World War II: Germany vs Britain (minus USA)
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Rich- the US was involved economicaly in the First World war, and that lead directly to its real involvement. Would Churchill have persisted in the war after France was knocked out in June of 1940, if there was not a shread of hope of any support from America? Would it have been realistic?
By most accounts, the war was a close call, especialy for Russia. How much closer do you think it would have been without american supplies? That would amount to 13,300 aircraft, 6,800 tanks, 312,000 tons of explosives, 406,000 trucks and Jeeps.
Gee whiz, sorry if America seems to be central to this thread... but what was the name of this discusion again?
By most accounts, the war was a close call, especialy for Russia. How much closer do you think it would have been without american supplies? That would amount to 13,300 aircraft, 6,800 tanks, 312,000 tons of explosives, 406,000 trucks and Jeeps.
Gee whiz, sorry if America seems to be central to this thread... but what was the name of this discusion again?
USNavySEAL3310
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[Do you mean without American military intervention or no intervention and no supplies to other allied countries?]
Basically repeating what everyone said. Had the U.S. not joined the war at all or when it did, Britain would have held out indefinitely. The Soviets were pushing back after the Battle of Kursk in the East, defeating most of Germany's offensive war machine that had been pulled back from the postponed Operation Sealion, forcing Germany to call up real old and real young men to fight in their ranks. Their reserves had dropped too low to build up another offensive in either the USSR or across the Channel, as had happened with the British. By the time Germany reserves had built up in the following decade, British reserves would have increased also so they would have had a defending army.
Germany's air power was being diminished in the Battle of Britain. Germany no longer had the mighty fighters and bombers that had participated in the Blitzkrieg in Poland, Belgium, and France.
As someone said earlier, neither side would have won but neither side would have lost either. Britain would have increased air campaigns but would have been unable to pull together the necessary land army to deal with the Normandy or any beach defenses with a minimum casualty rate at any point in the near future.
Basically repeating what everyone said. Had the U.S. not joined the war at all or when it did, Britain would have held out indefinitely. The Soviets were pushing back after the Battle of Kursk in the East, defeating most of Germany's offensive war machine that had been pulled back from the postponed Operation Sealion, forcing Germany to call up real old and real young men to fight in their ranks. Their reserves had dropped too low to build up another offensive in either the USSR or across the Channel, as had happened with the British. By the time Germany reserves had built up in the following decade, British reserves would have increased also so they would have had a defending army.
Germany's air power was being diminished in the Battle of Britain. Germany no longer had the mighty fighters and bombers that had participated in the Blitzkrieg in Poland, Belgium, and France.
As someone said earlier, neither side would have won but neither side would have lost either. Britain would have increased air campaigns but would have been unable to pull together the necessary land army to deal with the Normandy or any beach defenses with a minimum casualty rate at any point in the near future.
suddendeath
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interesting topic i have researched it and have concluded hitler was a
was dictator not a military genius a proven fact.
1 he didn't send the reinforcements Rommel had asked him effectively losing control of Africa.
2 he tried to invade the soviet union depleting his reserves and having another enemy to fight against.
3 he concentrated on surface ships like the kaiser before him nullifying the
element of surprise for the u boats had he built them Britain would be
starved that happened until the system of convoys was implemented.
4 he didn't use the Luftwaffe effectively like not concentrating on the
royal air force but on the population center's doing this he 'could' invade england in combination with the u boats.
5 Hitler depleted his reinforcements in the east and the west.
6 he counted to much on his commanders to save him when he knew
tht the allies and the soviets had entered Berlin.
several other reasons are present also they are to numerous to list bye.
If I may offer a few thoughts....
The problem with debating the "what ifs" of history is that no event or decision ever happens in isolation. Thus, theorizing on the neutrality of the US, requires us to allow for the English, their empire and their Commonwealth.... making different decisions and applying different priorities. For example, it is a real question whether Britain would have retained so many of their resources in the far-east, had the threat of invasion still been real post-1940.
Japan's expansionist policy was always about resources. Their attack on the US was driven by their belief that they would not be able to expand their empire as they desired, without US interference. Arguing that the Japanese did not have to attack the US, suggests that they were incorrect in that assessment, or that they (the Japanese) would have been satisfied with a very much smaller empire..... which in turn would have been less of a threat to British and Commonwealth interests, and released military resources for the defence of Britain.
