Small quibble: the economic damage wasn't caused by building barges. They were already built. The damage was caused by the disruption of transport, both internal & international, from taking the barges away from what they normally did. Inland waterways freight was of similar importance to railway freight at the time. The W. European canal & river network connected (still does!) the Baltic, Black Sea, Mediterranean & Atlantic. Grain from Poland & Hungary & Yugoslavia, oil from Romania, coal, iron ore, & much else reached & moved around Germany by barge.
WW2 Scenario Germany
- Thread starter XaNDeR
- Start date
Small squibble: The Rhine-Main-Danube canal (to the Black Sea) wasn't built yet back then, and pretty much all important canals in France, in particular the ones connecting the Rhine to the Rhone and Marne, back then were (and are) limited to Freycinet-Peniches (38.5m x 4.5m maximum dimensions, 300 tons payload typically).
For comparison, a modern push tow (lighter combination) on the Rhine can easily reach 180m length, with payloads in excess of 3300 tons.
The completion of the Rhine-Main-Danube canal in 1992 really changed pan-European trade on the waterways significantly.
Hitler actually had some submarines moved over land to the Danube in 1942 to use them in the Black Sea.
Interesting - can you elaborate a little more on the submarine comment.
featured in this article (in German) yesterday:
http://einestages.spiegel.de/static/topicalbumbackground/1342/u_boot_auf_der_autobahn.html
(with pics there)
Basically, six older submarines were moved from their baltic homeports up the Elbe river, then across land to the Danube, then through the Danube to their new Romanian homeport. From there, their mission was to harass Soviet shipping in the Black Sea, between 1942 and 1944.
The land transport was done on specialized heavy-load flatbed trucks.
The submarines were moved this way because a Turkey didn't want to enter a deal offered to them - which would have exchanged German subs in the Mediterranean for Turkish subs in the Black Sea.
All six Type IIB subs used for this were already retired around 1940, and used for training only until 1942. They sank some 26 ships in the Black Sea, for about 45,000 GRT.
In 1944, the Soviets crossed the Dniestr and Romania switched sides. U-9 was sunk in port, U-18 and U-24 only got out of port heavily damaged and were scuttled, U-19, U-20 and U-23 went to sea (U-19 with light damage). The three survivors were ordered to sink as much as they could, which was followed by U-23 firing all three of its torpedoes at the pier of their Romanian homeport. Originally, the subs then wanted to try diving through the Bosporus to reach a friendly port.
Denying this request, Dönitz instead offered Turkey to sell the three subs - which they refused, with the thought that the three subs would have to come into a Turkish port anyway and could then be seized. The three subs went close to shore and were scuttled, the crews later taken into custody in Turkey.
Article above appeared yesterday because supposedly U-19, U-20 and U-23 have recently been found (although they have to be properly identified still). U-20 has been identified before, but the other two subs had been lost for the past 60 years.
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An even smaller quibble . . . the first canal connecting the Main & Danube opened in 1846. King Ludwig the not mad . . . But it was too small, too unreliable (water problems), & had too many locks to be much use, so in principle you are correct, & the barges lost at Boulogne, etc. would be unlikely to have included any from the Danube, so the traffic upriver to Austria & Bavaria would not have been affected. Mea culpa.
http://www.andre-kraut.de/kanal/index_en.html
Apparently it wasn't officially closed until 1950, & the Allies thought it worth bombing in WW2.
Well, there were also dedicated barges/lighters built for Sealion as well. The Siebel Ferries (Army project, Luftwaffe idea), and the Marinefährpram (Navy project) in particular.
Both kinds were later interestingly used mostly in the Mediterranean, some also in the Black Sea (as well as along the channel and in the Skagerrag). Primarily in a supply role, rarely also for reinforcement transport (in convoys) to Africa.
There were actually a couple later landing craft projects, the Pionierlandungsboot 41 for example. Some of these were also attached to the African forces as an amphibious company.
Postwar German riverine amphibious units up till the late 60s / early 70s used a design closely based on German WW2 amphibs btw, built for USAREUR Rhine River Patrol during the early occupation as LCMRR.
Of somewhat personal interest - one of the three units back then was stationed in Mannheim, where the entire LCMRR series was also built; nowadays, there are no LCMRR, or amphibious units remaining there - however, a retired German Navy LCU is homeported in the same place.
Both kinds were later interestingly used mostly in the Mediterranean, some also in the Black Sea (as well as along the channel and in the Skagerrag). Primarily in a supply role, rarely also for reinforcement transport (in convoys) to Africa.
