Moderated taiwan invasion war game

[ever4244]

Maybe each one or two man can ride a single wooden or rubber motorboat and imagine 10k motorboat flow across the strait at night.
It s less costy than deploy so many decoys and wooden boat is invisible for ladar ,and the small engine is stealthy for infrared ray detector as well.
Plus: no one want to use harpoon or hellfire to kill a single man. and try to hit so many boat in the night with 20mm gun, which travel 40mph is really hard.
only problem is 10k motorboat is also very very expensive.

BTW: Taiwan strait is rather tamed comparing to other strait.

 

[gf0012-aust]

Maybe each one or two man can ride a single wooden or rubber motorboat and imagine 10k motorboat flow across the strait at night.

welcome to the world of air burst munitions and FAE's .....

 

[Manfred]

Here we go again....

I was gleefuly going over lists of Chinese ships, amassing a decisive reply to gf0012... when I realized my mistake. I had started off with a false premise; "what if about 20% of the Chinese merchant fleet was built with a military purpose in mind?"

Well, when you start off with a variable like that, you open the door to the other side coming up with their own variables, and you end up with a mess. Taiwan's supply of ASMs {Gb ash? When did that come into common use?) becomes larger, and so on.

A third party mentioned that this was the longest thread dealing with this subject that had not degenerated into vile diatibes and name-calling. Why is that? Why is this subject so emotional?

I am continuing to prep for a serious game, at another site. We are looking at months of research and preperation, and the group looks likely to hang together for the duration. We could use another member perhaps, anyone intersted in following the original pupose of this thread?

 

[gf0012-aust]

Well, when you start off with a variable like that, you open the door to the other side coming up with their own variables, and you end up with a mess. Taiwan's supply of ASMs {Gb ash? When did that come into common use?) becomes larger, and so on.

I've only seen this scenario roled out to a maximum conclusion - hence why I've no qualms in throwing it (other variables) in.

I wish you luck in gaming it out, but I suspect that like most Taiwan Invasions it won't remotely reflect what the US response is.

It invariably pans out to a cross between the battle of the coral sea, the battle of taranto, elements of Sea Lion with a dash of D Day thrown in.

edit:

I'd be curious to see the other "game" thread though, its always interesting to see how lateral some posters are willing to be to achieve their ends.

 

[Manfred]

It invariably pans out to a cross between the battle of the coral sea, the battle of taranto, elements of Sea Lion with a dash of D Day thrown in.

That is exactly what I am trying to avoid! Too many armies train for the last war, instead of the next. The only one of the above I see having relevance is Sea Lion, and not much at that.

As far as the US response goes; if the PRC tries the Phoney War approach, a devestating US presence is guaranteed. {hmmm, maybe Taranto IS relevant after all... }

In order to forstal that, I would go with the masked aproach, followed with a mad dash. With good staff preperation, it could work, even tho the PRC would have to take it on the run and go in with less than everything they could bring to bear. The disadvantages would be great, but by keeping the warning time to less than 48 hours, the weight of a US response is minimal at best.

 

[alexycyap]

Maybe each one or two man can ride a single wooden or rubber motorboat and imagine 10k motorboat flow across the strait at night.

You can't transport tanks, artillery and other heavy equipment in motorboats. So, any credible decoy must be at least the size of a small ferry. Otherwise, the defenders will just concentrate their fire on the larger real transports.

Furthermore, the idea is to get the Taiwanese to expend as much of their missiles as possible in the first wave.

Note that this strategy does not require such commercial ships to be built for military purpose. They only need to be modified to resemble military transports from afar, i.e. from satellite and from cruise missile range, and be rigged for remote control.

BTW, I think we should consider that USA/UN will not intervene militarily, because otherwise the invasion has NO CHANCE of success (and China knows it), hence it will not be carried out.

 

[Ozzy Blizzard]

It invariably pans out to a cross between the battle of the coral sea, the battle of taranto, elements of Sea Lion with a dash of D Day thrown in.

That is exactly what I am trying to avoid! Too many armies train for the last war, instead of the next. The only one of the above I see having relevance is Sea Lion, and not much at that.

