This discussion has been thouroughly debated 3 times now. The most comprehensive can be found here:
http://www.defencetalk.com/forums/showthread.php?t=3328
I cant be botherd making the same argument over and over so i'll just cut and paste some of my previous posts.
"Lets have a look at this senario in general terms. You've got a island to take, 200km of ocean to sea lift from friendly ground. About 5-600 000 enemy troops in the theater and probably 100 000 at the invasion area. Only a few suitable beaches, each one heavily defended with massive amounts of pre targeted artillary, hundreds of rockets and tubes. Limited sea lift capacity for 1 heavy brigade at a time with 12hr turn around in theoretical terms (meaning perfect sercumstances ie not war) so 2 a day so two thirds/1 division. So in a perfect scenario, 50 brigades, but when you add traffic problems and atrittion you could probably say 10 div on the first day. The probability of air superiority, maybe air supremacy but only in the face of stiff resistance. Naval threats are probably extensive minefields, Land launched AShM's, and possibly USN SSN's or even a CVN battlegroup or two. An unfriendly population at the landing area, and the objective generaly. An enemy that has the advantages of a small island to defend which although deprives them of depth, gives them mass and shortens their lines. It also means that ammo dumps will be close to the front lines easing the logistical situation for the defenders. The attackers have all the problems of supplieing their forces over beaches, due to the lack of a usable port, with around 50 medium vessles that can not be effectively used without a working port, not to mention a larger merchant marine which also can't be used without port facilities. So the 10 division deployed on the first day need to be supplied over ivasion beaches under heavy artillary bombardment.
Compare this to operation overlord, the single largest amphibious operation ever. The possible landing areas were over 1000km of suitable beaches that have to be defended. 5 infantry divisions and one armourd division in the vecinity of the beaches so 70/80 000 combat personell, with 59 in the theater, spread across france. The allies have compleat air superiority and have effectivly isolated the beachead area and made travel by day impossible for large formations. Total naval supremacy with e boats, u boats and mines as the primary naval threats, but massive ASW and minehunting assets to secure the sea lanes. Sealift capability for 5 divisions at a time, 5 in the initial assault and around 11 on the first day, less after that. Also had to supply over the beaches. But 2 mullburry artificial harbours to allow merchant marine to be directly utilized with two ports, le harve and brest within the invasion area.
Spot the difference? More advantages for the defender, the main ones being logistic and the build up fase (smaller distances to move units to reinforce the beachead area and no french resistance to contend with). Less potential landing areas to defend and more heavily defended landing areas (not beach defences but artillary). Manny more problems for the attacker, totally inadequate sea lift capability. 10 div on the first day. All need to be supplied over the beaches which are all within range om masses of pre targeted arty. Air superiority could be acheived by the PROC if the USAF/USN didnt intervien, but they dont have the assets or time to secure the sea lanes properly and would be under AShM attack from the sure, thats if the USAF/USN does not intervien. The most importand problem is the build up. The PROC doesn't have time to effectivly isolate the beachead with airpower, they can at best lift 10 divisions on the first day although they can only supply over the beach using amphibs, and therefore the more units deployed the more amphibs needed to cart supplies over the beaches. The Taiwanese have less space to move units to re enforce the beachead and would soon outnumber the PROC forces on the beachead. They would have enough forward logisical baces to keep all deployed units well supplied even during high intencity operations. Supply for PLAN would have been a total nighmare. Normandy had massive traffic jams on the beach and it wasn't constantly raining MLRS's. Basically it is so unrealistic to think that PROC can achieve anything but a total f*#king bloodbath. They dont have the naval assets, the sea lift assets, the air assets, the logistical assets, the terrain is bad, the defences are formidable, the enemy is strong determined and well equiped, they dont have time, the enemy has many allies with a more effective navy and airforce in deployable baces close to the theater. mission impossible or what???? let me know if theres anything i've missed."
post 582 in the thread linked above