Fighting a Second Falklands War

[riksavage]

How would you prevent the Hercs being shot down by the all weather 24-7 Rapier batteries covering the airfield, or being picked up by the RAF surveillance radar designed to provide advanced warning to the resident F3 flight? Do you seriously think an operational RAF base is operated on a five day week, 9-5 subject to fine weather? By the way at least one F3 has a crew standing by ready 24-7 (not asleep, in a warm room next to the hanger) for immediate take off regardless of weather. You shoot down one Herc, the rest will turn tail. Also once the first and possiblly second F3 are airborne I would imagine the RAF will have the ability and plans inplace to drive there own plant onto the runway to prevent any suprsie landings whilst fast-air is away causing mayhem.

The plan you have come up with was the same proposed by the DS SF in 82, land a HERC painted in Argie colours under the guise of a technical emergency on the mainland with one squadron of SAS contained therein. The SAS mission was to storm the pilots / aircrew mess and kill the lot. Plan cancelled, considered suicidal!

NEXT SCENARIO PLEASE

 

[Cooch]

Do you permit questions?

(1) You speak of intelligence assets. Are you prepared to abort the entire mission if one of these assets "might" be compromised, if for no other reason than a comms failure? I ask because the consequence may well be that you fly six plane's worth of men and equipment into an ambush.

(2) Am I right in thinking that in your scenario - in spite of having a "no fly" zone - the British will have no-one looking at a radar screen and remarking that the "distressed" Chilean airliner has seperated into six large pieces which are, miraculously, still flying? Or are you flying in the first assault plane unsupported.

(3) As the Argentine troops will be assaulting an airfield used by civilian traffic , and expecting the imminent arrival of a civilian passenger aircraft, how many civilians do you expect to be casualties? Best and worst cases?

Curiously... Peter

 

[Abraham Gubler]

How would you prevent the Hercs being shot down by the all weather 24-7 manned Rapier batteries covering the airfield, or being picked up by the RAF surveillance radar designed to provide advanced warning to the resident F3 flight? By the way at least one F3 has a crew standing by ready 24-7 (not asleep) for immediate take off regardless of weather. You shoot down one Herc, the rest will turn tail.

The RAF surveillance radars are both located on West Falkland with a radar horizon of 80km. They are quite easy to fly around for an airlifter on a one way trip. First detection of the incoming force would be as they approach for landing and probably by the ATC radar.

I very much doubt there is a Rapier ready for instant action 24-7-52. While a system may be set up and even manned it needs to be activated and acquire the target – very hard since they wouldn’t be data linked into the ATC radar. Since the only warning they will have is as the Hercs are on final approach – from the other side of the air base – it is very unlikely they can provide any kind of defence. Similarly I doubt they keep one out of four Tornados at +5 on the Falklands 24-7-52. Even +5 would not be enough for response as the runway would be blocked in under this time.

The plan you have come up with was the same proposed by the DS SF in 82, land a HERC painted in Argie colours under the guise of a technical emergency on the mainland with one squadron of SAS contained therein. The SAS mission was to storm the pilots / aircrew mess and kill the lot. Plan cancelled, considered suicidal!

Well the SAS plan is not original but based on the Israeli Entebbe raid which itself was based on a number of German airlanding coupe de mains from WW2. The key difference between the SAS assault against mainland Argentina in 1982 is that the Argentineans would be the first wave. So it would not be suicide.

 

[Cooch]

Which was because the British had intelligence fore warning because the Argentineans had sailed their entire fleet in a conventional invasion approach. Without that intelligence warning the Royal Marines would have been in the barracks and shot to crap.

I quoted that as a simple example of the way that things can and do go wrong. The more complex your plan, and the more you rely on your enemy being fat, dumb and happy (or in this case, warm and cosy) ,the more likely things are to go wrong.

Forget the riposte that had the Argentines not sailed in, there would have been no-one there to shoot at the Marines anyway... It's immaterial to what I was trying to say.

