Future of the Australian Defence Force

[black shark]

yes but response would take around 60-90 days sure they could send earlier but the legal considerations are immense

Based on that, then Australia will have to maintain air superiority for that period at least. I'm sure in the event of hostilities, there would be some lead time which would allow the US Air Force time to conduct a local "planned exercise" involving 2 or 3 squadrons of F-22's to effectively back up the ADF if needed.
I might be out of date with this but hasn't Australia signed a mutual defence agreement with the US which would solve the legal time delays?

 

[Aussie Digger]

yes but response would take around 60-90 days sure they could send earlier but the legal considerations are immense

What?

Do the US and UK not monitor military movements throughout the world?

Are you seriously suggesting a major military power could move forces, attack Australia on a significant scale and neither the US nor UK would do or say anything about this, because of "legal concerns"?

If Australia were to be threaten by a major military power, this is what I suggest would happen.

1. Australia would appeal to the UN and would place it's own forces on a high alert. Do you remember what the readiness system for ADF's state of readiness was called, Willur? It has changed now of course...

2. Allies would be immediately aware of this major power's intentions and would provide an adequate response in consultation with Australia.

3. Any overt movement of significant military forces would be noticed and matched, by the USA. Significant diplomatic pressure would be brought to bear on this major power at this time. Enormous pressure would be brought to bear on the Country that would have to host this force. No power in the world besides the US has a capability to launch a significant military action against the Australian mainland from the sea.

4. Under the conditions of the ANZUS treaty, the US would act to help defend Australia in a time of conflict, sailing a Carrier Battle Group or deploying fighter squadrons all the way to Australia, might not be the only way that the USA could militarily defend us...

 

[gf0012-aust]

yes but response would take around 60-90 days

Well under 24hrs to get a reaction and decision - under a few days to get a response.

but the legal considerations are immense

what legal considerations?? we have a number of treaties and agreements we can invoke.

Australia has over 64 international treaties and agreements in place - guess how many include the UK and or the US in the response chain.

 

[Ozzy Blizzard]

I don't believe any power on earth (bar the US) currently has the power projection capability to put a sufficient force into the sea air gap to seriously challenge the ADF on our own ground (and water), period. In any case such a move by a major power (PROC is the only possibility as far as i can tell) would have massive consequences for the wider security situation in the Asia Pacific region and for the US's alliance system, thus you could expect a swift and decisive reaction.

If however in the 2030+ time frame the US is unable or unwilling to defend Australia in a wider conflict with another major power then the alliance may not be the panacea it is now. (But of course that is dooms day stuff). If the regional balance of power significantly alters in favor of other major powers then the ADF may have to address a fundamental shift in our strategic environment, one never faced in the history of this nation. We have a long history of relying on "great and powerful friends", what will happen if our current friends are no longer able to defend us? Will we look to a new alliance system or to our own defense at a wider regional level?

 

[battlensign]

I don't believe any power on earth (bar the US) currently has the power projection capability to put a sufficient force into the sea air gap to seriously challenge the ADF on our own ground (and water), period. In any case such a move by a major power (PROC is the only possibility as far as i can tell) would have massive consequences for the wider security situation in the Asia Pacific region and for the US's alliance system, thus you could expect a swift and decisive reaction.

If however in the 2030+ time frame the US is unable or unwilling to defend Australia in a wider conflict with another major power then the alliance may not be the panacea it is now. (But of course that is dooms day stuff). If the regional balance of power significantly alters in favor of other major powers then the ADF may have to address a fundamental shift in our strategic environment, one never faced in the history of this nation. We have a long history of relying on "great and powerful friends", what will happen if our current friends are no longer able to defend us? Will we look to a new alliance system or to our own defense at a wider regional level?

It's interesting. Some thoughts, if its is okay......

Singapore and Malaysia have no reason to attack (territorially etc) and Indonesia seems to be the only real potential issue, However, were someone like China to be on the cards, I think we can expect several issues to come into play:

A) China has no real reason to attack beyond conquest etc (no direct military threat to the mainland - perhaps limited to punishment strikes to disarm or inflict retribution for supporting 'interventionist western forces). Raw material possession may be a factor, but we already sell it (although I admit that I don't think this stopped the Japanese in WW2).

