Australia is not ready for war

[swerve]

I note that the Spanish started small making wheeled APCs in the 1980s, but proved capable enough to be bought by IVECO.

No, I suggest we use existing engineering knowledge and innovate based on that. That's not "from scratch". A group of final year uni students from engineering departments can make prototypes given budgets, but I'm sure experienced commercial engineers will do better.

The Spanish automotive industry is several times the size of Australias. It's bigger than the UKs. That is the basis on which Spains move into AFV production was built, as with Spanish warship production, which is based on a substantial civilian industry. And even so, like the industries of Switzerland, Austria, Sweden, the Netherlands & Belgium, it's no longer independent.

You are advocating Australia builds capabilities across the spectrum, not just in a few niches. Unless you propose militarising the economy, Soviet-style, that isn't attainable. You can't argue niche by niche, you have to consider what resources are available, & divide them between all your proposed capabilities. I believe you will run out of resources (engineering skills, investment funds - whatever you care to consider) long before you run out of weapons developments which would need them.

 

[Aussie Digger]

Do go on, but about threats. All of the above are capabilities, and I'm sure the Minister was referring to threats that need to be considered by Australia.

Definition of a threat is intent + capability. Intent is easily changed, capability is not.

In-service capabilities ARE a massive component of ANY threat.

Oh, 1.5 is it? That's as in six INFANTRY COMPANIES?

Army hasn't maintained 4x rifle coy's per battalion for a LONG time and even then you ARE forgetting Support and Admin Coy's, which each regular battalion maintains...

But please continue "enlightening" us...

Timor - Op Astute: 2x rifle companies, plus an Admin Coy - 5RAR.

Afghanistan Op Slipper: 1x Rifle Coy from 7RAR, 1x Commando Coy from 4RAR (Cdo).

Solomans: Op Anode: 1x rifle coy from 5/7 - 8/7 Royal Victoria Regt.

Iraq: Op Kruger: 1x Rifle Coy minus from 5RAR.

Hence we have 1RAR, 2RAR, 3RAR, 6RAR and the first Coy of 8/9RAR with NO rifle Coy Groups deployed whatsoever.

7RAR has only 1 Coy group deployed.

4RAR has only 1 out of 3 Commando Coy's deployed.

Artillery has a troop of 14x diggers seconded to the British Arm and a Coy group formed from 16 AD Regt.

Want to count them out on your fingers, again and see if we could deploy more than Timor levels?

Available for what? The RAN/RAAF combined could not lift one extra battalion above those available now, and certainly not with their complement of Bushmasters without leasing a civilian Ro-Ro vessel.
They are running the in-battalion IET courses because of the reduction in the Singleton course length, what two years ago? (I forget)

No. They are running IET courses in the battalions, because Singleton's capacity is maxed out, course in course out. If you actually spoke with real soldiers, you would HEAR the stories of bottlenecks in the training program, digs WAITING to get on courses.

So far 3, 5/7 and 1RAR have run their own IET courses, because Singleton based courses are FULL of new infantry recruits.

As for RAAF/RAN lift, I'm not quite sure what you are comparing their lift levels too? Timor or when?

Certainly ADF lift capacity has improved enormously since 2000....

What if East Timor turned into an Australian Northern Ireland? Would Bushmaster still be an outstanding vehicle? And lets face it, Australians were only involved in protecting their own training and local activities and not so much combat in Iraq. In Afghanistan the ADF has just been lucky. However, the intensity is really only just now starting to pick up there.

What if. Try looking at the underlying causes of such conflict before making such ridiculous statements. As for Bushmaster, it WAS deployed to Timor and once again, performed superbly.

Oh I don't know. With the new order there will be as many Bushmasters in the Army and the RAAF as the total M113 fleet, including storage, the best of which were used for the AS3/4 upgrade. What do you reckon is supplementing what?

You don't know what you are talking about quite clearly. The original HNA plan was for Bushmaster to supplement M113AS3/4 in 5/7RAR.

Then ELF came along and delinked 5/7 into the 2 battalions. In addition to this, an additional 81x M113AS3/4's have been ordered, as you no doubt know, however the Bushmaster is not being employed within these battalions now. Soley M113AS3/4.

The Bushmaster is being issued to 1 Brigade units that would traditionally be equipped with nothing better than B vehicles, along with the originally planned for "motorised brigade" 7 Brigade and the aforementioned B Sqn 3/4 Cav.

I think you just put your words into my mouth. What I said is that we should not put infantry into a vehicle for which "The original concept was that the vehicle would be used solely for transportation, bringing the troops forward under armor and then having them dismount for combat; the M113 would then retreat to the rear."

We don't and nor do we operate our M113s in this fashion. One might as well employ them from soft skin trucks if this is going to be your conops...

This is disingenuous. In bot the US and British armies the upgraded APCs serve in solely support roles not frontline infantry combat vehicles. AFAIK the Australian AS3/4 upgrade has not received anything like the armour package of the Israeli version.

The M113AS3/4 is being built to a cost capped budget. However it's specification is akin to an interim status with respect to the deployability of the vehicles.

Armour upgrades, plus additional belly armour and " anti-RPG mesh screens" are intended for the vehicles, should a deployment to an AO such as Afghanistan be contemplated.

DMO has confirmed that such options have been scoped and engineering work done on them. What remains absent is the funding, as with ASLAVs, before Iraq, to actually buy the kit.

The vehicles would much more closely match the protection offered by the Israeli packages, under such circumstances.

Ah, so you think that all those countries with infantry trained for dedicated operations from amphibious ships are wasting their time?

Not at all. However they don't try and achieve all these capabilities with a regular force of only 8 infantry battalions and an amphibious force of 3 ships in total...

What Sea Lion, Army's amphibious doctrine and other activities are attempting to do is develop the basis from which an amphibious force could develop and subsequently operate.

Army and RAN proved they could deploy a mechanised unit by amphibious means on operations during Interfet itself, with 5/7RAR.

Amphibious operations are at the end of the day, are simply an insertion method. Your arguments about "lack of air cover" etc apply equally to the land force under ANY type of deployment.

And the East Timor border is 172km long. That leaves a 72km gap in air defence...

What? Can we only deploy one vessel?

FYI, ESSM has a range in excess of 50k's.

SM-2 Block IIIA (what the FFG's will have - AWD will have an improved variant) has a publicly declared range in excess of 185k's.

Have you ever seen the air defence version?

Yes.

I have not, but knew the Rapiers were the trailer part. In any case, its off-road capability does not compare with the rest of the fleet of vehicles, and neither does its survivability in a conventional conflict that may call for AD.

So what? Do you think that SAM missiles are EVER fired from tracked vehicles bouncing around off -road at high speed?

In any case, the Land Rover AD variant is an interim vehicle, the same as the Perentie 6x6 vehicle was for the infantry battalions at Gallipoli Barracks, Enoggera.

It provides excellent deployability, excellent mobility, for it's needs, which are NOT close combat with an entrenched enemy force.

I have no doubt the "protected vehicle" acquired under LAND 125 will replace the 16 AD vehicle fleet in due course.

I said they are not fired from M113, because that is not, as far as I know, the practice in the ADF, although it is elsewhere. It should really be fired from an M113/Bushmaster turret if it is to fit into the Army's doctrine and force structure of the mechanised/motorised infantry battalion. Currently its a toss up which is the weakest link in the Army, the AD or the towed artillery.