 

[OPSSG]

With regards to some of OPSSG's comments...

In terms of a battalion (or company for that matter) being insufficient to defend an airfield, it really depends on who/what the attacker is. In the case of the Falkland Islands, seems to be revolving around two critical issues. The first issue is if Argentina can transport a sufficiently large number of troops and supplies to where it would be needed fast enough to achieve an initial victory in the Falklands. The second issue, which relates to the first, is if Argentina can do so without being detected long enough to prevent a British response prior to any defensive measures Argentina would take.

Todjaeger,

Please indulge me and allow me to clarify what I have said earlier (so that you can take these thoughts into consideration). From my point of view:

(i) Air field defence extends beyond the physical boundary of the fences. If the aggressor is in a position to shoot at the first pair of jets taking off (with missiles), it would give the aggressor an advantage.

(ii) Air field denial need not be the capture of an air field. If there is any active fire fight in close proximity, flight ops can be severely disrupted. If flight ops can be disrupted even for an hour or two, the aggressor's air force can now be a factor in the D and D+1 fight.

(iii) Air field defence also includes intrusion detection and prevention of sabotage. In other words, unconventional warfare. Any fuel supply contamination (or other form of disruption) would also be sufficient to affect flight ops.

(iv) If intrusion detection is the main concern, the deployment and scheduling of patrols would require a different posture (from say trying to prevent an infantry assault from succeeding). If the force is small, the flexibility to respond will be limited and you will need to rely more on non-humans such as sensors (for intrusion detection), to augment the manpower limitations.

(v) For a company sized force, even a platoon going for a morning jog together will affect the relative combat power of the air base. Further, at the start of the assault, you can expect some losses from the defending forces. One of the concerns at that time will be: When can the off duty guys kit up?

(vi) The off-duty guys returning to the air base can also be subject to an ambush. With a company sized force, even the loss of 2 to 3 sections will be a big concern.

Many thanks in advance for taking a closer look. I shall now differ to the opinions and insights of my fellow forum members.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Do you permit questions?

Mod edit: Text deleted.

(1) You speak of intelligence assets. Are you prepared to abort the entire mission if one of these assets "might" be compromised, if for no other reason than a comms failure? I ask because the consequence may well be that you fly six plane's worth of men and equipment into an ambush.

The key intelligence capability of the British is signals. By avoiding all use of RF media in planning and operating this attack the Argentineans can try to avoid tipping the hat to the British. Considering the int cycle there could be a lot of comms traffic in the hours leading up to the attack without providing the British time to collate, analysis and warn as the follow on forces are notified and prepared. But by avoiding radio comms in the initial strike you avoid tipping off Falklands based force level EW assets.

As to determining if the assault has been ferreted out satellite surveillance of the base in the lead up to the attack would give warning if they were to adopt an active defence posture allowing for the assault to be called off before it goes in if this happens.

(2) Am I right in thinking that in your scenario - in spite of having a "no fly" zone - the British will have no-one looking at a radar screen and remarking that the "distressed" Chilean airliner has seperated into six large pieces which are, miraculously, still flying? Or are you flying in the first assault plane unsupported.

You don’t understand the airspace. The British have two ground based surveillance radars and an ATC radar. All that would be on this radar would be any commercial local traffic. The initial strike force would not appear on these radars until they are a seconds or minutes out from landing. The no fly zone is only good against aircraft they can see and the curvature of the earth is a bitch.

The approach could be timed so the LAN flight is maybe 5-10 minutes from landing (so the runway is light and clear). A false mayday call would be to divert attention of the ATC operators and to confuse them as they try to work out why the radar is full of another aircraft way ahead of the LAN flight. Just a few seconds of diversion, probably not even needed.

(3) As the Argentine troops will be assaulting an airfield used by civilian traffic , and expecting the imminent arrival of a civilian passenger aircraft, how many civilians do you expect to be casualties? Best and worst cases?

