According to Russian sources, even at the time of the first round of long-range training flights, the Norwegian military classified the Russian heavy bomber missions as “unusually lengthy” and “reaching farther south” than usual. [11] A similar assessment was given three weeks later by U.S. Air Force General Gene Renuart, who commented that “over the last probably three months or so the Russians have been flying their bomber force maybe a little bit more than we’ve seen in the past; certainly they’re ranging farther than they have in the past.” [12]
On August 8-9, the Russian Air Force conducted another large-scale exercise; approximately 30 bombers (four Tu-95, 12 Tu-160, 14 Tu-22M3, and four refueling Il-78) flew toward the North Pole, the Atlantic, and the Pacific Oceans, including toward Guam, home of a major U.S. military base. [13]
The exercises, which Putin announced on August 17, were apparently the third in a series. Thus, his speech at the Chebarkul training center did not inaugurate a new policy – although it was probably meant to sound as if it did – but rather made public a policy that had been in effect for more than a month. The time and place for that announcement were deliberately chosen to maximize the political effect and were probably intended as much for Russia’s SCO allies as for the West. ..
The next round of patrols took place two weeks later, on September 5-6, 2007. The new series of flights took Russian heavy bombers “around the corner” to the northern Atlantic, to the Sea of Japan, and beyond the North Pole. [14] On September 14, it was announced that two Tu-160s were sent to patrol the Arctic Ocean for 15 hours. [15]
The missions flown since mid-July reveal a rather stable pattern; they all have been training flights that lasted less than 24 hours and usually involved 10 or more aircraft simultaneously flying in different directions. Russia has not attempted to maintain a permanent presence in the air, suggesting that there was no intention to transition to a “war posture.”
The choice of patrol areas, however, suggests that the Russian Air Force continues to train for combat missions even though Putin emphasized in his August 17 statement that patrols would be conducted in the areas of Russian economic interests and active shipping, rather than in regions required for “deterrence of a missile-nuclear attack on Russia.” [16] In fact, the list of areas unveiled since July closely correlates with missions flown by heavy bombers during almost every large-scale exercise since 1999. During these exercises heavy bombers apparently simulated limited strikes (against targets in the United States, NATO, other U.S. bases, and naval targets) in response to attacks against Russia by the United States and its allies. Even the flight toward Guam in August 2007 was not particularly new; in 2003, Russian Tu-95s flew to the Indian Ocean to practice cruise missile launches against land-based targets (presumably the U.S. base at Diego Garcia). Training for these types of missions fits the “de-escalation” strategy set forth in Russia’s 2000 Military Doctrine and subsequent documents. [17] The only difference is that previously these missions were flown only once or twice a year and only in the context of large-scale maneuvers that involved all or most branches of the armed forces, while now they are being undertaken more often and independently of other services. ..This is simply enhanced training, he said, an opportunity for heavy bomber crews to “restore qualifications that had been lost in previous years.” [21] He also praised the “calm and pragmatic” reaction to enhanced training in the United States, which, he claimed, demonstrates that “experts understand that the words of the Russian President about combat patrols mean something other than what they meant during the Cold War.” In the future, funding permitting, the same pattern will be expanded to other elements of the Air Force, he added.
http://www.wmdinsights.org/I19/I19_R1_RussianStrategic.htm