Replacement and supplementing of both capabilities is long overdue. It seems offensive artillery in the Army is close to finally being brought to a modern standard, here's hoping Government sees fit to fund a similarly capable project for AD under the White Paper.

Most of the combat operations are performed by the SO troops, not the infantry.
Obviously you have not heard proposals on acquiring 120mm mortars and where to get personnel to serve them....

No I haven't. Please enlighten me...

What I have heard about, in relation to Army mortar projects, is in relation to the ARES Artillery units, they are NOT equipped with 120mm mortars.

They are equipped with 81mm mortars, the same as issued to the infantry battalions (F2 81mm mortar).

A proposal for 120mm mortars in the last 10 years for Army was the "motorised 120mm mortar" project, however that was dropped in 2004 in favour of a new tank capability.

The only other "new" mortar project for Army is it's "Long Ranged Mortar" project, MINCS(l) AMP 48.36 which again, was not a 120mm based solution, but rather a replacement 81mm solution.

So, you can see, I try and keep up with Army, but I don't quite manage everything...

How is this relevant to ADF?

Well let's see. You have criticised ADF for not being able to deploy a Tiger helo to Afghanistan.

France, which has purchased MORE Tiger helos than us, has trained MORE pilots and has been developing the Tiger for LONGER than us, cannot yet provide a deployable Tiger capability.

Yeah, how is this relevant?

Ah, perhaps because the aircraft is NOT YET sufficiently mature, to deploy operationally?

Furthermore, it isn't simply a matter of helos and pilots/battle captains. You need more crews than helos (which we don't currently have) to deploy, you need the maintainers, you need spares, you need the time to develop your operational tactics and conduct collective, as opposed to individual training activities.

1 Aviation Regt is currently introducing a brand new helo which has not yet achieved IOC in Australia, or indeed in ANY other Country.

We need time to train pilots/battle captains/maintainers in how to operate the things, yes, but they then need to consolidate the capability, undertake mission rehearsal exercises etc. They need to build up a capability to employ the helo within the existing combined arms team formations we currently undertake and actually practice deploying the helo, as a capability (ie: a package of helos, plus supporting elements to conduct operations - say from Darwin to Shoalwater bay, for 4x helos and support)

It is here where you begin to learn what the problems are going to be. How many sorties can the aircraft generate, with the level of support available? Is the level of support we THINK is going to suffice, going to be enough? How can we best employ the Tiger?

All of this takes years. Just training enough pilots is only the beginning of the capability and we haven't even reached that point yet.

Well, if I'm impatient to see them in action, I can only imagine how the serving personnel must feel....

Agreed, but the fact is, our program is actually ahead of the French and German projects in some aspects. We have had to slow our program down somewhat because of this.

Type certification for the aircraft can't happen in Australia, until it's completed in France and there have been training delays on top of this, because the contractor hasn't delivered what was promised in terms of simulator capability etc.

Trainer shmainer, its an air force jet aircraft. Isn't that why they are painted in low vis scheme and not some gaudy RAAF red? They are low maintenance and shorter take off aircraft, and there are no targets that need advance targeting capability (though can be fitted), and even some rocket and gun pods will do...good fun Easier to ship to Afghanistan also. Not sure how the F-18 fits into a C-17. Americans used a C-5 Galaxy to deliver the initial batch F/A-18s.
Anyway, RAAF thinks its a two-seat advanced trainer/light attack fighter, and is armed with 30 mm Aden cannon, Sidewinder missiles, and light bombs. I bet it can also fire rockets. Love those 2.75" rockets

1. RAAF doesn't maintain a 2.75 inch rocket capability.

2. Australian RoE's will never authorise the use of a combat aircraft without a targetting pod capability.

3. EVERY target in Afghanistan is requiring precision guided munitions. Abe can no doubt chip in hear, if he is so inclined, but there is a SIGNIFICANT requirement for combat aircraft to employ munitions within "dangerous" (to blue forces) ranges in Afghanistan.

4. RAAF does NOT think it is a light attack fighter. It's 30mm cannon is only employed for gunnery training and it's "light bombs" are BDU-33's, which don't even possess an explosive charge, just a marking charge. If you want a little puff of smoke employed onto enemy forces, than this is the right aircraft, I guess....

The Hawks are not designed to train F/A-18 pilots, but pilots that will LATER train on F/A-18 after their initial flight training. The idea is that after Hawk they can say they can fly a jet. By that stage maybe Australia can sell Afghanistan some of its F/A-18 Hornets as it starts to receive F-35s? Mind you there will be so many F-16s and F-18s for sale soon that I think I will be able to afford one to fly to the corner store for milk and eggs

No, the Hawks are used to ONLY train pilots who will fly F/A-18s. They WERE used to train pilots who USED to go on to fly F/A-18s and F-111s, but the last F-111 course flew in 2007 and the Hawks are now soley used for would-be F/A-18 pilots, 76 and 79 Sqn instructors and the odd maritime and GBAD defence training.

The cockpit of the Mk 127 has been designed to replicate the F/A-18 Hornet cockpit as closely as possible. What does that tell you?

Australia's Hornets airframes will be entirely knackered by the time we are finished with them. FLEI is the measurement of the fatigue time left in the airframe and there is little left now. By 2018 there will be bugger all left...

Some spare parts, engines etc will be all that is useful in them. The airframes themselves will be shot ducks...

Yep, I'm all for it...lets go.... Oh, er, hmmmm, wait....not sure that's going to be in the White Paper...but we can hope

I don't live by the Internet alone either. DMO HAVE confirmed that options to further upgrade the M113 HAVE been studied. If they are going to be deployed, they will be enhanced...

What link? I do not live by the Internet alone. That's when the next US election is due, and Democrats are known as much for getting into wars as for getting out of them. The "significant ramping up" is, at a guess, so that in three years time Obama can declare a significant withdrawal (see Bush's preparation for the last US election with Iraq), hopefully after he has declared Bin Ladin dead by any means short of nuclear weapons. Either that, or he will announce general conscription and a campaign to occupy Pakistan (just kidding ), because short of that Afghanistan's security can not be ensured for all the money in China, and everyone knows it.

The USA is pumping an extra 4x Brigades into Afghanistan at present.

That doesn't point to a nation on the verge of withdrawing...

 

[FutureTank]

The Spanish automotive industry is several times the size of Australias. It's bigger than the UKs. That is the basis on which Spains move into AFV production was built, as with Spanish warship production, which is based on a substantial civilian industry. And even so, like the industries of Switzerland, Austria, Sweden, the Netherlands & Belgium, it's no longer independent.

You are advocating Australia builds capabilities across the spectrum, not just in a few niches. Unless you propose militarising the economy, Soviet-style, that isn't attainable. You can't argue niche by niche, you have to consider what resources are available, & divide them between all your proposed capabilities. I believe you will run out of resources (engineering skills, investment funds - whatever you care to consider) long before you run out of weapons developments which would need them.

Building armoured vehicles in a low-rate production scenario does not require either a highly developed general automotive industry, nor a militarised one.

 

[FutureTank]

Err.... good one. Do you even understand that warfare is divided into different clasifications depending on the type of conflict expected. There is a world of difference between forces configured to fight a high intensity conflict such as the classical Russian forces streaming through the Fulda gap into Germany, and a few paddies taking pot shots with semi or even full automativc weapons and the odd explosive device.