But there are fundimentals to all military operations whether they occured in 1066 or 2066. Logistics is the largest of them, and novel tactics and technology will not alter these fundimental priciples. Every sucsessfull operation has sucsessfully adhered to these fundimentals. Last war or not, and i personally dont think you are adressing these points.

As far as the US response goes; if the PRC tries the Phoney War approach, a devestating US presence is guaranteed. {hmmm, maybe Taranto IS relevant after all... }

In order to forstal that, I would go with the masked aproach, followed with a mad dash. With good staff preperation, it could work, even tho the PRC would have to take it on the run and go in with less than everything they could bring to bear. The disadvantages would be great, but by keeping the warning time to less than 48 hours, the weight of a US response is minimal at best.

But theres a catch 22 in that statement. With the ammount of ISR assets the US has pointed at china at any one time it would be virtually impossible to achieve 48hr notice. Any troop movements or build up of supplies would be noticed. This intervention of US strategic air assets would alone be devistating to the amhipb forces themselves and staging areas. Even with 2 hrs notice the US could have a massive impact on the campaign. But in reality the US/Taiwan would probably have weeks/months notice and could have some serious assets in place. Imagine what half a dozen SSN's could do to PLAN in the streights, not to mention TLAM strikes on ports and staging areas. The nuts and bolts of such an operation is truely stagaring. It would be a logistical NIGHTMARE, not to mention the huge tactical problems. This really is mission impossible.

 

[Manfred]

That's why I am steering towards skipping the build-up, and just taking it on the fly with what they have deployed on the coastal areas, plus what little can be sneaked in.

Back in the 1970s, there was a famous war-game that ran the planned Sea-Lion invasion, and the participants included many of the men who would have been involved in 1940, including Adolf Galland. Run without computers of anything else that would not have been available during the war (a deck of cards was used to determine chance) . The results showed that, while making some good initial gains, the Germans could not sustain the effort and would have been lucky to withdraw even half the surviving troops.

WHat is less well-known is a study and book from 1980 called "Invasion" that showed that, if the Germans had taken the Channel on the run in early July, rather than September, the British would have been in too much chaos to stop them. Sorry, no name for the author, the book is long out of print.

I am not saying that logistics are a major factor, I say that it is the MOST important factor. Strikes on Chinese ports would cripple the operation if they were delivered at exactly the right time. I give the Chinese credit for knowing this, and expecting them to open the war with all-out strikes at all Taiwanese bases that are capable of delivering such attacks.

Another lesson from 1940 comes to mind; France itself. Prior to May 15th, not many people thought that Germany could defeat them, and nobody in the West thought that it could happen the way it did. They pointed to Technological marvels like the Maginot Line and French Tanks (which had thicker armor and larger guns than anything the Germans had). In fact, when the 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions met a like number of French tanks in Belgium, they were stopped cold and sufferd much worse cassualties.
However... the French were lacking in operational flexibility, and based their starategy on plans captured from the Germans in January.

 

[weasel1962]

Re:

I've always wondered about this strategy as a first strike ops for invasion.

Lease 3-4 merchant vessels neutral flagged eg Liberian flag. Load up with full complement of tanks, armed personnel. Sail into harbor and launch a night surprise attack from dockside.

Monitoring of commercial vessels is always difficult in the best of times. No one can afford 24/7 monitoring.

Once area is secured, push in heliborne troops. Use merchant vessels as a temp logistic base ops.

 

[alexycyap]

Lease 3-4 merchant vessels neutral flagged eg Liberian flag. Load up with full complement of tanks, armed personnel. Sail into harbor and launch a night surprise attack from dockside.

Who is going to unload the tanks + heavy equipment at port, since merchant ships are not built to dispatch their cargo directly to shore? So they'll need a port that is already under friendly control to operate the cranes, etc. Are you thinking about capturing the port using covert operatives or commandos, or using bribery, or assault troops directly from the ships themselves? It'll take many hours to unload a cargo ship, even without enemy counterattacks / airstrikes.

