had elevated the defence to new mastery, if one can trust the enemy intelligence...

P.S: Lone Sentry: German Remote-Controlled Machine Gun for Assault Guns and Tank Destroyers (U.S. WWII Intelligence Bulletin, May 1945)

An interesting first "Hunter-Killer" RWS

 

[Firn]

Recent American experience, OIF



In Sadr city


Every wanted tanks


The Battle of Fallujah



Comments: Similarities and Differences in MOUT


Differences:


Most impressive are the different fates of the tip of the armored spearheads. The Soviet tankers and SP tankers seemed to have the loss of the first tanks in an enemy ambush practically for granted. In Iraq the American Armor seemed almost invulnerable. Only the rear and the rear flank seem to have suffered penetrations.


During MOUT soviet sappers lead the way, followed by tanks supported by SMG infantry. This was necessary as "The Germans had converted every sewer manhole into a gun pit and mined the streets around them. So it was difficult to move forward, the attack progressed very slowly." In Sadr "Mahdi army elements set many burning roadblocks that had
to be destroyed immediately." However once again it was tanks who led the way, even if RPG gunners used the thermal screen to ambush the tanks.


Panzerfaust operators would (and partly had) to seemingly very often fire from very close range and were greatly feared in the last years/last year of the war, especially in built-up areas. They caused massive losses of Soviet AFV. In Iraq the RPG gunners seem to have very little experience. Although the fought with courage their positions were not set up very well. Losses were very low for the Americans. This is of course part of a general trend, Soviet losses were appalling and the stories of the veterans underline it often. Overall the American also suffered very few losses.


Soviet tankers would close their hatches very often in MOUT even if it blinded them as German defensive fire as well as handgrenades were seemingly very deadly. In Iraq members of the tank crew and additional soldiers would fire from the top of the tank even if the Abrams offered far better SA than the T34. The Iraqi small arms fire was rather uneffective. Lesson: "During military operations in urban terrain (MOUT), tank units without infantry support need to fight open hatch."


In most MOUT in WWII overall progress was even with slow and very slow. Even if the commanders had great (Stalingrad) and huge (Berlin) firepower at their disposal. So while combat itself was very fast and fluid, operations were very timeconsuming. In OIF the Allies mostly advanced all in all very quickly.


Something in between

During MOUT the soviet tankers stated " Our regiment was lucky enough to enter Berlin from the Potsdam side, and we never had to fight through the center of the city, where the Panzerfausters were just running wild…" The tanks fired HE, "But the “fausters” hid a lot, waiting for a chance to ambush a tank." In Iraq "Tanks had shock effect. Some interviewees pointed out that “tanks got respect” and that many Iraqi fighters ran from them". On the other hand wounded where evacuated under great danger.



Similarities


AFVs running into undetected positions seems to have been the norm in both wars. In the case of the Abrams the armor was able to compensate for the poor SA. As said above the outcome was quite different though.


In Iraq "Reconnaissance by fire is very effective against strong dismounted opposition in urban terrain". Seems right out of the introduction of a Soviet MOUT book, with "destruction by fire" as step 2.


In WWII the machine guns of tanks were very important against enemy infantry. The tankers usually also had SMG, handgrenades and sometimes Panzerfausts. In Iraq "We killed a number of enemy on rooftops, but constantfire from our coax machine guns and .50-caliber machine gunskept them from putting together cohesive attacks from two- and three-story building rooftops" Note that this fire was partially delivered out of opern hatches.


Both in WWII and Iraq quick and heavy firepower was very important to suppress and kill the defenders. The gunners engaged targets with their main gun quickly.


HE was the ammunition of choice in MOUT and used to suppress and kill the enemies which had revealed their position. In Iraq " 120mm HEAT is better than .50-caliber for limiting collateraldamage HEAT causes a great deal more structural damage, but dissipates after one or two rooms, killing everybody at the point of impact. Using 120mm HEAT has more of a decisive tactical advantage and limits unnecessary deaths."