I doubt the Argentinean initial strike force would even approach the commercial terminal. If you have ever been to a dual use airbase (I’ve been to several) you may notice that passengers or friends waiting for the inbound flight usually aren’t allowed to loiter around the fighter hangars, C2 centre and barracks... Also I don’t think you’re find that Mount Pleasant International is a very busy terminal, not in the league of Heathrow.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

I quoted that as a simple example of the way that things can and do go wrong. The more complex your plan, and the more you rely on your enemy being fat, dumb and happy (or in this case, warm and cosy) ,the more likely things are to go wrong.

Mmmm so by this rationale there has never been a surprise attack that worked and caught the enemy with their pants down around their ankles?

The complexity is actually in a large scale conventional attack - like the 1982 invasion of the Falklands. If the Argentineans had just flown a Herc or two into Stanley airfield with a couple of armoured cars and a company of troops onboard they could have captured the islands without any problems or any forewarning to the British. The Royal Marines would have been caught in their base, surrounded and cut off and unable to defend the Governor’s residence.

 

[gf0012-aust]

General advice to all.

PLAY NICE​

 

[Cooch]

General advice to all.

PLAY NICE​

I'm trying.

Please note that I'd prefer not to be likened to the Three Stooges, or have multiple refences to "fools" made in posts addressed specifically to me.

Thankyou....... Peter

 

[riksavage]

A detachment of the RAF Regiment is specifically assigned to protect the airfield, they do not hunker-down behind the wire but patrol the outer perimeter to deter stand-off atacks as well as man static positions.

Role as defined as follows: The RAF Regiment takes the lead on Force Protection (FP) for the RAF and is responsible for ensuring the protection of any deployed RAF assets. This could include anything from training other branches of the RAF to mounting aggressive patrols around an air base to deter any attackers. There mission extends beyond the immediate perimeter to prevent attacks against aircraft taking off or landing.

Current practice is for at least one F3 to be airborne on long range patrols supported by the resident refueler. The mission of these aircraft is specifically aimed at monitoring any unauthorized intruder to sovereign Falklands airspace. These missions are flown in addition to ground based surveillance.

Not since Entebbe has anyone attempted to land a force of aircraft against a defended airfield. The current overlapping and interlocking fixed positions around the runway allow for both external and internal arcs of fire. Even if we assume (highly unlikely) that the resident RAF base crew, army intelligence / monitoring section are completely fooled by the deception plan, there would still be enough warning given to man these positions (some will already be manned as part of the standard RAF Reg base protection standard operating procedures). If the first Herc is forced to crash-land rendering it impossible for any subsequent aircraft to arrive then the whole plan would go south. A burst of GPMG fire into the fuel tanks or cockpit would be catastrophic to any approaching aircraft.

This proactive defence posture adopted by RAF is the same provide across the globe and was the primary reason why the Regiment was raised in the first place, they are not just gate guards.

Finally I would like to take the side of the poor Argentine pilot tasked with flying the surprise mission. Somehow he has to believe that the deception plan has WORKED and that he and the 90 plus assets stuck in the back of his cab are not actually flying into an airbase manned by an all professional armed force with a proven track record, who have at their disposal air-defence systems which could blow him out of the sky in a heart beat. Even if he managed to limp away having failed to land after suffering just small arms fire his only prospect might be having to ditch in the icy South Atlantic miles from home with zero prospect of rescue. I'm sure this will cause him and his crew to doubt the soundness of the plan, however audacious it may appear on paper! Plus the plan risks almost all the available C130 fleet, one hell of a gamble.

Should it fail it would make the 82 invasion look like a strategic success.

The only way such a mission would be contemplated is if an advance SF team was able to confirm the base remained at a state of low alert or was able to provide armed overwatch.

 

[gf0012-aust]

All, a bit of self moderation is in order.

Can all participants in this discussion please go back and edit out any comments which aren't socially helpful or necessary for the technical debate.

48hrs to do so. Otherwise the Mods will go in and do it.

Robust debate can occur without pithy adjectives etc.....