Furthermore, the invasion will only happen in the context of Taiwan declaring independence. When this happens, the Taiwanese navy will definitely scrutinise every vessel that approaches its shores.

 

[tphuang]

But in reality the US/Taiwan would probably have weeks/months notice and could have some serious assets in place. Imagine what half a dozen SSN's could do to PLAN in the streights, not to mention TLAM strikes on ports and staging areas. The nuts and bolts of such an operation is truely stagaring. It would be a logistical NIGHTMARE, not to mention the huge tactical problems. This really is mission impossible.

I don't think you know the amount of air defense layers that plaaf has deployed. Nor do I think you can appreciate the amount of stealthy targets that different PLA SAM has tested against. I'm talking about targets of 0.01 m^2 RCS flying at low altitude. So unless USN has several hundred TLAM pointed at mainland, it's not going to cause that much pain.

SSNs would constitute a much more serious problem. I don't want to make a fool out of myself talking about what kind of defenses PLAN has against SSNs, but I would imagine it's a lot easier to hunt down opposing subs when you are close to your own shore and have green water ASW assets available like MPAs, SSKs and subhunters.

 

[Ozzy Blizzard]

I don't think you know the amount of air defense layers that plaaf has deployed. Nor do I think you can appreciate the amount of stealthy targets that different PLA SAM has tested against. I'm talking about targets of 0.01 m^2 RCS flying at low altitude. So unless USN has several hundred TLAM pointed at mainland, it's not going to cause that much pain.

Which systems are you refering to??? S300/400, Thor? What exactly did they test against? A single target at close range, all be it at low altitude and low RCS? The single major problem ground based systems face against low altitude cruise missles is line of sight. And therefore unless the missile flys over the SAM site its not going to get a chance to to hit it. And without a decent AEW&C, your going to have a hard time against a concerted cruise missile attack. And i wonder how well they are going to function against a USAF EA capability???

And a single hit to a port or railhead would set back the timedable days. In a logistical operation this complex that would be devistating. So even one or two hits will cause alot of pain.

SSNs would constitute a much more serious problem. I don't want to make a fool out of myself talking about what kind of defenses PLAN has against SSNs, but I would imagine it's a lot easier to hunt down opposing subs when you are close to your own shore and have green water ASW assets available like MPAs, SSKs and subhunters.

USAF coupled with SSN's and any attempt is over before it has begun.

 

[tphuang]

Which systems are you refering to??? S300/400, Thor? What exactly did they test against? A single target at close range, all be it at low altitude and low RCS? The single major problem ground based systems face against low altitude cruise missles is line of sight. And therefore unless the missile flys over the SAM site its not going to get a chance to to hit it. And without a decent AEW&C, your going to have a hard time against a concerted cruise missile attack. And i wonder how well they are going to function against a USAF EA capability???

They tested against Ba-7. That's the drone they use to simulate extremely stealthy targets. And the systems tested it against it, whether it's HQ-9, HQ-12 or HQ-7 had no problem shooting it down. As for S-300, China does have quite a few battalions of that, but it's by no means the main SAM of PLA or even the most advanced system that China has. Think about it this way, the entire air defense is a national network. You have numerous 2D and 3D early warning radars which are selling pretty well in the international market like JYL-1, YLC-2 and YLC-6. You have something like YLC-20 which is a passive detector like Vera-E. So, you already have active and passive radars providing early warning. Then you have KJ-2000 + KJ-200 that can track cruise missiles for sure. You have other surveillence platforms that can do the same thing. Although currently, whether aerial surveillence targetting info have been integrated with the air defense network is an unknown.

Anyway, now we get to the meat part, which is the air defense network here. You have many HT-233, SJ-231 and other radar that are used to track targets and obviously act as FCRs for the SAM battalions in the form of HQ-9, HQ-12 and HQ-2. These are all linked, so if one goes down, another radar in the network can control the air defense units previously controlled by the radar that just went down. So, even if say a HQ-9 launching unit's closest radar can't track an incoming target, it can still be controlled by a farther away FCR. And when you talk about EW planes, you are going to be facing not just missiles using TVM or command guidance but also passive seekers (you can check up on FT-2000, although I'm not sure how much they are actually getting deployed). Think about the number of active and passive radars you have to disable on this network. And if SEAD and EW planes are involved in this mission, you are looking at an invasion of the mainland, that's kind of out of the scope of this discussion in my opinion.

