Ok before you two get into a big argument again … I’d better add in my $0.02!
Prior to the mothballing of the air combat force, all trainee pilots flew the Aermacchi after their basic wings course (well those that passed) before progressing onto the Skyhawk, or the Hercules or Orion or B727 etc. So all pilots had at least some fast jet experience (and presumably in the event of a major conflict etc, Herc pilots etc could be retrained on A4’s relatively easily).
So in my opinion, if National or Labour were to reinstate the MB339’s then that could only be a good thing, and it would certainly help justify reinstating these aircraft if all pilots, no matter where they ended up, had basic fast jet experience as part of their flying training.
Because we are not at war with anyone, nor likely to anytime soon, top of the line air combat aircraft are not a priority to either political party, unfortunately (there are no votes in there for them as already pointed out)! There have been many reviews on the air combat force over the last 20 years or so, and unfortunately, they have always been considered the last priority by the reviewers (not the RNZAF of course, nor myself personally as I believe there is a role for some type of air combat aircraft, whatever they might be), but politically one can see the problem….
The other issue we have, is that of the views of the Navy and Army as these views are important because the Govt wants to see a whole of Govt approach or whatever the phrase is. In other words, air combat forces must be important to support the Navy and Army.
Now without appearing to be bashing any one particular arm of the services (I’m not), the Navy sees value in NZ having an air combat force for their training (and if we think about it, the Navy level of capability is quite high evidenced by their continual exercising with the RAN and several Asian Navies. The Army on the other hand, don’t operate in some WWII or Vietnam type fashion whereby they need to call in airstrikes to support them, they operate with other forces in a supplementary light infanty role (and if they end up in some hotspot, air cover will more than likely already be provided by other allies anyway).
From the “Review of the lease of F-16 aircraft for the RNZAF” by Derek Quigley, as requested to do so by the incoming Labour Govt in 1999 (whatever one thinks of him, he did actually recommend the Labour Govt to renegotiate the F16 lease to maintain some 18 or so F16’s instead of 28, unfortunately Labour ignored his recommendations).
* * * * * * * *
Pages 25-31 ...Quote:
The Whineray report concluded that only the major powers had the requirement and the resources for air combat capabilities to perform all operational roles. For most countries, including New Zealand, maintaining an air combat capability to carry out selected roles was sufficient for its defence policy purposes.
It noted that the 1991 Combat Air Power Requirements Study had recommended that New Zealand maintain air combat capabilities for close air support, air interdiction, and maritime strike. It stressed that ownership of an air attack force capable in these roles was important to “train and work with the RNZN and NZ Army in joint exercises providing maritime strike and support for ground forces” and to “provide potent defence for our maritime approaches and valued contributions to collective security operations”.
Whineray considered that deciding to maintain an air combat capability for some roles, while rejecting ownership of a capability for others, had significant long-term implications for the achievement of defence policy. His study therefore tested the roles identified in 1991 and 1997 to validate their continuing policy value.
His Committee’s conclusions were:
Close Air support
A land/air capability for Close Air Support was not a role with high utility in responding to most of the security challenges that might confront New Zealand and its territorial security in the medium term. However, it had high policy and military utility in contributing to the common New Zealand-Australia strategic area. It complemented rather than duplicated the core roles selected for Australian air combat capabilities and offered a practical way of providing mutually beneficial training and exercise opportunities.
Close Air Support normally required conditions of local air superiority. Air assets performing the task did not usually require the same levels of self-defence required in roles that are carried out in more demanding threat environments. However, they needed to be able to defeat or avoid ground based air defence systems.
They also needed reliable and interoperable air-ground communications and precision guided munitions. Close Air Support had high military and policy utility in terms of New Zealand’s security relationships with Australia and others in the Asia-Pacific region.
Land/Air Operations - Air Interdiction
This had many of the same policy and military utilities that characterised Close Air Support. It would not have utility in responding to most security challenges that could confront New Zealand in the medium term. It would, however, send a strong sign to our security partners that New Zealand could make a significant and relevant commitment to a broader defence effort in the event of a serious degradation in our strategic circumstances.
As with Close Air Support, Air Interdiction had high utility in contributing to New Zealand’s security relationships with Australia. It offered a capability consistent with how New Zealanders view a contribution to regional security. New Zealand was not a country that saw itself carrying out the first attack missions of an air campaign such as strategic strike and counter-air roles. Restricting the application of force solely to targets of direct relevance to on-going military operations was more consistent with New Zealand’s national philosophy.
Air Interdiction had maximum military utility in conventional war. In lesser circumstances of conflict, its utility was restricted to the high end of peace support operations where it could be used as a punitive deterrent to protagonists, or to stop transgressors breaching UN mandates or causing casualties, as has been demonstrated in Bosnia. The ability of air interdiction to inflict proportionate and precise damage was crucial in conflict management tasks.
