[PART 3/4 OF MY LONG POST]
It is clear from all the above texts that there exists today an "Invasion" discourse in the Greek Cypriot government texts which portrays the "facts" of 1960's and 1970's very different from the government texts in the 1960's and early the 1970's which were mainly dominated by the "Enosis" discourse.
The "Invasion" discourse of the government is challenged by both some internal non-governmental (Greek Cypriot) texts, eg., Clerides' memoirs, and foreign texts, such as the dozens of UN Security Council Resolutions which agree on the need of UN peace keeping forces in Cyprus and Secretary General reports*7 since 1963.
The "Invasion" discourse puts the Turkish Cypriots into "minority" status and also makes it more difficult to reach a solution to the Cyprus Conflict, based on the UN Resolutions and Secretary General's "Office of Good Mission.7"
So, the question is "Why does the Greek Cypriot government pursue this discourse which portrays a distorted reality of the 1960's and 1970's, and makes the negotiation process harder?" There might be many different answers to that question drawn from many contemporary theories. However, this writer believes that the question can mostly be tackled with the "Realist Theory" - more specifically with the "Power Politics" - which many theorists and academicians believe to be already dead:
The Greek Cypriot government is still recognized as the legal government of the 1960 "Republic of Cyprus." With the 1983 Resolution 541, the Security Council "Concerned at the declaration by the Turkish Cypriot authorities issued on 15 November 1983 which purports to create an independent state in northern Cyprus.
... the attempt to create a "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" is invalid, and will contribute to a worsening of the situation in Cyprus." This shows that the Greek Cypriot side has a strong position on the table, i.e., being recognized by the UN as the legal government of the "Republic of Cyprus" and the other side (Turkish Cypriots) without any "governmental" title, or with an unrecognized state (i.e., "TRNC". The current "status quo" seems to be the Greek Cypriot side's BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement). To change the current "Invasion" discourse and sit for negotiations, based on the UN resolutions, would not satisfy its "interests" and would deprive it from a considerable power it now enjoys - as the "legal" government of the whole Cyprus.
If we look at the following text of the UN Resolution 649 (March 12, 1990) ;it will be clear to demonstrate what the Greek Cypriot government has to give up to change its present "Invasion" discourse which obstructs a solution based on the UN Resolutions:
The Security Council "Calls upon the leaders of the two communities to pursue their efforts to reach freely a mutual acceptable solution providing for the establishment of a federation that will be bi-communal as regards the constitutional aspects and bi-zonal as regards the territorial aspects ... and to cooperate, on equal footing, with the Secretary General..." (UN Resolution 649, March 12, 1990).
Therefore, for a UN-based solution, the "Invasion" discourse should be modified to accommodate the following points of the UN Resolution: * give up the "unitary state" concept for a "bi-zonal" "federation" * give up its argument that the Turkish Cypriots are a "minority" and accept the concept of "bi-communality" and, negotiate with them on "equal footing" As can be understood from the above UN resolution (649), it would put the Greek Cypriot side into a troubled position if it pursued the Enosis discourse (union with Greece) in the 1990's. The "invasion" discourse, although in opposition with the UN Resolution, at least gives some room for modification in certain conditions8 and that it can be seen as 'one side is trying to strengthen its hand on the negotiation table' - that is, one can argue that it is giving up a lot in the negotiation, so that it can demand more concessions from the other side. As a matter of fact, in the actual negotiations the Greek Cypriot side is demanding territory from the Turkish Cypriot side in return to what it seemingly gives up (unitary state for a federation).
As we stated earlier, the "Invasion" discourse can be modified to accommodate itself to a UN proposed solution in certain cases. However, there is another powerful discourse within the Greek Cypriot community which, although not widely popular, is capable of blocking the way to a negotiated solution. This discourse is a mixture of the 1960's Enosis discourse and the government's post-1974 "Invasion" discourse. It borrowed the idea of "union of Cyprus with Greece" from the Enosis discourse and the claims that "Turkish invasion was an act of pure aggression and violence" from the "Invasion" discourse:
CONTINUATION OF PRE-1974 DISCOURSE INTERTWINED WITH THE INVASION DISCOURSE TODAY :
"Turks are a barbarous people. They are the last barbarians of civilization. A people with violent instincts and a thirst for blood. We rather live with savage animals than the Turks. Until the Turks digest that Cyprus is Greek they can live in this country only as a minority. And our slogan can not be anything else but "best Turk is a dead Turk." The union of Cyprus with Greece is the only democratic solution for the Cyprus problem. No to the talks, no to the federation, Enosis and let channels fill with the flow of blood." (Excerpt appeared in Philelephteros, November 11, 1990)
"If the Cretan Greeks were living in Cyprus today not a Turkish Cypriot would have been in the north....I see the fate of Greece and Cyprus as being intertwined. It would not be realistic to think that Cyprus can today fight for a prolonged period of time without Greece or that Greece is not interested in the fate of Cyprus. Because what is Cyprus? is it not Greece. I say to the Greeks who come here "The place that you have come to is not a foreign place, it is Greece.'" (Statement of the Commander of the Greek Cypriot National Guard Commander General Siradakis, Selides Magazine, October 3, 1992).