The next level is obviously your HQ-7, Tor-M1 and HQ-61. Which use different form of guidance.

And the one part people seem to dismiss, is the extreme widespread of units like LD-2000, FB-6A, Yitian and the QW series manpads. I can't say they are ideal for dealing with LACMs, but that's another level you have to deal with. Specially the newer QWs like QW-11 and QW-18 (I can't remember which, but one is supposedly developed to counter low flying LACMs).

I'm not to into the anti-aircraft artillery side of things, so you can also read this article to see what China was offering for export in IDEX 2007
http://strategycenter.net/research/pubID.152/pub_detail.asp
(it's in there somewhere)

And a single hit to a port or railhead would set back the timedable days. In a logistical operation this complex that would be devistating. So even one or two hits will cause alot of pain.

if US was actually targetting non-military targets inland, this really is going to get escalated out of hand. If you are just talking about the military ports, then you can take a look on the map at where they are and draw your own conclusions. Remember, one thing China is not sure on is manpower, so even if an airport gets hit or a port gets hit, it can fix it very fast. It did that in Korean war facing far more open bombardment. I find it amusing that people say Taiwanese airbases will need to be repeatedly hit and damaged, because they will get repaired. For some reason, the same doesn't apply to mainland.

USAF coupled with SSN's and any attempt is over before it has begun.

The recent PLAN progress on ASW is much less documented, so I can't really give an answer to this, but as you can see from my responses. You severely underestimate the capability of certain Chinese systems.

 

[Rich]

The recent PLAN progress on ASW is much less documented, so I can't really give an answer to this, but as you can see from my responses. You severely underestimate the capability of certain Chinese systems.

For instance?

Remember, one thing China is not sure on is manpower, so even if an airport gets hit or a port gets hit, it can fix it very fast. It did that in Korean war facing far more open bombardment.

In the Korean war the PLA was a peasants army of infantry. I dont see how that equates into anything today. You may be able to patch a runway, or a road together using huge bands of illiterate laborers, or at least in 1951 you could. But how is that going to help you in 2007 when a high tech communications center, or air defense headquarters gets destroyed?

 

[weasel1962]

Re:

Who is going to unload the tanks + heavy equipment at port, since merchant ships are not built to dispatch their cargo directly to shore? So they'll need a port that is already under friendly control to operate the cranes, etc. Are you thinking about capturing the port using covert operatives or commandos, or using bribery, or assault troops directly from the ships themselves? It'll take many hours to unload a cargo ship, even without enemy counterattacks / airstrikes.

Furthermore, the invasion will only happen in the context of Taiwan declaring independence. When this happens, the Taiwanese navy will definitely scrutinise every vessel that approaches its shores.

There are such things as shipboard cranes which was how tanks used to be offloaded at dockside. There are also such things as ship modifications. Its not the first time merchant ships have been modified.

You'd be surprised how busy ports are. Scrutinising every ship is not as simple as it sounds and Taiwan is not going to be able to restrict all shipping. The advantage is that China can pick its timing. Reality is not many country's ports are adequately monitored (taiwan is no exception). Most monitoring is done via ground radar (which is not going to show up any merchant vessel as hostile).

Sure, unloading a container ship or an oil tanker may take many hours but we're not talking about containers or pumps here. The first wave will be ground troops which is not going to take hours to offload.

3-4 ships may offload about a brigade of troops. I think that's more than sufficient to overwhelm any security forces at the port itself. Military forces may be stationed nearby but they're not likely to be at portside (ports are not small premises). The best part is that the port environment favors light troops due to confined spaces and can channel mechanised forces into kill zones.

