Thank you for a considered an well thought out reply.
Future influence and power in the Baltic region will very much depend on economical influnce and the ability to project political power as well as military power. There´s a risk that Nato weakens due to conflicts of interest, less solidarity between Nato members and a economical decline for the US in conjunction with an economical boom for russia and china. It might be difficult to get the US to pay attention to what happens in the Baltic region if they have more urgent matters in middle east, taiwan/china and south america (venezuela with neighbours).
re US capability to project mil power. They are as great as ever in absolute terms. True, relatively they face pressures from Asia etc.. This will only be diluted in case the US enters a prolonged war in SEA. Not likely. Russia is simply not going to match the threat that USSR posed.
The US does not need a physical presence in the Baltics, as the their influence in the region is as a power in being. The de facto drawdown of US mil power in Europe has been a fact for a decade now, however their interests wrt Russia hasn't changed, ie interests and political influence has not one away. This will remain, as it is a matter of will of the regional states (Denmark, Estonia, Lativia, Lithuania, Poland in particular) and the US. It is clear that the newest eastern NATO/EU members does seek their core security in NATO (and to a lesser extent EU for softpower protection), and *not* in formal bilateral alliances with neighbours.
The US is relevant to discuss as it is the ultimate guarantor of NATO military capability. Because NATO is the
only credible guarantor of security in the region. In operational terms, all high intensity warfighting capability is politically, de jure and physically vested in NATO. No other entity has the ability to deliver this. The EU is decades upon decades from being able to deliver any such package.
Which is why Eastern Europe went straight to NATO for security and didn't go non-aligned or chose other bi- or multilateral approaches.
That being said, in wider terms, the US is investing less in Europe and EU will have a more significant role to play. However I note that on the political level, if Afghanistan is a credibility killer for NATO, then it is even more so for the large EU members.
This begs the question: is Afghanistan relevant as an indicator of the strength of the core mission of NATO? I would contend not, as succes of the A'stan is so extremely marginal on the security horizon of the countries in the region wrt core security. ISAF was Europes gift to the US post 9/11.
Regarding a US decline, that has already started and I think the US, politically, has never been as weak as now since WWII. Nato solidarity is crumbling and Germany's refusal to support the US, Canada, Netherlands, Australia and Denmark in the fight in the southern part of Afghanistan is devastating for the alliance. I think Germany and Nato will pay dearly for that...
American Cold War influence in Europe was a function of a belligerent and powerful Sov Union. A resurgent Russia will increase US relevance as that power in being. The only alternative on the distant horizon is the EU, as no country in the region has the power to guarantee each others security.
Mr. Gates letter to the German defmin was a grave mistake; he should not be asking for something he is obviously not going to get, though it may please elements of the US admin and Congress. Much to my surprise, as Mr. Gates is supposed to be one of the clever boys in the incumbent US admin.
Nonetheless, A'stan is ultimately (and even less than in a wider NATO context) not a test of NATOs role in the Baltic region. I point to that the most high profile continental Europe particapants in A'stan are - Denmark, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia!
As per the Ellemann-Jensen Doctrine.
The Ellemann-Jensen doctrine is a Danish idea specifically aimed at promoting small countries' ability to gain influence in the world order.
The doctrine is not a written document but rather inspired by the former Danish Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen's term of office in which he promoted the notion that a small country can gain influence by supporting those greater countries that share the same values and ideas, which the small country itself embraces.
[...]
The Ellemann-Jensen doctrine is thus, that a small country - like Denmark - can affect world politics through successfully building alliances to promote its foreign policy goals. An unstated implication of this is obviously that a small country should therefore also be willing to adopt and support the goals of its allies in a quid pro quo (something for something) for them supporting its own goals.
[...]
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ellemann-Jensen_doctrine
I know UK and Holland (plus Canada) is playing an extremely important role too, but they were already extremely Atlanticist (like Denmark).
Basically when a nation has to survey for a security constellation to work with, that potential arrangement has to be able to deliver. NATO, because it can deliver the full package in the military end of the spectrum. And can do so credibly.
Norway might also face an economic decline due to less demand for oil - the Norwegian government has said that it might be that they can´t sell the oil as long as they have expected, even if the oil fields still remains...
How much money will Norway be able to spend on arms in the future?
If the oil in Norway was to disappear, they might face a situation where GDP/capita could drop to Swedish levels.
The current trend is that demand for energy is on the increase and will continue to increase.
Fossils can only partially be replaced by renewables/alternatives, as the renewables, despite getting cheaper to produce, do hit a point of dimishing returns (applies to wind & solar power, biomass). Transportation fuels are going to be very hard to replace. Some of the alternatives are not politically viable in many countries (nuclear power). Reality kicks in, as opposed to a sound bite for the purpose of shaping opinion in Norway.
I note that Norway has one of the largest sovereign wealth funds on this planet.
So I have absolutely no worries on behalf of Norway.
On top of that you have a green house effect that might turn southern europe and nothern africa a difficult place to live in. This will affect the economics for the whole of EU and you might get large flows of climate refugess - where to?
I think this getting a bit far flung.
Malthus.
So, it will be more difficult to project Nato military power due to a weakened US, a weakend EU and less economical resorces.
Nope. NATO military power is primarily vested in the region by virtue of the locals, and backed by the US/W Europe as a power in being.
