Will Super Anti Ship Missile change who controls the oceans?

[weasel1962]

Back to the topic.

I tot this is a well-reasoned article in sep last yr with quite a bit of background that covers a comprehensive aspect down to when a propituous time might be to conduct a flight test....

http://project2049.net/documents/chinese_anti_ship_ballistic_missile_asbm.pdf

Personally I have my suspicions regarding China intentionally hiding OTH radar capability to avoid potential site detection. It is clear that would be a priority target in any target list.

Also the capability to strike sats is not a uniform one. So far ASATs have been targeted at low orbit sats. Sats at medium level orbits may not be as easily struck. That applies to both sides.

It is interesting to note that the latest beidou sat was announced early this month to be the first to have an inclined orbit up to HEO. Could changing orbits increase targeting difficulty? I think it could.

 

[Cailet]

if a force has no detection capability to determine an ICBM/IRBM is inbound, than why can't you use it (the unknown variable of whether it's strategic or conventional is null/irrelevant).

People watching out for nuclear launches are looking at the launch sites. If a US ICBM is launched then every other nuclear power in the world will know about it very, very quickly (seeing as their whole strategy is predicated on being able to launch before their own launch sites get hit and all) and with no way to determine if it's nuclear, conventional or full of candy they have to assume a worst-case scenario.

If the US starts announcing it's conventional ICBM launches then they lose the whole 'element of surprise' thing and I'm not sure the PLA high command is going to take their word for it, I certainly wouldn't trust them if they were doing something similar*.

Joe Militant in Afghanistan wouldn't know if the explosives that killed him were from an aeroplane, a drone, an artillery round or an ICBM (and an ICBM would be a colossally wasteful way to hit such an enemy). But the PRC, UK, RuF and France would all be aware, suspicious and various degrees of afraid and trigger-happy.

It's a neat idea on paper but it's a very bad political/strategic move.

*Not that I expect anyone to start trying a nuclear sneak attack today but no-one wants to set a precedent that might make one easier in the futuer.

 

[Sampanviking]

As an Australian I'd ask that you perhaps extend myself and others the courtesy of not automatically assuming the reasoning behind my opinions comes from national bias, and I'll endeavor to do the same for you and hope that others will, too. Debating the capability of the DF-21D, as I believe was AD's intent, has nothing to do with nationality - but instead with the very real questions there are surrounding real-time targeting capabilities. It's a fascinating topic, so let's not get caught up in accusing one another of prejudice.

As a moderator, I'd also request that you please stay on topic, as this sort of thing is going to do nothing but derail the topic. Nothing personal but this thread is not the right place for such a discussion, and I hope you understand.

Fair do's

The interest though was Australian attitudes to a changing security environment. I would like to explore this, so maybe a separate thread in the general section would be acceptable?

Rather than selectively quoting from the article, you might want to post what the article stated as well to support its headline...

Its a bit more than that Weasel. Without publishing dates for both the Korean and Chinese articles its difficult for me to be clear. While there is a lot of activity in the bloggosphere regarding Chinese ASBM tests, it all seems to be coming from Western blogs and MIC affiliated institutes, with nothing of real substance being issued from China itself. The big news from China over the last fortnight has been the successful operational launch of the JL2



Now while I have no doubt that China has a viable ASBM programme and that the technical obstacles are well within its abilities to overcome, it seems to me that much of the current fuss about it is simply a western product and no doubt related to procurement funding over the next few years. Such a move could backfire however as; given the extremely tight budgetary constraints that the US military will face as the country looks to halve its federal deficit by 2015, if the case for Carrier vulnerability is made to effectively, views on their financial viability may be taken which are other than the authors original intention.

 

[Bonza]

Fair do's
The interest though was Australian attitudes to a changing security environment. I would like to explore this, so maybe a separate thread in the general section would be acceptable?

If you find the topic interesting and provided participants can conduct themselves maturely and reasonably, by all means. Thanks for understanding.

 

[weasel1962]

Re:

Back to the topic.

I tot this is a well-reasoned article in sep last yr with quite a bit of background that covers a comprehensive aspect down to when a propituous time might be to conduct a flight test....

http://project2049.net/documents/chinese_anti_ship_ballistic_missile_asbm.pdf

Personally I have my suspicions regarding China intentionally hiding OTH radar capability to avoid potential site detection. It is clear that would be a priority target in any target list.

Also the capability to strike sats is not a uniform one. So far ASATs have been targeted at low orbit sats. Sats at medium level orbits may not be as easily struck. That applies to both sides.

