The problem was French arrogance, in that they kept making unreasonable demands. It's time they realise they don't run Europe anymore and accept work & project control has to be shared out evenly.
Exactly,
that's the point.
The problem was French arrogance, in that they kept making unreasonable demands. It's time they realise they don't run Europe anymore and accept work & project control has to be shared out evenly.
No way for the F/A-18E/F or Typhoon, those aircrafts wasn't able to meet the requirements of the French Ministry of Defence, and also, it would have definitively killed the Aeronautical Military Branche of France, and would have caused a dependence in term of equipment (including armament) to the US.
Sure, but you don't have the right to demand disproportionate control of a multi-national project when you weren't going to order anywhere near a majority of the aircraft.We have the right to do our proper aircraft like other countries including UK, etc...
In a negotiation you have the right to demand anything, it's a part of the game. What's interesting is what ultimately decides the outcome. Was the control of the program what made the French refuse to participate, or were they prepared to accept to not get the control if their request for a carrier capable fighter was met?Sure, but you don't have the right to demand disproportionate control of a multi-national project when you weren't going to order anywhere near a majority of the aircraft.
This is the point. You wanted to be part of Eurofighter but only if you could override the interests of other members. That was clearly not going to happen, so why did France bother having such unreasonable demands? Either it was naive in believing it could get away with it, or it was arrogant and didn't care.
You can demand what you like, but making stupid demands gets you kicked out of the process altogether. So what's the point in making the stupid demand if you still want to be in the club?In a negotiation you have the right to demand anything, it's a part of the game.
Making demands don't get you kicked out even if they're stupid, unless your counterpart is stupid. All negotiations start from different points of views and then the counterparts starts moving towards each other.You can demand what you like, but making stupid demands gets you kicked out of the process altogether. So what's the point in making the stupid demand if you still want to be in the club?
IIRC the French weren't kicked out, they left, when all three other countries refused to accept their terms. The others were willing to continue negotiating, but the French wouldn't compromise.You can demand what you like, but making stupid demands gets you kicked out of the process altogether. So what's the point in making the stupid demand if you still want to be in the club?
source:How France’s Rafale Lost Morocco Sale
By PIERRE TRAN - AFP, 15 Okt 2007
PARIS — The knives are out, as French industry contemplates an astounding defeat in efforts to sell Dassault Aviation’s Rafale fighter jet to Morocco, leaving the door open to the U.S. F-16.
If Lockheed Martin completes the sale, it will mark a retreat in French diplomatic and military influence in francophone North Africa. Morocco was a protectorate under French colonial rule until independence in 1956, but it maintained close relations — until recently.
Dassault Chief Executive Charles Edelstenne and Eric Trappier, the company’s head of military aircraft, are said to be livid as the prospect of a sale of the twin-engine Rafale recedes.
“This was not even a tender,” an industry executive said. “This was a bilateral deal. Who knows when the next opportunity will come?”
There are no words harsh enough for the Délégation Géné-rale pour l’Armament (DGA) among Dassault executives, who privately blame the arms agency, particularly the international development department, for what they see as fatal miscalculations in the export campaign.
“The lesson of Morocco is France is incapable of exporting arms,” the industry executive said.
A DGA official vehemently denies the accusations.
“It’s calumny,” he said. “You have to ask yourself, who benefits from these accusations? Has industry nothing to reproach itself?”
The consequences of failure are far-reaching for industry. The Rafale is a French symbol of military aeronautical excellence and is a sales platform for Thales, Snecma and the Safran group’s Sagem, and a host of other French equipment suppliers.
The Rafale’s latest defeat — the Netherlands, Singapore and South Korea all passed on it for U.S. aircraft — raises fundamental questions for the future of the fourth-generation fighter and France’s sway in the Arab world, said Robbin Laird of consulting firm ICSA, based here and in Washington.
Officially, until a Moroccan order is announced, the French Defense Ministry maintains the Rafale is still in the running. But Defense Minister Hervé Morin implicitly accepts a checkmate by the Americans.
Asked for his view of why France failed in Morocco, Morin said Oct. 8, “When the time comes, I will give you my explanation.”
Bungled Bundle?
France completed technical and commercial negotiations with the Moroccan authorities in the spring, the industry executive said. Edelstenne said in June, just before the 46th Paris Airshow, that the Rafale offer was being handled on “a government-to-government” level.
France proposed 18 Rafales for 2.3 billion euros ($3.2 billion), according to French press reports.
