I don't think that we're in disagreement here (except that Norway would buy JSF to be in good standing with the US - US would help Norway out regardless. Actually I would think that a heavier Norwegian engagement in A'stan would curry more favour).
There is also the matter of the local OPFOR - the Russians. Inside the service life of this jet, the Russians will operate MiG-31/Flanker variants/PAK-FA. It's not just about intercepting bombers. No one can match the Americans, but they do need to match, or preferably overmatch, the Russians.
There are several discussions running parallel here. One is that VLO is of little use based on the wrongful assumptions that:
- partners won't get the full VLO of the F-35.
- VLO is stand-alone quality.
- an IADS capable of defeating VLO is just around the corner.
- use of EW can be considered a replacement.
- F-117 is retired due to battlespace obsolescence on platform level
- <fill in>
I'd just point out that the country that brings out stealth jets like the F-22A/F-35, also has the full portfolio of stand-off power jamming/escort jamming/self protection systems, full electronic spectrum dominance, and yet they still conclude that:
"Legacy fourth generation aircraft simply cannot survive to operate
and achieve the effects necessary to win in an integrated, anti-access environment."
Because stealth is complimentary and sympathetic to the rest of the package; a force multiplier, some would say.
It allows for a different use of offensive air; different from what it looks like with "3/4th gen" jets:
http://www.lucky-devils.net/baghdad.html
Obviously, no one factor caused the loss of two F-16s and the possible loss of others. Rather a series of frictions the lateness of the Air Tasking Order, not enough coordination time, a tactical approach that provided the Iraqis considerable warning, fuel problems for the Weasels and other aircraft, bad weather, insufficient attrition of the defenses combined to create a dangerous situation, one ultimately catastrophic for two aircraft.
"There were a number of crucial lessons from Package Q. The most obvious was that enemy defenses in Baghdad remained lethal; consequently, it was not worth the risk to send conventional packages into the heart of those defenses, especially when F-117s could strike such targets with little risk. This was entirely the result of its stealthy qualities, which its precision-guided munition capabilities magnified. Conse-quently, enemy defenses never put F-117s in the position where they had to jettison bombs over populated areas, and the chances of civilian casualties that would allow Saddam to manipulate the American media were considerably lessened."
So it boils down to if Norway percieves a need to do offensive air ops.