WRT Hitler's attack on Russia, history appears to indicate that in Hitler's view it was never a case of "if", only of "when". Likewise his declaration of war on America. His grand plan was a German Empire to rival that of Britain, and that required the ability to match both the Royal Navy and the USN. In the long term, permitting Hitler to remain in control of Europe - or to invade England - was not in America's national interest. Fortunately the US Government was sufficiently far-sighted to recognise this. America did not join the European war only because it regarded the English as friends.
My reading indicates that the Battle of Britain was not quite as close as was thought at the time. Belief that it was, relies mostly on contemporary reports which (a) lacked good intelligence as to how stretched was the German capacity to maintain the assault and (b) found it politically expedient to magnify the (now defeated) danger . Best estimates of casualties and ongoing capacity seem to indicate that the RAF was not going to completely disappear from the skies under any scenario - but at worst were going to have to base their fighter squadrons further north and west. This would have reduced their capacity to defend the South-Eastern of England, but would not have rendered England completely defenseless.
As for the question of the Battle of the Atlantic.... Again, had Hitler built more U-Boats earlier, it is probable that the English and Americans - with good memory of commerce-warfare in WW1, would have responded earlier and more effectively. Likewise, concentrating on submarines at the expense of his surface navy would have required Hitler to cede even greater naval superiority to the Allies. Submarines have not proven sufficiently lethal against a slow-moving convoy when it was adequately protected. There is little evidence that they would prove more effective against the level of screening provided for a capital fleet.
None of which provides an ultimate answer to the question provided by this topic, but it should caution us against an overly emphatic revision of theoretical history.
Cheers............ Peter
The problem with debating the "what ifs" of history is that no event or decision ever happens in isolation. Thus, theorizing on the neutrality of the US, requires us to allow for the English, their empire and their Commonwealth.... making different decisions and applying different priorities. For example, it is a real question whether Britain would have retained so many of their resources in the far-east, had the threat of invasion still been real post-1940.
Japan's expansionist policy was always about resources. Their attack on the US was driven by their belief that they would not be able to expand their empire as they desired, without US interference. Arguing that the Japanese did not have to attack the US, suggests that they were incorrect in that assessment, or that they (the Japanese) would have been satisfied with a very much smaller empire..... which in turn would have been less of a threat to British and Commonwealth interests, and released military resources for the defence of Britain.
WRT Hitler's attack on Russia, history appears to indicate that in Hitler's view it was never a case of "if", only of "when". Likewise his declaration of war on America. His grand plan was a German Empire to rival that of Britain, and that required the ability to match both the Royal Navy and the USN. In the long term, permitting Hitler to remain in control of Europe - or to invade England - was not in America's national interest. Fortunately the US Government was sufficiently far-sighted to recognise this. America did not join the European war only because it regarded the English as friends.
My reading indicates that the Battle of Britain was not quite as close as was thought at the time. Belief that it was, relies mostly on contemporary reports which (a) lacked good intelligence as to how stretched was the German capacity to maintain the assault and (b) found it politically expedient to magnify the (now defeated) danger . Best estimates of casualties and ongoing capacity seem to indicate that the RAF was not going to completely disappear from the skies under any scenario - but at worst were going to have to base their fighter squadrons further north and west. This would have reduced their capacity to defend the South-Eastern of England, but would not have rendered England completely defenseless.
As for the question of the Battle of the Atlantic.... Again, had Hitler built more U-Boats earlier, it is probable that the English and Americans - with good memory of commerce-warfare in WW1, would have responded earlier and more effectively. Likewise, concentrating on submarines at the expense of his surface navy would have required Hitler to cede even greater naval superiority to the Allies. Submarines have not proven sufficiently lethal against a slow-moving convoy when it was adequately protected. There is little evidence that they would prove more effective against the level of screening provided for a capital fleet.
None of which provides an ultimate answer to the question provided by this topic, but it should caution us against an overly emphatic revision of theoretical history.
Cheers............ Peter
Further on this topic, may I venture to quote Lt-Gen Syd Rowell (Australians will recognise the name).
Syd wrote in relation to the New Guinea campaign that "no-one wants to fight the first battle". Speaking as a commander, he points out that the "first battle" is the one in which you have to face the unknown quantity of the enemy's weapons and tactics. Those who fight the subsequent battles have the benefit of observing - at least to some degree - how and with what the enemy fights.... and can develop strategies to counter them accordingly.
The Battle of France was very much such a "first battle" for the Allies against the Blitzkreig. There may be reason to think that the Allies were slow to learn on occasion,
:hitwall , but I don't think that we should discount their capacity to do so.