And what do you understand Marc 1? Do you know the origin of the term "Low Intensity Warfare"? It was introduced in the USA as a budgetary requirement so conventional forces allocation will not have funds syphoned off to SOF units. So SOFs have their own allocations, because they also said that some equipment are secret and can not be disclosed except to closed hearing of the Select Arms Committee due to threat to national security.
Low intensity warfare is where the observed enemy activity is reduced in density due to a variety of reasons, not the least political, or terrain, or....(continue with long list). As we can see in Afghanistan an estimated 10,000 Taliban fighters, essentially a light infantry division, is causing a lot of worry to NATO, an organisation set up to oppose the Soviet Army. This is not "low intensity warfare", but higher difficulty target acquisition warfare, that's all. The bullets are same. The tactics are same. You know it....patrolling is same regardless of it being Mao Mao, or Viet Cong, or Soviet Army, or IRA, or illegal Mexican border runners, etc. Its the same in the arid terrain of Israel, in the jungle of East Timor, in the fields of Ireland, in the mountains of Kashmir, in the cities of Iraq, etc.
At section and platoon level in any case. And when the target is found, guess what, it gets very intense for a while.

The LIC is NEVER applied to MOST of the Australian troops that are deployed now, which are the SAS, the Incidence Response and the Commando regiments. Taking out an NVA division commander is only different to taking out a Taliban province commander in the type of terrain the op happens in. The op is always intense. Conducting an ambush on a weapons caravan is always intense. Attempting to take Taliban prisoner in a surprise raid is always intensive.

The Bushmaster has had IED's detonated underneath them on many occasions in Afghanistan and Iraq yet I believe not one occupant has lost their life in one. Given the level of threat, what more do you want?

So you are saying that the ADF will never be called upon to engage in conventional warfare? So I guess the Abrams crews will only be issued with the HE ammunition?

Most regional armies have equipped their infantry with vehicles that mount a variety of auto-cannons and ATGWs that can punch holes through both sides of the Bushmaster, and the M113 for that matter, though not the AS3/4 (perhaps) . This includes the Indonesian Army's BMP-2s, 3s and AMX-10Ps. I don't know if the upgraded ADF M113s are to be issued with the SLAP rounds for their .50 cal HMGs, but they would be useful.

 

[Aussie Digger]

Most regional armies have equipped their infantry with vehicles that mount a variety of auto-cannons and ATGWs that can punch holes through both sides of the Bushmaster, and the M113 for that matter, though not the AS3/4 (perhaps) . This includes the Indonesian Army's BMP-2s, 3s and AMX-10Ps. I don't know if the upgraded ADF M113s are to be issued with the SLAP rounds for their .50 cal HMGs, but they would be useful.

The "Quick Change Barrel" variant of the M2 12.7mm machine guns we operate has been equipped with an undisclosed "improved range" of ammunition.

Make of this what you will...

 

[Marc 1]

And what do you understand Marc 1? Do you know the origin of the term "Low Intensity Warfare"? It was introduced in the USA as a budgetary requirement so conventional forces allocation will not have funds syphoned off to SOF units. So SOFs have their own allocations, because they also said that some equipment are secret and can not be disclosed except to closed hearing of the Select Arms Committee due to threat to national security.
Low intensity warfare is where the observed enemy activity is reduced in density due to a variety of reasons, not the least political, or terrain, or....(continue with long list). As we can see in Afghanistan an estimated 10,000 Taliban fighters, essentially a light infantry division, is causing a lot of worry to NATO, an organisation set up to oppose the Soviet Army. This is not "low intensity warfare", but higher difficulty target acquisition warfare, that's all. The bullets are same. The tactics are same. You know it....patrolling is same regardless of it being Mao Mao, or Viet Cong, or Soviet Army, or IRA, or illegal Mexican border runners, etc. Its the same in the arid terrain of Israel, in the jungle of East Timor, in the fields of Ireland, in the mountains of Kashmir, in the cities of Iraq, etc.
At section and platoon level in any case. And when the target is found, guess what, it gets very intense for a while.

The LIC is NEVER applied to MOST of the Australian troops that are deployed now, which are the SAS, the Incidence Response and the Commando regiments. Taking out an NVA division commander is only different to taking out a Taliban province commander in the type of terrain the op happens in. The op is always intense. Conducting an ambush on a weapons caravan is always intense. Attempting to take Taliban prisoner in a surprise raid is always intensive.


So you are saying that the ADF will never be called upon to engage in conventional warfare? So I guess the Abrams crews will only be issued with the HE ammunition?

Most regional armies have equipped their infantry with vehicles that mount a variety of auto-cannons and ATGWs that can punch holes through both sides of the Bushmaster, and the M113 for that matter, though not the AS3/4 (perhaps) . This includes the Indonesian Army's BMP-2s, 3s and AMX-10Ps. I don't know if the upgraded ADF M113s are to be issued with the SLAP rounds for their .50 cal HMGs, but they would be useful.

No, what I am saying is that you can employ some of our vehicles in Afghanistan because this is not considered a high intensity conflict. The armour the Bushmaster is equipped with can no doubt be penetrated by BMP 2's, AMX 10's etc, but tell me, how many MICV's do the taleban operate? The greatest threat to the Bushie is an RPG or IED. These weapons are characteristic of a low intensity conflict. Our diggers do not face sustained artillery bombardment from 130mm guns, or have to face taleban MBT's. It would not surprise me at all that the Leo 2's in country with other forces have bugger all APDS rounds, mostly they would have HESH, HE, or canister rounds (if any of these were available). Again the loadout would fit the type of target and conflict. I'm damned sure the exchanges that occur on a battlefield level are lethal and intense to the participants. But so is a shootout between the Chicago PD SWAT team and a drug gang in a crackhouse in say downtown Chicargo - that does not make Chicago a High Intensity conflict.

Its also crap to say that the tactics are the same. In a high intensity scenario, such as the fabled soviets through the Fulda gap, do you seriously expect light skinned patrol vehicles to be utilised as one of the main means of inflicting casualties on an enemy? This war has all the hallmarks of LIC, no defined front line, an enemy that can blend in with the population. The enemy will concentrate, strike then withdraw rather than try and engage in a protracted battle (they have tried that a number of times and have come off second best.) To the best of my knowledge, there is no such classification as "higher Difficult Target Acquisition Warfare". What do you base your military knowledge on? Where were you trained?

 

[FutureTank]

Definition of a threat is intent + capability. Intent is easily changed, capability is not.

In-service capabilities ARE a massive component of ANY threat.

Yes, but that is not what you said. Identified threats are rarely a part of Minister's public speech. You listed capabilities.

Army hasn't maintained 4x rifle coy's per battalion for a LONG time and even then you ARE forgetting Support and Admin Coy's, which each regular battalion maintains...

If you look at various deployments, you will more often see references to something called "Company Group" not "Infantry Company". This means that we are counting differently. You count the Companies by their deployed COs, and I count them "by barrels". Of course the CSS personnel are also armed.

But please continue "enlightening" us...

Timor - Op Astute: 2x rifle companies, plus an Admin Coy - 5RAR.

Afghanistan Op Slipper: 1x Rifle Coy from 7RAR, 1x Commando Coy from 4RAR (Cdo).

Solomans: Op Anode: 1x rifle coy from 5/7 - 8/7 Royal Victoria Regt.

Iraq: Op Kruger: 1x Rifle Coy minus from 5RAR.

Hence we have 1RAR, 2RAR, 3RAR, 6RAR and the first Coy of 8/9RAR with NO rifle Coy Groups deployed whatsoever.