Let's examine this in reality. Can Taiwan afford to station division-sized units at every of its ports? Its got to consider the long stretch of beaches. The possibility of airborne landings across the country. China can pick the least defended port. That's why there is a focus in the ROC on rapid action forces.

Even then, its going to take time for Taiwanese forces to raise the alarm. Mobilise the troops. Recon the area before an adequate assault force can be mobilised. Any untimely assault on well-defended areas will just delay a successful assault. Fog of war applies. I may think 3-4 ships. China may have a different idea. There could be other vessels streaming in as a second or third wave. Can Taiwan afford to ID every merchant vessel streaming into port? Its not to going to help when Korean/Jap vessels get sunk. Every delay will afford more time to offload heavy equipment. Chinese troops will probably train its forces to maximise offload times.

Chinese forces could be supported by ship-based artillery (its not difficult to camoflage mortars, howitzers or even SAMs for air defence). Support will be provided by subs stationed offshore to deter any counter naval forces. Reinforcements via heliborne/airborne troops and air support can be expected.

The best part is, if and when the ROC believes this scenario to be real, its going to dilute the forces that will be available to defend every other vital installation etc. Tactics will have to be modified, etc.

How unreal is this scenario? I think there's a lot of implications and complications for defence. Current port practices and security will need to be beefed up. I've got other ideas as well. Just playing a little imagination game.

 

[tphuang]

For instance?

There has been a fair amount of news and pictures coming out on the development of heavy torpedoes. I don't think the Songs/Yuans are using the TEST torpedoes that we bought from the Russians as part of the Kilos deal. Normally, when PLAN is revealing pictures of a new weapon system (as it is doing with Yu-6A), it's a sign that it's confident with it. Also, there has been some articles out recently on the improvements of Chinese sonar. We've seen indigenous towed array sonar made available for export. Even some Type 37 subhunters are getting equipped with towed array sonar. But there really is no remote hint of the actually capability of the system.

In the Korean war the PLA was a peasants army of infantry. I dont see how that equates into anything today. You may be able to patch a runway, or a road together using huge bands of illiterate laborers, or at least in 1951 you could. But how is that going to help you in 2007 when a high tech communications center, or air defense headquarters gets destroyed?

if you take a look at Shanghai, things get built fast. They are not short of labourers in China. And also, most of the air defense HQs are located far enough from Taiwan that any attack on them would constitute an invasion. If you are talking about the command post of the air defence battalions. As mentionned, the system has a lot of redunduncy built in.

 

[Ozzy Blizzard]

They tested against Ba-7. That's the drone they use to simulate extremely stealthy targets. And the systems tested it against it, whether it's HQ-9, HQ-12 or HQ-7 had no problem shooting it down. As for S-300, China does have quite a few battalions of that, but it's by no means the main SAM of PLA or even the most advanced system that China has. Think about it this way, the entire air defense is a national network. You have numerous 2D and 3D early warning radars which are selling pretty well in the international market like JYL-1, YLC-2 and YLC-6. You have something like YLC-20 which is a passive detector like Vera-E. So, you already have active and passive radars providing early warning. Then you have KJ-2000 + KJ-200 that can track cruise missiles for sure. You have other surveillence platforms that can do the same thing. Although currently, whether aerial surveillence targetting info have been integrated with the air defense network is an unknown.

These systems may be capable of hitting a stealthy cruise missile, but i am unconvinced of their capability to deal with a concntrated, low level, multiple cruise missile attack, even without EW support. Thats the problem with low level, stealthy cruise missiles when you dont have an airborne sensor. All of your radars (passive or active) are LOS restricted and have a limited reaction time. They may be able to hit a cruise missile in testing, but that doesent equate to being able to stop a large scale cruise missile attack by the USN, although the IADS may dilute it somewhat. And thats not taking the USAF/USN's formidable EW capability into account.