It is interesting to note that the latest beidou sat was announced early this month to be the first to have an inclined orbit up to HEO. Could changing orbits increase targeting difficulty? I think it could.

Tot I add to this with testimony in May this yr regarding China's growing missile capability.

http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2010hearings/transcripts/10_05_20_trans/10_05_20_final_transcript.pdf

3 bdes of DH-10 is about 50% more to double the estimate by DoD's 2010 CMPR. 8 bde of DF-21s.

Its not just ballistic missiles but also growing numbers of long-ranged cruise missiles (DH-10).

 

[Galrahn]

While there is a lot of activity in the bloggosphere regarding Chinese ASBM tests, it all seems to be coming from Western blogs and MIC affiliated institutes, with nothing of real substance being issued from China itself. The big news from China over the last fortnight has been the successful operational launch of the JL2

This is actually not true. The analysis in March of 2009 that kick started the discussions now all over the blogosphere into high gear was done on my blog by Feng (tphuang) - who was citing a Chinese source. As a result, this article was picked up by the Drudge Report and it has been a hot topics on blogs since. Before that time it was all inside baseball in places like - this forum actually.

The most comprehensive source on China's ASBM development is Andrew Erickson's blog, who btw does a fantastic job of citing his sources. The truth is there is a lot - and I mean tons of literature written in several Chinese journals about the ASBM capability - including several science journals on rocket technologies where the author is a high ranking officer in the Second Artillery Corps.

There is plenty of analysis in the west, but there is plenty in China as well but in China the discussions are all at the insider rocket science and academic level.

 

[weasel1962]

Re:

This is actually not true. The analysis in March of 2009 that kick started the discussions now all over the blogosphere into high gear was done on my blog by Feng (tphuang) - who was citing a Chinese source. As a result, this article was picked up by the Drudge Report and it has been a hot topics on blogs since. Before that time it was all inside baseball in places like - this forum actually.

The most comprehensive source on China's ASBM development is Andrew Erickson's blog, who btw does a fantastic job of citing his sources. The truth is there is a lot - and I mean tons of literature written in several Chinese journals about the ASBM capability - including several science journals on rocket technologies where the author is a high ranking officer in the Second Artillery Corps. These are just a drop in the ocean filled with a whole plethora of papers on the same subject but one gets the picture.

There is plenty of analysis in the west, but there is plenty in China as well but in China the discussions are all at the insider rocket science and academic level.

The actual source was academic. It became widespread due to papers published by the 2nd Artillery engineering college betwen 2003 to 2006 (including a public discussion in an annual conference) on the subject (and still ongoing). The possibility was also discussed in the naval war college, USN prior to that. Prior to that (I note as early as 2000), MRBM re-entry vehicles as a way of attacking vessels were already highlighted but the identification of the target vessels may not have been as overt.

Examples included Huang Hong Fu's "Concepts Regarding ABSM Attack on Aircraft Carrier Group (2003)", Qiu Zhenwei and Long Haiyan's "A Discussion about the Development of Chinese Antiship Ballistic Missiles (Combat Scenario)" (2006), Tan Shoulin, Zhang Daqiao, and Diao Guoxiu, “Determination and Evaluation of Effective Range for Terminal Guidance Ballistic Missile Attacking Aircraft Carrier." <- All out of the 2nd arty college.

The titles should be self-evident. Most academic journals are generally regarded as academic rather than practical applications but this was from 2nd artillery so there was a certain significance to it.

Erickson's blog is indeed informative but his info should be read in the context of his subjective views ie he believes that is the direction of the chinese development and hence one would generally read the pro-ASBM views rather than the opposite. Having said that, his blog is quite convincing.

p.s. conventionalising ICBM/IRBMs isn't exactly the sole purview of the chinese. There is quite a bit of discussion over the past few years on conventionalising the tridents.

 

[Sampanviking]

This is actually not true. The analysis in March of 2009 that kick started the discussions now all over the blogosphere into high gear was done on my blog by Feng (tphuang) - who was citing a Chinese source. As a result, this article was picked up by the Drudge Report and it has been a hot topics on blogs since. Before that time it was all inside baseball in places like - this forum actually.

The most comprehensive source on China's ASBM development is Andrew Erickson's blog, who btw does a fantastic job of citing his sources. The truth is there is a lot - and I mean tons of literature written in several Chinese journals about the ASBM capability - including several science journals on rocket technologies where the author is a high ranking officer in the Second Artillery Corps.

There is plenty of analysis in the west, but there is plenty in China as well but in China the discussions are all at the insider rocket science and academic level.