Cheers............. Peter
Syd wrote in relation to the New Guinea campaign that "no-one wants to fight the first battle". Speaking as a commander, he points out that the "first battle" is the one in which you have to face the unknown quantity of the enemy's weapons and tactics. Those who fight the subsequent battles have the benefit of observing - at least to some degree - how and with what the enemy fights.... and can develop strategies to counter them accordingly.
The Battle of France was very much such a "first battle" for the Allies against the Blitzkreig. There may be reason to think that the Allies were slow to learn on occasion,
:hitwall , but I don't think that we should discount their capacity to do so.Cheers............. Peter
Thats debatable, the russians yes, in the end they had become superb proponents of mobile warfare. But the western allies never seemed to grasp the importance of the rapid breakthough, and seemed to conduct there campaigns at an almost leisurely pace. There were bright spots where allied commanders displayed creativity flexibilty in the attack, but for the most part high explosive was the order of the day.
I know German tactical genius has been over inflated in the passing years, but that doesent negate the fact that for the most part the allies were unable to grasp the importance of concentration, and more importantly the rapid exploitation of the breakthrough.
This was probably the one area where the Germans maintained there ascendancy almost to the end of the war.
Hmmm......
Maybe some of the Allied commanders spent too much time waiting for "the breakthrough" during WW1.
Maybe they decided not to play to their enemy's strengths.
Maybe they had lots and lots of explosives to play with.
One analysis of the Normandy campaign argues very strongly that Montgomery did understand the principle of concentration, and conducted his operations so as to cause the enemy to concentrate away from where Monty planned his breakthrough.
I've pontificated before about not expecting protagonists to act out-of-character when we're speculating about alternative history, so I must remain consistent. So while I can argue that manouvre-warfare owed a lot to the British (Check Allenby's Megiddo campaign), I will not suggest that the Allies might suddenly see the light and out-Blitzkreig the Germans. What I will argue, however, is that they found an effective counter for it and that this should be allowed for when discussing potential strategies.
No doubt not everyone will agree.
Peter
Maybe some of the Allied commanders spent too much time waiting for "the breakthrough" during WW1.
Maybe they decided not to play to their enemy's strengths.
Maybe they had lots and lots of explosives to play with.
One analysis of the Normandy campaign argues very strongly that Montgomery did understand the principle of concentration, and conducted his operations so as to cause the enemy to concentrate away from where Monty planned his breakthrough.
I've pontificated before about not expecting protagonists to act out-of-character when we're speculating about alternative history, so I must remain consistent. So while I can argue that manouvre-warfare owed a lot to the British (Check Allenby's Megiddo campaign), I will not suggest that the Allies might suddenly see the light and out-Blitzkreig the Germans. What I will argue, however, is that they found an effective counter for it and that this should be allowed for when discussing potential strategies.
No doubt not everyone will agree.
Peter
Well they certainly did have a lot of high explosives.. I remember a quote(cant remember by who though) something about a maximum of high explosives a minimum of finesse
I think there were a couple of points where there existed the possiblity of ending the war in 44 (and completely changing the nature of post war europe)
After the collapse of the Germans in Normandy and the liberation of Paris the allies allowed the Germans the breathing space they need to restore there shattered front.
If they had pushed on then there was very little the Germans could have opposed them with. As it was when they renewed there assault they were confronted with the amazing regenerative abilities of the germans. It is hard to imagine a German or Russian commander at that stage of the war not pushing on and exploiting such a breakthrough.
Boldness at that point could have reaped hugh gains. If the roles had been reversed, the Germans would have gone for the throat.
Monty for all his faults was an excellent Commander, In Normandy he won a massive victory, the British and Americans completely shattered the Germans, it was the squandering of that opportunity that is most frustrating.
It was the lack of urgency in combat that sets the American and British armies of WW2 apart from the Germans and Russians.
Probably some thing to do with the prevailing levels of humanity in the respective armies.
The Allies did push on - until they outran their supply lines. The Germans wrecked ports behind them, railways & road bridges were destroyed by both sides (the Allies behind retreating Germans, the Germans as soon as they were over them). Normandy August 16th, Paris August 19th-25th, Brussels September 4th - that's not pushing on? But the Allies were running out of fuel. The advance had to slow down.
Antwerp September 13th, to find the biggest port in NW Europe in ruins, unusable, with the entrance mined. So no solution to the problem of getting fuel to the front. Then they tried to push on further - and we all know what happened at Arnhem, don't we?
I seem to recall reading (Antony Beevor?) some rather "interesting" numbers WRT to people shot by both Russians and Germans to encourage the others. IIRC, the German's shot at least the equivalent of a full division over the course of the war, and the Russians went through similar numbers during the course of the Stalingrad siege alone.! Not good evidence that they placed high value on the lives of their own men.
