China Wants To Target US Aircraft Carriers

[Grand Danois]

So, in your expert view, could the Soviets with their noisy subs execute a
2nd strike against NATO/US, yes or no?

SSBNs was never the primary 2nd strike tool for the Soviets - the landbased, fixed and mobile, ICBMs were. The same goes today.

IIRC there are some think tanks that argue that the U.S. would be able to do a succesful first strike today - but that is more a discussion of what succesful is than practicability.

 

[Firehorse]

SSBNs was never the primary 2nd strike tool for the Soviets - the landbased, fixed and mobile, ICBMs were. The same goes today.

That may have been so, but even then NATO, according to the Soviets, was able to keep track of about 20% of their noisy boomers-primary 2nd strike platforms or not. That would leave 80% unaccounted for. Now, to be on the conservative side, and in the case of China, even if just one boomer survives long enough, the 2nd strike (or the 1st one, against CSG/TF) won't be long in coming. The seas around China are not ice covered like the Arctic Ocean the Northern Fleet uses, but there are plenty of shallow spaces to hide!

 

[Grand Danois]

That may have been so, but even then NATO, according to the Soviets, was able to keep track of about 20% of their noisy boomers-primary 2nd strike platforms or not. That would leave 80% unaccounted for. Now, to be on the conservative side, and in the case of China, even if just one boomer survives long enough, the 2nd strike (or the 1st one, against CSG/TF) won't be long in coming. The seas around China are not ice covered like the Arctic Ocean the Northern Fleet uses, but there are plenty of shallow spaces to hide!

I commented on Soviet strategy - and I'm highly skeptical 20% figure. For what period is that?

 

[gf0012-aust]

I commented on Soviet strategy - and I'm highly skeptical 20% figure. For what period is that?

The USN estimates were that they could kill over 80% of the Soviet boomers within 12 hrs. Its important to note that they had virtually a one for one hack of SSN's to SSBN's.

Considering that the USN has over 20 deployed nukes at any one stage, then hacking PLAN boomers if the political climate starts to change would dramatically alter in the USN's failure.

According to some of the VPNO commanders interviewed after the Cold War (Red Storm Rising, Weir), the Sovs thought that they would at best be able to sink 20% of the CTF's - and that is with a caopability that still dwarf anything that the PLAAF and PLAN could muster.

The PLAAF and PLAN are 15-25 years away from resembling the Soviet capability in the mid 70's - let alone the mid 80's.

 

[Firehorse]

If remember it right, the article covered 1960s and 70s- I can't find the live link to it, but:

the current levels of technology do not allow a potential enemy to conduct continuous and prolonged tracking of Russian SSBNs even under ideal conditions. ..it seems unrealistic to neutralize all strategic submarines, even if they are located at sea and they are being continuously tracked. ..
A number of authors built their claims about the vulnerability of Russian strategic submarines only on the fact that our submarines are noisier than the Americans. This argument becomes complicated to ignore because specialist advancing it have themselves served on strategic submarines.(17)
However, as follows from our results, the question of whose submarines have a greater acoustic signature is less important if their noise levels are below a defined value. The maximum operational range of a submarine's sonar in this case is limited not by technology, as used to be the case, but by the natural noise of the ocean from which it is impossible to escape. ..to organize continuous prolonged secret tracking of all strategic submarines does not seem technically possible. Moreover, even if the potential enemy were to attack, there would be no guarantee that it would destroy all the strategic submarines.
http://www.armscontrol.ru/subs/snf/snf0322.htm#Toc05

..deployment of strategic weapons at sea meets the criterion of survivability much better than other options. Survivability is becoming the most important feature of strategic forces in future.
http://www.armscontrol.ru/subs/collisions/comm0319.htm#detection

..to deter the United States, the PLAN could conduct SSBN patrols further east of Taiwan to allow JL-2 SLBMs to cover all of the United States.
http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.60/pub_detail.asp

 

[mic of orion]

interesting article, but one wonders, if China were to use nukes to target US carriers, would you think US carriers would idly wait to be hit, I mean each carrier can be armed with tactical nukes. you arm 12 F18 E/F's with 4 tactical nukes, China will think twice using Nukes on US ships.