Unofficially, Dassault executives fault the DGA, which bundled the aircraft into a large arms package that included helicopters and frigates. That package approach sabotaged the deal, the industry executive believes.
The DGA official said Morocco has long-standing needs for fighter aircraft, helicopters and warships, and the French offer was made in response to those requirements.
“We have supplied price and technical information to the government,” a Eurocopter spokeswoman said. “The information is part of a global package being negotiated at a government-to-government level, and we do not know the details of the negotiations.”
A spokeswoman for naval company DCNS said, “There is an informal exchange of information.” DCNS had previously offered the FREMM multimission frigate, but Morocco is looking for something bigger than the Gowind corvette and smaller than the FREMM.
“We would offer something that meets their needs,” she said.
The French civil service has a tradition of equality of treatment, in which public officials resist selecting one offer above another to avoid the appearance of favoritism for one contractor, a defense analyst said. An arms package fits that principle.
Moroccan officials were not available for comment.
Another grievance Dassault harbors is an apparent discrepancy in Rafale prices, with the DGA accused of submitting a figure said to be 20 percent lower than Dassault’s.
The DGA official insists the blame is unfair. The DGA did not get involved in commercial talks. “There is no government-to-government contract,” he said. “We don’t have a Foreign Military Sales procedure.”
Commercial negotiations are an industry responsibility, the DGA official said. DGA’s role is to provide technical support, including evaluation services if needed, he said.
The inconsistency in price seems to have arisen from a DGA official’s reference to Rafale’s 50 million euro ($70 million) unit price for the French Air Force during a meeting with Moroccan officials in October 2006.
“It was probably a mistake,” said a person familiar with the talks. “It was outside his competence.”
That was not a commercial offer, but it was a figure of which the Moroccans took note.
Export aircraft can be more expensive than domestic orders when they come with newer equipment such as laser target designators or infrared search-and-track sensors. A letter of acceptance for a foreign sale of the F-16 may tag each plane at up to $45 million, compared with the $35 million list price at the U.S. Department of Defense.
But Dassault executives suspect the DGA of undercutting Rafale’s price to help sell French frigates, using the aircraft as a loss leader item much as a retailer might do.
There was also hesitation by the Finance Ministry in underwriting financial guarantees with Coface, the French export credit agency, the executive said. The uncertainty was because of the presidential election, as Finance Ministry officials had to wait to see whether Socialist Ségolène Royal or Conservative Nicolas Sarkozy won the ballot.
For Dassault, the package approach, confusion over prices and dithering in financial support led to disenchantment in Morocco and an invitation to the United States to pitch its aircraft.
An official at the presidential office said Sarkozy will visit Morocco Oct. 22-24t. He declined comment on the Rafale.
Many Reasons for Failure
Dassault’s rage against the DGA may be misdirected. The Rafale was probably doomed to failure for technological, financial and geopolitical reasons, analysts said.
“The Rafale was too sophisticated for the Moroccan authorities,” said Loic Tribot La Spiere, chief executive of think tank Centre d’Etude et Prospective Stratégique. “The Mirage 2000 would have been more appropriate in technology, cost and maintenance terms.”
But Dassault recently closed the Mirage production line after delivering the last plane to Greece. A chance to sell Mirages faded when India last year dropped bilateral talks for a buy of 126 combat aircraft and launched an international tender.
An upgraded Mirage 2000 is seen as an internal competitor to Rafale, and while reopening the line would be possible if there were a customer, there would be a cost.
Financially, Saudi Arabia’s buy of 72 Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft was a double whammy. Riyadh might have financed a Moroccan purchase, but when the Saudis signed for the Eurofighter, funds were no longer available for the Rafale buy.
“The Saudi buy is significant,” Laird said.
Riyadh’s purchase boosts the credibility of Eurofighter and maker EADS in world markets. “It gives the aircraft global legs,” Laird said. Electronics and weapon makers provide support to aircraft that sell, such as the F-16, which makes them more upgradeable.
While capable as a deep strike aircraft, the Rafale is probably too much aircraft for ground attack in the counterinsurgency role, Laird said.
Morocco has a long-running conflict in the Western Sahara with the Polisario Front independence movement, which wants a referendum for autonomy or limited independence. Morocco has offered limited autonomy to the Western Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty.