Hi Galhran

If you are talking about general ASBM discussion, then you are absolutely right. I was however specifically talking about imminent tests of the missile as an operational system. Since the issue of Yellow Sea and South China Sea's joint exercises involving the George Washington has blown up, there has been a wealth of speculation about an imminent test of this system. It has all (as far as I can see) come from the Western side with nothing authoritative coming from China.

My point with Weasels article is that while it talks of a new missile being tested, the only missile which has been officially acknowledged by China as having been operationally tested recently, is the JL2 SLBM, which happened in early August. I acknowledge Weasels point that the media article he quoted was accompanied by an artists impression of a terminal phase ASBM attack, but would point out that China Daily yesterday illustrated an article responding to the DOD China report, with an artists impression of a very modern angular looking Indigenous Chinese Aircraft Carrier.

If anyone does have a current and authoritative article from China discussing an imminent test of the ASBM, then I would be very grateful if they could share

 

[weasel1962]

Re:

Read pg 14. Note the person testifying and the occasion. Dated 25 Mar 2010.

http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/FC032510/Willard_Testimony032510.pdf

Quote: China is also developing and testing a conventional anti-ship ballistic missile based on the DF-21/CSS-5 MRBM designed specifically to target aircraft carriers.

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The Chinese don't report every test they conduct. This was in 2007.

China Accelerating Ballistic Missile Tests | AVIATION WEEK

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What is important is that the Chinese can hit a moving target with a suspected DF-21-derived missile. Read ASAT test. That test proved that the chinese:

(a) can do mid-course guidance.
(b) can whack a moving target.

A satellite moves at far greater speed than a CVN ever will. The only difference is that a satellite is far more easily tracked than a CVN.

I think what some people could well be looking for is a demo rather than a test.

The source of the link bet ASAT test tech and ASBM is cited here:
THE TAIWAN LINK: China's Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Program: Checkmate for Taiwan?

 

[justone]

Read pg 14. Note the person testifying and the occasion. Dated 25 Mar 2010.

http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/FC032510/Willard_Testimony032510.pdf

Quote: China is also developing and testing a conventional anti-ship ballistic missile based on the DF-21/CSS-5 MRBM designed specifically to target aircraft carriers.

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

The Chinese don't report every test they conduct. This was in 2007.

China Accelerating Ballistic Missile Tests | AVIATION WEEK

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

What is important is that the Chinese can hit a moving target with a suspected DF-21-derived missile. Read ASAT test. That test proved that the chinese:

(a) can do mid-course guidance.
(b) can whack a moving target.

A satellite moves at far greater speed than a CVN ever will. The only difference is that a satellite is far more easily tracked than a CVN.

I think what some people could well be looking for is a demo rather than a test.

The source of the link bet ASAT test tech and ASBM is cited here:
THE TAIWAN LINK: China's Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Program: Checkmate for Taiwan?

Thank you for that information I know China don't report all there tests and the U.S. don't either. I have gotta a lot of information on this topic. I will said this China is making a lot of progress on its missile program. All the things that China is doing is not reported all the time. Do anyone think that China is just trying to scare the U.S. ? I don't think so they know they have to step up there game if they want to try to takeover Taiwan. This come from years of planning how to stop a CBG. I will said this some member brought up some good points about when you launch this system how other country (nuclear armed nations) will react. A mistake can cause some big problems and could lead to end of earth.

 

[Akula540]

I am not allowed to post a link so I can only encourage you to search for China's Bulava article from Federation of American Scientists' Strategic Security Blog.

The missile seems to be encoutering some problems as the final tests(at least some of them) have failed.

 

[lizs]

I am not allowed to post a link so I can only encourage you to search for China's Bulava article from Federation of American Scientists' Strategic Security Blog.

The missile seems to be encoutering some problems as the final tests(at least some of them) have failed.

Indeed there was setback in the past test (2006), as the post points out.

The blog article is based on Pentagon's 2010 China military report. But this report is untrusted or more like a joke. For example, it says the existing number of DF-31A is 10~15 this year. But 16 were displayed to the world in the national day parade in 2009. Is Pentagon telling people PLA lacks money building missile?

 

[Juramentado]

For example, it says the existing number of DF-31A is 10~15 this year. But 16 were displayed to the world in the national day parade in 2009. Is Pentagon telling people PLA lacks money building missile?

No - recent documents from the US Naval War College shows that China could field up to eighty (80) DF-21Ds by 2015. This is based on the historical production rates of previous DF-21 marks, assuming the majority of manufacturing switched over to the ASBM variant.