What will be critical for the Baltic/EU economies, the basis for their military power, and for their future influence are: Raw material, technical know how, energy resources, industry/production capability and high tech, food production and space. Russia has a lot of the above. Their industry is right now not competitive and their energy resources are dirty but they have raw material, food production and space/room.
I disagree. Globalisation has kicked in plus EU relative power is on the increase. Some of your examples has always been an issue, others have not. Despite this European nations and Europe as a whole have had no problems in becoming important power(s). Malthus has been disproved over and over again.
As said, military resources and power will depend on all above because that is what finances weapons and training. Norway Finland and Sweden have all the above though Norway lack the broad industry base - I´m not counting the oil & gas industry now. Denmark lack raw material, "green" energy and a broad industry basis. Space/room, well yes if we count Greenland but I don´t think we should, so it´s a no.
Ignoring Greenland would be a very selective thing to do, but for the sake of argument ok. Here's the thing: having the raw materials on your territory is not important. Having acces to raw materials is. Hence Denmark as an example is in no worse position than Sweden is.
Wrt to industry base. I have already contended that it is only important if you have the entire portfolio. Sweden does *not* have that today. Swedish defence industry is de facto on its way to becoming a subcontractor to a consolidated European market. Industry base is not important geopolitically (unless you can deliver the entire package, Swedish defence industry is primarily a commercial operation) - having acces to technology and defence product is - and the best way to ensure that is through an alliance system.
As Sweden is weak on alliances and does not have a truly independent arms industry, it would be unable to deliver a complete security package to countries threatened by a power like Russia.
I think that gives a hint on future power and influence in the BAltic region.
IMV your arguments are way too one-dimensional. The focus on industry base and raw materials for countries the size of Denmark and Sweden is all wrong, when both lack the critical mass anyway.
The limiter is not those.
Sweden, as for all countries in the EU, will no longer be able to develop state of the art weapons systems on their own but that´s already a fact. I agree on that. The new Meteor missile are developed by a number of countries in cooperation. The question is, which countries are qualified to be a partner in these programs? Swedish arms industry have already adapted to that situation with great success. Saab sells more than ever but most of the sales is export. Also, a new industry for our defence industries are civil security and in that area, Saab is extremely well prepared.
Yes, I expect Swedish defence industry will do well.
Regarding the Swedish stance on the Nord Stream pipe line - the one that never will be built
I can recommend the following reading "“Policy networks and Nord Stream.” It´s worth reading if you understand Swedish
and you can find it on: add www before...
.diva-portal.org/kau/abstract.xsql?dbid=917
The document gives a few answers to why Sweden will say no to the Nord stream pipeline. There are more reasones. One is that it will increase Swedish influence in the baltic region. Why do you ask? Well, Sweden, Finland, Poland and the baltic countries are in intense talks in how to coordinate their resistance to the pipeline and no other country besides Sweden has the actual power to stop it. The Nord Stream consortium must have a yes from Sweden in order to start the work. The other countries depend on Sweden in that case and the intense talks and cooperation, of course, brings these countries tighter together.
Nice read. Here is the thing. It confirms that the enviro review is a proxy. Policy networks that establish legitimacy for decision making are only relevant if the ultimate decisions are actually made on basis on values or normative power. They rarely are. Otherwise they are a proxy. That is fine, but they are weighed against realpolitik. The "system" has to accept it. When Sweden has to make a decision, it also has to consider the yardstick by which it will have its own projects measuered and if it restricts its own ability to maneuver. By restricting others on basis of an essentially normative power NGO argument, they create a Damocles sword for themselves. And Sweden is aware of this.
Making a poor argument can return as a boomerang anytime.
Proof is in the pudding. My bets are on that raison d'etat will kick in. Btw, except for a flaring station off a Swedish island, the environmental concerns seem to have been met on the technical level. The pipes have been ordered.
Besides that, Sweden doesn´t want Russia to get more revenues from selling oil & gas, revenues they partly use for more arms or for buying natural resources in other countries. Sweden want´s to decrease EU dependance on russian oil & gas in order to decrease russian political influnce over EU. Cheap russian oil & gas will also slow down a turn in EU to more environmental friendly energy resources.
Agreed.
What can russia do about this. Well not much. They can bash swedish companies in russia like IKEA and Ericsson but that won´t change Sweden's stance. Germany will not put pressure on Sweden in this case for many reasons. Germany need Swedish support in other matters in the EU. Besides, the only thing that is important for Germany is to get the gas and they will. A land route for the pipeline to Germany will only cost half the price compared with one in the baltic sea and that is what Poland is proposing. If the Poles give russia a good offer, then a no will be difficult for russia to motivate and even more difficult to explain. Also, where will russia take the Shtokman gas, if they can´t sell it to Europe - nowhere! If you look on where that gas field is, the only probable customer is europe - they are not going to build a pipeline to china for that reason
The pipeline will be built on land, passing through the baltic countries and poland on it´s way to germany. All this will delay the whole project for at lest two years - with a price on 400$ per 1000 cubilc meter that will be lost revenues of about 43 BUSD
So, Sweden has all to gain, especially influence, and relatively little to loose. The russian loss will be less the quicker it goes for a land based pipeline but I think that Putins ego will prevent that
Short on time, so only one comment. Russia would like to get the Shtokman field in order to prevent Europe from diversifying.