 

[Cooch]

Mmmm so by this rationale there has never been a surprise attack that worked and caught the enemy with their pants down around their ankles?

No Sir.
I did NOT say that, and I find it offensive that you'll put words in my mouth in that fashion.

As I have said before, and I have not seen you acknowledge it, I consider an attack of the nature that you propose and with the results you desire to be improbable, given the expected capabilities of the Argentinian forces, not absolutely impossible.

Peter

 

[Abraham Gubler]

A detachment of the RAF Regiment is specifically assigned to protect the airfield, they do not hunker-down behind the wire but patrol the outer perimeter to deter stand-off atacks as well as man static positions.

I don’t believe that the RAF can sustain a Tornado airborne 24-7-52 from their Falklands presence. For one that would require a huge force of pilots and navigators because of flying hours per day limitations and each Tornado would burn through over 2,000 hours a year. Each year would eat up a single Tornado’s entire airframe life (assuming 8,000 hours as a rough guide), so the Tornado presence in the Falklands to date would have junked 16 aircraft...

As for you’re from the book quote of airfield defence capability I think you will find that the day to day base readiness is a little bit below the level of full alert defensive capability. Even in the Falklands.

 

[Cooch]

The key intelligence capability of the British is signals. By avoiding all use of RF media in planning and operating this attack the Argentineans can try to avoid tipping the hat to the British. .

Ahhh, No.

My question was specifically referring to Argentine intelligence assets which your scenario posits as being in position for a sufficent period to ensure that all British military assets will be where they are expected to be. Not "out training" in your words.
In a small and fairly tightly knit community, strangers and unusual behaviour tend to be noticed, so obtaining/inserting such assets in the numbers required would seem difficult.

It seems reasonable to assert that any such asset identified by the British would serve as a warning. In this case, what is your "plan B" if one such asset fails to communicate?

Peter

 

[Abraham Gubler]

I did NOT say that, and I find it offensive that you'll put words in my mouth in that fashion.

May I refer you to a dictionary? In particular: rationale.

1. the fundamental reason or reasons serving to account for something.
2. a statement of reasons.
3. a reasoned exposition of principles.

I said

Mmmm so by this rationale there has never been a surprise attack that worked and caught the enemy with their pants down around their ankles?

In response to your statement:

I quoted that as a simple example of the way that things can and do go wrong. The more complex your plan, and the more you rely on your enemy being fat, dumb and happy (or in this case, warm and cosy) ,the more likely things are to go wrong.

Perfectly reasonable to draw such an exposition of principles to show that you were belabouring the point of complexity.

As I have said before, and I have not seen you acknowledge it, I consider an attack of the nature that you propose and with the results you desire to be improbable, given the expected capabilities of the Argentinian forces, not absolutely impossible.

Yes and we are “debating” the variations in probability based on different levels of knowledge, understanding and perspectives.

You have made repeated demands of me to explain all sorts of things when all I wanted to do was share an idea about how the Argentineans could evacuate the Falklands population to avoid a British counter strike if they ever captured the islands again. Mod edit: Text deleted.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

It seems reasonable to assert that any such asset identified by the British would serve as a warning. In this case, what is your "plan B" if one such asset fails to communicate?

I would imagine such 'assets' would be commercially acquired high resolution satellite imagery. There are several providers of such services who can make sure MI6 doesn't know you are buying. Even if they did Moonraker was just a movie...

 

[riksavage]

A detachment of the RAF Regiment is specifically assigned to protect the airfield, they do not hunker-down behind the wire but patrol the outer perimeter to deter stand-off atacks as well as man static positions.

Role as defined as follows: The RAF Regiment takes the lead on Force Protection (FP) for the RAF and is responsible for ensuring the protection of any deployed RAF assets. This could include anything from training other branches of the RAF to mounting aggressive patrols around an air base to deter any attackers. There mission extends beyond the immediate perimeter to prevent attacks against aircraft taking off or landing.