Also, each carrier battle group as a norm has 2-3 attack submarines which can be armed with tactical nukes as well (Nuclear tipped Harpoons and Tomahawks).

We are not even mentioning US has 8 active Ohio Class, each can deliver 24 Trident missiles.

 

[gf0012-aust]

If remember it right, the article covered 1960s and 70s- I can't find the live link to it, but:

That is a 12 year old article. (Look at the numbers of nukes they list available, a cursory look at RANSAC data shows that the russians have been wrecking 6-12 nukes per year - and paid for by the US, Sweden, Japan, Australia and New Zealand (even New Zealand gave funds to cut up a nuke sub!). Less than 20% of their penanted fleet is fit enough for bluewater ops). So the data used to support their arguments are irrelevant today. (As are the technology assumptions)

That immediately brings into question the fact that in the last 7 years alone there has been an exponential leap in signature management capability, but also in asw detection technologies.

To argue in the article that acoustic management thresholds are relative to a notional detection level ignores the reality that the detection thresholds are completely different.

Quite frankly, Soviet and Russian ASW was never that good - so again the argument that detection pockets were unpolluted by complimentary ASW protection ignores the capability that was available.

Post cold war estimates were that the USN SSN's were hacking greater than 90% of Soviet SSBN's.

The PLAN as an example is nowhere near the numerical placement and deployment - and breaking down actual subs to tasking makes it even worse.

Is the USN in a platform position to hack every PLAN SSBN? Yes undoubtedly. So can the Russians, the RN and the French. The PLAN numbers don't stack up - and if the aforementioned navies were compelled to effect cold war type levels of direct surveillance, they could forego other mission types and be tasked solely to hacking.

 

[tphuang]

Is the USN in a platform position to hack every PLAN SSBN? Yes undoubtedly. So can the Russians, the RN and the French. The PLAN numbers don't stack up - and if the aforementioned navies were compelled to effect cold war type levels of direct surveillance, they could forego other mission types and be tasked solely to hacking.

when you say hack every PLAN SSBNs, shouldn't these boomers have attack subs around protecting them? And how many SSBNs do they need to avoid having this problem of getting everyone tracked? I guess the other question is how quiet do they need to be to get away from this?

 

[gf0012-aust]

when you say hack every PLAN SSBNs, shouldn't these boomers have attack subs around protecting them?

The PLAN philosophy promoted a few years back is that they will run in pairs. A shooter and a guard. No comment on other boomer/bomber navies.

And how many SSBNs do they need to avoid having this problem of getting everyone tracked?

At a counter hacking level, a navy would need to have more SSBN's than a competitors SSN's or SSK's at a minimum if you wanted to achieve greater than 1:1 disparity. That also assumes its against one principal competitor. There are obviously others who have an interest in hacking other navies subs for their own national interests.

I guess the other question is how quiet do they need to be to get away from this?

Thats up to them to work out.

 

[DarthAmerica]

Question for GF

Does an SSK have the kind of persistence to hack an SSBN? It would seem that at some point the SSK would be vulnerable to detection due to snorkling requirements and the SSBN could get away. Also, because of nuclear propulsion, wouldn't the SSBN be able to just outrun the offending SSK?

Another thing. Isnt it completely contrary to the purpose of an SSBN to get anywhere near a CSF? Even if is was possible to shoot a BM at the CSF the space ISR systems of the US and probably some others would at best give away the launch position of the SSBN and at worse trigger retaliation from the nuclear forces of other nations?


-DA

 

[gf0012-aust]

Does an SSK have the kind of persistence to hack an SSBN?

No

It would seem that at some point the SSK would be vulnerable to detection due to snorkling requirements and the SSBN could get away. Also, because of nuclear propulsion, wouldn't the SSBN be able to just outrun the offending SSK?

It would more likely be an opportunity shot. Not a lot of likelihood of that happening either....

Another thing. Isnt it completely contrary to the purpose of an SSBN to get anywhere near a CSF?