Anyway, now we get to the meat part, which is the air defense network here. You have many HT-233, SJ-231 and other radar that are used to track targets and obviously act as FCRs for the SAM battalions in the form of HQ-9, HQ-12 and HQ-2. These are all linked, so if one goes down, another radar in the network can control the air defense units previously controlled by the radar that just went down. So, even if say a HQ-9 launching unit's closest radar can't track an incoming target, it can still be controlled by a farther away FCR. And when you talk about EW planes, you are going to be facing not just missiles using TVM or command guidance but also passive seekers (you can check up on FT-2000, although I'm not sure how much they are actually getting deployed). Think about the number of active and passive radars you have to disable on this network. And if SEAD and EW planes are involved in this mission, you are looking at an invasion of the mainland, that's kind of out of the scope of this discussion in my opinion.

It is a formidable IADS i agree, however i dont think it'll be mutch of a wory for the USAF/USN. There may be alot of redundancy, however i never mentiond SEAD/DEAD missions, they would be unessesary. Most targets would be close to the coast, so EW assets would not have to penitrate PROC airspace, just cover the TLAM's as they penitrated. And as far as pasive SAM's/AAM's being a threat, well the APG 79 has the capability to use an DE attack on an inbound missile, and thats just normal fighter radar, imagine what dedicated EW assets can do. Your not looking at an invasion of the mainland with the utilisation of EW asstes at all, its just cover for an air strike.

And the one part people seem to dismiss, is the extreme widespread of units like LD-2000, FB-6A, Yitian and the QW series manpads. I can't say they are ideal for dealing with LACMs, but that's another level you have to deal with. Specially the newer QWs like QW-11 and QW-18 (I can't remember which, but one is supposedly developed to counter low flying LACMs).

I appolagise for being one of those "people", but i'm going to have to be dismissive of this capability too. Even if a MANPAD was out and ready to go, the guy wouldn't hear the missile until it was directly overhead, and then it would be gone before the guy could get a usefull shot off. Unless you were tracking the missile on radar and were allerting infantry units on its projected path, and they could react in time then maybe you would have a chance of getting a hit, but that all goes out the window as soon as the target changes path. I personaly dont see any use for MANPADS in countering a TLAM like threat, apart form a 1:1000 lucky shot.

I'm not to into the anti-aircraft artillery side of things, so you can also read this article to see what China was offering for export in IDEX 2007
http://strategycenter.net/research/pubID.152/pub_detail.asp
(it's in there somewhere)

if US was actually targetting non-military targets inland, this really is going to get escalated out of hand. If you are just talking about the military ports, then you can take a look on the map at where they are and draw your own conclusions. Remember, one thing China is not sure on is manpower, so even if an airport gets hit or a port gets hit, it can fix it very fast. It did that in Korean war facing far more open bombardment. I find it amusing that people say Taiwanese airbases will need to be repeatedly hit and damaged, because they will get repaired. For some reason, the same doesn't apply to mainland.

I dont think you're fully comprehending the effect even one direct hit on a port would have on an operation like this. If your going to move 200 000+ men (10~20 divisions+), thousands of tanks, IFV's arty pieces ect ect ect, all the supplies to sustain them in a high intencity conflict and all the extra bits and peices that go with all of that, across hundreds of k's of open ocean, the logistical organisation has to be perfect. If just one port took a direct hit and was out of action for 12hrs, this would have massive ripple effects throughout the whole operation. Image what would have happened on D+1 or D day if protsmouth had been hit or mined. Chaos thats what. And this operation would not have any of the logistical advantages that the allies had for overlord. Basicaly this whole operation would be on a logistical knife-edge, and just one TLAM/JASSM/whatever strike on any of the logistical structure on the mainland would have serious consequences, and i think the USAF/USN could manage a whole lot more than one. Imagine what a B2 strike could do......

The recent PLAN progress on ASW is much less documented, so I can't really give an answer to this, but as you can see from my responses. You severely underestimate the capability of certain Chinese systems.

Given the continued advances in signature management, battle management systems, sonar and weapons on USN SSN's, I doubt any advances made by PLAN (whatever they may be) are going to change the ASW situation significantly.