The discourse in the above texts (especially the first one) is much more dangerous than the "Invasion" discourse. Here, there is no room for a negotiated solution based on the UN proposals. Instead it suggests a very "BLOODY" solution in the name of "DEMOCRACY" - i.e., "Enosis." It makes one think of 'how a "barbarous", instinctively "violent", less-than-the-"savage"- "animals," "Turks" such as this writer, can be incorporated as a "minority" in a "democratic solution"! The answer has already been provided: by a "bloody" way. Although the above discourse is not widely popular among the Greek Cypriots, it is not discouraged by the government either. That gives the impression to the "other side" (Turks) that the Greek Cypriot government is actually supporting that discourse, which also plays a big role in the failure of the negotiations.
From the above study we got the evidence that there is at least one main "discourse" that dominates a government's global policy towards a certain issue:
In the 1960's and early the 1970's the dominant discourse in the Greek Cypriot government policies towards the Cyprus Conflict was the "Enosis" discourse. It greatly helped to prepare and execute the 1974 coup sent by Greek military regime. Failure of that action (the coup) or, rather the defeat of the coup by Turkish military operation created another powerful discourse (the "Invasion" discourse) that dominated the future policies of the Greek Cypriot government. Although we mentioned about a "main discourse" that dominates the global policy of a government on a specific issue, we are also aware of the other discursive practices that strive to influence a government policy. However, the scope of this paper is too small to deal with all the discursive practices that shape a policy. Instead, we talked about major non-governmental discursive practices that oppose to the "reality that the government's dominating discourse create.
We tried, also, to account on the failure of the UN sponsored negotiations in terms of the Greek Cypriot "Invasion" discourse. However, that is only part of the explanation. In a more comprehensive paper the dominant discursive practices of the Turkish Cypriot, Greek and Turkish governments and non- government texts should be studied to obtain a more complete picture.
Because there are many discursive practices within the above mentioned Turkish, Turkish Cypriot and Greek texts (especially government texts) that are in opposition to the UN proposed solution to the Cyprus Conflict. As a matter of fact, the most recent proposal of the UN to the two communities of Cyprus is to implement a series of "Confidence-Building-Measures" that will decrease the lack of trust between the two communities which, according to this writer, fostered by the "dominant discourses" of the two communities leaderships.
The Confidence-Building-Measures of the UN call on the two communities to give more chance to their people to come together and establish more channels of communication through "joint committees," "joint workshops," "joint cultural events," etc. This, we believe, is an implication that the first-tract diplomacy of the political leaders has failed due to its dominant discursive practice. The second- and third-tract diplomacy of the people (rather than the leaders) might help to create new discursive practices that can open the way to a successful negotiated solution.
1 Stephen, Michael (1986). "Cyprus, Two Nations in One Island", Bow Educational Briefing, No.5, G. Britain.
2 Stephen, Michael (1986). "Cyprus, Two Nations in One Island", Bow Educational Briefing, No.5, G. Britain.
3 To cut the channel of the Turkish Cypriots to present their case to the world.
4 Each community didn't have the right of "self determination" separately. An indivisible "sovereignty" was given to both communities to share.
5 The Greek Cypriot guerrilla organization which was originally formed to drove the British colonizers away from the island.
6 The name of the July 20, 1974 Turkish military operation.
7 "Cyprus is the common home of the Greek Cypriot community and of the Turkish Cypriot community. Their relationship is not one of majority and minority, but one of two communities in the State of Cyprus. The mandate given to me by the Security Council makes it clear that my mission of good offices is with the two communities. My mandate is also explicit that the participation of the two communities in this process is on equal footing" (The UN Secretary General's report to the Security Council, S/21183, March 8, 1990).
8 In 1986, some Muslim countries, such as Indonesia, Bangladesh and Pakistan, threatened to recognize the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)" if the negotiations fail to give a solution. So, the possibility of a recognition of the "TRNC" is a condition which forces the Greek Cypriot government to modify its "Invasion" discourse to reach a UN-based solution - since the recognition of the "TRNC" is worse than the current UN proposed federal solution for the Greek Cypriot side.
