New submarines for Sweden, Singapore and Australia?

[yoron]

Palnatoke you wrote "But sh..t happens in every major work of this nature, that's a fact of life." Couldn't agree more. Just need to put in that 'r' instead..
Short version "sh..t happens, that's a fart of life." That one would be a beauty. Yeah I know, humor under the belt

---------
As for them being 'noisy'. As I understand it this was a early problem only.
http://www.submarineinstitute.com/?i=downnews&dl=100

The problem with their propellers seems to have been another miss from Kockums side? They just 'upgraded' the size on those propellers from our own smaller subs with the bigger Collin class getting cavitation problems as a consequence. So, the Aussies sent those propellers to USA who smiled happily and 'fixed' them getting some good insight in how our propeller technology looked, quite funny I think.

I believe that the Australians, with a little friendly advice from the Americans, are perfectly able to build themselves, read my first link and you will see. If they are willing to afford it all though?
That's a perfectly different matter.

 

[gf0012-aust]

What I am objecting against is the singling out of Krockum as responsible for what seems to be a long array of problems: 12 years of development process, resulting in subsystems obsolete before completion, leaky pipes, a general design failure of being to noisy etc etc etc. That points to problems that are not Krockum's making, since they absolutely have demonstrated that they can build subs (something that Aus have demonstrated that they can't). But I quess that it's politically convenient to blame the foreign contractor, instead of one's own "constituency".

actually, if you read the official reports, and get commentary from those who were involved (and I was one of therm at various points in time), the blame is levied across the board.

I make it pretty clear that Defence and the politicians share some responsibility for the mistakes.

I'd contest your last claim about australia not being able to build subs - all the Kockums identified problems were solved by third party australian companies - not swedish. in fact companies that never had any involvement with sub building identified engineering defects with the kockums base design. eg he propeller design is a classic example of where the material science issues were incorrect for an upscaled design - and it was initially DSTO who discovered that. The problem was solved by NAVSEA and the USN

I blame the contractor for a raft of issues - but I don't ignore the mismanagement of that contractor that was done by Defence, or the fact that Navy much preferred a different design and were not happy about e nding up with a swedish solution.

the positive out of this is that the initial problems have been solved and that we ended up with one of the finest bluewater conventional subs made.

personally, I would not get ASC involved in another sub ever again, as I believe that their management are incompetent in the way that they handled collins. I would much prefer a US managed outcome. This is primarily because we have other critical technology sharing issues that are available with the US and that we know the Swedes (or Germans, or Spanish, or French) cannot even hope to compete with.

in fact, I'd rather see us co-build the next sub with the japanese as we have similar design philosophies and doctrine/threat issues and we know that the baseline collins and oyasio/suryo class have the energy requirements to go to the next generation weapons and combat systems.

I would never recommend upscaling a small sub to bluewater fleet class. It was madness.

btw, I work with swedish companies nearly every day on other sensor issues, I have no problem with those companies and have a very high regard for the capability.

Collins is an issue for me as I've seen much too much patriotic nonsense promoted when the issues were far more complex.

 

[StevoJH]

Palnatoke you wrote "But sh..t happens in every major work of this nature, that's a fact of life." Couldn't agree more. Just need to put in that 'r' instead..
Short version "sh..t happens, that's a fart of life." That one would be a beauty. Yeah I know, humor under the belt

---------
As for them being 'noisy'. As I understand it this was a early problem only.
http://www.submarineinstitute.com/?i=downnews&dl=100

The problem with their propellers seems to have been another miss from Kockums side? They just 'upgraded' the size on those propellers from our own smaller subs with the bigger Collin class getting cavitation problems as a consequence. So, the Aussies sent those propellers to USA who smiled happily and 'fixed' them getting some good insight in how our propeller technology looked, quite funny I think.

I believe that the Australians, with a little friendly advice from the Americans, are perfectly able to build themselves, read my first link and you will see. If they are willing to afford it all though?
That's a perfectly different matter.

The last Government allocated $20 Billion AUD+ for the collins replacement before they left power, though whether that budget will remain i don't know.

