Dr Paul Buchannan has popped up with his own views on David Farrah's kiwiblog (a NZ politics blog) with his contribution relating to the NZDF and the report. Very interesting remarks.
[Paul G. Buchanan
September 4th, 2008 at 6:30 pm
The reasons for the NZDF problems are multiple and not reducible to partisan faults. In fact, the seeds for the current situation were sown once the ANZUS alliance was disbanded–and I do not think the declaration of nuclear free status should have resulted in that–because from then on percentage GDP spending on the NZDF began dropping to its current levels of just under 1.9%. This is slightly lower than the OECD average of approximately 2.5%. Thus, in spite of the Labour government’s cash injection in the last few budgets, the NZDF remains a bit cash-strapped when it comes to weapons procurement. Recruitment is down because, in spite of the economic downturn of the last 12 months (most of which is due to adverse externalities such as oil prices and the global sub-prime crisis), most young people eligible to serve simply prefer to pursue their material fortunes in the private sector or other government agencies. Short of a major resurgence in patriotism, which is unlikely, the best and the brightest simply are not attracted in numbers to the military as a career. I have been lucky to have former students who did in fact join and are serving honorably, but they are few and far between. Again, in spite of recent recruitment efforts, the military is not a first choice or even attractive option for the young. This is not a government failure; it is a disdain for service on the part of those who are the preferred recruitment pool.
Beyond these immediate issues are the larger failures shared by both major parties over the last two decades. In spite of numerous White Papers issued, there appears to be lack of a coherent sense on the part of the civilian elite that ultimately determines national security policy and the NZDF role within it as to what role NZ should play in international security affairs. To put it over-simplistically: geostrategic landscape—>threat environment–>strategic perspective–>mission definition–>force composition–>weapons acquisition–>force training–>operational readiness–> force deployment.
The LAV purchase was based on political, not operational considerations. The vehicle is not suited for jungle, swampy or mountainous terrain, which is where NZDF personnel are most liely to be deployed. The Javelin anti-tank missle, impressive as it is at over a million dollars a copy, is designed to kill heavily armoured main battle tanks. Unless NZ is going to join in an attack on Russia or China, what potential adversary will have such a weapon? That Javelin is over-kill when it comes ot the so-called “technical” vehicles employed by most irregular or low-tech adversaries in the Pacific Rim and beyond ( a “technical usually being a Toyota ute with a machine gun bolted to the flatbed). These purchases were oredered by National and accepted by Labour.
The decision to kill the tactical air wing was wrong even if the F-16 purchase was also an error. Again, the mission defines the platform. What NZ needs is a close air support capability to cover troops on the ground and at sea. It needs a larger surface fleet to cover its territorial waters and undertake martime interdiction duties in sea lanes of communication vital to its interests. It needs a better airlift capability to get troops and supplies abroad quickly in times of crisis. It needs, and could in fact be a model for, joint force inter-operability and combined operations. But to do so first requires an assessment of what the purpose of the NZDF should be given NZ’s recognised international security role. That is a subject for parliamentary debate and public discussion, be it in favour of a limited UN support role or something more roboust and national-defense oriented.
Having said all that I agree that NZDF personnel do remarkably well with what they have. They are well-regarded by virtually all allied military services (allied understood here as the ones that work with the NZDF) and the NZSAS is regarded as one of the elite special forces units in the world. So it should be a source of pride, not disdain, that they do so much on so little.
The NZDF report is obviously a call for money, both for weapons and recruitment. That is a bureaucratic as well as operational imperative. But the real debate should be about the NZDF role in the current and foreseeable strategic environment, not just its need for resources. Perhaps we can move beyond the name calling and engage the larger issue in a bipartisan fashion, as has been suggested above.]
I think Paul has made a typo over the stated 1.9% GDP spend or got it wrong.(It is about 1.2% Gross and around 1.75% for the OECD) Interesting comments on the Javelin as over kill in terms of the likely deployment of NZ ground forces. He is correct in terms of an air combat capability, I remember him sour on the F-16 deal on the grounds that the FA-18 C/D was the better solution as per the multi-role nature of NZ's air combat requirements. Paul is worth listening to though at times his specific knowledge of actual defnce platforms is not always correct - where he has it over many is in his end of the business which it geo-strategic. Hopefully, Paul will play a role in the next White Paper.