Yes, which I was trying to be subtle about...

Even if is was possible to shoot a BM at the CSF the space ISR systems of the US and probably some others would at best give away the launch position of the SSBN and at worse trigger retaliation from the nuclear forces of other nations?

This is one of those circuitous opinion issues - personally I subscribe to the concept of the cold war - "one flies - all fly"

 

[DarthAmerica]

Yes, which I was trying to be subtle about...

Agreed. SSBNs are like hidden silos who's real value is in the uncertainty they bring to the enemy planning process. Even if just one survives, you still have to figure that your opponent has the capability to send 12-24 nuclear missiles which could be MIRVed toward you in which case you are dealing with 12 to 200+(with MIRVs) nuclear detonations. Thats an overwhelming retaliatory capability. To squander away the ability to nearly destroy a nation for a carrier just doesn't seem logical. Especially when the Carrier if its USN can be replaced several times over because of the number of CVNs in the fleet. You would be reducing your striking power many times over for very little in return.

Besides SSK's, SSN's and SSGN's are purpose built for this and do not carry the risk of triggering a nuclear response.

-DA

 

[gf0012-aust]

Agreed.

You'll note the somewhat spectacular lack of success I had in trying to inject some reality into that portion of the debate.... :unknown

 

[DarthAmerica]

You'll note the somewhat spectacular lack of success I had in trying to inject some reality into that portion of the debate.... :unknown

Yes I did. I'm just hoping the logic here makes sense to others who before may not have understood the nature of the platforms and operational characteristics in question. Another point that you made is the overwhelming numerical advantage the PRC SSBNs would be up against. At their level of proficiency and ability to operate out in blue water nations would be literally standing in line and taking turns hacking the few SSBNs they have. Their best option is to remain as stealthy as possible and avoid any situation that could compromise their location. With your reference to girls marching bands, its bad enough when you have a technological deficiency. To further compound it with tactical employment deficiency and the PRC would be almost giving up their deterrence capability.

Aside from all the above. The PRC still has some issues with the kill-chain starting with getting timely targeting data to the shooters if the target is a carrier in the open ocean and you are shooting with BMs. The idea that a terminally guided BM is antiship capable because it can hit point tatgets on
and doesn't really illustrate how difficult this really is. The way these articles describe the capability the PRC would have to have a very advanced knowledge of hypersonics that would rival some of the technology currently in R&D in the US and Oz. A pure ballistic trajectory isn't likely to hit a moving ship without the most precise target data and cooperation of the target itself. That means the payload would have to at some point leave the ballistic flight profile, track and then "maneuver" onto the target. That sounds eerily familiar to some DARPA and DSTO programs and I haven't read anything in open sources that would suggest they are at that point. Especially when they are still struggling to perfect their domestic military aircraft engine technology.


-DA

 

[Firehorse]

Post cold war estimates were that the USN SSN's were hacking greater than 90% of Soviet SSBN's.

Well, estimates by whom? Even if true, >90% isn't 100%, and those remaining <10% were enough to execute a 2nd strike. Years ago I talked to a Soviet whaler who once met a Soviet, (possibly SSBN) submariner. From him he learned that their subs were also present in the S.Atlantic and communicated with whaling ships there- apparently another patrol area. Also, Soviet Pac.Fleet subs patrolled of Guatemala as well- although most likely they were SSNs targeting Panama Canal Zone & USN traffic.
I doubt the USN/NATO had enough SSNs to keep track of even 50-60% of all Soviet SSNs/GNs/BNs in all their patrol areas, not to mention escorting CV/Ns and conducting intel. gathering missions since the USS Pueblo capture.
As for PLAN's SSKs/Ns/BNs, they will increase in # and quality- and the boomers may resume their legacy detterance patrols in a different area- even after sending some of their BMs against CSGs/TFs. If SSNs could useSUBROCs against subs, why not SLBMs with ASHMs/torpedoes on top of them can't be used against big surface ships & subs?