[continued on part 4/4 of my long post]
It is clear from all the above texts that there exists today an "Invasion" discourse in the Greek Cypriot government texts which portrays the "facts" of 1960's and 1970's very different from the government texts in the 1960's and early the 1970's which were mainly dominated by the "Enosis" discourse.
The "Invasion" discourse of the government is challenged by both some internal non-governmental (Greek Cypriot) texts, eg., Clerides' memoirs, and foreign texts, such as the dozens of UN Security Council Resolutions which agree on the need of UN peace keeping forces in Cyprus and Secretary General reports*7 since 1963.
The "Invasion" discourse puts the Turkish Cypriots into "minority" status and also makes it more difficult to reach a solution to the Cyprus Conflict, based on the UN Resolutions and Secretary General's "Office of Good Mission.7"
So, the question is "Why does the Greek Cypriot government pursue this discourse which portrays a distorted reality of the 1960's and 1970's, and makes the negotiation process harder?" There might be many different answers to that question drawn from many contemporary theories. However, this writer believes that the question can mostly be tackled with the "Realist Theory" - more specifically with the "Power Politics" - which many theorists and academicians believe to be already dead:
The Greek Cypriot government is still recognized as the legal government of the 1960 "Republic of Cyprus." With the 1983 Resolution 541, the Security Council "Concerned at the declaration by the Turkish Cypriot authorities issued on 15 November 1983 which purports to create an independent state in northern Cyprus.
... the attempt to create a "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" is invalid, and will contribute to a worsening of the situation in Cyprus." This shows that the Greek Cypriot side has a strong position on the table, i.e., being recognized by the UN as the legal government of the "Republic of Cyprus" and the other side (Turkish Cypriots) without any "governmental" title, or with an unrecognized state (i.e., "TRNC". The current "status quo" seems to be the Greek Cypriot side's BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement). To change the current "Invasion" discourse and sit for negotiations, based on the UN resolutions, would not satisfy its "interests" and would deprive it from a considerable power it now enjoys - as the "legal" government of the whole Cyprus.
If we look at the following text of the UN Resolution 649 (March 12, 1990) ;it will be clear to demonstrate what the Greek Cypriot government has to give up to change its present "Invasion" discourse which obstructs a solution based on the UN Resolutions:
The Security Council "Calls upon the leaders of the two communities to pursue their efforts to reach freely a mutual acceptable solution providing for the establishment of a federation that will be bi-communal as regards the constitutional aspects and bi-zonal as regards the territorial aspects ... and to cooperate, on equal footing, with the Secretary General..." (UN Resolution 649, March 12, 1990).
Therefore, for a UN-based solution, the "Invasion" discourse should be modified to accommodate the following points of the UN Resolution: * give up the "unitary state" concept for a "bi-zonal" "federation" * give up its argument that the Turkish Cypriots are a "minority" and accept the concept of "bi-communality" and, negotiate with them on "equal footing" As can be understood from the above UN resolution (649), it would put the Greek Cypriot side into a troubled position if it pursued the Enosis discourse (union with Greece) in the 1990's. The "invasion" discourse, although in opposition with the UN Resolution, at least gives some room for modification in certain conditions8 and that it can be seen as 'one side is trying to strengthen its hand on the negotiation table' - that is, one can argue that it is giving up a lot in the negotiation, so that it can demand more concessions from the other side. As a matter of fact, in the actual negotiations the Greek Cypriot side is demanding territory from the Turkish Cypriot side in return to what it seemingly gives up (unitary state for a federation).
As we stated earlier, the "Invasion" discourse can be modified to accommodate itself to a UN proposed solution in certain cases. However, there is another powerful discourse within the Greek Cypriot community which, although not widely popular, is capable of blocking the way to a negotiated solution. This discourse is a mixture of the 1960's Enosis discourse and the government's post-1974 "Invasion" discourse. It borrowed the idea of "union of Cyprus with Greece" from the Enosis discourse and the claims that "Turkish invasion was an act of pure aggression and violence" from the "Invasion" discourse:
CONTINUATION OF PRE-1974 DISCOURSE INTERTWINED WITH THE INVASION DISCOURSE TODAY :
"Turks are a barbarous people. They are the last barbarians of civilization. A people with violent instincts and a thirst for blood. We rather live with savage animals than the Turks. Until the Turks digest that Cyprus is Greek they can live in this country only as a minority. And our slogan can not be anything else but "best Turk is a dead Turk." The union of Cyprus with Greece is the only democratic solution for the Cyprus problem. No to the talks, no to the federation, Enosis and let channels fill with the flow of blood." (Excerpt appeared in Philelephteros, November 11, 1990)
"If the Cretan Greeks were living in Cyprus today not a Turkish Cypriot would have been in the north....I see the fate of Greece and Cyprus as being intertwined. It would not be realistic to think that Cyprus can today fight for a prolonged period of time without Greece or that Greece is not interested in the fate of Cyprus. Because what is Cyprus? is it not Greece. I say to the Greeks who come here "The place that you have come to is not a foreign place, it is Greece.'" (Statement of the Commander of the Greek Cypriot National Guard Commander General Siradakis, Selides Magazine, October 3, 1992).
