Looking at it from an Argtine perspective again.
Before the any mission is approved the high-command in Argentina are going to conduct a pretty comprehensive micro risk assessment to ascertain whether the risk is worth the reward. They will look at their adversary’s capabilities, their own capabilities coupled with their ability to mitigate any identified vulnerabilities / threats, which have been exposed throughout the mission profile planning. As part of this thought process they will go through endless ‘what if’s’ and prepare the appropriate contingencies.
Now so far I have come up with the following ‘what if’s’ based on the discussed scenario and I’d be interested to hear how they would be countered to allow the mission to proceed:
1. What if the UK has identified through their agent network (military personnel on MI6’s pay roll) and intelligence / an electronic surveillance capability (GCHQ America’s section) that plans are being studied for a possible military option against the Malvinas. We can’t prove they know, when, where or how, but we have to assume they may have detected an increase in secrecy, chatter amongst the major arms responsible, and consolidation of SF assets at or near embarkation points. How will we counter this?
2. What if at least one of the UK’s nuclear attack submarines is currently patrolling the Southern Hemisphere? This is considered likely; with one vessel dedicated to escorting the Nuclear Deterrent that leaves at least two available to the Admiralty (rest in refit or committed to the ME or North Atlantic). If we assume the UK has picked up on increased ‘chatter’ amongst the Argentine military, then one must also assume the UK will assign one of it’s Hunter Killers to the South Atlantic theatre of operations. How will we mitigate the risk of Tomahawk strike against air and naval bases immediately our mission starts or over the following days? Assuming the Brit’s have an Astute on station (2010) you could be looking at potentially 20+ missiles considering the vessel can carry a mix of 35 harpoons, torpedoes and / or cruise missiles.
3. We know that the UK maintains a single flight of F3’s on the Island. Unlikely that these are airborne 24-7, however we don’t know their patrol patterns and they don’t follow a regular flight plan. Worst case scenario at least one will be on ‘scramble’ alert with a crew on short notice to respond. What if an F3 is flying CAP during our intended approach?
4. We intend attacking during bad weather (very common), we therefore chose to assume the UK assets dedicated to protecting the airfield will be hunkering down in their messes drinking coco and not manning the minimum amount of defensive positions laid down in RAF SOP’s. We are also assuming that these diminished assets will not be able to activate the Rapier system, or reach for the pre-positioned Starstreak Man-Pads (10-seconds – to two minute activation time) to disrupt our final approach. What if this isn’t the case, what if the base is running a drill or has received intelligence to indicate an increased threat profile, how are we going to determine the state of readiness during the final approach – success or suicide?
5. What if the final ‘shit or bust’ plan by the British is to park the 24-7 manned emergency fire tenders on the runway blocking any chance of an air-landing? What will the Hercs do then, turn round and return to base? How will they then survive the prospect of the Rapiers or Starsreak Man-Pads now coming on line sending them a few parting gifts, or worse scenario, the F3 on stand-by getting airborne once the fire tenders are cleared? Do we have a back-up plan to drop parachutists on pre-identified DZ’s near the airfield? If so, what are prevailing wind conditions, anything over 8-10 knots and we are in serious trouble, up to a third of our deployable troops could be injured on landing sucking up valuable embedded medical assets. We will also need time to assemble on our respective DZ markers, unpack our containers / heavy weapons pallets, revise objectives (based on losses incurred in the drop) before advancing to contact – a very confusing time, particularly in bad weather (as planned)? What if, as I suspect, the UK has already identified all nearby DZ’s and have pre-marked mortar tables ready (assuming their 105mms are still in storage), this will become a race against time, clearing the DZ before the (QRF) mortar teams begin pounding the area with HE.
6. In addition to the RAF Regiment defensive detachment we have to contend with a single Company of well trained and motivated infantry. At least one Platoon will be on QRF duty, one involved in training (weapons, tactics, patrolling) and one possibly stood-down (light duties, PT, meals). What if the QRF platoon is on high-readiness in the vicinity of the airbase? How quickly can the stood-down platoon deploy, how quickly can the Island defence force deploy, have we studied this?
7. Have we built in operational redundancy? One must assume at least a single HERC will not make it (shot-down, mechanical failure, accident). Have all the SF troops been briefed on primary and secondary objectives, do they have the extra capacity to deal with an attrition rate of at least 30% (minimum expected in a mission of this magnitude), can we still seize and hold all objectives? What happens if the UK military assets decide to withdrawl and consolidate to defensive positions away form the airfield, backed up by the slowly mobilising resident defence force happy in the knowledge that they have the unequivocal support of the local population? What if these new postions allow them to control the airfield with heavy weapons over-watch (MMG’s, Javelin, 81mm Mortars) preventing the air-landing of our much needed reinforcements? There objective being to consolidate, reinforce and then launch a counter attack against our attacking force, which is suffering diminishing ammunition supplies? We must also consider what happens if the defenders are further boosted by any RAF/Army/RN tradesmen, cooks and bottle-washers who will have all completed their APWT and be fully capable of firing their own personal weapons (this could add another 100-200 personnel). This will leave a combined RAF Reg / Infantry Company unit compromising at least 100 men to start the process of draining our attacking forces ammunition to a point where (unless re-supplied by air-drop) we will be forced to withdraw to the West or capitulate. And to cop it all they keep hitting us with Javelin, whilst we are stuck with Milan!
Unless the above can be answered by the SO providing the briefing I would tell him to fetch his coat and seek alternate employment!
From a numbers perspective, with 3-Commando Brigade about to leave A-Stan replaced by a light Brigade, and 16-Air-Assualt back at Catterick with the added benefit of the vastly expanded SBS/SAS/SFSG SF Group the UK will have enough assets availalbe to match those, which were sent in 82 (regardless of current operational deployments). Back then we had 10,000 Troops in Ireland and 2 Div's in Germany facing the Russians.
