Will we see future tank projects such as the Leopard 3 emerging?

[RobWilliams]

I suppose it's different from a UK perspective than it is for Poland or Germany, for example.

The UK doesn't face a land based threat, that's down to our geography and the fact that all of our neighbours are friendly and cooperative. Therefore, it could have been considered that the most probable deployment of UK armour is the likes of ODS/OIF. Meaning it's as a coalition so there'll be others to chip in.

On the other hand, wars in Iraq/Afghanistan have made the UK war weary, especially when ground forces are concerned. Air power (and naval power) are currently the preferred, most politically acceptable, forms of intervention.

I suspect these have a big impact on why tank numbers have been cut and will probably be continued to be cut. Add in a healthy dose of our international ambitions as far as what we want the Army to be able to do are significant smaller.

Compare that to Germany where - from an outsiders view - it would appear the Budeswehr and to a slightly lesser extent (again, outsiders view) the Luftwaffe are seen as the higher priority than the Deutsche Marine for national defence.

Personally, I prefer squadrons of tanks than companies

 

[Waylander]

The problem is that it looks increasingly like the US being the only one to being able to contribute a usefull heavy element to any deployment. Not good from a sovereign EU perspective.

And as in the past any threat to peace on the continent is heavily influencing the UK even it is not about a direct threat.

We don't even have a reserve component worth the name anymore. So in times of crisis the best our allies in the east could hope for would be a mixed Division cobbled together from our small standing forces with low numbers of reinforcements being available after some preparation time. And that from the biggest country by population and economy in the EU and in NATO after the US.

I as an eastern NATO member wouldn't feel terribly secure with this...

 

[RobWilliams]

The problem is that it looks increasingly like the US being the only one to being able to contribute a usefull heavy element to any deployment. Not good from a sovereign EU perspective.

Agreed, that is true. Which points to the need (or greater reliance rather) for enhanced air power capabilities to retain parity against armoured formations, but only if MBT numbers decrease.

Which causes problems considering Air Force numbers in the West are shrinking, forcing the drive for everything to be multirole.

And as in the past any threat to peace on the continent is heavily influencing the UK even it is not about a direct threat.

In a hypothetical Russian crisis, the UK's number 1 priority would be to maintain SLOC with the US including securing the GIUK gap (which it currently would have a difficult time to do). That's probably the role the UK would provide the greatest use, keeping the lanes open for US forces to be able to enter Europe.

We don't even have a reserve component worth the name anymore. So in times of crisis the best our allies in the east could hope for would be a mixed Division cobbled together from our small standing forces with low numbers of reinforcements being available after some preparation time. And that from the biggest country by population and economy in the EU and in NATO after the US.

That's the effects of peace and it's present across Western Europe. I'd say that very description applies to both France and the UK as well.

I as an eastern NATO member wouldn't feel terribly secure with this...

Agreed, that's why it almost seems like every other day Poland buys a new weapon system. They recently ordered 120 Korean K9 SPH if I remember rightly?

 

[Feanor]

Agreed, that's why it almost seems like every other day Poland buys a new weapon system. They recently ordered 120 Korean K9 SPH if I remember rightly?

They had a domestic howitzer project, but it seems to be failing. They have a truck mounted variant, called the Kryl in development, and they had a tracked variant too (Krab). They're going to use the South Korean chassis, but still their own cannons.

bmpd -
bmpd -

The problem is that it looks increasingly like the US being the only one to being able to contribute a usefull heavy element to any deployment. Not good from a sovereign EU perspective.

Well there's Poland. Don't they have, iirc 400 MBTs?

 

[RobWilliams]

They had a domestic howitzer project, but it seems to be failing. They have a truck mounted variant, called the Kryl in development, and they had a tracked variant too (Krab). They're going to use the South Korean chassis, but still their own cannons.

Ahh I see, I was under the impression it was the system as a whole.

Also, just read on defensenews that while on one hand the newly published Russian military doctrine names NATO expansion as a direct threat to Russia, it notes a decreasing likelihood of all out war.

 

[Waylander]

Airpower can't hold and can't take terrain.

Remember Kosovo? If we wouldn't habe bombed Serbias infrastructure into smitherens and forced them to stand down we could have bombed their forces in Kosovo till the end of days and wouldn't have achieved much.

I somehow doubt that that would be an appropiate strategy against a a Russia which just marched into the baltics or Romania.

 

[CB90]

Agreed, that is true. Which points to the need (or greater reliance rather) for enhanced air power capabilities to retain parity against armoured formations, but only if MBT numbers decrease.

Which causes problems considering Air Force numbers in the West are shrinking, forcing the drive for everything to be multirole.