Yes. The Germans were lead by a man who believed that "will" or simple, continued aggression was capable of making up for tactical, numerical and logistical deficiencies. It's hardly surprising that his favourite general (fore a while, anyway) was characterized as being no great student of the strategic arts and having only two basic tactics. Attack and Counter-attack, both of which he tended to overdo. (Morshead on Rommel.)
Bear in mind that manouvre-warfare requires suitable terrain and - to be successful, an opponent who can be knocked off-balance and kept that way. As happened to Rommel, when he came up against a sound strategist who refused to be flustered or diverted, he lost. If it works, you're famous, but if it doesn't work, you may well have run your troops into a Kessel.
It is arguable that in Western Europe, that the Allies knew that they had the men and resources to defeat the Wehrmacht - if they didn't do anything silly. They didn't need to do spectacular things.
Cheers......... Peter
Investigator
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I dont agree with this analysis, I dont have time now but will come back to it.
Yes as I alluded to, the armies of the democracies were unable to insitle the same kind of brutal discipline on there troops. Patton was disgraced for slapping a trooper he thought was a malingerer.
But this is a separate issue, speed of explotation, the ability to quickly capitalise on local situations. The failed Ardene's offensive is instructive, the rapid breakthrough was brought to a halt as much by the lack of fuel as the efforts of the Americans. What the Germans showed was it was possible to make rapid breakthroughs in the west. If the enfeebled Germans could make dramatic gains as long as the had cloud cover and fuel, why couldn't the allies who out numbered them in everything but men do the same?
Because the Allies won there is a tendency gloss over there failures, I believe a more forcefull commander could have ended the war in 44'. It is true they did'ent have to take risks, that time was on there side, but the shape of post war europe decided in this period, and the Russians certainly did'ent hang around.
CARTHAGExRULES
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you know i think, i think hitler should have just started the war later while building up his forces.(i mean the SS...). then after he was ready he should of attacked europe. one country at a time. for him a long series of wars would have been better then a few world wars. then after conquering europe he should have waited a few years to replenish his army than spread to asia saving russia (and china) for last. I also think that, every thing above aside, if every thing had happened the same except the following he could of obliterated britain.
1. he should have trained more SS( his elites, look it up),
2. he should have made jets a prioity,
3.he should have left russia the **** alone( i have no idea what i put in i just typed stars,),
4. he should have trained the SS in naval stuff,
and 5. he should have done more research on things he didn't have the tech for.(for example the king tiger tank. it was huge and had impenatrable armor but he didn't have a strong enough engine.)
but you also have to take into consideration that when his scientists and designers made the things like the king tiger it was getting close to the end of the war and they were getting desperate. but they also came up w/ some good stuff, they were the first to use infared in combat(the SS) given more time they could have come up w/ some pretty impressive stuff and i conclude yes it is possible hitler could have destroyed britain and i mean that completely literaly.
1. he should have trained more SS( his elites, look it up),
2. he should have made jets a prioity,
3.he should have left russia the **** alone( i have no idea what i put in i just typed stars,),
4. he should have trained the SS in naval stuff,
and 5. he should have done more research on things he didn't have the tech for.(for example the king tiger tank. it was huge and had impenatrable armor but he didn't have a strong enough engine.)
but you also have to take into consideration that when his scientists and designers made the things like the king tiger it was getting close to the end of the war and they were getting desperate. but they also came up w/ some good stuff, they were the first to use infared in combat(the SS) given more time they could have come up w/ some pretty impressive stuff and i conclude yes it is possible hitler could have destroyed britain and i mean that completely literaly.
The problem with elite units, is that they require exceptional people. If you attempt to build up such units beyond a certain point, then you have to either (a) lower your entry standards or (b) strip your regular units of every good soldier - which generally means the good NCOs who are the backbone of any unit.
The problem with waiting until you have any particular technology is that you don't know from the outset what your results will be.... and you are effectively engaging in an arms-technology race with potential enemies who are not standing still, either. IMHO, this view is only justified by hindsight, not by the information that Hitler had at the time.
IIRC, the problems with Hitler's super-tanks were not just limited to the lacxk of engine power, but their reduced ability to operate over much of the landscape of the day.
The problem with waiting until you have any particular technology is that you don't know from the outset what your results will be.... and you are effectively engaging in an arms-technology race with potential enemies who are not standing still, either. IMHO, this view is only justified by hindsight, not by the information that Hitler had at the time.