In both wars MOUT tactical Situations changed very quickly and demanded a lot of support and command and control. Communication was vital between firendly elements.



More to come...

I will later try to sum it up better and see how a HMFV aka MBT with a mortar would likely perform under the mentioned circumstances.

 

[Firn]

More links:


Field artillery and firepower in special operations

By seemingly on of the biggest authorities on Artillery and firepower. The whole book seems to be worthwhile to read, but is rather huge.


Thesis about MOUT in Grozny



Grozny: Tactial Observations

[ame="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I7eYGWjZI8s"]The terrible thermobaric/fuel-air Shmel[/ame]

[ame="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KX8McyNa6jk&NR=1"]Russian fuel weapons[/ame]

Truly frightening weapons, fit for their terrible purpose, more informations here.

Note that the writer seems do think that "Otto von Clausewitz" has written little about the "people's war" and "to use Clausewitzian principles belies the nature of urban combat". Other than these most easily rebuked misunderstandings about Carl von Clausewitz it is seems to be a good thesis. But then again it is hard to go against the mentor...

[ame="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FYg17YrgWlk"]The USA follows suit[/ame]

"Violence arms itself with the inventions of Art and Science in order to contend against violence", Carl von Clausewitz.



After reading about MOUT in WWII it truly seems to be among the most terrible forms of warfare for the soldiers and especially the civilians. Grozny was hell too...

[ame="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oCXox3l7fWU&feature=related"]Berlin in Ruins[/ame]

 

[Firn]

During my training experiences in the north german plain we seldomely had engagements at more than 1km with some training days seeing no engagement at more than 1 klick at all.

And the north german plain is said to be one of the better tanking areas in europe.

Thanks. Where did you train, perhaps I can googlemap it

What where the the shortest engagements? And broadly at which ranges happened the most?

 

[Waylander]

The biggest training areas where I trained where Bergen and Munster.

The shortest ranges where maybe at roughly 50m-100m.
That happens when one or both sides get lost on some forest trails right in the middle of a dense fog (not good even for modern thermals).
During such infights friendly fire also becomes a big problem...

Without digging deep in my AGDUS statistics I would give 400-800 meters as the ususal fighting distance.

 

[Firn]

The biggest training areas where I trained where Bergen and Munster.

The shortest ranges where maybe at roughly 50m-100m.
That happens when one or both sides get lost on some forest trails right in the middle of a dense fog (not good even for modern thermals).
During such infights friendly fire also becomes a big problem...

Without digging deep in my AGDUS statistics I would give 400-800 meters as the ususal fighting distance.

I will give the areas a look - so much open ground is almost scary for me, I'm somehow hardwired to fix axes and mountain peaks


A more serious question: It seems that the ambushes by the German rearguards with well camouflaged assault guns (often supported by scouts nearby) were mostly very deadly for advancing soviet tanks without previous infantry recce. At least the sovie ex-tanker describe it that way.

Most of the times areas with good protection or decent cover like small villages and forests with open ground ahead were choosen. After the ambush the Stugs (and the scouts and snipers) raced away, having completed their delaying action.


I face now a dilemma. On one hand the thermals offer better SA and a greater change, I presume to see a hidden tank. On the other hand a hidden, waylandering tank camouflaged in both spectrums will have an even greater chance to aquire the moving target. The great leaps in gun and ammunition as well as in the FCS and the sights allow MBTs now to engage tanks at ranges over 4 klicks. So all in all this should mean that the ambush is in a tank engagement deadlier than ever before, or did I miss something

 

[Firn]

The GMG doing well in Afghanistan

Colonel Peter Rafferty, who leads Defence Equipment & Support's Dismounted Close Combat project team, said:

"This contract completes our planned buy of the equipment, a large proportion of which has been delivered ahead of schedule to meet the urgent requirements of the men on the ground.