The discourse in the above texts (especially the first one) is much more dangerous than the "Invasion" discourse. Here, there is no room for a negotiated solution based on the UN proposals. Instead it suggests a very "BLOODY" solution in the name of "DEMOCRACY" - i.e., "Enosis." It makes one think of 'how a "barbarous", instinctively "violent", less-than-the-"savage"- "animals," "Turks" such as this writer, can be incorporated as a "minority" in a "democratic solution"! The answer has already been provided: by a "bloody" way. Although the above discourse is not widely popular among the Greek Cypriots, it is not discouraged by the government either. That gives the impression to the "other side" (Turks) that the Greek Cypriot government is actually supporting that discourse, which also plays a big role in the failure of the negotiations.
From the above study we got the evidence that there is at least one main "discourse" that dominates a government's global policy towards a certain issue:
In the 1960's and early the 1970's the dominant discourse in the Greek Cypriot government policies towards the Cyprus Conflict was the "Enosis" discourse. It greatly helped to prepare and execute the 1974 coup sent by Greek military regime. Failure of that action (the coup) or, rather the defeat of the coup by Turkish military operation created another powerful discourse (the "Invasion" discourse) that dominated the future policies of the Greek Cypriot government. Although we mentioned about a "main discourse" that dominates the global policy of a government on a specific issue, we are also aware of the other discursive practices that strive to influence a government policy. However, the scope of this paper is too small to deal with all the discursive practices that shape a policy. Instead, we talked about major non-governmental discursive practices that oppose to the "reality that the government's dominating discourse create.
We tried, also, to account on the failure of the UN sponsored negotiations in terms of the Greek Cypriot "Invasion" discourse. However, that is only part of the explanation. In a more comprehensive paper the dominant discursive practices of the Turkish Cypriot, Greek and Turkish governments and non- government texts should be studied to obtain a more complete picture.
Because there are many discursive practices within the above mentioned Turkish, Turkish Cypriot and Greek texts (especially government texts) that are in opposition to the UN proposed solution to the Cyprus Conflict. As a matter of fact, the most recent proposal of the UN to the two communities of Cyprus is to implement a series of "Confidence-Building-Measures" that will decrease the lack of trust between the two communities which, according to this writer, fostered by the "dominant discourses" of the two communities leaderships.
The Confidence-Building-Measures of the UN call on the two communities to give more chance to their people to come together and establish more channels of communication through "joint committees," "joint workshops," "joint cultural events," etc. This, we believe, is an implication that the first-tract diplomacy of the political leaders has failed due to its dominant discursive practice. The second- and third-tract diplomacy of the people (rather than the leaders) might help to create new discursive practices that can open the way to a successful negotiated solution.
1 Stephen, Michael (1986). "Cyprus, Two Nations in One Island", Bow Educational Briefing, No.5, G. Britain.
2 Stephen, Michael (1986). "Cyprus, Two Nations in One Island", Bow Educational Briefing, No.5, G. Britain.
3 To cut the channel of the Turkish Cypriots to present their case to the world.
4 Each community didn't have the right of "self determination" separately. An indivisible "sovereignty" was given to both communities to share.
5 The Greek Cypriot guerrilla organization which was originally formed to drove the British colonizers away from the island.
6 The name of the July 20, 1974 Turkish military operation.
7 "Cyprus is the common home of the Greek Cypriot community and of the Turkish Cypriot community. Their relationship is not one of majority and minority, but one of two communities in the State of Cyprus. The mandate given to me by the Security Council makes it clear that my mission of good offices is with the two communities. My mandate is also explicit that the participation of the two communities in this process is on equal footing" (The UN Secretary General's report to the Security Council, S/21183, March 8, 1990).
8 In 1986, some Muslim countries, such as Indonesia, Bangladesh and Pakistan, threatened to recognize the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)" if the negotiations fail to give a solution. So, the possibility of a recognition of the "TRNC" is a condition which forces the Greek Cypriot government to modify its "Invasion" discourse to reach a UN-based solution - since the recognition of the "TRNC" is worse than the current UN proposed federal solution for the Greek Cypriot side.
[continued on part 4/4 of my long post]