There were actually a couple later landing craft projects, the Pionierlandungsboot 41 for example. Some of these were also attached to the African forces as an amphibious company.
Postwar German riverine amphibious units up till the late 60s / early 70s used a design closely based on German WW2 amphibs btw, built for USAREUR Rhine River Patrol during the early occupation as LCMRR.
Of somewhat personal interest - one of the three units back then was stationed in Mannheim, where the entire LCMRR series was also built; nowadays, there are no LCMRR, or amphibious units remaining there - however, a retired German Navy LCU is homeported in the same place.
Another factor, which would have had a major impact upon any German invasion of Britain, was intelligence and counter-espionage. The Allies were highly successful in convincing the Germans they intended to land at the narrowest point between England and France causing Hitler to deploy his Panzer Divisions in the wrong place. The Germans did not have the expertise to do likewise. ALL Germany's double agents in Britian were caught early on and turned against their masters thanks to ULTRA and John Masterson (Reference: Agent ZIGZAG, life of Eddy Chapman by Ben Macintyre)
With ULTRA, the UK had an unprecedented insight into Germany’s long term planning, particularly naval movements. Even if Hitler postponed Sealion till later in the war, his invasion plan, deployment of forces and dispositions would have been known in advance allowing the UK to focus its naval, air and land assets to meet the threat head-on.
The fact that UK destroyers could sink the German barges with their wake, never mind gun-fire, meant that once mixed in amongst the German invasion fleet they would have wrecked havoc and caused huge casualties.
Interestingly, following Dunkirk Churchill hosted a meeting of very senior officers from all branches of the armed services. The topic of the meeting was to discuss how they could and would bring their expertise to bare following the defeat of Germany, specifically how rebuild the economy and prevent a new Hitler rising from the ashes of a devastated and demoralized country. His confidence never wavered, he would never have negotiated with Hitler.
With ULTRA, the UK had an unprecedented insight into Germany’s long term planning, particularly naval movements. Even if Hitler postponed Sealion till later in the war, his invasion plan, deployment of forces and dispositions would have been known in advance allowing the UK to focus its naval, air and land assets to meet the threat head-on.
The fact that UK destroyers could sink the German barges with their wake, never mind gun-fire, meant that once mixed in amongst the German invasion fleet they would have wrecked havoc and caused huge casualties.
Interestingly, following Dunkirk Churchill hosted a meeting of very senior officers from all branches of the armed services. The topic of the meeting was to discuss how they could and would bring their expertise to bare following the defeat of Germany, specifically how rebuild the economy and prevent a new Hitler rising from the ashes of a devastated and demoralized country. His confidence never wavered, he would never have negotiated with Hitler.
It's always dangerous to run on memory, but I can't be bothered checking for sources.
IIRC, Hitler gave up on the idea of invading England when he recognised the the preconditions for invasion did not exist. The inability to achieve air superiority became obvious at the end of the BoB, so it's reasonable to suspect that the penny was dropping by that stage.
As to how serious Hitler was. I think it's safe to say that he was always serious about having to deal with Britain at some point - given that his long-term vision was always a world-wide expansion of the German "Empire". We know that he had his staff do the planning, and it is reasonable to believe that, had the preconditions existed, the invasion would have gone ahead. From Hitler's POV, the options look rather like (a) Do it now, when neither of us are prepared, or (b) Do it later, when both of us are well prepared. Had he been able to achieve air superiority, neutralized the Royal Navy, and overcome the logistics issues, it is possible that the great gambler might have decided to succumbed to the temptation.
Regardless, we know that Hitler did the sums on the exercise, and the sums did not add up.
Cheers........ Peter
As you undoubtly know
- Luftwaffe also had radars And they would have strong AAA support advantage other british bombers. Any large vessel coming close will be easely sunk by aviation, coastal artillery and subs. It is much easer to clear small way from one coast to other off mines for transport vessels than whole area between France and UK for large military vessels. Transport vessels required to cross 40km water are very cheap - true military vessels are not. Germany could even allow itself to lauch these vessels as 1-way only - it is still very economically viable. Try to launch new destroyer or corvete every day...
There were such plans. They required huge resources and suggested large losses. In retrospect, these "huge" resources and "large" losses were much smaller than even losses for half-succesfull part of blitzkrieg - i.e. up to Moskow offencive part.
