Have you guys seen this article: "A Historical Basis for Force Requirements in Counterinsurgency" by Steven Goode? While there might be concerns about his approach, do take a look at the table on page number 52 where he sets out the different counter insurgencies and some of the relevant numbers.
That's a good article. A few years ago during the height of the Iraq War, I worked for a think tank that was contracted to CAA to look at insurgency/counterinsurgency warfare. I utilized some of those historical cases, not all of them since the cases were specific to having a foreign interlocutor. I wonder if he used any of my data.
The Malayan Emergency certainly has had too much deference placed on it but I think its got more to do with the fact that it stands out as a near perfect example of how to conduct a counter insurgency campaign, rather than its successful outcome.There were other counter insurgency campaigns that were won militarily but ended up being political failures. Had the Malayan campaign been mishandled from the start it could easily have gone out of control, despite the lack of material support from Communist China and the lack of widespread local support for the MRLA. One of the key lessons learnt from the Malaya experience, apart from over reliance on fire power, was that to defeat a counter insurgency you also need to build a nation. Though the situation in Afghanistan is most certainly more complex and challenging than Malaya, I believe many of the lessons learnt in Malaya still apply in Afghanistan.
And unlike the Taliban, the MRLA didn't enjoy the same level of support from the local population. The MRLA enjoyed some level of support from portions of the local community in Southern Thailand but never from the Thai government. As a whole the situation in Afghanistan certainly cannot be equated with Malaya, being much more complex and on a much larger scale. Having said that, I believe however that the Malayan Emergency was important in the sense that many fundamental lessons in counter insurgency, many of which still hold true, were learnt.
One correlates to the other, and I did mention that it had a perfect peak and decline to the violence/KIAs.
That isn't necessarily the case...a military victory should be a political victory as well...Clausewitz correlates this. If you mean tactical victories...sure Algeria, Vietnam, the Counterinsurgency killed more bad guys but they are still considered defeats.
Well, it was mishandled at the start which is why COIN ops still took 12 years. The Briggs Plan wasn't put into place until 1950 and the violence did not peak until '52, or '53.
Well, the British also promised Malaya its independence and thus a withdrawal of British troops. Also, certain aspects of that COIN ops probably are not repeatable in the current Afghan conflict (e.g. forced removal of citizens).
The Taliban are considered as 'strategic assets' by the ISI. They can be used to further Pakistan's policy without any blame coming on the Army or the Pakistan govt.
That is a highly over-simplified assessment by the writer. I would urge you to refrain from posting articles from sources that pander to certain ethnic & religious affiliations. The writer puts all regional and international actors along with the Taliban & Al-Qaeda in one big pot and ends up with a foul tasting broth.Ray17 said:
Differentiation is paramount here. Pakistan Army & ISI are taking out the Pakistani Taliban since they are a threat to Pakistan's security interests. Afghan Taliban do not have anything against Pakistan; hence they are not treated in the same manner.
Hundreds of mid-level commanders of Pakistani Taliban have been paraded for the media already. And as we are all aware, both Baitullah Mehsud and Hakimullah Mehsud have perished in drone strikes. Meanwhile, in the past three weeks, Pakistan has also arrested some of the big-fish of the Afghan Taliban network.Ray17 said:
The Pakistani Taliban, who subcribe to the same ideology and share the same goals of the Afghan Taliban have been a threat to Pakistan for quite a while. The key question IMO is whether the Pakistan government went into the tribal areas because it was really in Pakistan's interest or because it was due to pressure from Uncle Sam?
The fact that the Emergency was only officially declared over in 1960 was I believe due to a number of factors and not due to mishandling during the start of the Emergency.Indeed it was mishandled from the start. But then again, most governments faced with an insurgency threat, tend to start off underestimating the nature of the threat and the counter measures needed. IMO the difference in Malaya was that the British were relatively fast in formulating their ''hearts and minds'' programmes by winning over the Chinese population and having a clear chain of command under civilian control with various intel bodies complemeting one another and operating in unison. A major advantage the Brits in Malaya had over the Coalition in Afghanistan was a much better understanding of the local culture, customs and mindset. In pre-independance Malaya, it was common even for junior level British district officers to speak the Malay language and also in many cases Chinese.