PROC's IADS may be more capable than i thought, however this does not alter the situation significantly as far as the USN/USAF is concerned when combating an amhipious invasion of taiwan. I think you severley underestimate the logistical complexity of an aphibious operation of this scale, and its vulnerability, and the capabilities of certain chinese systems isnt going to change that. I also think you underestimate the USAF/USN's capability to defeat an IADS of this scale with relative ease, and ability to sink shipping in the South China Sea in spite of PLAN.

 

[tphuang]

These systems may be capable of hitting a stealthy cruise missile, but i am unconvinced of their capability to deal with a concntrated, low level, multiple cruise missile attack, even without EW support. Thats the problem with low level, stealthy cruise missiles when you dont have an airborne sensor. All of your radars (passive or active) are LOS restricted and have a limited reaction time. They may be able to hit a cruise missile in testing, but that doesent equate to being able to stop a large scale cruise missile attack by the USN, although the IADS may dilute it somewhat. And thats not taking the USAF/USN's formidable EW capability into account.

They have tested against concentrated attack under strong EW environment. The institute that produces Ba-7 has been making quite a profit recently for a reason. Why do you assume that PLA doesn't do their homework? It's not Iraqis we are talking about here. I mean you can do a search to see the multi-target handling capability of some of these systems.

It is a formidable IADS i agree, however i dont think it'll be mutch of a wory for the USAF/USN. There may be alot of redundancy, however i never mentiond SEAD/DEAD missions, they would be unessesary. Most targets would be close to the coast, so EW assets would not have to penitrate PROC airspace, just cover the TLAM's as they penitrated. And as far as pasive SAM's/AAM's being a threat, well the APG 79 has the capability to use an DE attack on an inbound missile, and thats just normal fighter radar, imagine what dedicated EW assets can do. Your not looking at an invasion of the mainland with the utilisation of EW asstes at all, its just cover for an air strike.

Well, in that case, we are going to have to bring in PLAAF then and then bring in PLAN into the scenario. Because the ships will get the first crack at the missiles. Also, with EA-6B retiring, I don't think the jamming power of EA-18G is anything that PLA can't replicate with it's much larger and powerful Y-8 ECMs. Please, do a check on http://cnair.top81.cn/y-8x_sh-5_a-50i.htm, you will see some of the surveillence systems they have in place to counter such attacks and providing early warnings and such.

Unless a few hundred missiles are coming, I just don't see how it could cause China much pain.

I appolagise for being one of those "people", but i'm going to have to be dismissive of this capability too. Even if a MANPAD was out and ready to go, the guy wouldn't hear the missile until it was directly overhead, and then it would be gone before the guy could get a usefull shot off. Unless you were tracking the missile on radar and were allerting infantry units on its projected path, and they could react in time then maybe you would have a chance of getting a hit, but that all goes out the window as soon as the target changes path. I personaly dont see any use for MANPADS in countering a TLAM like threat, apart form a 1:1000 lucky shot.

Well, obviously, that's where the system comes in. You have all these early warning radars for a reason. You have KJ-2000 and KJ-200 to track missiles coming in and feed it back to the system, so that whether it's people operating manpads or FB-6A or the air defense artillery units, they will be ready to react. The reaction time of some of these systems are in public domain.

Just for a case study, let's look at LD-2000.

It's naval version Type 730 CIWS has the capability to track multiple incoming anti-ship missiles and shoot down numerous concurrently (this is based on the public available test results or goalkeeper and Chinese assertion that Type 730 has done better than that in its own tests).

I dont think you're fully comprehending the effect even one direct hit on a port would have on an operation like this. If your going to move 200 000+ men (10~20 divisions+), thousands of tanks, IFV's arty pieces ect ect ect, all the supplies to sustain them in a high intencity conflict and all the extra bits and peices that go with all of that, across hundreds of k's of open ocean, the logistical organisation has to be perfect. If just one port took a direct hit and was out of action for 12hrs, this would have massive ripple effects throughout the whole operation. Image what would have happened on D+1 or D day if protsmouth had been hit or mined. Chaos thats what. And this operation would not have any of the logistical advantages that the allies had for overlord. Basicaly this whole operation would be on a logistical knife-edge, and just one TLAM/JASSM/whatever strike on any of the logistical structure on the mainland would have serious consequences, and i think the USAF/USN could manage a whole lot more than one. Imagine what a B2 strike could do......

sure, if hit in the right spots, it will be a pain. But without knowing exactly where PLA is going to transport from and such. The logistics in those locations and PLA's plans to counter crisis, it's hard at this point to predict how much disruption you will get or how long it will take for the repairs.