With just available - yes. But if ALL resources and prepatations were commited to such task - it looks doable.
He considered USSR as enemy, yes. As untrustworthy - yes ( is there anyone he trusted anyway? lol). As immediate or even close term threat - no. GB, on the other hand, was immediate threat. Already in war. It was very, very stupid to start a new war while not ending previous one.
Lets assume it.
No go. Giving up everything Germany gained - for what? For a untrustworthy peace? Practically, you suggest surrending to Germany to UK.
Nope, true navy was much less important than luftwaffe and erzatz-navy (basically cheap floating artillery batteries instead of true blue water ships)
As i already told, there were NO perceived Russian threat! No germany (or USSR) internal documents suggested such threat! Hitler attacked USSR exactly BECOUSE he thinked USSR army was very weak and incapable!
Yes, if only not the war on the Eastern front which diverted most resources...
could be achieved IF not the eastern front...
Could be negated by deny RN the access to vital area near the La-Manche
By the time, Luftwaffe already lost close to 10.000 planes on the eastern front, and 70% combat air units were stationed there. Germany industry suffered HUGE strain due to need to replace land army losses and manpower losses (mans drown from industry...). Imagine these GB bomber raids (already quite unsuccesfull) would encounter at least 5 times more fighters in they way to Germany...
1944 - not 1942. GB had much, much, much weaker Air forces in 1941/42. And VERY excaused Germany air defence in 1944 - is not 1941/42. Without war in Eastern front, Germany could allow order of magnitude large concentration of AA assets in France.
As i said, there were no immedeatly need to deal with Russia. For all we know, USSR might wait its order to deal another 10 years
For USSR, Germany was counter-balance to GB & allies - these were percived just as dungerous (if not more) than Germany.Of course. But why you such obsessed with Russians? I mean, USSR in 1940 is not the same as in 1960. It was order of magnitude weaker. Political situation looked much differently. Do not project later USSR image and power status to 1930x USSR - this is very common mistake.
Of course. But not becouse of some difficulties to cross channel. Nope. Mainly becouse german army was THAT strong EVEN in 1944, after all these defeats on Eastern front...
Becouse Wermacht was order of magnitude more powerfull than GB army.
Chrom....
I was going to answer at length, but this is becoming boring. The reality facing Hitler has already been established. Even he recognized that an invasion in 1940 was not viable, as did OKW. Any subsequent invasion plans required facing an England which had 12 or 24 months to prepare, against a Wehrmacht which had almost none of the advantages enjoyed by the Allies during Operation Overlord.
We know that plans were made. We also know that the very people who made those plans, declared that they were not viable.
England has a long history of looking across the channel at large continental armies - armies which could have beaten anything that the English could field at the time. In each case, not once since 1066 has such an army succeeded in crossing the channel. This is just one more occasion. It didn't matter a pfennig how many divisions that Hitler had in France. All that mattered was the number that he could get across the channel in condition to fight. The answer was "not enough".
Peter
I was going to answer at length, but this is becoming boring. The reality facing Hitler has already been established. Even he recognized that an invasion in 1940 was not viable, as did OKW. Any subsequent invasion plans required facing an England which had 12 or 24 months to prepare, against a Wehrmacht which had almost none of the advantages enjoyed by the Allies during Operation Overlord.
We know that plans were made. We also know that the very people who made those plans, declared that they were not viable.
England has a long history of looking across the channel at large continental armies - armies which could have beaten anything that the English could field at the time. In each case, not once since 1066 has such an army succeeded in crossing the channel. This is just one more occasion. It didn't matter a pfennig how many divisions that Hitler had in France. All that mattered was the number that he could get across the channel in condition to fight. The answer was "not enough".
Peter
The Luftwaffe didn't have a radar network covering the whole area, with sophisticated command & control behind it. That was a huge advantage for the UK in the Battle of Britain.As you undoubtly know
Any large vessel coming close will be easely sunk by aviation, coastal artillery and subs. It is much easer to clear small way from one coast to other off mines for transport vessels than whole area between France and UK for large military vessels. Transport vessels required to cross 40km water are very cheap - true military vessels are not. Germany could even allow itself to lauch these vessels as 1-way only - it is still very economically viable. Try to launch new destroyer or corvete every day...
"Easily?" No, with difficulty.
- German aviation was not capable of sinking RN ships fast enough, & had great difficulty at that time in sinking large ships. We've already discussed the Luftwaffes deficiencies in this area.