 

[Palnatoke]

gf0012-aust

It's my impression that there were a lot wrong with the Collins class. Some can be attributed to Krockums and a lot can be attributted to the management of the project and the main contractor. but I don't know the specifics.

I would dare say that what "the Collin" example and a multitude of others show, is that the antiquated and "Now the politicians can give gifts" style of aquring complex machinery by insisting that a homegrown industry has to be heavely involved, which essentially turns the project into a "high tech equvivalent" of 3rd world development aid (not that AUS is 3rd world - at all) is a very expensive way of getting hardware for your country's defense. It's like when you buy a car: trust your average German or japaneese to make that car, they are probably - or rather, for sure, better at it than you, and then perhaps you can do something else that you are good at.

If Australia wanted a sub they should have called a swede/French/American/German and said: "Submarine, delivery Australia", and not "We really liked some of your designs, maybe you guys will help us build our own sub...".

 

[gf0012-aust]

gf0012-aust

It's my impression that there were a lot wrong with the Collins class. Some can be attributed to Krockums and a lot can be attributted to the management of the project and the main contractor. but I don't know the specifics.

There is certainly no shortage of incompetency across the 3 levels of governance (vendor, builder, govt)

I would dare say that what "the Collin" example and a multitude of others show, is that the antiquated and "Now the politicians can give gifts" style of aquring complex machinery by insisting that a homegrown industry has to be heavely involved, which essentially turns the project into a "high tech equvivalent" of 3rd world development aid (not that AUS is 3rd world - at all) is a very expensive way of getting hardware for your country's defense. It's like when you buy a car: trust your average German or japaneese to make that car, they are probably - or rather, for sure, better at it than you, and then perhaps you can do something else that you are good at.

as it turns out though, australian companies have been onselling their underwater defence tech capability - we've been involved in at least 3 other navies modifications to their respective submarine fleets.

If Australia wanted a sub they should have called a swede/French/American/German and said: "Submarine, delivery Australia", and not "We really liked some of your designs, maybe you guys will help us build our own sub...".

There is always national interest, and there is always the issue of strategic industrial depth. ASC have come up with their own designs for whats loosely referred to as "Sub 2020" - personally I think that the designs are crap. There are better offerings about, and there is certainly a lot better technology to use than whats been proposed to date - but it is early days.

IMO, we still need to build locally - and we can, but we need to be tighter in managing the projects, deal with grey contractual obligations early and cut off the fatal demon of scope creep. I'm not convinced that an offshore build is worthwhile even though it would be cheaper to do.

 

[yoron]

Definitely so gf0012-aust. I'm enjoying you Aussies attitude immensely. I think you are on the right track there. You are somewhat, 'isolated' might be the word there? Well, you and New Zealand, that is. You need a 'homegrown' defense capability, just like us in Sweden. Of course it will cost you, and there will be mistakes done too but it's a good thing to have.

As you write, your's is a 'bluewater' sub force, Sweden's waters are so much shallower, somewhere around three hundred meters at most? That's one of the reasons why our sonars are so good, we really need them to be, otherwise we all would be like that Russian sub that 'visited' us some years ago, ah, stranded that is There are different prerogatives ruling here, we having shallow seas with extensive archipelagos, you having a deep blue ocean outside your door. So I sincerely hope you'll manage your goals here. But, I'm still surprised over Kockum's inability to handle your requests. My guess is that they took on a little to much there, not really having a full understanding of Australia's needs.

 

[Palnatoke]

gf0012-aust

While I think that your points regarding "homegrown" defense cababilities are completely valid, both in lieu of independent national defense capabilities as well as boosting domestic industry, I still think that that route leads to massive budget overflows and waste of money. There is a very damaging "Everybody is happy" circuit, which, put to the point, is about national politicians looking "Strong" and pro-defense. The millitary high brass is happy for the new toy (and because their political masters are happy), the millitary aquisition organisation (Material command?? not sure what it is called in English) are happy because they have something to do and gets large budgets and thus become important, the industry makes a lot of money - and are happy, the local politicians can claim to have created jobs at the local yard/factory and are happy - Everybody are happy: EXCEPT the taxpayers and - God forbid - those that have to go to war with the machines who are either sub-optimal or in too few numbers, because the process is not very good at focussing on what should be a question of getting the best and most equipment for the defense of "the fatherland". And this is so because in the heart of it, the important interesents are oblivious to what the millitary actually gets: The politicians wants to send certain signals to secure them the re-election and the industry is interested in the economical activity generated by the public subsidy - and the millitary persons are not important.