7RAR has only 1 Coy group deployed.

4RAR has only 1 out of 3 Commando Coy's deployed.

Artillery has a troop of 14x diggers seconded to the British Arm and a Coy group formed from 16 AD Regt.

Want to count them out on your fingers, again and see if we could deploy more than Timor levels?

See above. The usual practice, with notable few exceptions, has been to deploy a two-platoon company group with attached sections from battalion's support (couple of GPMGs) and admin companies. For example I think East Timor was the first time since Vietnam when the battalion mortars were taken along as part of the Support Company. In a sense the ADF battalions are four-company battalions, with the support company usually serving as infantrymen.

No. They are running IET courses in the battalions, because Singleton's capacity is maxed out, course in course out. If you actually spoke with real soldiers, you would HEAR the stories of bottlenecks in the training program, digs WAITING to get on courses.

So far 3, 5/7 and 1RAR have run their own IET courses, because Singleton based courses are FULL of new infantry recruits.

I wasn't aware that regular Army battalions are inducting school leavers. This is supposed to be a plus in the ADF capability for conducting a war?

As for RAAF/RAN lift, I'm not quite sure what you are comparing their lift levels too? Timor or when?

Certainly ADF lift capacity has improved enormously since 2000....

Has it? You mean the C-17s. However, how many regional possible combat areas can take a C-17?
As I see is a capability for conducting war by the ADF in our region requires an ability to lift at least one Infantry Brigade (+), not the 1st.

What if. Try looking at the underlying causes of such conflict before making such ridiculous statements. As for Bushmaster, it WAS deployed to Timor and once again, performed superbly.

Causes change.
In East Timor the Bushmasters stayed on the roads. The roads in East Timor were apparently as bad as the terrain in the areas where they were tested in Australia. The Bushmaster is the ADF's version of the British Army's Saxon.

You don't know what you are talking about quite clearly. The original HNA plan was for Bushmaster to supplement M113AS3/4 in 5/7RAR.

You always assume to know what I don't know. The reality is though that the vast majority of armoured vehicles that will be used in future by the Infantry Corps of the ADF will be the Bushmasters.

Then ELF came along and delinked 5/7 into the 2 battalions. In addition to this, an additional 81x M113AS3/4's have been ordered, as you no doubt know, however the Bushmaster is not being employed within these battalions now. Soley M113AS3/4.

The Bushmaster is being issued to 1 Brigade units that would traditionally be equipped with nothing better than B vehicles, along with the originally planned for "motorised brigade" 7 Brigade and the aforementioned B Sqn 3/4 Cav.

Yes, and? I don't know how the 81x M113AS3/4's are to be used (maybe delivered in the Bulldog-type upgrade?), but nothing had changed in therms of the "motorised brigade" concept since the Bushmaster is a truck with minimal armour by infantry combat vehicle standards. Its better than nothing, but its not something to go to a real war in.

We don't and nor do we operate our M113s in this fashion. One might as well employ them from soft skin trucks if this is going to be your conops...

Didn't say ADF operated M113s as designed. I'm just saying that that is what the design philosophy was. Its about time the infantry had a vehicle it didn't have to adopt its doctrine to.

The M113AS3/4 is being built to a cost capped budget. However it's specification is akin to an interim status with respect to the deployability of the vehicles.

Armour upgrades, plus additional belly armour and " anti-RPG mesh screens" are intended for the vehicles, should a deployment to an AO such as Afghanistan be contemplated.

DMO has confirmed that such options have been scoped and engineering work done on them. What remains absent is the funding, as with ASLAVs, before Iraq, to actually buy the kit.

The vehicles would much more closely match the protection offered by the Israeli packages, under such circumstances.

I think we both know that the M113 should have been replaced in the 1990s. now we are getting 81 more of the "interim" vehicles until when? 2015-20?
For a Ministry that is always talking about the future, we sure are short of capabilities that would have been apparent in the last budget.

Not at all. However they don't try and achieve all these capabilities with a regular force of only 8 infantry battalions and an amphibious force of 3 ships in total...

What Sea Lion, Army's amphibious doctrine and other activities are attempting to do is develop the basis from which an amphibious force could develop and subsequently operate.

Army and RAN proved they could deploy a mechanised unit by amphibious means on operations during Interfet itself, with 5/7RAR.

Amphibious operations are at the end of the day, are simply an insertion method. Your arguments about "lack of air cover" etc apply equally to the land force under ANY type of deployment.

The only problem is that amphibious insertion is the only method available to the ADF where there are not commercial port facilities available. In a war situation these facilities are likely to be protected by the opponent, and how many are there in the region? This is besides the very predictable point of arrival that puts the TF at risk en-route. And yet the ADF has never had this capability, and INTERFET deployment represents the entire extent of such capabilities, and that only with the offloading area being secured by previously air delivered 3RAR troops.

What? Can we only deploy one vessel?

FYI, ESSM has a range in excess of 50k's.

SM-2 Block IIIA (what the FFG's will have - AWD will have an improved variant) has a publicly declared range in excess of 185k's.

No, I allowed two vessels deployed on either coast.
"will have"...

So what? Do you think that SAM missiles are EVER fired from tracked vehicles bouncing around off -road at high speed?

No, but they are not fired from vehicles that are limited to roads in a combined arms force.

In any case, the Land Rover AD variant is an interim vehicle, the same as the Perentie 6x6 vehicle was for the infantry battalions at Gallipoli Barracks, Enoggera.

Interim....thats like M113AS3/4s....
Remember the last Leopard 1 interim upgrade and how long it took to get Abrams after it?

It provides excellent deployability, excellent mobility, for it's needs, which are NOT close combat with an entrenched enemy force.

I have no doubt the "protected vehicle" acquired under LAND 125 will replace the 16 AD vehicle fleet in due course.

If it comes to using AD, it is likely going to be something other than "LIC" environment, so either the ADF will be requiring excellent mobility, or the enemy forces. In either case I would not want supporting AD on Perentie.

Replacement and supplementing of both capabilities is long overdue. It seems offensive artillery in the Army is close to finally being brought to a modern standard, here's hoping Government sees fit to fund a similarly capable project for AD under the White Paper.

Amen. It seems to me that at least the 1st Brigade should be composed of vehicles with same protection and mobility capabilities across combat and combat support arms and services. This to me means at least a Troop of tracked self propelled and armoured AD platforms.

No I haven't. Please enlighten me...

What I have heard about, in relation to Army mortar projects, is in relation to the ARES Artillery units, they are NOT equipped with 120mm mortars.

They are equipped with 81mm mortars, the same as issued to the infantry battalions (F2 81mm mortar).

A proposal for 120mm mortars in the last 10 years for Army was the "motorised 120mm mortar" project, however that was dropped in 2004 in favour of a new tank capability.

The only other "new" mortar project for Army is it's "Long Ranged Mortar" project, MINCS(l) AMP 48.36 which again, was not a 120mm based solution, but rather a replacement 81mm solution.

So, you can see, I try and keep up with Army, but I don't quite manage everything...

The suggestion is to use 120mm mortars in the reserve brigades in place of the artillery units. These are judged to be more deployable, and require fewer personnel as there is a considerable shortage in gunners across the Army.

Well let's see. You have criticised ADF for not being able to deploy a Tiger helo to Afghanistan.

France, which has purchased MORE Tiger helos than us, has trained MORE pilots and has been developing the Tiger for LONGER than us, cannot yet provide a deployable Tiger capability.