Morocco’s relations with neighboring Algeria are also tense. Algeria has bought Sukhoi aircraft. Between 1975-88, Morocco bought 20 U.S.-built F-5 fighters and six OV-10 counterinsurgency aircraft, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Military Balance. The mainstay of the Royal Moroccan Air Force is the Mirage F1 fighter/attack aircraft, of which 27 are undergoing a modernization program with the French joint venture company Astrac.
In world markets, the counterinsurgency mission is a big one, and the Rafale is too costly for that role, Laird said. Demand for a top-class combat aircraft like the Rafale is limited.
In political terms, the context was not the best, Tribot la Spiere said. Morocco’s King Mohammed VI was close to former French President Jacques Chirac, and the apparent lack of a personal relationship with Sarkozy acted as a brake on a Rafale deal.
Sarkozy visited Algeria, Tunisia and Libya in the summer but is visiting only Morocco later this month. His official visit is unlikely to reverse the pick of the F-16.
The package approach was also a bad idea, Laird said. A trend of the last few years in Arab countries has been a rising sophistication, with purchases of specific capabilities rather than bundled arms packages.
The push for a French package, which would make for a bigger splash than separate deals, came from a diplomatic adviser to Chirac, analysts said. That tied arms even more closely to political standing.
In geostrategic terms, Paris was out of its league. The Iraq war has been a military negative for the United States and Britain, but for conservative Arab states, the engagement of these two Western countries showed a commitment to the region, Laird said.
France needs to build its standing in the region, particularly in the Arabian Gulf, where security concerns over Iran are high.
One French defense expert said the Rafale may not have suited Morocco, but the F-16 selection was really a political choice: “The U.S. offered their umbrella.”
The Rafale’s future looks uncertain.
Laird said, “The absence of export sales presents stark choices.” France can radically cut the 294-aircraft program, maintain or increase the numbers, or take the capability and create a “global aircraft,” by partnering with someone else.
One option might be to take the Mirage 2000-9 sold to the United Arab Emirates and develop that into an export product, in cooperation with Lockheed Martin. The United Arab Emirates also flies the F-16. But given the competitive reality on the ground, there is no chance of cooperation.
The Sarkozy government in March will publish a defense white paper that will set foundations for the new multiyear military budget law. That will decide the near-term future for national Rafale orders. But for the longer term, the export outlook is dim.
What a load of rubbish!Financially, Saudi Arabia’s buy of 72 Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft was a double whammy. Riyadh might have financed a Moroccan purchase, but when the Saudis signed for the Eurofighter, funds were no longer available for the Rafale buy.
“The Saudi buy is significant,” Laird said.
IndeedWhat a load of rubbish!
Dassault did. And there was nothing flunked about the M4000, the prototype was developed rapidly, without problems, and had excellent flight performances. The only thing the M4000 was missing was an audacious buyer.if anyone who remembers who funded the flunked Mirage 4000...
I don't think it is a bad news... I mean Thailande was not expected to buy a batch of Rafale, on the contrary Thailande had expressed its interest for the Gripen several times. It is a good news for Saab.riksavage said:More bad news Thailand will buy Gripen.
Yes, the Royal Saudi Air Force did fund it - please don't insult my intelligence or eyesight by stating otherwise. RSAF through MODA funded the M4000 just like the rest of the late 1970's kit France developed for Saudi with its funding (AMX-40, Shahine, DCA-30, F-2000).Dassault did. And there was nothing flunked about the M4000, the prototype was developed rapidly, without problems, and had excellent flight performances. The only thing the M4000 was missing was an audacious buyer.
Did I say otherwise? Of course Saudi would fund such a deal - Morocco is a fellow Arab nation. What I questioned was the view that Saudi suddenly would run out of money for the deal after buying Typhoon. Of course it wouldn't - and at the end of the day, Typhoon has actually been bought on credit. No straight exchanges of oil or bulk cash this time.As for Saudi arabia funding a possible Rafale purchase for Morocco, it was all over the newspapers. And considering the ties between the 2 kingdoms and that SA was said to have funded previous armaments deals for Morocco, this possible financial help was nothing out of this world.
It certainly is good news for SAAB and their Gripen International partner... BAE Systems.It is a good news for Saab.
Agreed, Gripen is a positive move forward for Thailand's Air Force and full marks to them. They must have resisted considerable pressure to buy surplus F-16s from the US.I ment bad news for Rafale, not Thailand. Gripen's an excellent choice - easy to maintain and it can be used from sub-standard airstrips. More than a match for anything Burma has!