While the above leads to "ordinarry" waste of money in general, the real danger is for countries that have defense industries that "almost" can get the job done... Then you are set up for spending money indefinately.

Also
Simple economical rules and principles applies to the production of tanks or ships as well as they do to cars. If the swedes are better at producing subs than australians while australiens are better at brewing beers all will be better off if the swedes makes the subs and the australiens brew the beer (I know for a fact that all will be better off if swedes don't brew beer, but that's beside the point).

Likewise a "goverment dollar" invested into an non-competiative industry is if not wasted, then a very poorly invested dollar (Something the former DDR (east germany) proved beyound doubt).

 

[gf0012-aust]

Definitely so gf0012-aust. I'm enjoying you Aussies attitude immensely. I think you are on the right track there. You are somewhat, 'isolated' might be the word there? Well, you and New Zealand, that is. You need a 'homegrown' defense capability, just like us in Sweden. Of course it will cost you, and there will be mistakes done too but it's a good thing to have.

we have lost some significant immediate industrial strategic independence through various industry rationalisation events over the last 20 years - and that will in all likelihood become even more subject to change in the next few years. But, the view has changed as to how much we should "give away" and that critical industries (which are technology magnets) like submarine building should be done here

As you write, your's is a 'bluewater' sub force, Sweden's waters are so much shallower, somewhere around three hundred meters at most? That's one of the reasons why our sonars are so good, we really need them to be, otherwise we all would be like that Russian sub that 'visited' us some years ago, ah, stranded that is There are different prerogatives ruling here, we having shallow seas with extensive archipelagos, you having a deep blue ocean outside your door. So I sincerely hope you'll manage your goals here. But, I'm still surprised over Kockum's inability to handle your requests. My guess is that they took on a little to much there, not really having a full understanding of Australia's needs.

what a lot of people miss with the issue of the USN leasing Gotland were the subtle issues:

eg

Gotland was designed to operate fundamentally as a greenwater or immediate bluewater force - the similarity between Skandinavian coastal areas and some Chinese coastal areas is significant. The lessons learnt for the USN to operate in such waters - completely away from their normal open water ASW operations is important to understand

Gotland and Collins, apart from sheer size differences, and some sensor suite differences, have some acoustic transmission similarities - this is only natural considering the core design issues. Whats important to understand again, is that the USN already knows that Collins can fight under apparent non-AIP limitations, thats been proved repeatedly. In fact local testing showed no advantage for cost/capability to include AIP in the base Collins design. However, an AIP sub operating in the littorals is a different issue - hence the US got to know first hand how subs with fundamentally similar profiles operate over a wide range of locales. The USN/RAN co-operative development on the CBASS torpedo is one legacy of that knowledge sharing.

Remember that subs are also designed around their likely fighting locale - the buoyancy issus are different and that effects how some components are changed and designed.

I guess thats why I get frustrated at the sometimes simple comments that a Walrus, Seahound, Collins, 209, Oberon, Gotland, Dolphin "killed" a US Carrier.

Any Carrier can be killed - as can any sub be killed - its the consistency and persistency and the effectiveness of the doctrine and ability that counts.

All kills are designed to extract information - even when carriers are "sunk". UD Warfare training is very similar to DACT. After all, Aerodynamics and Fluid dynamics are kissing cousins.