Subroc Rocket-propelled Anti-Submarine Nuclear Depth Charge Subrocs were intended for targets within sonar but beyond torpedo range. Launched from a standard torpedo tube, the solid-fuel rocket carried a 5-Kiloton nuclear depth charge to a distance of 35 miles (56 km). Although hitting a submarine-sized target at that distance posed a challenge, a nuclear explosion underwater would render pinpoint accuracy moot. http://americanhistory.si.edu/Subs/weapons/armament/other/index.html

The very large lethal radius (about 10 km) of the warhead would have allowed usage of the missile to its maximum range of 185 km (100 nm) despite its inherent limited accuracy. ..
U.S. Navy attack submarines currently have no high-speed loing-range stand-off weapon at their disposition. http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/sealance.htm

BTW, the Russians have a similar weapons- SS-N-15 'Starfish'/81R Vyuga and 90RU Tsakra

The payload ranges from a simple depthcharger, to a 20 kt of TNT nuclear warhead. It is analogous in function to the now retired Subroc missile carried by US Navy submarines. http://www.spiritus-temporis.com/ss-n-15/

Until recently, the SS-N-15 was carried by Typhoon, Charlie I/II, Oscar I, Victor I/II, Alfa, Sierra, Mike, and Akula class submarines. It was estimated that four anti-submarine nuclear standoff weapons (either SS-N-15 or SS-N-16) were allocated to each vessel.

In fact, the SS-N-15 and SS-N-16 — the former a nuclear depth charge and the latter a nuclear-tipped torpedo — were considered complementary weapon systems, and both types were jointly assigned to Russian submarines. The weapon is fired from a torpedo tube, then a rocket booster ignites, clearing the surface and transiting to the target's vicinity. The Starfish releases a 200 kiloton nuclear depth charge (the yield is disputed, see in the specifications), which detonates at the optimum depth, likely destroying submarines in a 5-10 kilometer radius.

SS-N-16 Stallion ASW (Vodopod)

Very little is known about the SS-N-16 Stallion. It is a short-range, submarine-launched weapon, very similar to the U.S. ASROC, and also similar to the Russian SS-N-15 Starfish, of which it is an evolutionary improvement. It differs from the SS-N-15 in that after launch and flight, it releases a torpedo instead of a depth charge. The missile is launched via a 66 centimeter torpedo tube, broaches the surface, and uses its solid-fuel booster to fly to the suspected location of the enemy submarine. It then jettisons the booster and the torpedo deploys a parachute, dropping into the sea and seeking its target with a preprogrammed search pattern.
The Type 45 lightweight torpedo (E45-75A) itself has a range of 15 kilometers at 30 knots speed. It has both active and passive sonar. The torpedo has either a 100 kilogram high explosive warhead (termed the Veder by the Russians), or a nuclear warhead of unknown yield (referred to as the Vodopod). The SS-N-16 is carried aboard the Typhoon, Oscar I/II, Victor III, Sierra I/II, and Akula class submarines — unlike the SS-N-15, it can only be fired by the larger 65 centimeter torpedo tube, limiting the submarines which can carry it. The standard estimate is that each such submarine was allocated four anti-submarine nuclear weapons — a mixture of SS-N-15s or SS-N-16s. http://www.cdi.org/issues/nukef&f/database/rusnukes.html#ssn15starfish

And again, if it was possible for the PLA to destoy an old fast moving SAT in orbit, it's not a science fiction to be able to find & destroy/mission kill a naval group. Hell, if I knew 5 possible locations separated by 100s of miles I would send 5 SLBMs to cover all of them, or 1 BM with 5 MRVs!

 

[gf0012-aust]

And again, if it was possible for the PLA to destoy an old fast moving SAT in orbit, it's not a science fiction to be able to find & destroy/mission kill a naval group. Hell, if I knew 5 possible locations separated by 100s of miles I would send 5 SLBMs to cover all of them, or 1 BM with 5 MRVs!