Unlike Close Air Support, air assets carrying out interdiction had greater tactical flexibility to avoid ground air defences. While this means that the self-defence requirements for these missions might be slightly less than for Counter-Air and Strategic Air Strike operations, it imposed speed and manoeuvrability requirements for the aircraft to keep up with accompanying escorts. The utility of Air Interdiction in contemporary and future conflicts was also increasingly dependent upon air assets that have precision guided munitions. Such weapons were significantly more cost-effective, reducing the amount of sorties needed to achieve the mission objective, while reducing collateral damage and minimising casualties.
Maritime Air Strike
Unlike some other roles examined by the study, this had some military utility in responding to the security challenges that could confront New Zealand across the conflict spectrum. The capability was a deterrent against low-level security challenges and resource protection, and would be of high utility in the event of a serious degradation in New Zealand’s security circumstances, because it would almost inevitably involve indirect or direct sea borne threats.
Along with Close Air Support and air interdiction, maritime strike had high utility in supporting the security relationship with Australia, as well as contributing to regional security. Mutual training benefits were gained from the RNZAF Skyhawk detachment at Nowra, which provides air defence training for the Royal Australian Navy.
The role had high policy and military utility for New Zealand in contributing proportionately and visibly to international peace support (particularly embargoes and sanctions enforcement) and collective security initiatives,
security challenges and resource protection.
The Five Power Defence Arrangement developed its exercising profile to include a significant maritime operations component. Furthermore, it was directly relevant to any multinational military force initiative to protect sea lines of communication. Any security circumstances where sea lines of communication were interdicted could have severe implications for New Zealand’s sea borne trade, and that of its key trading partners.
The other doctrinally recognised air combat operational roles were discarded by Whineray as inappropriate for a New Zealand air combat capability because of their limited military and policy utility for New Zealand’s defence policy goals and the strategy for achieving them.
Recent changes in the New Zealand/Australia environment
In considering the NZDF’s air combat capability, it is necessary to take account of recent changes in the Australia-New Zealand environment. Australia has shifted its overall defence policy away from continental defence to a policy of defeating threats to its maritime approaches while they are still at arm’s length. Australia is buying Hawk lead-in fighter trainers with the first in service next year. While training pilots for the F-111 and F/A-18 Hornet squadrons, the Hawks will have a number of other tasks, including fleet air support training.
Information was provided that the RAAF acknowledged New Zealand’s expertise in maritime attack and would seek to attain the same level of competence itself. The Australian army had an increasing requirement for air/land operations training with air combat capabilities as it moved away from purely continental defence. However, these and other defence issues are likely to be the subject of more detailed consideration in the current “comprehensive review of all (Australian) expenditure and investment priorities” (Dr Hawke’s speech to the Australian National Press Club on 17 February 2000).
This aside, changes are likely anyway in the range of tasks undertaken by the RNZAF for Australia. For example, fewer ship work-ups for the RAN will be required over the next three to five years as it retires its guided missile destroyers. Also, because the RAN has not proceeded with the last two ANZAC frigates, there will also be a reduction in working-up time with it, and a smaller RNZN surface combatant fleet.
However, the indications are – although this has not been tested with the Australians during this review - that most skills areas are covered by our two air combat forces. New Zealand has strengths in maritime attack, close air support and battlefield air interdiction. Australia has strengths in air superiority, offensive counter air and interdiction. The RNZAF and RAAF share doctrines with high levels of interoperability. The Skyhawks can aerial refuel from RAAF tankers using probe and drogue equipment. The F-16s are fitted with a different type of air refuelling system based on a flying boom. This is not currently available in the RAAF, although the capability may be acquired shortly for the F-111s. The F-16s can refuel from other air tankers, primarily those of the United States and Singapore.
There is another factor, less definable. It is the ability of the RNZAF through its small size, national characteristics and strengths in air combat capability (ACC), to get along well with Asian air forces.
A key question remains. How would the F-16 fit into a restructured Australia-New Zealand scenario? Early indications, for example, suggest that a new Nowra type agreement (where New Zealand makes air combat elements available to the Australian Defence Force) requires a redefining of the combined and joint activities of the two forces. These could involve an increase in close air support and battlefield air interdiction for the Australian army, although this needs further investigation.
Because of the new Hawks (and the RNZAF’s existing skill levels), the demand for maritime attack training might be reduced, possibly back to Directed Level of Capability (DLOC) levels.
Views of the Navy and Army on Air Combat Capability
The Navy
The views of the RNZN and the New Zealand Army were sought on this issue. The Navy took a wide approach and said it would look to continue to draw on support from all RNZAF force elements in the conduct of daily activities. The Orion maritime patrol force provided the closest links with the Navy, although it also had close contact with the air combat arm during maritime strike training in New Zealand and Australian waters.