- Coastal artillery powerful enough to sink large British warships has to be emplaced: takes time, & the works would be interfered with. Couldn't be hidden while being put in place.
- Subs have to get through the mines to sink anything, & operating in such confined & unfamiliar waters is dangerous for them.
Clearing mines is not permanent, takes time, & the RN & RAF coastal command could probably lay mines much faster than the Germans could clear them. It's very easy indeed to lay mines off ones own shore, when one has huge numerical superiority in boats. Any fishing boat can be pressed into service as an improvised minelayer.
Germany did not have the time, nor the shipbuilding industry, to build a large fleet of transport vessels, & the vessels it did have were 1) very poorly suited to the task, & 2) essential for the functioning of the German economy. Again, already discussed. Also, the fleet has to be assembled. That's not a coast where you can hide it, or anchor offshore, & the RN & RAF knew the exact location of every harbour, & had people who knew every inch of it well enough to guide raiders into every inlet, in the darkest, foggiest night. The fleet would suffer heavy losses while assembling. In fact, it did.
Throughout, you ignore British abilities to counter what the Germans would be doing.
Remember, the Germans have to do all this quickly, or it becomes physically impossible. All the British had to do was delay them, & the whole thing would have to be called off - as it was.
Irrelevant. What matters is the size of the force that can be put ashore, & that was not more powerful.
William of Orange did.
Ozzy Blizzard
New Member
william of orange was invited by parliament IIRC and did not face an opposed landing or campaign.
Chrom:
Your just going over stuff that has been dealt with earlier. German air power could not effectively counter the royal navy, they failed to do so miserably at dunkirk. They did not have the logistical assets to put the required forces in theater, their agregate forces are irrelevent if you cant use them. They could not protect said logistical assets or the lines of communication for the whole duration of the campaign. If the RN broke into the sea lanes for say as little as an hour the losses to the german logistical fleet would have been decisive. How can you claim that naval parity is not needed for an amphibious campaign comperable to overlord? You sight air power as the answer but the luftwaffe clearly demonstrated its incapability to 1) defeat the RAF & 2) counter any major RN action, therefore you provide no logical evidence to support your claim. Your arguing against both the historical evidence and the grain of military logic. As has been said before it was NOT VIABLE and OKW (the ones who planned it) said so.
As for the USSR "not being a threat", in the short term perhaps, but the week state of the red army would have only lasted for a few years maximum, then they would be a much more capable force. That gave Hitler a small window which he had to take while he still had superiority. If he waited untill 1943/44, the time that would have been required to build the naval, logistical and air assets to defeat britain, either by commerce warfare or by direct invasion, and then redirect production to the army, the russians would have been much stronger. In the period were the german army had been neglected in the face of the navy and air force and germany bogged down fighting the british, Stalin may have used this windoew of superiority and attacked in poland which would have been a disaster for the germans. Hitler could not take such a chance. It HAD to be USSR first once the BoB failed to force the UK to capitulate.
His landing was opposed more strongly than that of the other William (the RN tried to intercept his invasion fleet, but tide & wind were in Williams favour & he evaded it), & he did have to fight a campaign. There was little fighting in England, true, but the only reason he didn't have to fight a major battle en route to London was because James, having taken the field, decided his army was unreliable & refused battle, despite having significantly greater strength than William. The "not a shot fired" myth is just that, a myth. There were skirmishes - and I walk through the site of the largest (maybe 50 dead, mostly Irish) on my way to & from work every day. There were certainly major battles in Ireland. You've heard of the Battle of the Boyne?
William was both astute enough to plan & execute almost the perfect campaign, & lucky enough to face an incompetent adversary, who made almost every wrong tactical & strategic decision possible. As a result, he had to fight only skirmishes in England, the main war taking place later, in Ireland. But that was unexpected, & only due to James being as incompetent militarily as he was politically. William was invited by part of Parliament, not the whole, & rightly did not believe their assurances that he needed only to turn up with a small force to take the country. He invaded, with a good-sized (by the standards of the time) army consisting mostly of Dutch regulars in transports escorted by most of the Dutch fleet. If he had not, he might well have met the fate of the Duke of Monmouth.
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Ozzy Blizzard
New Member
Ahh, thanks i didnt know that. I thought william came at parliaments discression, and with the majority of the population's support. Then any action launched by james was minor and incosequential. I'll have to read up on my 17th century english history.