 

[gf0012-aust]

gf0012-aust

While I think that your points regarding "homegrown" defense cababilities are completely valid, both in lieu of independent national defense capabilities as well as boosting domestic industry, I still think that that route leads to massive budget overflows and waste of money. There is a very damaging "Everybody is happy" circuit, which, put to the point, is about national politicians looking "Strong" and pro-defense. The millitary high brass is happy for the new toy (and because their political masters are happy), the millitary aquisition organisation (Material command?? not sure what it is called in English) are happy because they have something to do and gets large budgets and thus become important, the industry makes a lot of money - and are happy, the local politicians can claim to have created jobs at the local yard/factory and are happy - Everybody are happy: EXCEPT the taxpayers and - God forbid - those that have to go to war with the machines who are either sub-optimal or in too few numbers, because the process is not very good at focussing on what should be a question of getting the best and most equipment for the defense of "the fatherland". And this is so because in the heart of it, the important interesents are oblivious to what the millitary actually gets: The politicians wants to send certain signals to secure them the re-election and the industry is interested in the economical activity generated by the public subsidy - and the millitary persons are not important.

While the above leads to "ordinarry" waste of money in general, the real danger is for countries that have defense industries that "almost" can get the job done... Then you are set up for spending money indefinately.

Also
Simple economical rules and principles applies to the production of tanks or ships as well as they do to cars. If the swedes are better at producing subs than australians while australiens are better at brewing beers all will be better off if the swedes makes the subs and the australiens brew the beer (I know for a fact that all will be better off if swedes don't brew beer, but that's beside the point).

Likewise a "goverment dollar" invested into an non-competiative industry is if not wasted, then a very poorly invested dollar (Something the former DDR (east germany) proved beyound doubt).

Will get back to you, work calls, and I will edit a decent response once I'm free.

 

[yoron]

See your point there

Looking at this I get the feeling though, that USA will need to train against theose new 'Stirling subs' as well as the 'Collin class subs' some more.
http://www.youtube.com/swf/l.swf?sw...th_seconds=241&allow_ratings=1&title=Be Aware

---
Ah, Palnatoke?
What exactly are wrong with our beer?

If you say 'everything' I promise to send Gotland to you.
Or should it be 'on you'?

English

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Likewise a "goverment dollar" invested into an non-competiative industry is if not wasted, then a very poorly invested dollar (Something the former DDR (east germany) proved beyound doubt).

This is a grossly simplified argument and from commercial point of view which is not exactly defence specific. The Government case is not to spend money to see a return on investment by exporting submarines but to save money in whole of life costing for owning these submarines.

By building them in Australia (Collins class) there may have been an increase in the size of the cheque signed compared to importing but it actually saved the Government a lot of money. For one much of outlay was returned to the Government through income, VAT and business taxes which would have not been returned by importing. Also the domestic build meant much of the expenditure on materials was spent in Australia boosting domestic businesses from steel to chair suppliers. All the employment generated decreases the Government's social security outlay. Finally the domestic industry capability developed enabled much cheaper domestic maintenance of the submarines.

All these factors are considered and why many nations who may not have had historical domestic submarine development industries in recent years have license built submarines.

 

[Palnatoke]

First of all I don't have indepth knowledhe of the particular project, so my reply will be more general:

Government case is not to spend money to see a return on investment by exporting submarines but to save money in whole of life costing for owning these submarines.

OK

(...) For one much of outlay was returned to the Government through income, VAT and business taxes which would have not been returned by importing. Also the domestic build meant much of the expenditure on materials was spent in Australia boosting domestic businesses from steel to chair suppliers. All the employment generated decreases the Government's social security outlay.

Yes, but remember that these people would have other jobs, if you weren't building the sub, that would also have generated income, VAT and other taxes. Maybe those engineers would be making a product that could be exported and earn foreign money to australia?
A healthy industry shouldn't in general need the goverment to boost it. There can be exceptions, like extraordinary circumstances like trade wars etc. But in general if an industry starts needing taxpayers money directly or indirectly that industry is probably not worth it.

Finally the domestic industry capability developed enabled much cheaper domestic maintenance of the submarines.

I accept that, but don't know the extend and significanse.

 

[Palnatoke]

Ah, Palnatoke?
What exactly are wrong with our beer?