"Reports from the front line have been extremely favourable, with the weapon's effectiveness allowing infantry company commanders to engage and defeat the enemy at range, providing overmatch of the enemy and the ability to achieve mission success more rapidly.

"The grenade machine gun, whether mounted on vehicles or on a tripod, has given our troops a major boost in the firepower they can bring to bear on the enemy.

"It's extremely effective – especially when teamed up with the powerful 0.5in calibre machine gun – and does the job that was intended. It's so accurate that a well-trained user can put a grenade through the window of a building over a kilometre away."

Colonel Rafferty added:

"The grenade machine guns were needed both to support infantry in difficult terrain, and to completely dominate the battlefield when in open terrain.

"While this programme will deliver the system mainly for use in a tripod-mounted role from the ground, it can also be mounted on several in-service vehicles, including armoured Land Rovers and the Mastiff protected patrol vehicle."

So it truly seems that a mix of HMG and GMG is the way to go for light/medium RWS mounted on AFV including the MFV. One can also clearly see the trend towards high quality optical and thermal sights and laser rangefinders integrated with a FCS on crew served weapons. It simply seems to enable the user to get out so much more of the GMG.

 

[Tony Williams]

The GMG doing well in Afghanistan

So it truly seems that a mix of HMG and GMG is the way to go for light/medium RWS mounted on AFV including the MFV. One can also clearly see the trend towards high quality optical and thermal sights and laser rangefinders on crew served weapons. It simply seems to enable the user to get out so much more of the GMG.

Yes - I've seen presentations of these modern sighting systems and they transform the accuracy of these weapons. They mean that you can get the first round on target, so the enemy has no time to take cover.

 

[Firn]

Yes - I've seen presentations of these modern sighting systems and they transform the accuracy of these weapons. They mean that you can get the first round on target, so the enemy has no time to take cover.

I frankly never understood why the crew-served weapons where almost the last ones to get even a simple scope. It seems that a good mount and scope enables the old MG3 to reach out to an effective range of 2 klicks. Such an expensive and effective weapon like the GMG can be trasformed from a short to medium range suppression weapon to a seemingly very accurate 1 klick "sniper"...

Give the nearby spotter not only good binos but also a true spotting scope like this Swarovski . You can have a brilliant 20x or a still very crisp 60x magnification in one ocular. It will prove worthwhile.

 

[Waylander]

I will give the areas a look - so much open ground is almost scary for me, I'm somehow hardwired to fix axes and mountain peaks


A more serious question: It seems that the ambushes by the German rearguards with well camouflaged assault guns (often supported by scouts nearby) were mostly very deadly for advancing soviet tanks without previous infantry recce. At least the sovie ex-tanker describe it that way.

Most of the times areas with good protection or decent cover like small villages and forests with open ground ahead were choosen. After the ambush the Stugs (and the scouts and snipers) raced away, having completed their delaying action.


I face now a dilemma. On one hand the thermals offer better SA and a greater change, I presume to see a hidden tank. On the other hand a hidden, waylandering tank camouflaged in both spectrums will have an even greater chance to aquire the moving target. The great leaps in gun and ammunition as well as in the FCS and the sights allow MBTs now to engage tanks at ranges over 4 klicks. So all in all this should mean that the ambush is in a tank engagement deadlier than ever before, or did I miss something

Your forward elemts are pretty much toast if your recce assets don't warn you.
A tank in a well camouflaged position is really hard to spot even with modern TIs.

Let's for example take a NATO vs Sovjet type of scenario with the sovjets being in the attack.
When they haven't located you by other means the first units are going to stumble upon your screening units which are well hidden.
The screening units might very well plinker some enemy AFVs but the real question is if they think they located the main line of defense or not.
If yes they start to unload their wall of fire and are going to advance behind it. Hopefully right into the guns of the main line which waits in prepared positions.
If not they are going to eat the screening units and wait for the main line.
This is the critical point. They are for sure going to loose a number of units due to them getting plinkered by camouflaged tanks but if they maintain cohesion and direct their artillery and possible air support right on top of you they might very well be able to close the gap very fast.
This results you having to change position less organzied and faster than anticipated with the sovjets being nearer than one hoped.
All this negates alot of the advantages one gets from sitting in an ambush position and at least the next echelon is going to eat you alive.
Atrittion goes up much too fast.