B) Any attact on Australia implies freedom of movement through the seas with forces capable of strike or bases sufficient to facilitate use of airpower. In relation to the former even a single nuclear submarine would be a problem without sufficient MPAs and therefore suggest that increased numbers would be required and in relation to the latter, that suggests the acquiescence of regional states and therefore a proactive policy of diplomatic denial ought to be the tactic of the day.

C) Threats from China that require transit/passage through the region depend a little on the outcomes of territorial disputes from areas such as the South China Sea. Smaller states tend to gravitate to the dominant powers of the day (in this case US, ealier British Empire and potentially in the future - PRC). As such it cannot be assumed that ASEAN nations will necessarily be persuaded to join in any regional alliances unless diplomatic relations with the PRC sour for some reason (Disputes etc). I think we can rely on continuing Japanese friendship as a regional competitor, but but regional coalitions/alliances may be restricted to peace within the South East Asian regional nations only. It may be a little to much of an 'ask' to expect that regional states in the 'zones of primary transit' would proactively attempt to restrict PRC's freedom of maritime manouvre.

D) At this point the intentions of the PRC and India become important. Three potential scenarios for CHINA might be:

ONE the Chinese government forms the impression that it will persue an introverted policy of self-focus, assisted by international diplomacy and action to secure resources and trade then conflict is unlikely unless provoked (ala Taiwan).

TWO, great power with interests vested as a stake-holder in the current international setup - proactive action within the scope of the will of the international community with only the occaisional foray into proactive military action (limited in scope and duration - full expection of Taiwan initiated reunification) which augers well for Australia. A peaceful border resolution with the Russians is an example of this.

THREE, proactive great power - where the growing capabilities of the PRC are combined with the political desire to project an image of power for international and domestic political reasons. Forced resolutions of disputes presents the greatest potential for great power conflict. Australia is drawn in with western allies against China (perhaps the only realistic China threat scenario for Australia). At this point it seems to depend alot on the timeframes involved and whether the conflicts can be confined to the NEA region and whether the use of nuclear weapons can be negated (either by deterence, premptive strike or BMD). The indian position becomes important as a result of the potential of the Indian Navy in particular in the future to develope into a force capable of preventing Chinese expansion into South West Pacific and more likely the Indian Ocean.




All in all the prospects for avoiding war are good so long as there is no reason for the US and PRC to be drawn into conflict or where disputes are negotiated and positive soft power draws in the 'rebel' Taiwanese. If the India/PRC borders become an issue that is a whole new ball game and I am not sure what would happen in this scenario.

Regards,

Brett.

 

[Ozzy Blizzard]

It's interesting. Some thoughts, if its is okay......

Singapore and Malaysia have no reason to attack (territorially etc) and Indonesia seems to be the only real potential issue, However, were someone like China to be on the cards, I think we can expect several issues to come into play:

A) China has no real reason to attack beyond conquest etc (no direct military threat to the mainland - perhaps limited to punishment strikes to disarm or inflict retribution for supporting 'interventionist western forces). Raw material possession may be a factor, but we already sell it (although I admit that I don't think this stopped the Japanese in WW2).

B) Any attact on Australia implies freedom of movement through the seas with forces capable of strike or bases sufficient to facilitate use of airpower. In relation to the former even a single nuclear submarine would be a problem without sufficient MPAs and therefore suggest that increased numbers would be required and in relation to the latter, that suggests the acquiescence of regional states and therefore a proactive policy of diplomatic denial ought to be the tactic of the day.

C) Threats from China that require transit/passage through the region depend a little on the outcomes of territorial disputes from areas such as the South China Sea. Smaller states tend to gravitate to the dominant powers of the day (in this case US, ealier British Empire and potentially in the future - PRC). As such it cannot be assumed that ASEAN nations will necessarily be persuaded to join in any regional alliances unless diplomatic relations with the PRC sour for some reason (Disputes etc). I think we can rely on continuing Japanese friendship as a regional competitor, but but regional coalitions/alliances may be restricted to peace within the South East Asian regional nations only. It may be a little to much of an 'ask' to expect that regional states in the 'zones of primary transit' would proactively attempt to restrict PRC's freedom of maritime manouvre.

D) At this point the intentions of the PRC and India become important. Three potential scenarios for CHINA might be:

ONE the Chinese government forms the impression that it will persue an introverted policy of self-focus, assisted by international diplomacy and action to secure resources and trade then conflict is unlikely unless provoked (ala Taiwan).

