True. And a 120mm gun is a 120mm gun. At the time the decision was made, it was the most modern and heavily-armed tank in SE Asia.
@ Chino,
Sorry, doesn't the PT-91M have a 125mm smoothbore gun (and not 120mm)? Must be a typo, right?
In support of your point about the PT-91M having killing power in closed terrain, it also comes with Sagem SAVAN-15 fire control system
(and the Drawa FCS found on the PT-91). IIRC India is also upgrading their T-72M1s (also called the Ajeya Mk1 tanks) to the Ajeya Mk2 standard with some elements from PT-91, such as SKO-1T DRAWA-T FCS and PZL-Wola S-1000 engine.
And well-crewed, well-lead, will be a match for any other MBT you can find in this region...
@Chino and DavidDCM
I also agree leadership, training and other factors are important too. In this respect, I think the MAF is taking a page from the South Africa Army (SAA) and has chosen mobility over armour. I have tremendous respect for the professionals in the MAF (especially their jungle warfare skills).
In a Rand study called "
In the Middle of the Fight" by Johnson et al. (2008), studying the effects of medium armoured forces (of which South Africa's Border War in Angola in 1975–1988 was a case), the study's authors concluded that
world-class training received by the SAA
provided a (perhaps the) decisive advantage over Angolan and Cuban forces.
At some stage, the SAA was operating in the absence of air superiority. The SAA medium-armor units were employed in much smaller dispersed packages. In fact, SAA medium-weight armored units operated at a significant disadvantage in terms of lethality and survivability when compared
to heavy opposition forces.
However, the SAA had superior intelligence and situational awareness, which was gained via their use of recce elements and UAVs. Further, the SAA fielded large, task-organized “combat groups” with a remarkable array of capabilities, including infantry, armor infantry (carried in armored IFVs & APCs), heavy armor (the SAA's upgraded MBT was developed and deployed too late for the conflict), mortars, tube artillery (indirect fires provided by the G-5 gave SAA lethality - which Malaysia also uses), rocket artillery (Malaysia has Astros II), special forces, electronic warfare, and logistics elements. These capabilities allowed the South Africans (and no reason why Malaysia cannot do the same) to achieve the survivability and lethality levels offered by combined-arms formations while remaining sustainable.