Thing is, Russia (on paper at least) has very formidable air defense systems, and its air forces are no pushover either. At the very least, I'd expect them to significantly complicate ground attack efforts simply due to the number of protection missions (SEAD, counter air) that would have to be flown. Even though NATO's ground forces should be able to slow an all out Russian attack, it's reasonable to expect that it will take some time for an environment conducive to ground attack to be set.
If ground forces in place aren't sufficient to stop a Russian advance in some defensible battle line, it gets even harder.

IMHO Airpower is the one field were NATO as a whole has the most advantages. The same applies to our navys which should be able to keep all important seaways open and the Russians confined to their home waters.

But airpower alone won't stop a Russian aggression against one of our eastern members nor will it allow us to counterattack. In any case of conventional conflict the Russians won't get stopped on NATO's borders but well past them. Pushing them out again with what NATO can mobilize has to be taken into account.

And if anything light forces will not counterattack against Russian heavy formations, even with (probably hard pressed) air superiority.

I am not sure about the US Army's ability to rapidly deploy heavy forces. Shouldn't one HBCT be on high readiness status?

A SWAG based on current BCT numbers breakdown, I'd guess 2, maybe 3 at a given time. With an armored BCT providing 60 tanks and 60 Brads.

Problem of course, is time and distance. Even if we always had one armored BCT operationally ready to go, I expect it would still take time to mobilize them and get all equipment loaded up for transport overseas. Even working day and night, I'd expect it to take a few days to get everything loaded up on the right sealift assets, and it would take about a week just to get across the Atlantic on a fast 20+ kt ship. Then a couple of days to offload and get everything ready to go on the back end. Two weeks would be my SWAG.

Other things I would question would be whether or not in place logistics could even support movement of US reinforcements from offloading ports to the front lines. And NATO readiness to operate as an integrated force on the ground across national borders. Also question effectiveness of NATO gunships against Russian forces. Or sufficient quantities of PGMs in place (based on Libya campaign). Or defensibility of marshalling areas against a Russian long range ALCM strike.

Point is, NATO can expect rapid reinforcements by air. And modern NATO ATGMs are apparently quite effective which helps with air transportable ground forces. But this is precisely what Russian defense modernization has been developing systems to counter for quite some time now. But Arena, Pantsir, and S-300 won't mean diddly against MBT's and artillery.

 

[Waylander]

2 weeks is also what I thought would be a reasonable time frame to get the first high readiness heavy units to where you want them to have.

From a pure logistics point getting them from european ports to say eastern Poland should be no problem. Load them off in Rottderdamm or Hamburg (no way Russians are able to close both of these mega ports). Put them on rail flatbeds and use the extensive railroad network at least up to Warsaw. Russians can't possibly cut all available raillines either. Use military and civilian flatbeds for the last part or to support the rail operations. There are tons of them available in europe, too.

The same applies to air deliveries. Land them somewhere in western Germany or the Benelux countries and transport the troops and equipment by road and rail to their final destination. Intercepting theye transports is tough for the Russians.

If we have anything in abundance it's logistic capabilities.

 

[Volkodav]

Well that's depressing

But not totally unexpected. 2010 reduced us from 386 to 227 tanks in service. Cutting a bunch of the spare hulls to become sources of spares seems a reasonable idea if it means we can deploy a 56 strong tank brigade (even perhaps a strengthened brigade if needed) with a proper spares pool.

The last tank was built over a decade ago, the first rolled out over two decades ago. Considering there's a CR2 combat lethality improvement program either underway or starting to begin relatively soon, I suspect it was the more shagged out hulls which were to be cut open.

At least, that would be the better solution than 'that one'.

What is the UKs obsession with destroying gear? It seems these days the second something is retired, usually for short term budgetary reasons, is to cut it up, sell it or render it permanently unusable.

While I can understand disposing of obsolete or superseded equipment why destroy gear that is still front line quality?

It almost seems to be a deliberate political solution to prevent any future government from second guessing and possibly subsequently proving the current government was wrong. If the capability is gone you have to do without it, something the military is very good at, but if it is still available the military may demand its refurbishment and return to service rather than wasting lives.

 

[RobWilliams]

What is the UKs obsession with destroying gear? It seems these days the second something is retired, usually for short term budgetary reasons, is to cut it up, sell it or render it permanently unusable.

While I can understand disposing of obsolete or superseded equipment why destroy gear that is still front line quality?.

I'm not sure on the total numbers which are being cut up, a significant number are going into storage, but we're talking about a cut of 160+ tanks. Depending on if the proper climate controlled storage is available (bearing in mind other AFV cuts demanding more space) it may be more financially & operationally viable to cannibalise whatever there isn't space for to support the readiness of the operational fleet.