TWO, great power with interests vested as a stake-holder in the current international setup - proactive action within the scope of the will of the international community with only the occaisional foray into proactive military action (limited in scope and duration - full expection of Taiwan initiated reunification) which augers well for Australia. A peaceful border resolution with the Russians is an example of this.

THREE, proactive great power - where the growing capabilities of the PRC are combined with the political desire to project an image of power for international and domestic political reasons. Forced resolutions of disputes presents the greatest potential for great power conflict. Australia is drawn in with western allies against China (perhaps the only realistic China threat scenario for Australia). At this point it seems to depend alot on the timeframes involved and whether the conflicts can be confined to the NEA region and whether the use of nuclear weapons can be negated (either by deterence, premptive strike or BMD). The indian position becomes important as a result of the potential of the Indian Navy in particular in the future to develope into a force capable of preventing Chinese expansion into South West Pacific and more likely the Indian Ocean.




All in all the prospects for avoiding war are good so long as there is no reason for the US and PRC to be drawn into conflict or where disputes are negotiated and positive soft power draws in the 'rebel' Taiwanese. If the India/PRC borders become an issue that is a whole new ball game and I am not sure what would happen in this scenario.

Regards,

Brett.

Its too late mate, i'll have a comment tomorrow hopefully.

 

[Todjaeger]

General question here. If Australia were directly threatened by a hostile power, what sort of (if any) military response would the UK have? I can easily see the UK responding diplomatically due to longstanding cultural and historical ties... However, AFAIK the ANZUK treaty became defunct 1974, following the British withdrawl of forces east of the Suez. In its place were the FPDA where Australia, NZ and the UK consult in the event of an attack upon Malaysia or Singapore, as opposed to involvement if there is an attack upon Australia.

Also, given the location of Australia, and the general disposition of UK deployments, what sort of assistance could the UK provide and in what sort of timeframe?

-Cheers

 

[Aussie Digger]

It's interesting. Some thoughts, if its is okay......

Singapore and Malaysia have no reason to attack (territorially etc) and Indonesia seems to be the only real potential issue, However, were someone like China to be on the cards, I think we can expect several issues to come into play:

Agreed.

A) China has no real reason to attack beyond conquest etc (no direct military threat to the mainland - perhaps limited to punishment strikes to disarm or inflict retribution for supporting 'interventionist western forces). Raw material possession may be a factor, but we already sell it (although I admit that I don't think this stopped the Japanese in WW2).

Agree with "China has no real reason to attack". Btw, Australia was NOT supplying Japan with resources DURING WW2. Before hand, yes.

B) Any attact on Australia implies freedom of movement through the seas with forces capable of strike or bases sufficient to facilitate use of airpower. In relation to the former even a single nuclear submarine would be a problem without sufficient MPAs and therefore suggest that increased numbers would be required and in relation to the latter, that suggests the acquiescence of regional states and therefore a proactive policy of diplomatic denial ought to be the tactic of the day.

China could certainly launch Ballistic missiles at Australia and there is NOTHING we could do to stop them from doing so, nor intercept the missiles themselves. It wouldn't require a submarine to do so. Chinese land based missiles (ICBM's) have sufficient range to hit Australia.

Of course, such action is going to incur a likely response from the USA and is in any case a remote possibility. We are friendly with China. There is not one credible reason why they would wish to fire ICBM's at Australia.

All in all the prospects for avoiding war are good so long as there is no reason for the US and PRC to be drawn into conflict or where disputes are negotiated and positive soft power draws in the 'rebel' Taiwanese. If the India/PRC borders become an issue that is a whole new ball game and I am not sure what would happen in this scenario.

Regards,

Brett.

Same thing as happened when they WERE at war with each other. Nothing, as far as Australia is concerned. Whilst our politicians may make noises, it would have about the same effect on Australia as the Iran/Iraq war did, which is to say: none.

 

[battlensign]

Agreed.



Agree with "China has no real reason to attack". Btw, Australia was NOT supplying Japan with resources DURING WW2. Before hand, yes.

I do realise that we were not supplying the Japanese during WW2, but we were selling as late as 1939 from my memory and therefore my point was merely that if we are willing to sell, then conquest/seizure of resources is unnecessary. The significance of this is that the PRC does maintain forces designed to 'secure strategic energy resource supplies' where flow in threatened/interrupted.

China could certainly launch Ballistic missiles at Australia and there is NOTHING we could do to stop them from doing so, nor intercept the missiles themselves. It wouldn't require a submarine to do so. Chinese land based missiles (ICBM's) have sufficient range to hit Australia.