Given the continued advances in signature management, battle management systems, sonar and weapons on USN SSN's, I doubt any advances made by PLAN (whatever they may be) are going to change the ASW situation significantly.

again, I don't have the knowledge to quantify PLAN ASW to anyone here, so I will just say again that all of the land based and green water assets will be available.

PROC's IADS may be more capable than i thought, however this does not alter the situation significantly as far as the USN/USAF is concerned when combating an amhipious invasion of taiwan. I think you severley underestimate the logistical complexity of an aphibious operation of this scale, and its vulnerability, and the capabilities of certain chinese systems isnt going to change that. I also think you underestimate the USAF/USN's capability to defeat an IADS of this scale with relative ease, and ability to sink shipping in the South China Sea in spite of PLAN.

well, a simple look at PLA IADS (an area that I'm not particularly familiar with) has shown that the Chinese capability is far greater than what you anticipated. Now, I think it's fair to say that you should give similar "higher opinion" toward other arms of PLA that I haven't had a chance to go into.

Be advise that I have not stated anywhere that I think PLA can put enough troops in Taiwan to succeed. I just thought I'd make you think a little harder about the relative ease you think PLA can be defeated.

As for USAF involvement. Let's put it this way, how many USAF fighters can actually even reach the theater in time carrying standoff weapons and loiter long enough to fight off PLAAF fighters and then attack the PLA AD. How far away is the nearest USAF air base? I'm actually mainly thinking about F-22 here. Now, if we are talking about E-2C + F-18s vs plaaf. I don't think China is as concerned. Let's just say, I don't think J-10/11B will let F-18s fly around unimpeded. As for strikes against PLAN surface fleet, we can go into here too if you want.

 

[Manfred]

This damn thing just won't die...

As regards F-22's, I think it might be worth noting that the first squadron of them ever deployed overseas went to Okinowa. A tempoary deal, as if they were testing the waters, but it may be significant.

I would never dare to sail Cargo ships loaded with troops and heavy equipment into an enemy harbor in some kind of ruse. Resaon; if even one man makes a mistake, its all over. On a ship with 1,000 men, SOMEBODY is going to make a mistake.

A couple of Jet-liners filled with troops might work, but that is as far as I would push it.

 

[weasel1962]

Re:

I would never dare to sail Cargo ships loaded with troops and heavy equipment into an enemy harbor in some kind of ruse. Resaon; if even one man makes a mistake, its all over. On a ship with 1,000 men, SOMEBODY is going to make a mistake.

7 years ago, who would have dared said any hijackers would dare hijack 4 airliners and ram these into buildings? The potential mistakes in that operation were even higher. Hijackers could have been detected at the airport. Fighters could shoot down the airliners. Passengers could have resisted etc. How about ramming a US warship with HE laden high speed craft, remember the USS Cole?

I agree, its an audacious/risky operation and depends a lot on the element of surprise. Nevertheless, I do have some brief understanding of how ports are run and at the same time, how something like this can be achieved.

I believe mistakes (although not specified what kind) can be reduced by training and not all mistakes are fatal. Still, it would be interesting to highlight some of the things that can go wrong. The maxim is of course, anything that can go wrong will normally go wrong. Yet sometimes things like this do go right.

The likelihood/justification for such an operation is often based on the potential impact/results. To be able to capture a port quickly would aid cross straits invasion plans significantly especially when considering the time factor of US intervention. That alone would at least make planners sit up on the viability and risk.

Think also about the downside. If things go wrong, China loses a brigade (3-4000 men), a few tanks and 3-4 merchant ships. Do you think that's a lot to China?

My main purpose is to highlight that port security is something that needs to be reviewed.