Yeah, how is this relevant?

Ah, perhaps because the aircraft is NOT YET sufficiently mature, to deploy operationally?

Furthermore, it isn't simply a matter of helos and pilots/battle captains. You need more crews than helos (which we don't currently have) to deploy, you need the maintainers, you need spares, you need the time to develop your operational tactics and conduct collective, as opposed to individual training activities.

1 Aviation Regt is currently introducing a brand new helo which has not yet achieved IOC in Australia, or indeed in ANY other Country.

We need time to train pilots/battle captains/maintainers in how to operate the things, yes, but they then need to consolidate the capability, undertake mission rehearsal exercises etc. They need to build up a capability to employ the helo within the existing combined arms team formations we currently undertake and actually practice deploying the helo, as a capability (ie: a package of helos, plus supporting elements to conduct operations - say from Darwin to Shoalwater bay, for 4x helos and support)

It is here where you begin to learn what the problems are going to be. How many sorties can the aircraft generate, with the level of support available? Is the level of support we THINK is going to suffice, going to be enough? How can we best employ the Tiger?

All of this takes years. Just training enough pilots is only the beginning of the capability and we haven't even reached that point yet.

AD, we are at war. It has been years. You think there should be some urgency imparted into the training and acceptance process?
I said 8 pilots and support crews, so at least two helicopters can be operated during the hours of darkness in support of ADF personnel in Afghanistan.
I don't care what France does with their helicopters.

Agreed, but the fact is, our program is actually ahead of the French and German projects in some aspects. We have had to slow our program down somewhat because of this.

Type certification for the aircraft can't happen in Australia, until it's completed in France and there have been training delays on top of this, because the contractor hasn't delivered what was promised in terms of simulator capability etc.

And this is the point I have been making all along. The capability to go to war goes beyond having a loaded weapon. We can't actually use the weapons we bought because of external factors. This is not satisfactory.

1. RAAF doesn't maintain a 2.75 inch rocket capability.

2. Australian RoE's will never authorise the use of a combat aircraft without a targetting pod capability.

3. EVERY target in Afghanistan is requiring precision guided munitions. Abe can no doubt chip in hear, if he is so inclined, but there is a SIGNIFICANT requirement for combat aircraft to employ munitions within "dangerous" (to blue forces) ranges in Afghanistan.

4. RAAF does NOT think it is a light attack fighter. It's 30mm cannon is only employed for gunnery training and it's "light bombs" are BDU-33's, which don't even possess an explosive charge, just a marking charge. If you want a little puff of smoke employed onto enemy forces, than this is the right aircraft, I guess....

Maybe it should maintain that rocket 'capability'
I'm fairly confident that a targeting pod can be used on a Hawk. Alternatively the pilots can learn how to fire unguided rockets with some precision Its one of those combat pilot skill sets thingy....
What, the RAAF requests the Army personnel to stand back a few kilometres because they are not used to firing weapons at empty ranges? Give me a break. They are listed as light attack on an RAAF site. Lots of air forces, including the RAF used and continue use them in this role. Weapons are used as required, not as designed. IMHO Hawks happen to be more suitable for use in Afghanistan than the F/A-18s.

No, the Hawks are used to ONLY train pilots who will fly F/A-18s. They WERE used to train pilots who USED to go on to fly F/A-18s and F-111s, but the last F-111 course flew in 2007 and the Hawks are now soley used for would-be F/A-18 pilots, 76 and 79 Sqn instructors and the odd maritime and GBAD defence training.

The cockpit of the Mk 127 has been designed to replicate the F/A-18 Hornet cockpit as closely as possible. What does that tell you?

It tells me that you can't l;earn to fly an F/A-18 until you actually fly in one. This is why there are 18 F/A-18Bs in the RAAF.

Australia's Hornets airframes will be entirely knackered by the time we are finished with them. FLEI is the measurement of the fatigue time left in the airframe and there is little left now. By 2018 there will be bugger all left...

Some spare parts, engines etc will be all that is useful in them. The airframes themselves will be shot ducks...

Wonderful news!!!! That means that Boeing can keep that support line going for a while longer.

I don't live by the Internet alone either. DMO HAVE confirmed that options to further upgrade the M113 HAVE been studied. If they are going to be deployed, they will be enhanced...

If, but the hope is that not.

The USA is pumping an extra 4x Brigades into Afghanistan at present.

That doesn't point to a nation on the verge of withdrawing...

Are you referring to the recent announcement for 17,000 troops? That's two brigades, one Marines and one Stryker, the rest being support personnel of various descriptions. There is a 'desire' by the USMC to deploy a division of 20,000 to Afghanistan, but that is yet to be concluded as a measure.
I think one brigade from 10th Mountain Division was scheduled to rotate and another, aviation, was approved before Obama was elected.
However, that is not really an issue. Even if there were four NEW brigades being deployed, it signals only one thing to me, and that is a desire to end the war in Afghanistan as soon as possible. AFAIC ASAP does not mean in three years. What is more I see more US and NATO combat troops being sent to Afghanistan as the US withdraws from Iraq because quite simply the Pakistan border has to be closed before the Afghan Government and its security forces can come to grips with internal issues. What happens after that, I am not brave enough to forecast. It largely depends on whether Pakistan slides into an Islamic state or not.

 

[FutureTank]

Err.... good one. Do you even understand that warfare is divided into different clasifications depending on the type of conflict expected. There is a world of difference between forces configured to fight a high intensity conflict such as the classical Russian forces streaming through the Fulda gap into Germany, and a few paddies taking pot shots with semi or even full automativc weapons and the odd explosive device.

The Bushmaster has had IED's detonated underneath them on many occasions in Afghanistan and Iraq yet I believe not one occupant has lost their life in one. Given the level of threat, what more do you want?

Does the ADF have a capability for a high intensity conflict?

 

[FutureTank]

No, what I am saying is that you can employ some of our vehicles in Afghanistan because this is not considered a high intensity conflict. The armour the Bushmaster is equipped with can no doubt be penetrated by BMP 2's, AMX 10's etc, but tell me, how many MICV's do the taleban operate? The greatest threat to the Bushie is an RPG or IED. These weapons are characteristic of a low intensity conflict. Our diggers do not face sustained artillery bombardment from 130mm guns, or have to face taleban MBT's. It would not surprise me at all that the Leo 2's in country with other forces have bugger all APDS rounds, mostly they would have HESH, HE, or canister rounds (if any of these were available). Again the loadout would fit the type of target and conflict. I'm damned sure the exchanges that occur on a battlefield level are lethal and intense to the participants. But so is a shootout between the Chicago PD SWAT team and a drug gang in a crackhouse in say downtown Chicargo - that does not make Chicago a High Intensity conflict.

Its also crap to say that the tactics are the same. In a high intensity scenario, such as the fabled soviets through the Fulda gap, do you seriously expect light skinned patrol vehicles to be utilised as one of the main means of inflicting casualties on an enemy? This war has all the hallmarks of LIC, no defined front line, an enemy that can blend in with the population. The enemy will concentrate, strike then withdraw rather than try and engage in a protracted battle (they have tried that a number of times and have come off second best.) To the best of my knowledge, there is no such classification as "higher Difficult Target Acquisition Warfare". What do you base your military knowledge on? Where were you trained?