Current practice is for at least one F3 to be airborne on long range patrols supported by the resident refueler. The mission of these aircraft is specifically aimed at monitoring any unauthorized intruder to sovereign Falklands airspace. These missions are flown in addition to ground based surveillance.

Not since Entebbe has anyone attempted to land a force of aircraft against a defended airfield. The current overlapping and interlocking fixed positions around the runway allow for both external and internal arcs of fire. Even if we assume (highly unlikely) that the resident RAF base crew, army intelligence / monitoring section are completely fooled by the deception plan, there would still be enough warning given to man these positions (some will already be manned as part of the standard RAF Reg base protection standard operating procedures). If the first Herc is forced to crash-land rendering it impossible for any subsequent aircraft to arrive then the whole plan would go south. A burst of GPMG fire into the fuel tanks or cockpit would be catastrophic to any approaching aircraft.

This proactive defence posture adopted by RAF is the same provide across the globe and was the primary reason why the Regiment was raised in the first place, they are not just gate guards.

Finally I would like to take the side of the poor Argentine pilot tasked with flying the surprise mission. Somehow he has to believe that the deception plan has WORKED and that he and the 90 plus assets stuck in the back of his cab are not actually flying into an airbase manned by an all professional armed force with a proven track record, who have at their disposal air-defence systems which could blow him out of the sky in a heart beat. Even if he managed to limp away having failed to land after suffering just small arms fire his only prospect might be having to ditch in the icy South Atlantic miles from home with zero prospect of rescue. I'm sure this will cause him and his crew to doubt the soundness of the plan, however audacious it may appear on paper! Plus the plan risks almost all the available C130 fleet, one hell of a gamble.

Should it fail it would make the 82 invasion look like a strategic success.

The only way such a mission would be contemplated is if an advance SF team was able to confirm the base remained at a state of low alert or was able to provide armed overwatch.

Also forget to mention the RAF Reg have the following man-pad system available for their use:

http://www.army.mod.uk/equipment/artillery-air-defence/1509.aspx

 

[Cooch]

Perfectly reasonable to draw such an exposition of principles to show that you were belabouring the point of complexity..Yes and we are “debating” the variations in probability based on different levels of knowledge, understanding and perspectives.

I disagree.
Strongly.

In the context of a debate on probabilities, it is illegitimate to claim that I was talking in absolutes.

You have made repeated demands of me to explain all sorts of things .

I did not.

If you choose to misrepresent requests, and the the observations that you've presented points without due regard to context, as "demands", then I cannot help you.

I would infinitely prefer that you discuss the substance of what I've presented, rather than undertaking unprofitable, off-topic diversions into commenting upon my style.

There are still issues with your primary point which have not been addressed. You have every right to not address them, just as we have every right to point them out.

Shall we continue politely?......... Peter

 

[swerve]

My scenario (Malvinas Evacuation) actually doesn't require a surprise attack. It could be a flat out conventional all or nothing amphibious assault. The whole point of it was what Argentina could do to ensure the Brits would not counter attack. But apparently the esteemed Britishers posting on this thread are in "deny all possibility" mode and won't engage in a bit of imaginative scenario thinking beyond Britiania Uber Alles. Which is a shame considering that was the very intent of this thread.

As to the surprise scenario the acquisition of improved air transport is a common thing for many countries. 12 new C-130Js and 12 CH-47Fs are hardly going to set the world on fire and result in the UK basing a battalion on the Falklands in the current environment. Especially if Argentina said they were acquiring the improved transport fleet to support a battalion deployment to Afghanistan.

PS The Falklands radars have horizons of about 80km against a seaskimming target providing 20 minutes warning against a helicopter or 5 minutes against a strike aircraft.

Er - you did start a discussion about a surprise attack. If you wish to discuss a hypothetical scenario which assumes Argentina has already captured the islands, without discussing how, fine. Up to you. But you did not: you expanded the discussion to how Argentina might achieve its capture. Having done so, you forfeited any right to complain when your scenario for the conquest is criticised. You continue to forfeit it, by persisting in discussing it.