The Navy said that the air combat force also provided valuable support for ship-borne sensors and weapons that could be properly tested only by fast combat jets. The Navy needed to train as it meant to fight.
Air support, ranging from Orions through Skyhawks to the new Seasprite helicopters (crewed by Navy but maintenance, training and land basing provided by the RNZAF) enabled the Navy to train and sustain naval force elements to DLOC levels.
This training provided better preparation for naval and air teams to integrate with allies in combined exercises or operations, including peacekeeping. Such support was also necessary when ships of coalition forces visited New Zealand. Without the full gambit of a challenging exercise environment – covering all aspects of maritime warfare – ships from other navies would be less likely to participate in New Zealand-hosted exercises.
The Navy made the point that when it deployed ships, they had to be prepared for any eventuality. Naval operations tended to be diverse. When the frigate Canterbury was sent to East Timor, its primary tasks had changed from shore support and emergency withdrawal, to maritime presence and surveillance, and to supporting amphibious landings. Each role demanded specific capabilities but the ship was able to change without reconfiguring or changing personnel. On top of these tasks, the ship also provided early warning of any threat that might develop.
The Navy also said that essential to air support was the relative ease and speed with which assets can be re-tasked or reconfigured for specific missions. A range of aircraft provided a naval commander with reach and the ability to undertake a task at significantly greater distances that was possible by the ship’s own sensors. This layered defence approach was essential to the RNZN which carried only self-protection weapons systems, although the combination of the new Seasprite helicopter and Maverick missile would provide greatly increased over-the-horizon capability from next year.
For surface and anti-surface operations, land based air assets played an important role by extending the detection, identification and targeting potential of surface forces. Given New Zealand’s reliance on maritime trade, the protection of this would continue to be a major role of the RNZN and the RNZAF’s air assets.
The review was told that Naval forces, both doctrinally and practically, were significantly more effective when supported by air assets. The combined use of these enhanced the capability of the force. Increasingly there was a focus on operations in littoral waters. In this environment, ships were particularly vulnerable to air and missile attack, hence air support was invaluable.
The Navy made it clear, however, that for conventional security situations, its ships would normally be deployed as part of a larger force (e.g. the Gulf and East Timor) with access to layers of defence and support. It saw the provision of air support in these circumstances as being provided by the coalition force. The Navy added that if New Zealand were to operate independently, it was important to have the assets to do so, as we could not always rely on our allies to provide them.
The Army
In contrast, the Army focused on the two roles of air interdiction and close air support. Its views were based upon the present and future land operational concept that an air combat capability will be required to support, and in particular, on how land forces manoeuvre.
Both roles, the Army said, were theatre tasks, and needed to be controlled at theatre commander level. Close air support had a lower priority for theatre commanders who might have a different appreciation of the value of a target than the tactical commander. The targets therefore tended to be accorded a lower value status – against which had to be set the high risk to aircraft from ground-based air defence systems.
According to the Army, fixed wing aircraft were a scarce and expensive resource with barely sufficient to go around. Close air support by fast jets was becoming, over the years, less responsive to land force needs. However, rotary winged air support (attack helicopters) increasingly provided the tactical commander with close air support.
New concepts of warfare, known as precision manoeuvre, involve units operating on a cycle of dispersion, concentration, and further dispersion. This required knowledge dominance and precision engagement. The Army’s view was that air combat capability could contribute in only two areas in support of the quest for knowledge dominance: armed reconnaissance and tactical air reconnaissance.
Fixed wing aircraft were said to be only one of six different platforms available to an army commander (the others being satellites, helicopters, vehicle-carried sensors, unmanned aerial vehicles and foot patrolling).
Precision engagement required high accuracy, and the Army considered that land based systems were better in this respect than close air support. Army commanders tended to place greater reliance on helicopters, long range artillery (rockets), field artillery and mortars.
In fact, the Army concluded that the primary implication of withdrawal of ACC would be in training forward air controllers and in practising close air support co-ordination. Both – the review was told – would need to be practised offshore if the air combat force were disbanded. Close air support co-ordination was routinely practised whenever an RNZAF aircraft flew in support of an Army exercise, but this did not happen often. Without a discrete NZDF air combat capability, training in-theatre or on the way to a deployment would be required to meet Operational Level of Capability (OLOC) standards.
The Army considered that the New Zealand air combat force would never be a discrete force and would, therefore, be deployed at the direction of the theatre commander. If New Zealand lacked an air combat force, this did not mean that the Army would not have access to this capability.
After the Navy and Army briefings, a senior officer expressed the view that some of the opinions conveyed to the review on air combat capability may have been a reflection of a gradual decline in the NZDF’s focus on joint operations as each service had concentrated on attempting to solve its own capability problems. He said that the present Chief of Defence Force had changed this and reasserted the need for a joint approach.
Both of these judgements are accepted.
* * * * * * * * * *
(End of quote)