I am not sure if there are any PRC ICBMs that contain only purely conventional warheads and even if there were I would have to believe that there would be some limitations on their employment and their usage. Surely the great powers capable of tracking such weapons would be unaware of the fact that these particular missiles contained only conventional warheads and might mistake their release as a 'first strike' (although the character/nature of release might have some indications if release was limited to 1 or 2).

If there were ICBMs coming Australia's way, perhaps an effective terminal phase interceptor could be employed, although I admit that this is the most difficult phase for interception and that almost anything in AUS could be a target.

Of course, such action is going to incur a likely response from the USA and is in any case a remote possibility. We are friendly with China. There is not one credible reason why they would wish to fire ICBM's at Australia.

We certainly do not appear to be a strategic target unless we were capable of supporting interventions within the Taiwan issue with an expanded submarine force. But why would we?: the US and China support the status quo and the status quo appears a strategic victory for China trhough winning the peace and drawing Taiwan through soft power. As such, the US will not intervene and we therefore are not involved.

Same thing as happened when they WERE at war with each other. Nothing, as far as Australia is concerned. Whilst our politicians may make noises, it would have about the same effect on Australia as the Iran/Iraq war did, which is to say: none.

But the last time that these two went head to head they were certainly not both 'great powers' and only one side had nukes......

Brett.

 

[alexsa]

Here's an interesting PDF on Australia's nuclear strategy, which questions the long term viability of reliance on the US's nuclear umbrella, and the need to at least hold an advantage in lead time to nuclear weapons over other regional players.




http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/SCVol4No1/vo4no1Heinrichs.pdf

Building a nuclear industry, as suggested, could come with th risk of increasing the likilhood of other states in the region doing the same. All done in the name of energy but wiht the assocated 'weapons' risk. However, nuclear energy need not be uranium based and the Thorium alternative that solves the conudrum of this situation (and solve our CO2 emmissions target problem in one go.... to the distress of the coal miners). India was well down the Thorium development path and much work has been done in the US and Russia. However, India slowed development when sources of uranium were opened up but has converted an existing reactor to thorium.

http://www.power-technology.com/features/feature1141/

Thorium does have its disadvantges and is not as easy to produce and reprocess however it is of an order of magnitured safer that uranium as it:

1. Runs sub critical (no run away reactions in the event of a failure)
2. Has a half life is an order of mantitude lowers
3. All the material cna be usedin the reactor where only a small percentage of natural Uranium can be
4. It cannot be weaponised
5. And the big one, it is more plentiful than uranium and Australia holds 30% of the worlds reserves.

 

[StingrayOZ]

Australia should develop a nuclear industry, one based on safe, non weaponising processes. Even if Australia does develop nuclear technology it won't significantly impact the coal industry in Australia. Merely curtail future growth (many jobs etc transfering to simular jobs in the nuclear industry). We can't keep using coal for 100% of the reliable base line power.

Treaties and agreements aren't pure solutions. Infact the more agreements the less worth they have. The agreements are worth more when Australia can significantly back itself.

There are often times where nations disagree in the method and timing of a response. Assets may not be avalible, or action could be held up by international consultation (UN or NATO or things proceeding outside expected events). The faster the response the more limited it will be. Having a functional force already in Australia means that allies are going to be quicker in assisting, and can send what ever they have instead of pulling together key units to provide a specific force.

ABM does not have to be a locally based *thing*. Working in combination with countries like Japan and the US we could deploy an interception shield which would be a significant deterant. Combined with diplomacy could be very effective. I don't think Australia should study too deeply terminal interception.

 

[riksavage]

General question here. If Australia were directly threatened by a hostile power, what sort of (if any) military response would the UK have? I can easily see the UK responding diplomatically due to longstanding cultural and historical ties... However, AFAIK the ANZUK treaty became defunct 1974, following the British withdrawl of forces east of the Suez. In its place were the FPDA where Australia, NZ and the UK consult in the event of an attack upon Malaysia or Singapore, as opposed to involvement if there is an attack upon Australia.

Also, given the location of Australia, and the general disposition of UK deployments, what sort of assistance could the UK provide and in what sort of timeframe?

