The answer to the original exam question has to be no - I suspect the only scenario that the UK will get involved militarily would be a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO). Of course were that to happen then there is the potential for the situation to develop in a similar fashion to that in Sierra Leone and I suspect that there is sufficient groundswell in Zimbabwe to indicate that certain sections of the population would be supported. You only have to look at how savagely the MDC are repressed by Mugabe to see that he sees them as a threat.
Of course making comparisons between Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe is fraught with danger - there are similarities of course, ex-Colony, elements of the population sick of suffering and the fact that it is in Africa. However there are huge differences as well - Sierra Leone has a coastline whereas Zimbabwe does not, Governance (however flawed people think it is) is stronger and the Security Forces are viable whereas in Sierra Leone they were not. Zimbabwe also has better infrastructure which could lend advantages to both sides.
Given that a NEO is essentially a raid in doctrinal terms this imposes a number of restrictions - secrecy, limited footprint and limited duration being the main ones. Coupled with that - if we accept that secrecy is paramount then there is no opportunity for a force build-up and we add the fact that the lack of a coastline limits UK forces to aerial insertion then the problems are compounded. It is likely that the UK would struggle to insert a force to pull off a NEO. Any support by tactical strike aircraft will be ruled out by political considerations because neighbouring countries would be compelled to support overflight and staging rights for military transport aircraft as it is a NEO, they are unlikely to sanction the basing of land-based strike aircraft.
The other planning factor then is where are the Entitled Persons (EPs - namely those that are going to be evacuated) and how many of them are there. Ideally they should be concentrated but as I don't know where they all live it is difficult to speculate. For the sake of argument we'll say that they are clustered around Bulawayo and Harare or at least can move there on instructions. This then means that an area in both Bulawayo and Harare needs to be secured and given the fact that aerial insertion is the only option here then that pretty much means the airports at those locations. Both look in pretty good order on Google Earth and have decent-sized runways so the type of aircraft they can accept is not too much of a problem, by that I mean that any of Strike Command's transport fleet (Tristar, C-130, C-17 and VC-10) could land there.
The other factor then is 'enemy forces' - worst case assumption is that this is going to be a contested operation and the first thing we need to think about is the Zimbabwean Air Force, in particular its fast jets. According to the aeroflight website this boils down to 10 x Hawk, 11 x F-7 and 3 x MIG-23 which are conveniently all at Thornhill. Given the previous assumption that UK combat aircraft will not be permitted to forward base in Africa then three COAs are likely:
COA1 - Insertion of UKSF to destroy the aircraft on the ground or with MANPADs.
COA2 - TLAM strike from maritime assets (Trafalgar Class SSN).
COA3 - Air strike by Harrier from a CVS off Beira.
COA1 - Advantages are that the troops on the ground can make a decision namely only to strike those aircraft that pose a threat (i.e. those taking off). This lessens the political fallout inherent in the other COAs. However it is probably the most risky because of the risk of detection.
COA2 - Provides better security and is the least risky politically but most risky in terms of achieving the effect in that if one aircraft is missed then it could potentially shoot down all of the incoming transport aircraft.
COA3 - This COA is quite risky logistically because Thornhill lies at the extent of the Harrier's range if flying a medium altitude profile. Also such a profile increases the risk of detection by air defence assets. Also there is the problem of overflying Mozambique - permission is unlikely to be granted and to ask for permission would compromise the operation. In extremis HM Government would in all likelihood just fly the sorties and deal with the political fallout later.
Given these options I would select COA1 - insertion of UKSF equipped with MANPAD. However I would have at least 2 x SSN on station to give me the option of launching TLAM and a Carrier BG to give me airpower (the need for this will become clear later).
Having dealt with the air to air threat we now need to look at ground threats and primarily those in the immediate vicinity of Harare and Bulawayo.
A quick search on wikipedia indicates the following in the Harare area:
1st Commando Regiment
Presidential Guard Regiment (3 x Bns of which one can be discounted because it would likely deploy to protect Mugabe)
Parachute Group (strength unknown - Coy strength for the sake of argument)
A Mechanised Bde comprising a Tank Regiment and an IFV Regiment and normal supporting arms.
An Infantry Bde with 3 x Inf Bns, a Recce Coy (Armoured Car), a Mortar Bty and an AD Bty
Two Field Artillery Regiments
An Air Defence Regiment
A similar Wikipedia search indicates the following in Bulawayo:
An Infantry Bde with 3 x Inf Bns, a Recce Coy (Armoured Car), a Mortar Bty and an AD Bty
Overall then it can be seen that the Harare-based forces pose the greatest threat to the operation and in particular I would single out the artillery and the air defence which fortunately according to Wikipedia are all at Inkomo Barracks.
The problem then becomes what assets do you need to secure Bulawayo airport and Harare airport in the face of those threats whilst concurrently processing, feeding and evacuating EPs. The force package I would go for would be something like this:
Harare area:
UKSF Squadron less one troop detached to Thornhill as previously described. The role of this squadron would be to provide surveillance on the Mechanised Bde Bks and the artillery/air defence bks. The Squadron would be there to cue Harrier airstrikes at the first sign of any deployment related activity. They would be equipped with LAW to deal with any air defence platforms that appeared to be active.
An RAF Regiment Field Squadron to provide specialist airfield defence capability and advice.
A Parachute or Light-Role Infantry Battalion to provide the majority of the combat power and secure a suitable perimeter as well as the logistic framework to deal with the EPs. For those of you looking at the numbers and wondering about the armour threat I would say that this is still a sufficient force - a combination of Javelin and LAW for instance will make mincemeat of the Armoured Brigade.
An Engineer Troop.
A 105mm Light Gun Troop.
If sufficient airlift was available I would take a Formation Recce Sqn to give me a mobile strike capability or a robust reserve.
Bulawayo Area:
A simpler problem requiring less resources - a Parachute or Light Role Infantry Battalion would suffice.
To deliver that would require every aircraft in the UK's transport inventory and more so the operation would need to be phased or civil aircraft would need to be chartered (whilst of course sustaining current commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan). So all in all - for the UK to conduct a simple NEO would provide challenging to say the least!
If we take the separate but more widely discussed option in this thread - namely depose Mugabe previous posters have covered the political difficulties. By that I mean involvement by Non-African and African countries and certainly rules out mercenaries in any guise. The solution therefore has to come from the Zimbabwean people which leaves two courses of action - palace coup or a protracted insurgency.
The former in terms of preventing even more bloodshed would be the most desirable COA - but I sense that loyalty to Mugabe amongst those who would be best placed to carry out the palace coup rules that COA out.
This leaves an insurgency as the only workable military COA, and it begs the question of is it possible? To be successful the insurgency would have to be based in a neighbouring state because the Zimbabwean security apparatus has shown itself as brutally effective in putting down any signs of dissent. Also the fact that people are struggling to exist in Zimbabwe means that the insurgency has to be based initially in a border state. The resources are certainly there, notably the Zimbabweans who are crossing the South African border in their droves. Given the lack of indicators that any of Zimbabwe's neighbours would be willing to host an insurgency for various reasons - be they ideological, economic or a combination of both, the situation looks pretty hopeless.