Oh come on. Killing you own asset on a predictable terminal orbit might sound good for some excited teenagers - but its a bit more subdued when you add up the volumes of satellites that need to be killed at 3 different orbit bands. When China does a deep kill then wake me up. When she demonstrates that she has the mass to kill in excess of 250+ satellites in different layers up to 25,000 miles, then I'll be suitably impressed. A Polar orbit kill? sounds impressive until you actually add up and analyse the redundancy in place - as well as the other critical military satellites that operate way outside a polar orbit.

ASAT energy bleed is inversely proportional to depth of target. So getting excited about a polar orbit kill on your own asset is about as relevant as arguing that a porsches advantages over the quarter mile directly correlates to competing in a camel trophy event....


As for your continued commentary about killing task forces etc... you do realise that the photo shoot images that you see of CTF's in peacetime have no reflection on how widely those assets are dispersed in wartime?

And for goodness sake - nukes don't work as you imply. The US conducted nuke tests on "complete fleets" spread out over a 100 sq miles and have real data available. Some of the less critical survivability results are on the net.

 

[Stryker001]

don't throw out the sat phone just yet

China obviously sees an advantage in developing ASAT capabilities, beyond the strategic intent mentioned in PLA National Defence University publication, Joint Space War Campaigns.

When looking at the total scope of ASAT capabilities being developed besides the direct ascent used against the weather sat.

Offensive weapons that will be used in a wider scope than to counter foreign Government policy or for psychological purposes as stated in the Joint Space War Campaigns publication.

The PRC are not exactly transparent on their budget or what they are spending it on.

 

[gf0012-aust]

China obviously sees an advantage in developing ASAT capabilities, beyond the strategic intent mentioned in PLA National Defence University publication, Joint Space War Campaigns.

When looking at the total scope of ASAT capabilities being developed besides the direct ascent used against the weather sat.

Offensive weapons that will be used in a wider scope than to counter foreign Government policy or for psychological purposes as stated in the Joint Space War Campaigns publication.

The PRC are not exactly transparent on their budget or what they are spending it on.

I have no problems accepting that an own goal shoot is a demonstration of latency. That is completely different to some of the more enthusiastic who suddenly think that they have a tipping point edge and that they've degraded a skin on the onion.

Lets compare the targetting ability of the US and Russia on deep space programmes as compared to some of the triumphalism of some chinese re the ASAT shot. The US has had laser targetting to a depth of 407000 km since 1969. China is nowhere remotely close to that kind of capability.

Similarly when I see enthusiastic debate about SSBN's used to kill carriers in a task force, then its clearly apparent that nationalistic commentary is taking precedence over technical comprehension.

 

[peterAustralia]

Just some thoughts

I would assert that land based mobile ICBM are better value for money that sea based. Whether they be road based or rail based I would assert that they are easy to hide in as big as country as China, and being mobile and being able to be hidden in small tunnels for periods of time, are highly survivable.

Nuclear Ballistic missile Submarines seem to cost a fortune and are high priority targets, so why bother to have them? Yes I know they can be put in out of the way places and stay out of harms way, but it seems that the cost / benefit ratio does not have a lot going for them.

As to getting US Carriers, well China now has many capable long ranged Sukhois. These are likely to keep any US Carrier a long way away from China itself. Thus US Aircraft are going to find their job harder as they have to fly a long way to get to Taiwan first before doing their job. China's tactical ballistic missiles I would have thought would be best used to target Taiwan's airfields, as these are large immobile places, here large numbers of missiles have their place as opposed to the highest technology.

If I were china I would also be looking at large numbers of cheap cruise missiles. An example might be a upgraded V1 doodlebug. These carry a large payload and can be made by the thousand for a low price. Obviously they would be upgraded to a degree, with GPS guidance, some degree of signature reduction, and a more refined engine. If a couple of thousand were in stock these could cause massive damage to Taiwan's airfields. Yes many could be shot down, but it would not be super easy if they come in large waves, are flying at very low level and have some degree of signature reduction. Becuase they would be so cheap to make, Taiwan might run out of air/air missiles before China runs out of upgraded doodlebugs.

peter

 

[Stryker001]

I thought the US are fortifying Guam as a super base to have a closer reach to China if any thing occurs in the future with Taiwan.