And when was the "low intensity conflict" invented?
Are we going to wait until Taliban get hold of 23mm cannons with AP rounds? If Hamas can get hold of ATGWs, I'm sure Taliban can also. Can those be suppressed with a 7.62mm machine gun?
As I said before, if the ADF's ONLY capability is for a "low intensity conflict" well and good. However, it seems to me that other armed forces in the region have other ideas.
What is the basis of your military knowledge? Where you trained to think that low intensity conflicts go one until the good guys win? Eight years on, and NATO is worried about "not winning" in Afghanistan, so I think its fare to say that their military knowledge and training are no longer relevant, so why is mine? Which is not the subject of this thread.

National armed forces of a state such as Australia are supposed to have a range of capabilities if and when they are called up, including in a conflict with other states. Does the ADF possess such capabilities?
All we have established so far is that it will...in future. I have been looking at this "future" for 30 years, and all I see is no future.

 

[Marc 1]

Does the ADF have a capability for a high intensity conflict?

If you are talking Fulda Gap level stuff, Not on our own. Our Abrams could help to supplement another nations forces, depending on the type of warfare towed artillery probably wouldn't cut it, if we are talking mechanised combined arms team nup, we lack MICV's, engineers under armour, SP artillery. Our army aviation assets are getting there too.

Medium intensity we would fare much better, but again we have capability holes. Its all a matter of spending - I'm sure Chief of Army would like to have a couple of regiments of tanks, state of the art SPG's regiments and 5 battalions of Mech inf in state of the art MICV's but the defence budget priority hasn't gone that way.

 

[Wooki]

Building armoured vehicles in a low-rate production scenario does not require either a highly developed general automotive industry, nor a militarised one.

Correct; Because you are going to have to import all of your talent and create a new industry from scratch with a very small customer who (from an outsider's perspective) can't seem to see their way to supporting expanded production of the Bushmaster IMV.

I presume by Armored Vehicle production you mean a main battle tank, right?

There are people in Australia who could pull it off, but they all have well paid jobs working for somebody else, ergo: you are never going to be able to hire them all away to create the base low rate production team, you speak of.

Why? Because you can't guarantee them job security.

Why? Because your plan is to create a tank that your customer (presumably the Commonwealth of Australia) doesn't need (they have tanks already thanks very much).

The closest thing you could come to is actually creating a boutique shop that provides enhancements to armored vehicles, not unlike the Ruag model in Switzerland.

e.g. you would have to sell the Army on things like, I dunno: the idea of replacing their zeroed in small caliber 120mm gun with a bigger, better 55 caliber version like on the leo 2, and oh, you've figured out the extra weight problem that burns out the elevation mechanisms when you place the longer gun on the existing trunions. Things like that.

Now something that might appeal to the Australian Army is a smaller, easier to maintain and more efficient powerpack that could be used across multiple platforms; oh and its Army green too. But that makes you an engine manufacturer, so now you are competing with people like Caterpiller and shucks, the key guy from their military power-plants division doesn't want to leave his job to come to your company, because he knows his protege, Fat Freddy (whom he has been grooming for 5 years) will seriously kick your butt in any RFP put out by Defense, once you have convinced them that your engine idea is the way to go.

Why is Fat Freddy going to kick your butt? Because you don't have capacity. e.g. Navistar and Force protection making MRAPS and interestingly enough Navistar are full of Fat Freddys.

I hope that explains some of the minutiae that make your proposal unlikely. It's always those damned details, eh? Get you everytime.

cheers

w

 

[Marc 1]

And when was the "low intensity conflict" invented?

Ask Sun Tzu - I think he established the principles.

Are we going to wait until Taliban get hold of 23mm cannons with AP rounds? If Hamas can get hold of ATGWs, I'm sure Taliban can also. Can those be suppressed with a 7.62mm machine gun?

Yes. ATGW's that the taleban is likely to use are normally SACLOS, you disrupt (supress) the firer and he cannot guide the missile. Any decent ATGW could go through a CV90 like butter - so it wouldn't really matter what you were in. 23mm AP rounds? Fit applique armour to the bushies/and or replace them with something more heavily armoured like a proper MICV. A COTS purchase could see MICV's introduced pretty damn quickly if need be. Flexibility is one of the (10?) Principles of War.

The weapons you are describing tend to be large and not well suited to the type of mobile warfare being conducted by the taleban. Chances are the UAV's, SF OP's or Choppers accompanying any deployment outside the wire would spot them before they had a chance to engage, or destroy them after they had fired. Threat eliminated albeit at the cost of own force casualties.

As I said before, if the ADF's ONLY capability is for a "low intensity conflict" well and good. However, it seems to me that other armed forces in the region have other ideas.
What is the basis of your military knowledge? Where you trained to think that low intensity conflicts go one until the good guys win? Eight years on, and NATO is worried about "not winning" in Afghanistan, so I think its fare to say that their military knowledge and training are no longer relevant, so why is mine? Which is not the subject of this thread.

No, your knowledge level isn't the subect of this thread, but my 18 months of training at RMC and 6 years in the ARA make me slightly more capable of judging the type of conflict Afghanistan is than whatever it was that you omitted to mention.

Low intensity conflicts have been won in the past (Malayan campaign) and can be won in the future. The problem is politicians lack the will to sustain the level of engagement to ensure this outcome. It has nothing to do with the military personnel. When GWB went into Iraq the second time the Joint Chiefs asked for half a million men which would have meant that essentially the entire military was committed on a war footing. Donald Rumsfeld over ruled them and went the 'economy' option which as was proven was fine to win the initial battle but insufficient to secure the peace. There was not sufficient troops on the ground to ensure the borders were secured, or to maintain internal control.

Afghanistan is winnable, but you'd need to see a commitment of at least 20 years, three times the deployed forces, and significant rebuilding of the country for this to happen. In this time the death toll will be huge, because of the number of 'targets' in country for the taleban to engage, and the allied forces need to change their modus operandi - out of the armoured vehicles and choppers and on foot among the population. BUT as the populations confidence grows that the allied forces are indeed there for the long term, the Afghani's will start to point out the enemy forces so they can be eliminated. At the moment, the locals dare not report what they see because if the NATO troops leave next week, they will be strung up by the taleban for betraying them.

The war is winnable, the politicians lose it, they forget the first principle of war: Selection and Maintenance of the Aim.

National armed forces of a state such as Australia are supposed to have a range of capabilities if and when they are called up, including in a conflict with other states. Does the ADF possess such capabilities?

No/ depends on which state. We could repel an attack from Naru pretty well. That would be because our emphasis (political) was as a self defence force with the doctrine being shoot them down/torpedo them in the moat to our north. But, we have been trying to become a much more deployable balanced force in the years since, but neglect takes time to fix.

All we have established so far is that it will...in future. I have been looking at this "future" for 30 years, and all I see is no future.

I'm encouraged. The ADF's transformation under the Hardened Networked Army is happening - just not overnight.

Now, as I've answered you question on qualifications to speak on this subject, please do me the curtesy of answering my question.

 

[FutureTank]

Rubbish. China already fields early 4th gen fighters. J-10, Su-27SK, Su-30MKK?

Unlike you, I have not been lucky enough to have flown in them
The Su-27SK & Su-30MKK are export versions of the Russian aircraft, and even those we are not sure about. The J-10 is a mongrel, and Chinese excel in 'borrowing' from others, but in this case the sum of all parts may not equal to a 4th generation whole.

