Hezbollah's communications network was never in any real threat. At the end of the day when things got serious Hezbollah just decided it would take over West Beirut and came out of that incident with veto power in the central government. The only negative side-effect was in respect to its public image. This is serious, of course, but it would have been alot worse if it were to lose its communications network.
I also suspect that the prisoner release made Hezbollah partially recover in terms of PR. But I haven't read any good analysis on the prisoner release and the effects of it so far so I'm merely speculating. It's highly probable though that this made them look like stars in Southern Lebanon.
I disagree with you that Imad Mughniyeh's assassination necessarily means Syrian involvement or Israeli-Syrian cooperation. But I definitely think it initiated Hezbollah's (and by extension Iran's) recent distrust in Syria, which was only exacerbated by Syria's recent peace talk with Israel via Turkish mediation.
I partially agree you that Hezbollah is in not in as good as a position as in 2006-2007 but only in terms of PR. But you have to understand that the massive support for Hezbollah in '06 was right after a military victory against Israel. This was inevitably going to raise moral and support for Hezbollah into record highs. But it was also inevitably going to die down after a while. So, I don't think the comparison between 2006 and now is such a good one.
If you were to compare their position just prior to the 2006 war and now, they are in a much better position in terms of everything. Politically, they now have veto power, giving them the capability of making virtually any action taken against them by the central government illegal. In terms of public support they now have the Lebanese Shi'ite community solidly in their corner and enjoy broad support in the Arab world. And in terms of their military readiness and proficiency they are one of the best light-infantry combat units (if you were to consider them as such) in the region and also has one of the best special forces components in the region.
If you were to compare Hezbollah to just right after the Lebanon war then they are still better off now than they were before in terms of power in the central government and military capability.
I also disagree with your statement about Israel waiting for any excuse to engage in another war with Hezbollah. Nassrallah's current political position and the public support his organization has in Lebanon is still an order of a magnitude better than his Israeli counter-part's (Ehud Olmert) political power and support in Israel. If Ehud Olmert goes into Lebanon again and comes out with unsatisfactory results, which is highly likely, he would be pretty much securing his own resignation. Any move by Ehud Olmert against Hezbollah has to incredibly calculated and has to have a high-chance of success.
Also, Hezbollah has not been, by any means, militarily weakened since 2006. And still poses the same threat, if not an increased one, to an invading IDF as it did in 2006. Hezbollah also has an ability of learning from their experiences incredibly well (as shown in the 90's). Not to say that the IDF doesn't learn from its experiences well, also.
But Israel can't just go into Southern Lebanon with a half-way decent excuse, like you put it. That's what they did in 2006 and look what happened.
If the IDF goes in with obscure or unachievable objectives then it would just be producing a defeat for itself.
This coupled with Israelis leaderships current political position make it unlikely that Israel would go into Southern Lebanon again without provocation or good reason. And Hezbollah will certainly not start another war.
I don't think another war is likely in the foreseeable future unless something extraordinary happens. But then again, the 2006 Lebanon war was itself a product of gross miscalculation and such miscalculations may happen again. This is why they call the Middle East a volatile region.
P.S. To the mods: Sorry, for going so off-topic. I thought the issue was wroth addressing in a more detailed manner in order to give a clearer picture of the current and future situation of Iran's most effective proxy in the Middle East.