-Cheers

As part of ongoing defence agreements between NZ, Canada, Aus and the US, the UK will provide intelligence support as part of Echelon in the early days. Plus the UK could, and definitely would send an RAF contingent to assist with the defence of Australian airspace (Typhoon, Sentinel and Tornado). I also believe they would dispatch at least one SSN, the current Trafalgar Class and future Astute Class can be on station anywhere in the world within 14 days from the get-go. Even with the current military commitments in A-STAN and Iraq the UK could send at least one Brigade, most likely 16-Air Assualt (UK currently has ten deployable Light, Medium and Heavy Brigades).

The English speaking alliance remains very strong even today, between Governments and at more micro cultural level. Any attack on Aus would cause a huge outcry in the UK, similar to what was witnessed during the Falklands invasion in 82. UK migrants to Aus remain the highest percentage even to this day, plus we share the same head of state and cultural heritage. Percentage wise a large majority of Aussies have English, Irish, Welsh or Scots ancestors.

'East of the Suez' reference is irrelevant, it's about protecting the UK's strategic interests and old alliances, after all it didn't stop the UK taking part in GWI & II and unilaterally in Sierra Leone.

 

[Todjaeger]

'East of the Suez' reference is irrelevant, it's about protecting the UK's strategic interests and old alliances, after all it didn't stop the UK taking part in GWI & II and unilaterally in Sierra Leone.

The reference to assets east of the Suez was more to due to the stationing of UK units. AFAIK, apart from international deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, etc the UK no longer maintains a permanent presence in the Pacific, like it had for roughly the past century and a half. This would mean that it would be less likely for the UK to have an available asset immediately 'on hand' in the event there was a threat to Australia.

Given this fact, as well as the great distance between Australia and the UK (and even greater flight shipping route) I wondered what sort of direct participation the UK would have.

-Cheers

 

[ThePuss]

I have got a question about the role of the F/A-18F the RAAF is acquiring.

The foxtrot's are being acquired to allow the F111 to retire as it becomes more expensive and difficult to be maintained in service. So that would lead me to believe that the foxtrot's would mainly train in the strike role.

However the foxtrot's is a more effective fighter than our upgraded Alfa's and Bravo's. The Alfa's (I am not sure about the Bravo's) are being upgraded to carry the new standoff strike weapon being aquired by the RAAF (I can't remember the name) and we are getting the new tankers to the alfa's will have the legs to be utilised in the strike role. So is the RAAF intending to use the foxtrot as our premier "fighter" squadron and utiles the alfa's as the strike platform.

Or is the Foxtrot's going to be a "rounded" squadron with equal training in air to air, attack and the strike role?.

 

[ThePuss]

CAF (an ex pusser by the way recently anounced that the RAAF will retire the Caribou's next year primarly because the AVGAS the BOU's run on is getting very difficult to acquire as it gets fazed out across the world.

So as a stop gap measure the Beechcraft B300 King Air operated by the Army's 173 squadron will be transfered to the RAAF's 38 squadron in RAAF colours but with army pilots. Additional King Airs will be leased and operated by RAAF pilots to round out the squadron. This is meant to be a short to medium term plan.

OK so for the proper replacement for the Bou's what would be the best option?.

Another squadron of Chinook's operated by the Army?.
A squadron of Osprey's either operated by the Army or as a joint unit with the RAAF much like the British joint harrier force operated by the RN and the RAF.
More NH-90's operated by the Army or as a joint force with the RANs NH-90's with a less tactical focuse than the the other army NH-90 squadrons.
A squadron of CASA C-295 operated by the RAAF.

My personal choise would be the joint Army/RAAF Osprey option. But I would be happy with any of the above.

 

[willur]

Based on that, then Australia will have to maintain air superiority for that period at least. I'm sure in the event of hostilities, there would be some lead time which would allow the US Air Force time to conduct a local "planned exercise" involving 2 or 3 squadrons of F-22's to effectively back up the ADF if needed.
I might be out of date with this but hasn't Australia signed a mutual defence agreement with the US which would solve the legal time delays?

still those agreements still have to be processed and any action approved by congress, what about projection of force a carrier does take awhile to restation any move of blue water fleet from RAN will take time and what about the first gulf war movement of troops and aircraft take less time than navy but the navy can cover more area. I think sending the F22 would be last resort might send 1 sqr but not 2 or 3and the US would send marines and such support.
but I still believe in 60 -90 days as noone has put up any solid except because they have to. Look at any conflict US is currently in or previous conflict how long was the response time.
Legal considerations are always prepared by the US for future conflicts except when economic considerations are to be met, also they will allow australia first to prepare its own response this alone would take time. Also the US is currently active on 3 fronts how much response would they have left and not leave themselves open.
Also to me a response is a projection of force not 'please dont because you are being naughty' and how many carrier groups are currently available for rapid relocation, what if this scenario happens during election time.
In I believe the US will respond, A DIRECT PROJECTION OF FORCE which to me is a response will still take at least 60 Days to be on station

 

[gf0012-aust]

Also to me a response is a projection of force not 'please dont because you are being naughty' and how many carrier groups are currently available for rapid relocation, what if this scenario happens during election time.

