Unlike the NTDS, which uses Links 11 and 16 to transmit commands among network platforms, which then fire defensive missiles based on fire control data from their own onboard sensors, a CEC-equipped platform uses directional antennas to transmit the raw radar data from its onboard radars to nearby ships and aircraft in the local CEC-network. These platforms, in turn, pass the data onto other ships and aircraft. In each ship or aircraft receiving the data, CEC hardware and software integrates the data of all SPY-1 Aegis radars—as well as other radar sensors such as the APS-145 surveillance radar on the E-2C Hawkeye carrier-based air battle management aircraft—to form “composite tracks” for all potential targets. By then sharing and integrating the “composite tracks,” a CEC engagement network can form a “single, real-time, fire-control-quality composite track picture.”227 In other words, CEC engagement networks should be able to achieve a single integrated air picture (SIAP)—the holy grail for naval (and air and ground) air defenses. If so, the implications for task force defense will be profound. CEC-enabled engagement networks will extend the range at which any given ship can engage a target to well beyond its own radar horizon. Indeed, a CEC-equipped ship will be able to fire at a target that would not normally be seen, much less tracked, by its own sensors. Said another way, a CEC-equipped ship operating near shore, well inside an enemy’s A2/AD network, will be able to use data from airborne sensors like those carried by the E-2C Hawkeye to see “through” terrain that would normally mask its own sensors.
With weapons that can engage on remote—that is, be guided toward their targets using offboard sensors like the E-2C’s radar—a ship will be able to fire at air and missile threats while they are still deep inland, long before they are in their terminal attack runs. This will allow the surface combatant fleet to protect naval units operating in close-in littoral waters, offshore, and to extend its own air defense umbrella over joint forces operating ashore. Moreover, because most stealthy platforms are only “invisible” from certain radar aspects (e.g., head-on), and because CEC tracks will be developed along multiple radar bearings, CEC also promises to be able to detect and track stealthy aircraft and cruise missiles over both land and sea.228 Like early NTDS engagement networks, early CEC engagement networks have some limitations.
Each platform in a current CEC network only communicates with the two platforms nearest to it, passing on all plots it receives. Because none of the plots passing through the sending platform are edited out, the data load on the system rises as the square of the number of participants. As a result, in order to keep the data current, today’s CEC networks are currently limited to only 19 participants.229 However, as was also the case with the NTDS, with further doctrinal, technical, and experimental development, the CEC seems certain to expand in both capability and effectiveness over time. For example, CEC engagement networks will soon be able to integrate non-radar sensor data from electronic intelligence or other links to further improve the quality of air and missile tracks. Future CEC networks, equipped with even more powerful processing capabilities, will likely be able to expand beyond the current 19-ship limit.
To exploit the power of new CEC-enabled engagement networks, naval Area Air Defense Coordinators onboard Ticonderoga-class CGs will soon be assisted by the new Area Air Defense Command Capability System (AADCCS). The AADCCS is a three-dimensional collaborative force planning tool designed to give a “god’s eye view” of the air and surface space around a CEC-equipped task group, including friendly forces, neutral contacts, and hostile aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles—along with their headings and impact zones. Using this information, the AADCCS can generate new network air defense plans in minutes. The Navy hopes that the introduction of the AADCCS and CEC will substantially improve the ability of naval battle networks to withstand attacks from enemy A2/AD networks—at least long enough until joint offensive counter-network operations can beat them down.