I've got no idea how much those hangars would cost, but if space was an issue, the cost of construction (as well as temporary storage) as well as recurring operating costs may be higher than just cutting them up and ripping out what we can use.

basically - bean counters.

 

[StevoJH]

Better to cull FV430 numbers in storage and keep the Chally 2's, unless most of those have been cut up as well??

 

[RobWilliams]

Currently Bulldog equips 3 mechanised infantry battalions and also operates as command vehicles, 81mm mortar carriers, battlefield ambulances and recovery vehicles.

The type is meant to be replaced by FRES UV if I remember rightly but that's early 2020s at the earliest (the type came around in the 60's if I remember rightly). I'd be hugely surprised if that option hasn't been exercised.

 

[sgtgunn]

In the end does it just fall back on nuclear deterence? Mr. Putin sure seems inclined to remind everyone about his stockpile.

IMHO Airpower is the one field were NATO as a whole has the most advantages. The same applies to our navys which should be able to keep all important seaways open and the Russians confined to their home waters.

But airpower alone won't stop a Russian aggression against one of our eastern members nor will it allow us to counterattack. In any case of conventional conflict the Russians won't get stopped on NATO's borders but well past them. Pushing them out again with what NATO can mobilize has to be taken into account.

And if anything light forces will not counterattack against Russian heavy formations, even with (probably hard pressed) air superiority.

I am not sure about the US Army's ability to rapidly deploy heavy forces. Shouldn't one HBCT be on high readiness status?

 

[Waylander]

Nuclear deterence all alone is a bad strategy. You need ways to escalate. If your only options are to do nothing or let the world burn doing nothing seems much more propable.

 

[sgtgunn]

Nuclear deterence all alone is a bad strategy. You need ways to escalate. If your only options are to do nothing or let the world burn doing nothing seems much more propable.

I don't disagree, but I can't help wonder if a NATO-Russia shooting conflict could end any other way. I think Russia is in a position where it cannot realistcially "win" a conventional shooting war with NATO. If one ever started, and Russia began to lose militarily, would they just pack up their stuff and go home? Could Putin survive that? Would he be willing to survive that?

I believe the US made a huge mistake removing its conventional deterrent from Europe. That and the intense downsizing of many major NATO armed forces might just tempt Russia into pushing things to far.

 

[Feanor]

I don't disagree, but I can't help wonder if a NATO-Russia shooting conflict could end any other way. I think Russia is in a position where it cannot realistcially "win" a conventional shooting war with NATO. If one ever started, and Russia began to lose militarily, would they just pack up their stuff and go home? Could Putin survive that? Would he be willing to survive that?

I believe the US made a huge mistake removing its conventional deterrent from Europe. That and the intense downsizing of many major NATO armed forces might just tempt Russia into pushing things to far.

You're thinking in cold war terms. I don't see russia going to war against a united nato. It seems much more likely that they will seek to isolate their intended opponent. Russia could certainly "win" against one or two countries and then reach some sort of ceasefire with the explicit nuclear threat as the alternative. The question of course becomes - what's the point?

 

[Blackshoe]

You're thinking in cold war terms. I don't see russia going to war against a united nato. It seems much more likely that they will seek to isolate their intended opponent. Russia could certainly "win" against one or two countries and then reach some sort of ceasefire with the explicit nuclear threat as the alternative. The question of course becomes - what's the point?

Problem is the leadership of Russia seems to think in Cold War terms, too. At the least, definitely in a "Western Them vs Orthodox Us". So it's a worldview/culture issue (per Samuel Huntington) vice an economic worldview, but there's still a gap.

As far as Russia going to war against a united NATO, I'd agree that they aren't likely to try that. But I genuinely fear they could think they've divided NATO (only to find out they haven't) and start a war that they have to go nuclear on.

I think everybody involved right now us very capable of mis-reading everyone else.

 

[Feanor]

Problem is the leadership of Russia seems to think in Cold War terms, too. At the least, definitely in a "Western Them vs Orthodox Us". So it's a worldview/culture issue (per Samuel Huntington) vice an economic worldview, but there's still a gap.

As far as Russia going to war against a united NATO, I'd agree that they aren't likely to try that. But I genuinely fear they could think they've divided NATO (only to find out they haven't) and start a war that they have to go nuclear on.

I think everybody involved right now us very capable of mis-reading everyone else.

Never mind capable, they've already misread the west, badly. They thought the EU commission report on the Georgian War (favorable to Russia) was a sign of weakness, and over-extended themselves in the Ukrainian mess. Hopefully they will learn their lesson, and curb their military expansionism. Russian military power should be a guarantor of stability on the post-Soviet space, not the primary destabilizing factor.