A major advantage for the Brits was that the presence of British and Commonwealth troops in Malaya was not unwelcomed by the majority of the local population, who were in no hurry to see a speedy withdrawal of these troops. The timetable for British troop withdrawal from Malaya was dictated by results in the field against the MRLA and internal British politics, not by the need to sooth any fears amongst the Malayan population.
Well analysed and well said.
1. If we want to continue to engage in an exchange of ideas, we need to recognise that Pakistan, China and India all have legitimate geopolitical interests in Afghanistan and that the interests of these three immediate regional states interact with other interested parties - like the Americans, the Russians and the Iranians and of course the other ISAF contributor countries and aid donors like Japan (who promised in Nov 2009, US$5b in aid over the next 5 years - Japan's MFA states that they have already given US$1.8b from Sept 2001 to Nov 2009). If we frame the problem in Afghanistan as just fighting the Taliban, it may result in a failure to understand the local political dynamics in relation to competing land use. These local political concerns may be part of ethnic or even tribal rivalries which in turn interact with the actions of external actors. And I'm fully confident that the choices that the various Afghan tribes will make are a matter of local strategic calculation rather than out-right defeat of the Taliban - as long as we understand this, the ability of external actors to further destabilise the situation in Afghanistan will be constrained.
Again, that is your assumption that the vernacular media is full of bile. Ofcourse there are those who write bile but the majority of vernacular media in Pakistan actually consists of mostly sane heads - now that may not necessarily mean that they have to 'agree' with your western mindset to appear 'sane'.
yada yada yada.. this is not a Strategy 101 lecture.
U.S drones target attacks after Pakistani human-Intel on the ground pinpoints 'em out; intel that is relayed to the Americans by Pakistanis - who, if given the drone technology - would be thrilled to take out the militant leaders themselves. U.S succeeded? U.S got lucky with the whole drone strategy; they gave it a shot when they were out of options and it produced some results, hence it was adopted as a full-fledged strategy. Let us not forget the fact that, ever since the serious COIN Ops by Pakistan Army began in Swat & now South Waziristan [with serious amount of commitment and boots on the ground, they have had 100x more success than what ISAF or the U.S have achieved in Afghanistan in more than 8yrs. No wonder American military officials were lining up to visit Swat before launching their major Op against Taliban in Marjah on the Afghan side; they wanted to replicate Pakistan's success in Swat.
That is a highly ignorant claim. Given the fact that I just spent 6months in Pakistan interacting with people and reading daily print-media and watching T.V talk shows on local politics; I can easily claim the Pakistani population is standing together with their government against the militants which is why the Army has been able to go in and clean up SWAT & South Waziristan.
Pakistan has to be on-board for Afghanistan's sakes and the Western alliance's face-saving in Afghanistan. Pakistan is not going anywhere. The ones to be condemned in history will be those Western boys & girls naive enough to lay down their lives for a war with no clear objective if no solution to the Afghan debacle is attained - something that requires Pakistan's approval.
Pakistani Taliban and Afghan Taliban have two different goals. While the Afghan Taliban want to expel Western forces out of Afghanistan, the Pakistani Taliban are made up of rival gangs of thugs who temporarily bonded together and in-so-doing, have solicited the help of Al-Qaeda, which has long stated its goal of over-throwing Pakistan's Western leaning successive governments [whether military or civilian].
I would appreciate if you can space out your posts. Pakistan's government is serious about the local Taliban; infact the entire Pakistani society is. I was in Pakistan for 6months just recently and you'd be amazed at how much awareness campaigns are running across country. For example: citizen-watch programs are being constituted in areas they did not exist and revived in areas where they were in use before.
Ahem! Uncle Sam doesn't provide any protection against India. Pakistan Army and its nukes do. Pakistan is not about pleasing the U.S, its more about not having many options since the global financial crisis hit the country hard & the problems compounded with the Western debacle in Afghanistan next door, consequences of which, Pakistan has to deal with.
"Protection' certainly was the wrong word to use and it's was my mistake. When I used the word ''protecton'', I meant it more in the diplomatic and poltical sense rather than literally.
All due respect but are you sure that ''the entire Pakistan society'' is serious about the local Taliban or supported the move by the army to go into SWAT and Waziristan?
I have always mantained that Pakistan is very big a part of the problem and most of my posts in this thread would reflect that.