I think he had Parliament pretty well solidly behind him by the time he landed, & he certainly had popular support in most of the country. The little battle here in Reading was a very one-sided affair because townspeople aided the Dutch: locals sneaked out to meet them, told them the dispositions of James's Irish troops, & showed them an alternative route into town, thus enabling them to take the Irish by surprise. The Dutch were outnumbered maybe 600:250, but routed the Irish in short order, aided by townspeople sniping from windows. The casualties are, as usual in battles of the time, disputed, but all accounts agree that most of them were Irish, the Dutch losing only a handful, plus a few of the citizenry. It's possible relatives of mine were involved, since some ancestors of mine lived only a mile away at the time, near the Dutch line of march.Ahh, thanks i didnt know that. I thought william came at parliaments discression, and with the majority of the population's support. Then any action launched by james was minor and incosequential. I'll have to read up on my 17th century english history.
I think the Dutch got similar aid in some of the other skirmishes, & Williams decision to land in Devon definitely owed something to his knowledge of the support Monmouth got there, & the festering resentment at the repression after his defeat at Sedgemoor (400 executed, many more shipped to the West Indies for forced labour). William said he hoped to provoke a collapse without needing to fight much, & therefore did not want to strike straight for London, but land far away & advance slowly, garnering support. He forbade foraging, despite the custom of the time, to prevent antagonising the locals. Very astute, & completely successful.
James prepared to fight, alerting the fleet (the Dutch were ready to fight it, but as I said, successfully evaded it), & marching an army of almost 20000 to Salisbury to meet William coming up from Devon. If William had landed with a token force, I'm sure he'd have been crushed there & then, popular support or not, lbut James became fearful of betrayal on the battlefield & retreated. This sign of weakness precipitated the switching of sides by some of his army he'd feared might happen in a battle. We'll never know what would have happened if he'd stood & fought, though I reckon he'd probably have lost.
One point omitted from the standard myth of the bloodless revolution is that it's uncertain whether the conspiracy to replace James with William & Mary was initiated by the English plotters, or William. It's certain that William had agents already in England & talking to the plotters when the plot was hatched.
Oh dear. I've fallen foul of my digressive tendency again.
Interesting indeed.
Prompted a bit of reading on my part, and thanks.
I'm not sure that the Scots and Irish Jacobites would thank you for characterising their battles with the Williamites as a defence of England... <grin> Given that by this time, William and Mary were acknowledged by most of the English as the King and Queen of England, and that James landed in Ireland with several thousand French troops in support, it's questionable whether those battles are best described as an invasion, or as civil war, or as something else entirely. (Wars of independance?)
I'm also not quite convinced that an "invasion" that succeeded due to its popularity, rather than by force of arms,, and that maintained, rather than supplanting, almost all authorities other than James' own kingship qualifies as such in the proper sense of the term, but the point is noted.
Regards......... Peter
Prompted a bit of reading on my part, and thanks.
I'm not sure that the Scots and Irish Jacobites would thank you for characterising their battles with the Williamites as a defence of England... <grin> Given that by this time, William and Mary were acknowledged by most of the English as the King and Queen of England, and that James landed in Ireland with several thousand French troops in support, it's questionable whether those battles are best described as an invasion, or as civil war, or as something else entirely. (Wars of independance?)
I'm also not quite convinced that an "invasion" that succeeded due to its popularity, rather than by force of arms,, and that maintained, rather than supplanting, almost all authorities other than James' own kingship qualifies as such in the proper sense of the term, but the point is noted.
Regards......... Peter
I wouldn't call it a defence of England. Defence of the realm, yes - and had James defeated the Williamites in Ireland, he planned to use it as a base from which, eventually, to regain England.
And yes, you can characterise it as a civil war. But that would apply to most European wars of the last millennium. Dynastic & religious wars are, for the most part, inherently civil wars. The conquest of 1066 was an exceptional event not only for England, but anywhere in Europe, because it changed an entire ruling class & social order. The norm was that when a ruler was changed, not much else did. We view our own past through the lens of that cataclysm, & assume that every time an army rolled across a country & a king fell, something similar happened, so our lack of such a subsequent seismic shift in national affairs for over 900 years is exceptional, but in reality, it's less of an oddity than we suppose, & the dynastic wars & changes we've actually had, many involving Continental armies, have been more like the experiences of other European countries than most of us realise. We have been rather like Sweden: a physically peripheral country, but involved in European affairs. And I think we may have had more foreign armies on our soil than the Swedes have.