Actually, the Backfire is out of production, as is the Tu-142, and the maritime Su-34 variant is likely to be quiet a whiles away. So literally nobody makes the plane you're asking for. Are you suggesting that Australia develop a long range maritime strike fighter from scratch?

When you say "from scratch", does that mean a project manager walks into an office and scratches his head as he says " I wonder how many chairs and tables we'll need for this"?

First set up a research project within the DSTO. Then set up project university collaboration infrastructure. Then expand the research infrastructure to the design stage with industry participation. With a completed design, conduct development and testing within the RAAF facilities. Refine and complete design. Commence production. Doesn't matter if it takes two decades to build the first production aircraft as it did with the F-35. It doesn't matter if by that stage Australia will only be able to afford a single squadron, or even half a squadron. It will have been an investment in enriching Australia's collective aviation technology knowledge base contributing to hundreds of project managers, engineers, technicians, etc. It will have produced a capability that Australia needs given its strategic position on the globe. Just maybe it will have produced other innovations along the way that will find use in civil aviation to earn revenue for continuation of the project like the CSIRO mobile technology.

And its not that hard even with existing technology. Take an F-35, and redesign it with two engines, and you will get an F-22 make-do-with. Add larger engines and more on-board fuel, and you get a long range fighter/strike aircraft. Yes, I know its not that simple, but we have technology now that was not available in 1980s, or even 1990s. Computer modelling can, and has achieved spectacular progress in engineering design. And Australia doesn't have to do it alone. Partner with all the countries that have asked for and will not get the F-22. Partner with other countries that may want a long range maritime strike aircraft. Japan, Israel, even dare I say the USA? EU might be interested.

Actually 600 and 900 are tiny production runs. The BMP-3 for example (which has yet to see induction in large numbers for our armed forces) has already well over a thousand orders (close 1500) and is nowhere near the end of the production run. They're only now starting to receive some major domestic orders.

The production run for the Bradley is in the thousands. You're envisioning a project for a full IFV with a production run of arond 600? Why not just buy an existing platform, which will cost less per unit, and cost nothing in development costs?

But development is exactly what I want for Australia. Development is a cost, but also has significant benefits. The price we pay to others is for them sharing their products with us, but not their KNOWLEDGE! That, in the information age, is more expensive. And right now is the time to gain this knowledge because there are going to be significant changes in armoured vehicle designs as designers try to find alternatives to reliance on existing engine technologies.

EDIT: Just a heads up, from what I found the Bushmaster currently has 737 delivered to the ADF, 15 Fire King firefighting variants, 58 ordered by the Netherlands and 24 for the UK. That makes for a total of 834 with potential additional orders from Spain. I.e. even with some modest export success, the Bushmaster has not managed to make it big time in the international market. You propose a larger and riskier investment, in something radically new and unlikely to receive a domestic order even as large as the Bushmasters?

Which part of the liberal economic theory applies to national security?! Who says it has to be profitable? The Bradley has not been exported (yet) and will never be profitable given the amounts spent on its development alone. Marder was never exported either.
Had Australia started a project to design and build a replacement to the M113 when it was supposed to (1980s), low rate production would have replaced all of them by now, and then some. However, it is probably for the best that this was not done because factors that were not evident in AFV design are evident now.

 

[FutureTank]

Future Tank, there is nothing I would like to see more than a decent weapons manufacturing industry, designing and building world class designs for our own forces and exported to the world.

Two things conspire against that though, the fact that programs not one tenth as complicated as the ones you propose are running behind schedule, massively over budget or even cancelled at massive cost. Remember we exist in a democracy where the government has to be accountable for the decisions it makes. Given recent procurement disasters, the press would be all over any government that announced something this ambitious - particularly these days in an era of ballooning deficits (although, ironically a decision to bolster our defence force by building indigenously could maybe be seen as a viable stimulus project).

The second reason is simply cost and our defence budget. If 11 Seasprites were to cost over a billion dollars (and that was an existing airframe), what would the from scratch development of a state of the art airlifter cost?

And that is where I started. In the first place we have to sort out accountability in decision-making and project management within the Ministry.

People in high places have to understand that failure is not a way to transfer to another project with full superannuation retirement entitlement. A billion of wasted tax dollars is no different from where I'm sitting than a billion stolen from the Treasury. Instead of asking the ADF to find extra cash within its organisational budgets, look at all the crap going on in the Ministry.

And yes, a national armed force must have a range of capabilities, including fighting a war with other states. And, such a capability requires an underlying defence support industrial base. Given Australia can be blockaded from current suppliers, in theory, and who knows in 20 years time, it is essential that such a base exists domestically. You think its a problem that I want Australia to be a technologically advanced, industrially productive country? These are the benefits of defence industry.

If you are not sure, check out the economic history of the United States. It was a net industrial IMPORTER until 1941.
Japan went to war in 1933 after COPYING everything Europe produced for 60 years. In the news reels of the time it was not called just the Japanese Empire, but the Japanese industrial Empire.

 

[FutureTank]

The "Quick Change Barrel" variant of the M2 12.7mm machine guns we operate has been equipped with an undisclosed "improved range" of ammunition.

Make of this what you will...

I'd change the barrel to er...25mm

 

[FutureTank]

If you are talking Fulda Gap level stuff, Not on our own. Our Abrams could help to supplement another nations forces, depending on the type of warfare towed artillery probably wouldn't cut it, if we are talking mechanised combined arms team nup, we lack MICV's, engineers under armour, SP artillery. Our army aviation assets are getting there too.

Medium intensity we would fare much better, but again we have capability holes. Its all a matter of spending - I'm sure Chief of Army would like to have a couple of regiments of tanks, state of the art SPG's regiments and 5 battalions of Mech inf in state of the art MICV's but the defence budget priority hasn't gone that way.

I'm not talking "Fulda Gap" scenario, but it seems to me the Australian Army should have a range of capabilities that extend to, and include conduct of combat in what amounts to armoured warfare. I'm using "armoured" here in the way it is used in the British Army to designate battalions mounted in Warrior ICVs. How this is done is academic because the choice to fight in in such a combat environment may not always be up to the Army to make.

I think it is cheaper to make than to buy in the long run, if only because one has greater budgetary control, and long term industrial support for the so equipped forces. Ultimately in all likelihood some systems for the Australian ICV would probably be bought elsewhere, but I'd want at least an 80% Australian built content of the finished product, and particularly the stuff that breaks the most, all of the chassis assemblies, the engine, all gunnery mechanicals, most of the optics.

 

[FutureTank]

The greatest threat to the Bushie is an RPG or IED. These weapons are characteristic of a low intensity conflict.

This war has all the hallmarks of LIC, no defined front line, an enemy that can blend in with the population.

Marc 1, the Bushmaster was not designed for "this war". I think the first production vehicle was accepted for testing by the Army in mid-90s, wasn't it? That's before 9/11. So what kind of war/doctrine was it designed for? Or was this based on input form the ADF's famed 12th Crystal Ball company?

As AD pointed out, it was designed to supplement the M113s for use in Australia, and limited duties in peace-keeping operations. All of a sudden it had become the main type of armoured vehicle operated by the Australian Army. What, the old policy got lost in the Canberra archives?

 

[FutureTank]

Correct; Because you are going to have to import all of your talent and create a new industry from scratch with a very small customer who (from an outsider's perspective) can't seem to see their way to supporting expanded production of the Bushmaster IMV.

I presume by Armored Vehicle production you mean a main battle tank, right?