We may be looking at a new missile race. In comparison, the US Navy has eighteen BMD capable hulls, and only about forty (40) SM-2 Block IVs as of 2008 – the only current SM version capable of BMD intercept – and possibly thirty (30) of the newer and controversial SM-3s. Production targets stated by DoD in 2009 aim for an inventory of about two-hundred twenty (220) SM-3s by 2015.

Assuming a two-shot engagement per ASBM/BM, it will be a very short-lived but exciting engagement for both sides. When you work out the numbers, if the BMD patrols in PACRIM get the smaller SM-3 inventory (SM-2 would go to CENTCOM because the Iranian BM threat is less sophisticated), then that works out to potentially 12 ASBMs per BMD vessel ratio. Balance that with the studies that show the really big technical gap for the Chinese is overcoming the Area of Uncertainty (AOU). If the seeker head on the RV can cover a larger AOU, then the Chinese have to fire less RVs per attack. Assuming a roughly 60km AOU, the PRC may need to fire as few as one (1) RV to a high of thirteen (13) RVs per attack attempt.

 

[weasel1962]

Re:

The PLAN may coordinate attacks with low level cruise missiles. DH-10s may have close to similar ranges to DF-21s. If they can target using ASBMs, they can certainly target ground based anti-ship cruise missiles as well.

Critically, what some analysts fail to take into account is that ASBMs/shore based anti-ship missiles do not necessarily have to target carriers. Could be phibs as a secondary target.

Ultimately, if US has to intervene on the ground. That means getting phibs to Taiwan. Air bases will certainly be interdicted so air transport's out of the question. Every port in Taiwan is less than 400km from the chinese coast. This not only includes DH-10s but also YJ-62s.

Mobile launchers and mobile radars (including surface wave radars) may be difficult to suppress completely. Its also a massive coastline to cover 24/7. DH-10 launchers at Shantou and Taizhou can cover all approaches to Taiwan.

Falklands validated the shore based attack principle with a successful attack. The Hezbollah success against israel validated the accuracy of chinese-made shore based anti-ship missiles.

Potential launching positions are already covered by long ranged SAM emplacements eg HQ-9 or S-300s as well as short to medium range SAMs + AAA.

Worse, submarines could easily cover the approaches as well.

Ultimately, clearing a safe path may not be that easy even with carrier support. It will definitely buy the PLA a far longer time required to establish control over Taiwan. I agree with Rand that the equation is starting to skew in China's favor.

Even if targeting a carrier is ultimately not successful, it will force carrier ops further from Chinese shores and consequently reduce carrier sortie rates.

The most difficult element for China is to remove the advantage in stealth fighters. That could end up as a base-suppression strategy.

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Separately, the ultimate plan is for all USN CGs/DDGs to be BMD capable. Just a matter of time. Even if so, it becomes a race to see who can build more missiles. As rightly pointed out in some research papers, China can produce far more ASBM/cruise missiles at a cheaper rate than the US.

The US needs cheaper alternatives like NCADE.

 

[Bonza]

Don't you think in terms of an anti-access strategy it makes more sense to threaten a carrier rather than an amphibious ship though? I'm only guessing here, but I suspect amphibs aren't going anywhere near the coast with air superiority first being established. A landing force isn't going to have a hope of success if they attempt an opposed landing without air superiority, are they? Not only does does it seriously compromise their ability to address air, surface and sub-surface threats, but it would greatly diminish their flow of battlefield information. So if you destroy their capacity to gain air superiority I doubt you'd have to worry about their amphibs at all...

I'm not well versed enough to say for sure of course, just a thought anyway.

 

[My2Cents]

What is important is that the Chinese can hit a moving target with a suspected DF-21-derived missile. Read ASAT test. That test proved that the chinese:

(a) can do mid-course guidance.
(b) can whack a moving target.

A satellite moves at far greater speed than a CVN ever will. The only difference is that a satellite is far more easily tracked than a CVN.

An ASAT test in space has no relevance to attacking a target in atmosphere using a guided projectile at velocities > 5 km/sec. Target speed is irrelevant if the target is on a predictable path [orbit] in a uniform media [vacuum] and clearly visible to the terminal homing system in order to refine the information from ground based sensors.

Targeting a ship moving in an evasive pattern, buffeted by high level winds in and steadily increasing air density, and with your sensors obscured by a reentry fireball, plus clouds and precipitation, is totally different.