20 minutes from the radars is a lot more for MPA. Plenty of time for it to be on full alert, & fighters to be airborne.

A complete re-equipment, & great expansion, of Argentinas air transport force, in order to support a battalion deployment to Afghanistan is hardly realistic. Who would fall for that? Certainly not the Argentinean public, nor the opposition parties.

It's obvious you haven't thought this through. You seem to me making it up on the fly, to support your "Argentina evacuates Las Malvinas" scenario. BTW, that isn't exactly well thought through, either. Where would all the thousands of Argentinean civilians to be shipped there come from? Who would persuade them to go, & once they'd gone, to stay? Where would they live, & what would they do? A few hundred sheep farmers & fishermen I can believe, the latter mostly using Stanley as a temporary base but leaving their families back on the mainland - but thousands?

FYI, rural areas in Argentina suffer from depopulation, & there's no shortage of low-grade sheep grazing land. The fishing ports of Patagonia are bigger places than Stanley, with more entertainment, no need to send the kids away to attend secondary school, & many other advantages. Been there, seen 'em.

BTW (Mod hat on) - this forum encourages debate, not name-calling. You have been reminded of the rules. You have received courteous replies, to which you have responded with insults. I suggest you change your tone.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Er - you did start a discussion about a surprise attack. If you wish to discuss a hypothetical scenario which assumes Argentina has already captured the islands, without discussing how, fine. Up to you. But you did not: you expanded the discussion to how Argentina might achieve its capture. Having done so, you forfeited any right to complain when your scenario for the conquest is criticised. You continue to forfeit it, by persisting in discussing it.

This is extremely selective interpretation. Please go back and read from the start of my post on this thread. You will find a perfectly innocent “hey guys, what about this idea” followed by a mass of haranguing responses about “how dare you suggest a surprise attack is possible”. I have expanded my contribution to provide an argument about how a surprise attack is feasible – and provided it with a lot more fact based argument than those opposing it – but only in response to the level or unfair criticism. I would love to just have gotten away with a discussion of the Malvinas Evacuation concept but the oppositionists to any idea that Argentina could retake the Falklands have denied me that opportunity.

20 minutes from the radars is a lot more for MPA. Plenty of time for it to be on full alert, & fighters to be airborne.

You don’t understand the airspace. The two radars located on West Falkland have roughly 80km radar horizons against a sea skimming aircraft (100 feet altitude), not taking into account any terrain masking just curvature of the Earth. It is quite feasible for a low level air infiltration to avoid these radar footprints and approach Mount Pleasant with little or no warning time. Neither radar has a horizon that extends east of Mount Pleasant. To dogleg around them only requires a low level aircraft to divert 50km north or south of the islands.

It's obvious you haven't thought this through. You seem to me making it up on the fly, to support your "Argentina evacuates Las Malvinas" scenario.

Well congratulations Sherlock you’ve worked me out. Considering that I have actually posted in this thread that I would do exactly that – develop a feasible surprise attack scenario to support the Malvinas Evacuation concept – it should not really come as a surprise.

BTW, that isn't exactly well thought through, either. Where would all the thousands of Argentinean civilians to be shipped there come from? Who would persuade them to go, & once they'd gone, to stay? Where would they live, & what would they do? A few hundred sheep farmers & fishermen I can believe, the latter mostly using Stanley as a temporary base but leaving their families back on the mainland - but thousands?

Considering the emotional attachment to the Malvinas in Argentina it should not be difficult to find at least a few thousand people to agree to some homesteading. They may not want to stay after the initial excitement wears off but their presence would be enough to secure facts on the ground and forestall any British attempt at reclaiming the islands.

BTW (Mod hat on) - this forum encourages debate, not name-calling. You have been reminded of the rules. You have received courteous replies, to which you have responded with insults. I suggest you change your tone.

Considering you have engaged directly and highly critically of me in this debate from my initial post you should do the honourable thing and seclude yourself from any attempt at Moderation.