I don't see these ships as being useful to the RN.
I tend to agree with this, right platform matters and this wouldn't appear to be the right platform.
We need ships with greater range & endurance, for open oceans, & if we're going to be in Iraq for long enough to need ships specialised for local conditions, I'd say it's time to get a new government, not new ships.
Actually I was thinking the corvettes are too big, not too small. I think the case is there for a mothership for the duties performed by the Royal Navy in places like the Persian Gulf, regardless of how long the Iraq conflict itself lasts. The Royal Navy pretty much was doing the same thing in the Persian Gulf throughout the 90s, just like the Caribbean Sea for centuries, it isn't like what the Royal Navy is doing in the Gulf started in 2003.
Going back in history, the British were among the first to master the use of small, well armed deployable boats from blue water ships as a major element in power projection in littorals. Something most Americans probably don't even realize, it was the combination of marine landing in concert with a small deployable boat force able to move up a river that allowed the British to burn Washington DC down during the War of 1812. It isn't like the need for small, well armed boats is something new, or even unique to modern times.
It is interesting that in the drive up to Baghdad, the USMC lessons learned lists the lack of mobile, supplied riverene force supporting the drive would have simplified many of the problems that occurred in the fighting for bridges, and in the future may be required to insure the capture of critical bridges in a future conflict. While not a true littoral mission per se, it is noteworthy that in war, usually the small things like "armed boats" compared to "warships" are overlooked until the evidence appears of their absolute necessity to insure success.
The same capability is obvious today as 70% of the world's population is coastal, and virtually all the energy in the world is dependent upon maritime trade, in and out of busy littorals (including rivers no less). Any country not developing a future strategy that accounts for this, and doesn't include small, fast, manned surface platforms is asking for trouble. The Royal Navy should know this well, considering the events of March are probably still fresh in their mind.
It has been pointed out in a number of places that the presence of the helicopter would have completely prevented the hostage event in March, but it is also true a small anti-tank style guided missile system on a boat would have completely changed that scenario as well. It is becoming clear in certain areas that the manned 11 meter RHIB isn't enough firepower to deter a threat (while the 11 meter unmanned vehicles with weapons weight instead of manned weight is a nice alternative), and a slightly larger manned platform for MSO with more teeth may well be required.
during the refit which finished last year, Ark Royal was modified in the direction you suggest, though she didn't receive all your changes. The RN says "5 days notice" for amphibious ops, she has a small marine detachment permanently based, & can carry up to 400.
swerve, interesting you bring that up, during my business trip last week I got into an extended (what I call a 10 drink minimum) conversation with a few RN gentleman involved in the Ark Royal refit. It is interesting in the way they described the refit, pointing out that while the Invincible class is an inherently flexible platform in operational theory, the original design of the Invincible class was not inherently flexible for modification of purpose. It was built as an aviation platform specifically, and a lot of the original design detail went into the optimization of that purpose. Those original designs are one reason why for even a small aviation ship, it was incredibly efficient.
Throughout the refit a premium was placed on increasing the base flexibility in the Ark Royal design, to allow for the inherent flexibility of the platform in situations like an amphibious assault. There were some major lessons learned in the Ark Royal refit that will directly affect the CVF design to insure flexibility and adaptation to other potential mission profiles potentially called upon the CVF platform in the future.
Those 'few ideas' I discussed are not exclusively mine, they are a derivative of a proposed Royal Navy concept called the "A Littoral Sea Control System." This is a theory involving a ship similar to a Fort Victoria class, designed for logistical support, command and control, and deployment of 10 manned surface platforms, 4 unmanned surface platforms, 4 unmanned undersea platforms, 4 small unmanned aviation platforms (Scan Eagle sized), and 4 helicopters. It would have a crew somewhere around 400, although much of that crew would for the deployable platform roles or a civilian logistical role. The idea is to relieve the roles recently played by the Albion class in Iraq as a forward littoral support platform, and provide a similar role to that of the HMS Ocean in sea control, except instead of aviation platforms, it would utilize manned surface platforms for MSO and MIW. A core purpose would be to act as a Mine Warfare command ship in wartime.
The theory is still early in development, and like many theories may not go anywhere, but I found the discussion of it, and other theories on how the Royal Navy can increase capability in an evolving budget crunched Royal Navy very interesting.