I apologize if I have hurt your feelings... but there is a reason why danes do yearly pilgrimage to the land of Volvo and swedes do weekly pilgrimage to the land of Carlsberg.

 

[Falstaff]

This is a grossly simplified argument and from commercial point of view which is not exactly defence specific. The Government case is not to spend money to see a return on investment by exporting submarines but to save money in whole of life costing for owning these submarines.

By building them in Australia (Collins class) there may have been an increase in the size of the cheque signed compared to importing but it actually saved the Government a lot of money. For one much of outlay was returned to the Government through income, VAT and business taxes which would have not been returned by importing. Also the domestic build meant much of the expenditure on materials was spent in Australia boosting domestic businesses from steel to chair suppliers. All the employment generated decreases the Government's social security outlay. Finally the domestic industry capability developed enabled much cheaper domestic maintenance of the submarines.

And that is a very simplistic excuse from the make-or-buy-or-ally construction kit itself that can be heard all through indigenous stuff military spending. You won't find unpolluted figures on either side, and I guess you will find studies that support both points of view. I guess the truth is somewhere in between. That's a phenomenon every production engineer faces when different sourcing solutions have to be considered down the capacity and technology management paths.
In defence you'll have to make a strategical decision about which competencies you want to retain or build up in order to make your defence doctrine or strategy work sustainably. It's only a (yet important) part of it that you try to make it as affordable as possible.
From that point of view, the decision to build up an industrial base for submarine construction in Australia makes perfect sense to me (although I don't hope you guys will challenge the world leader in conventional sub construction ).
Now before you start yelling at me I preventively apologise for my insolent behaviour.

BTW, everyone drink German beer, will you!

 

[Red]

Great post by gf0012-aust !! Joy to read. I can understand why the RSN opted for the Challangers so that the RSN can discern and evolve thier own doctrines and discover unique submersible needs.

Are there any news about the A26 subs by the way? There are alternatives. Is not Norway also looking to replace her subs?

 

[Vivendi]

Are there any news about the A26 subs by the way? There are alternatives. Is not Norway also looking to replace her subs?

Indeed, Norway will purchase new subs, and a collaboration with Sweden (and Singapore?) on A26 has specifically been mentioned as one option.

However no decision has been made yet. Perhaps later this year?


V

 

[OPSSG]

Great post by gf0012-aust !! Joy to read.

Your explanation of how older subs are being used as concept technology demonstrators, enabled me to make sense of RSN's second hand submarine buys. Like Red, I second the sentiment quoted above.

Some Info from a Kockums brochure called: 'From a submarine point of view'

(1) On Gotland vessels, the engines and other sound-emitting equipment are carried in sound-attenuating mountings. Active sonar is also a serious threat. The main factors in avoiding detection are the geometry of the hull, fin and control surfaces, and the materials used. An anechoic coating has a major effect on the avoidance of detection.

(2) Demagnetizing the ship is done by generating a counteracting magnetic field. On the Gotland class submarines, this counteracting field is generated by a system comprising 27 individually controlled groups of coils arranged in three perpendicular planes. The same coil system is used for compensating for both the permanent and the induced magnetic fields. Further, detection of the extremely low frequency (ELF) signature is prevented by short circuiting the electrical current by earthing.

(3) The AIP system of the Gotland comprises the virtually vibration-free and silent Stirling engine. In 1989, Kockums equipped the Swedish Navy’s Näcken submarine with the world’s first operational air independent propulsion (AIP) system for conventional submarines. The system extends the submerged endurance of the submarine from a few days to several weeks, which could previously be managed only by nuclear powered submarines. Combust -ion takes place at a pressure, which is higher than the pressure of surrounding sea, water, allowing exhaust gases to be discharged directly into the sea. The combustion process is continuous. Oxygen is stored in liquid form (LOX) in cryogenic tanks. Submerg -ed endurance is determined mainly by the amount of oxygen stored. Exhaust gases from the Stirling combustion chamber are cooled, which allows waste products to leave the vessel at low temperature, thus minimizing infrared signatures.