In I believe the US will respond, A DIRECT PROJECTION OF FORCE which to me is a response will still take at least 60 Days to be on station

They can get a TF on station within a week - and usually under. (They've done it a few times)

CINCPAC runs the largest fleet in the world - and more than half of the carrier and amphibious response capability (soon to be more) are based western seaboard. It also means that half of the Strike and Expeditionary capability can be close to any critical event etc.... Their Amphibious Expeditionary capability is larger and packs more punch than any current Non US Navy fleet - so even if they just send ARG/ESG's they''ll still hurt the other side.

They have been gearing up for a rapid conflict since 2004, they've been trialling merged task forces since that time.

In addition, none of this works in an intelligence vacuum. Major "enemy" assets are always hacked - so if there was a brew up, the black hat world would have done their morning reports weeks ago....

The world of ISR changed after 1999....

They have the redundancy to release meaningful lethal assets in the PACRIM more than anyone else - and get them in play to do harm sooner than any other navy in that pond.

 

[black shark]

still those agreements still have to be processed and any action approved by congress, what about projection of force a carrier does take awhile to restation any move of blue water fleet from RAN will take time and what about the first gulf war movement of troops and aircraft take less time than navy but the navy can cover more area. I think sending the F22 would be last resort might send 1 sqr but not 2 or 3and the US would send marines and such support.
but I still believe in 60 -90 days as noone has put up any solid except because they have to. Look at any conflict US is currently in or previous conflict how long was the response time.
Legal considerations are always prepared by the US for future conflicts except when economic considerations are to be met, also they will allow australia first to prepare its own response this alone would take time. Also the US is currently active on 3 fronts how much response would they have left and not leave themselves open.
Also to me a response is a projection of force not 'please dont because you are being naughty' and how many carrier groups are currently available for rapid relocation, what if this scenario happens during election time.
In I believe the US will respond, A DIRECT PROJECTION OF FORCE which to me is a response will still take at least 60 Days to be on station

From memory, the US have at least 25 carriers operational (11 or 12 of which are large 85-100,000 displacement). So I would imagine 50% or even 75% of these would be available. Add that to the Royal Navy which has about 5 carrier/amphibious assault ships.
I think response would be quicker than recent examples. Australia is higher on the priority list than oil security in my opinion (from a US perspective). Reaction time would be much faster than the Kuwait example.

I think the US can handle another front. Australia would be required to mobilise reserves to reduce the US troop requirements but all the high tech weaponry would be available. If required, the US could hand over the Afghan front to the UK and Germany to handle while they deal with the threat to Australia.

 

[black shark]

General question here. If Australia were directly threatened by a hostile power, what sort of (if any) military response would the UK have? I can easily see the UK responding diplomatically due to longstanding cultural and historical ties... However, AFAIK the ANZUK treaty became defunct 1974, following the British withdrawl of forces east of the Suez. In its place were the FPDA where Australia, NZ and the UK consult in the event of an attack upon Malaysia or Singapore, as opposed to involvement if there is an attack upon Australia.

Also, given the location of Australia, and the general disposition of UK deployments, what sort of assistance could the UK provide and in what sort of timeframe?

-Cheers

Good question. The UK forces are stretched no doubt. The army is the most stretched in my opinion. Any response would involve naval and air force assets mostly. A task force made up of the following maybe:
- A squadron of Typhoons
- 6 frigates and destroyers
Needless to say, the US has the big stick.

 

[gf0012-aust]

still those agreements still have to be processed and any action approved by congress, what about projection of force a carrier does take awhile to restation any move

actual recent history disproves that.

in '99 the US moved its assets as soon as they were aware - the fleet commander had the authority to move - and did. he also made it clear that he had the power to act if he thought that US allies were at risk.

they were on station in under 3 days.