 

[weasel1962]

Re:

Don't you think in terms of an anti-access strategy it makes more sense to threaten a carrier rather than an amphibious ship though? I'm only guessing here, but I suspect amphibs aren't going anywhere near the coast with air superiority first being established. A landing force isn't going to have a hope of success if they attempt an opposed landing without air superiority, are they? Not only does does it seriously compromise their ability to address air, surface and sub-surface threats, but it would greatly diminish their flow of battlefield information. So if you destroy their capacity to gain air superiority I doubt you'd have to worry about their amphibs at all...

I'm saying that a CVN is a priority target but its not the only feasible target.

The phibs will have to be somewhere at somepoint in time pending air superiority being established. But at some point in time, even with air superiority, it will be in a detectable location off Taiwan's coast if the USN or USMC needs to reinforce Taiwan by sea.

The attainment of air superiority does not restrict mobile launchers. US had air superiority in desert storm but could not prevent scud launchers from launching. The area covered is significantly larger wrt China compared to Iraq.

Having air superiority is no guarantee either. China has 27+ land airbases within 500nm the Taiwan strait. US has 1.

 

[weasel1962]

Re:

An ASAT test in space has no relevance to attacking a target in atmosphere using a guided projectile at velocities > 5 km/sec. Target speed is irrelevant if the target is on a predictable path [orbit] in a uniform media [vacuum] and clearly visible to the terminal homing system in order to refine the information from ground based sensors.

Targeting a ship moving in an evasive pattern, buffeted by high level winds in and steadily increasing air density, and with your sensors obscured by a reentry fireball, plus clouds and precipitation, is totally different.

If someone claimed that aircraft-detecting radar will one day cook food in your home, one might laugh but that's exactly what happened with the microwave.

One needs to look at capability differently. China already has workable ICBMs that has been tested over the past few decades ie heat shielding and terminal homing etc isn't going to be an issue. Moving target homing, that's another issue but as the ASAT test demonstrates, that's not going to be a problem either.

The question is to what extent china can handle terminal targeting in a specified target space. This would be a target that moves at 0.015 km/s compared to the target they hit in space eg 1-3+ km/s?

Ultimately, its still a question of detecting the CV, forming an adequate firing solution and ensuring the missile follows that. Agreed, the ASAT test does not mean China has a workable ASBM. The challenges are there. No doubt about it. I don't think its beyond China though. Matter of time.

 

[My2Cents]

If someone claimed that aircraft-detecting radar will one day cook food in your home, one might laugh but that's exactly what happened with the microwave.

This is totally non-sequitur. It is like claiming the ability of some birds to use tools proves that they understand quantum theory.

One needs to look at capability differently. China already has workable ICBMs that has been tested over the past few decades ie heat shielding and terminal homing etc isn't going to be an issue.

The terminal homing system in question is inertial. It cannot ‘see’ through the heat shield or the plasma bow wave created by reentry, nor does it have any need to. Nor is the heat shielding transparent on any wavelength that could be used by a homing system, active or passive. Demonstrations of unrelated homing system capabilities have only minor value at best, something completely new needs to be developed.

Moving target homing, that's another issue but as the ASAT test demonstrates, that's not going to be a problem either.

The ASAT test is as relevant to the design of an ASBM homing system as it is to one for a torpedoe, i.e. NOT. The principle problem is not the relative velocity of the target and the missile, but the ability to produce a sensor that can see through the heat shield and past the plasma bow wave. Currently nobody has even a working theory of how to do that.

 

[gf0012-aust]

The terminal homing system in question is inertial. It cannot ‘see’ through the heat shield or the plasma bow wave created by reentry, nor does it have any need to. Nor is the heat shielding transparent on any wavelength that could be used by a homing system, active or passive. Demonstrations of unrelated homing system capabilities have only minor value at best, something completely new needs to be developed.

The ASAT test is as relevant to the design of an ASBM homing system as it is to one for a torpedoe, i.e. NOT. The principle problem is not the relative velocity of the target and the missile, but the ability to produce a sensor that can see through the heat shield and past the plasma bow wave. Currently nobody has even a working theory of how to do that.

totally agree re plasma and sensors

all the talk about plasma shielding on aircraft (or weapons) means absolute squat until someone works out how to drive the sensor systems through the shield/plasma boundary layer. It is abject nonsense no matter what the more enthusiastic supporters of plasma shielding etc try to espouse.

at this stage you either hand off part of your sensor/shooter combo or you hand off your weapons sensor to a 3rd party FCS.

Forcing your principle weapons set to be dependant on 3rd party managers/shooters is just plain stupid.