There are people in Australia who could pull it off, but they all have well paid jobs working for somebody else, ergo: you are never going to be able to hire them all away to create the base low rate production team, you speak of.

Why? Because you can't guarantee them job security.

Why? Because your plan is to create a tank that your customer (presumably the Commonwealth of Australia) doesn't need (they have tanks already thanks very much).

The closest thing you could come to is actually creating a boutique shop that provides enhancements to armored vehicles, not unlike the Ruag model in Switzerland.

e.g. you would have to sell the Army on things like, I dunno: the idea of replacing their zeroed in small caliber 120mm gun with a bigger, better 55 caliber version like on the leo 2, and oh, you've figured out the extra weight problem that burns out the elevation mechanisms when you place the longer gun on the existing trunions. Things like that.

Now something that might appeal to the Australian Army is a smaller, easier to maintain and more efficient powerpack that could be used across multiple platforms; oh and its Army green too. But that makes you an engine manufacturer, so now you are competing with people like Caterpiller and shucks, the key guy from their military power-plants division doesn't want to leave his job to come to your company, because he knows his protege, Fat Freddy (whom he has been grooming for 5 years) will seriously kick your butt in any RFP put out by Defense, once you have convinced them that your engine idea is the way to go.

Why is Fat Freddy going to kick your butt? Because you don't have capacity. e.g. Navistar and Force protection making MRAPS and interestingly enough Navistar are full of Fat Freddys.

I hope that explains some of the minutiae that make your proposal unlikely. It's always those damned details, eh? Get you everytime.

cheers

w

But I wasn't talking about a tank....at least not a heavy tank like the Abrams

And there are a lot of people capable of contributing to such a project in Australia, so no imported talent would be required...nor do they have to quit their jobs (note, we are currently a net exporter of talent)

And given the design will be for a production of something the Army really wants rather than trying to find best match on the open market, there wouldn't be an RFP...

And the engine manufacturer can build engines that are also used in commercial vehicles like...trucks. There are trucks in Australia....about 400,000 of them, and about 30,000 of them are rated for 40t+, which is good enough for an AFV family suitable for the Army. How does a production facility for 30,000 engines sound? Low rate production also, initially. It can be linked to a national environmental standard requirement, so over time, say a decade, all commercial trucks would need to change their engine...to a domestic one Australians love to tinker with their engines, and none more than the truckies

And because it would be a low rate production, it will mean that by the time production is ended, its time to start first series of rebuilds/upgrades, just like the Sydney Harbour Bridge painting...so there is job security.

I hope that explains some of the minutiae that make your counter-proposal unlikely. It's always those damned details, eh? Get you every time.

 

[FutureTank]

And when was the "low intensity conflict" invented?

Ask Sun Tzu - I think he established the principles.[/QUOTE]
Nope, the Pentagon established that type of conflict.

Yes. ATGW's that the taleban is likely to use are normally SACLOS, you disrupt (supress) the firer and he cannot guide the missile. Any decent ATGW could go through a CV90 like butter - so it wouldn't really matter what you were in. 23mm AP rounds? Fit applique armour to the bushies/and or replace them with something more heavily armoured like a proper MICV. A COTS purchase could see MICV's introduced pretty damn quickly if need be. Flexibility is one of the (10?) Principles of War.

Nope, I dare you to hit a firing position of an ATGW from a moving Bushmaster at 2,000m with a 7.62mm MG.

I don't know if they envisaged adding anything to the Bushmaster when it was being designed in the 90s. Still, everything is possible. This is engineering flexibility you are talking about, and not Principles of War, and engine, transmission and suspension load ratings are less flexible than an infantry platoon

The weapons you are describing tend to be large and not well suited to the type of mobile warfare being conducted by the taleban. Chances are the UAV's, SF OP's or Choppers accompanying any deployment outside the wire would spot them before they had a chance to engage, or destroy them after they had fired. Threat eliminated albeit at the cost of own force casualties.

They were used against the Soviet Army, and you only need one round, which is not impossible with today's commercially available optics. Spotting a well camouflaged sniper armed with a 23mm cannon is harder than one may imagine.

No, your knowledge level isn't the subect of this thread, but my 18 months of training at RMC and 6 years in the ARA make me slightly more capable of judging the type of conflict Afghanistan is than whatever it was that you omitted to mention.

I have never questioned anyone's knowledge level, only their ideas...which as you are probably aware can come from the most unlikely source.

Low intensity conflicts have been won in the past (Malayan campaign) and can be won in the future. The problem is politicians lack the will to sustain the level of engagement to ensure this outcome. It has nothing to do with the military personnel. When GWB went into Iraq the second time the Joint Chiefs asked for half a million men which would have meant that essentially the entire military was committed on a war footing. Donald Rumsfeld over ruled them and went the 'economy' option which as was proven was fine to win the initial battle but insufficient to secure the peace. There was not sufficient troops on the ground to ensure the borders were secured, or to maintain internal control.

Wars are a national engagement, not just that of its armed forces. This is why my argument is based as much on industrial policy as it is on a defence one. Such a policy is more likely to be supported in the long term by different parties, and therefore offers a greater measure of predictability and sustainability for defence planners also.

Afghanistan is winnable, but you'd need to see a commitment of at least 20 years, three times the deployed forces, and significant rebuilding of the country for this to happen. In this time the death toll will be huge, because of the number of 'targets' in country for the taleban to engage, and the allied forces need to change their modus operandi - out of the armoured vehicles and choppers and on foot among the population. BUT as the populations confidence grows that the allied forces are indeed there for the long term, the Afghani's will start to point out the enemy forces so they can be eliminated. At the moment, the locals dare not report what they see because if the NATO troops leave next week, they will be strung up by the taleban for betraying them.

The war is winnable, the politicians lose it, they forget the first principle of war: Selection and Maintenance of the Aim.

Its not winnable. The aim is to destroy the Taliban, and with it Al Qaeda, but the Taliban represent the idea state in Islamic understanding, and Al Qaeda represent what a Muslim should do to free themselves of the Western influence.
20 years! In 20 years you will have the Afghanistan Liberation Organisation, and Bin Ladin will be its "Arafat".
And who will prevent Taliban from returning after the last NATO soldier departs? Eventually reindoctrination and corruption will set in. You are not dealing with a society that can be remoulded in the European-like state. It will take hundreds of years of violent interaction like the Turks before change comes.

No/ depends on which state. We could repel an attack from Naru pretty well. That would be because our emphasis (political) was as a self defence force with the doctrine being shoot them down/torpedo them in the moat to our north. But, we have been trying to become a much more deployable balanced force in the years since, but neglect takes time to fix.

Nauru is a bad example I think. Are they not sinking and will eventually require resettlement?
We should have always been thinking in terms of an interventionist, offensive force, but we were brought up to rely first on the British Empire, then on the USA. However, the offensive is the best defence, and the USA will not always be there for us. The British were not.

I'm encouraged. The ADF's transformation under the Hardened Networked Army is happening - just not overnight.

Next week?
Ok, next month, but only because I'm so patient

 

[swerve]

... but the Taliban represent the idea state in Islamic understanding, ...

Not so. The Taliban represent an extremist minority within Islam, & are heavily influenced by Pushtun tribal tradition. Ask the average Turkish Muslim what he or she thinks of the Taliban. Ask the Islamic schools of Qom, the religious centre of Iran. They'll throw up their hands in horror. Even the Iranians find the Taliban attitude to women primitive, & unjustifiable by Islamic teaching.