But you are right when you think that these days ambushes can be even more deadly than before.
Due to main guns and ATGMs reaching out to 4klicks or more it is important for the attacker to stay out of LOS for as long as possible.
At least if one goes against a decent organized and equipped enemy in something like european terrain.
Driving like the water flows and trying to get as wide as possible during the attack are the keys. (And hope that your recce, artillery and air support have a good day....)

 

[Firn]

Your forward elemts are pretty much toast if your recce assets don't warn you.A tank in a well camouflaged position is really hard to spot even with modern TIs.

Let's for example take a NATO vs Sovjet type of scenario with the sovjets being in the attack.

When they haven't located you by other means the first units are going to stumble upon your screening units which are well hidden.
The screening units might very well plinker some enemy AFVs but the real question is if they think they located the main line of defense or not.
If yes they start to unload their wall of fire and are going to advance behind it. Hopefully right into the guns of the main line which waits in prepared positions. If not they are going to eat the screening units and wait for the main line.

This is the critical point. They are for sure going to loose a number of units due to them getting plinkered by camouflaged tanks but if they maintain cohesion and direct their artillery and possible air support right on top of you they might very well be able to close the gap very fast.
This results you having to change position less organzied and faster than anticipated with the sovjets being nearer than one hoped.
All this negates alot of the advantages one gets from sitting in an ambush position and at least the next echelon is going to eat you alive.
Atrittion goes up much too fast.

Thanks for your input.

while the technical side has changed alot I'm still surprised how many fundamentals have still remained the same.




Thoughts


On of the big, relative recent changes is that the fire support of the defending side is, with good interaction with the screen and recon elements able to reach out and destroy enemy advances far more efficiently than before. We already discussed the advantages of new smart ammunition of artillery and mortars as well as the far easier geolocating/targeting by recon elements and better integration of all assets before.

Among the most basic advantages of the defense is that it sees the attacker usually first, unless the latter can achieve tactical surprise. It is an almost tautologic assessment. This has also been the reason why the Abrams where in Iraq and the Leopards are in Afghanistan the tip of the spear, or why the Merkavas combined with engineers lead the way. The key difference was that in the latter case the OPFOR had ATGM which could be effectively employed .



The heavy mortar fighting vehicle



Thinking about the heavy MFV one can see that modern MBT like the Leopard II would be with an 120mm mortar instead of a 120mm gun an excellent asset. We have already seen that it outperforms an classic MBT in MOUT operatios in all but two areas.


Intrinsic disadvantages of the mortar-armed Leopard II

(i) direct fights against MBTs and perhaps other heavy AFV
(ii) penetration power against hard targets
(iii) greater direct reach with canister
​

Intrinsic advantages of the it

(i) Very high elevation of the mortar, roughly 85°
(ii) A lower depression is due to the reduced recoil also possible to achieve
(iii) The shorter barrel (3ms vs 5-6m) makes a turret sweep far easier
(iv) More ammunition can be stored
(v) Reduced blast, eases cooperation wiht the infantry but doesn't kill entrenched enemies as well with it.
​

To that come all the huge advantages of the indirect fire which is also close by and very responsive. We touched that already.

 

[Firn]

BTW: If an 105mm large warhead of an RPG-29 with a weight of 6kg can penetrate the frontal arc (most likely lower hull!) of a Challanger 2 MBT than a 120mm large and heavier HEAT warhead of a mortar should also be not underestimated...

By far not on par with the good old 120mm smoothbore tank gun, but a more than enough for most threats...