(4) The combat system provides performance needed to meet the operation -al role of the submarine in a wide variety of missions - surveillance, attack, ASW missions, minelaying and special operations. A modern combat system is integrated and comprises:

• sonar system
• periscope
• electronic support measures, radar
• command and weapon control system
• fire control solution
• navigation system
• communication system​

According to the Kockums website, the Swedish Government had in December 2007 approved initiation of the design phase for a new generation of submarines. Kockums is currently finalising the project definition phase of the A26 submarine for the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV). Preparations are ongoing together with FMV to enter into the design contract.

A26 Master Schedule

2008: Definition work

2009: Start of the Design contract,
First half of 2009 - Request for Tender (RfT) issued for major systems

2010: Major systems selected based on open competition between suppliers

Lots of the info I have posted above is old. If there are any new Swedish news / publications on the A26 project: Any translation and posting of such info will be greatly appreciated.

 

[gf0012-aust]

Indeed, Norway will purchase new subs, and a collaboration with Sweden (and Singapore?) on A26 has specifically been mentioned as one option.

However no decision has been made yet. Perhaps later this year?


V

Kockums will be pushing for customers as they are in a bit of trouble at present. Up to 250 jobs in Malmo and Musko are at risk.

It also times in with announcements made by the Swedish Defence Minister that the Govt is going to initiate a procurement restructure thats never been done before.

 

[Vivendi]

Kockums will be pushing for customers as they are in a bit of trouble at present. Up to 250 jobs in Malmo and Musko are at risk.

It also times in with announcements made by the Swedish Defence Minister that the Govt is going to initiate a procurement restructure thats never been done before.

Indeed, in addition a potential Norwegian purchase of A26 has also been viewed in the context of a broader Nordic collaboration:

http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00109/progress_report_109363a.pdf

page 17 (page 26 in the PDF):

The project is procurement of a common submarine (working title: A-26) and in longer-term cooperation during the life-cycle-period of these submarines.
The Norwegian/Swedish joint defence study 2007 indicates a possibility to reduce cost for the project in case of a common procurement and establishment of a deep and broad cooperation in the lifetime support of A-26 submarines. Many factors make Swedish-Norwegian cooperation interesting. Both nations have submarines that reach its technical end-of-life in the time-period 2015 - 2020. This implies the possibility to a serial production, which implies a cost efficient procurement and cooperation in the life cycle. The field of cooperation could be operational and include for example in-service training, education and exercises. An even deeper cooperation could
include pooling of materiel and personnel up to certain limits. In a maintenance aspect, the cooperation for example could comprise a common spare part system and spare part stock.
An absolute condition is that both nations' time-schedules for the decision to enter into a joint procurement-contract versus a contractor correspond. Otherwise the mutual benefits and profits will not occur. For this reason it is crucial that the process is not delayed, rather accelerated.
A second condition is that technical and tactical requirements for the submarines must be harmonized to provide commonality.
The Norwegian -Swedish working group indicates in the report a potential saving as much as 30% in a common procurement. Swedish FMV indicates that a common procurement could result in a clear saving of 10 -20 per cent in project costs by comparison with a sole procurement.
According to Forsvarets Forskningsinstitu stt,udy reported in October 2007 the Swedish A26 is 40-60 % lower in price by comparison with submarines of similar and completed developed design. The main reason stated is the design to cost-principle in the A26 project.

V

 

[gf0012-aust]

Indeed, in addition a potential Norwegian purchase of A26 has also been viewed in the context of a broader Nordic collaboration:

http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00109/progress_report_109363a.pdf

page 17 (page 26 in the PDF):



V

Vivendi, this issue is another reason why a mini nordic pooling of military capability has been discussed between Sweden, Norway and Finland. They're effectively looking at having a maxi model of what the dutch and UK do with their combined marine/amphibious FEG, but at a far more complex integrated scale.

the upshot - and this is 10-20 years away (and assuming that it works) is that weapons procurement could be pooled and "commonised")

But thats a looooong way off yet. The fact that it's being considered is significant enough. It would never work in Sth America though! (eg).

gf