IIRC, the problems with Hitler's super-tanks were not just limited to the lacxk of engine power, but their reduced ability to operate over much of the landscape of the day.
The Ardennes offensive is not an example of quickly capitalising on a local situation - it was planned for something like 3 months in advance.
It also left the Germans worse off than before, just as it been argued that Market Garden left the allies worse off than before they started.
Reality is that both sides were constrained by fuel and logistics. I understand that each of Ike's commanders was pushing for mare than his fair share of resources in order to make just such an advance as you envisage. Ike preferred the broad-front advance. Making a breakthrough without the ability to exploit it does little more than place some of your men in a vulnerable situation....... Did I mention the "Kessel"?
Regards......... Peter
windscorpion
New Member
Germany would not have defeated Britain. An invasion of the UK was never on the cards while the RN was there. Germany never made any real attempt to build an invasion fleet anyway. The war would have become a stalemate and i suspect the inherant weaknesses in the German economy (Germany was in pretty bad shape economically by the late 1930s but managed to keep going through conquest) would have caused a Nazi collapse by the early 1940s even without the Eastern Front.
sn0bordrd004
New Member
this is my opinion about this scenario:
hitlers goal with WWII is to get more living space (which was in the east). he hated communists and the bolsheviks. he wanted to enslave the russian population to make them work for him. the only reason he fought france and britain was so that he could focus on russia. he assumed he could beat britain as swiftly as he beat france. obviously he didn't and couldn't. now, had the luftwaffe continued to attack the british airfields rather than switch to terror bombing, would that win the battle of britain for germany? and more importantly, would that allow them to launch an invasion of britain? my answer is no to both. it may be just my opinion, but i think the RAF would have addapted, and still would have been able to win the battle of britain, no matter what. but lets say germany won, would they be able to successfully invade britain? i'd say no, because hitler didnt really care. he switched to attacking russia when he decided that the war with britain was taking too long. So any sort of long drawn out war (which WAS going to happen with britain), would immediately frustrate and cause hitler to focus his attention on russia. So here is the next question important to this discussion. could and would germany have beaten the russians? again, my opinion is no, no matter what; i dont think there was anything hitler could have done differently to win the war with russia. but lets annalyze his mistakes, and consider if he acted differently, if it would have changed the outcome. first, he delayed operation barbarossa until june 1941, in order to reinforce his troops. second, he didnt prepare for the russian winter. third, he split his pandzer divisions during the battle of stalingrad , and again, august (1942) is much too late in the summer to start an invasion. hitler called off the battle of kursk, at the height of the fighting in 1943(historians disagree about whether or not germany was going to win that battle). So had he made different decisions (such as slowly securing cities rather than just "making a break for moscow", and supplying his soldiers better) made a difference?
the russians were expecting to lose moscow! but just like with napoleon, they would have burned the city and kept fighting. in my opinion, the russians would have just kept fighting had they lost stalingrad, moscow... etc. their mobile industries (which had been moved back behind the ural mountains) would have just kept moving back as hitler got closer and closer. also, the USSR mustered soldiers much quicker than hitler, or anyone really expected. but even if somehow germany captured all kinds of russian cities, generals, factories, tanks, whatever, the russians would have just kept fighting. at one point, only 1 in 10 soviets that were being sent to the front line had a rifle! the soviets were fighting the germans without any weapons! and that is the way the war would have gone on. so with this in mind, germany never could have beaten russia, and without beating russia, they never would have been able to invade britain
Leave alone already these myths about 1 rifle for 10. There were absolutely NO shortage of infantry weapon in any stage of war. However, there were sometimes problems with ammo supplies due to broken supply lines - but this is just like in any army.
I think these myths take roots from some cases in summer 1941, when mobilized, mostly unarmed, just reqruited soldiers could be ambushed on they way to front lines or supply points. About 500.000 such soldiers went MIA in first days of Barbarossa.
Besides, everyone here like to argue about Hitler mistakes - but most forget about much worse mistakes made by Stalin (and USSR High Command).
So in essence, even much better Barbarossa invasion plan might well bring worse outcome for Germany - just because USSR would react differently, and quite likely with less mistakes (or with more... who know?).
The problem wasn't the mistaken reactions of the Soviet High Command, but rather the fact that the Red Army dissolved, for the most part without making contact with the enemy. Just look at the example of Boldin's counter-attack. Most of his tanks were lost due to mechanical failures, or were simply abandoned. Desertion rates were rampant, and no sort of organization to the efforts on the lowest of levels, was evident. The officers were not capable of leading the troops, and the troops did not want to fight.
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