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Blackshoe

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
When your are talking trillions, the 355 ship navy, 10-15 Zumwalts, and another 187 F-22s would be possible with lots of change to spare. Will the US have the same regrets about building more Zumwalts 5-10 years down the road after the production run has ended? I think it is fair to say the USAF wishes it had double the number of F-22s. I agree the cost overruns were ugly for both items but lets face it, cancellation just made the numbers look really ugly. When cost overruns happen at the same time tons of money is being consumed in ME adventures, it doesn't allow some of these programs to be successful, probably even with minimal overruns.
Problem with this argument is that it argues US could have not been involved in ME, which I don't see a way to make that happen. We've been heavily involved since the 80s; we're not going away.

Actually another problem with it is to imply it's binary (ie we could have either bought the full line of ZUMWALTs or gone into the ME). We could realistically have done both (though in fairness there are political realities to defense spending that make it zero sum; it's a better argument domestically, where I point out to people that we in fact did spend trillions going into the ME and we spent trillions on health care/education/social welfare/whatever of those three their pet project was).

But in returning back to original question about the ZUMWALT, I can't claim to speak for all the 1110s (especially since I'm an 1115 now), but I don't know many who are like, "Oh man, we're losing so much by not having so many more of them!" Other than the supposed NSFS mission, no one seems to know what we want to use them for, and while NSFS might be a USMC requirement, so is a 38-ship amphib fleet, and we ignore that requirement so openly as to be close to mocking it. Or the strike mission of "17,000 ton 'stealth destroyer' in the littorals", which looks dumb even on powerpoint slide, and probably still isn't as good as that as other platforms.

So, again, what exactly is it that the ZUMies do? We go back to "Giant Leap Forward!...if it works". So it's a R&D test platform. I'm cool with two or three ships as an R&D test platform if they don't work. That's a lot less risk than a 32-ship class that may not work.

What follows on from DDG 1000 will be pretty cool, I hope (eg Future Surface Combatant). But that doesn't mean DDG 1000 itself will be cool/useful.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Problem with this argument is that it argues US could have not been involved in ME, which I don't see a way to make that happen. We've been heavily involved since the 80s; we're not going away.

Actually another problem with it is to imply it's binary (ie we could have either bought the full line of ZUMWALTs or gone into the ME). We could realistically have done both (though in fairness there are political realities to defense spending that make it zero sum; it's a better argument domestically, where I point out to people that we in fact did spend trillions going into the ME and we spent trillions on health care/education/social welfare/whatever of those three their pet project was).

But in returning back to original question about the ZUMWALT, I can't claim to speak for all the 1110s (especially since I'm an 1115 now), but I don't know many who are like, "Oh man, we're losing so much by not having so many more of them!" Other than the supposed NSFS mission, no one seems to know what we want to use them for, and while NSFS might be a USMC requirement, so is a 38-ship amphib fleet, and we ignore that requirement so openly as to be close to mocking it. Or the strike mission of "17,000 ton 'stealth destroyer' in the littorals", which looks dumb even on powerpoint slide, and probably still isn't as good as that as other platforms.

So, again, what exactly is it that the ZUMies do? We go back to "Giant Leap Forward!...if it works". So it's a R&D test platform. I'm cool with two or three ships as an R&D test platform if they don't work. That's a lot less risk than a 32-ship class that may not work.

What follows on from DDG 1000 will be pretty cool, I hope (eg Future Surface Combatant). But that doesn't mean DDG 1000 itself will be cool/useful.
There seems to be some discussion ref replacing one or both 155mm with extra VLS and possibly a different gun (Mk-45?). A step back in some ways but a massive leap in blue water capability in others depending what the load out is, I wonder how many Mk-41 modules can replace each 155mm.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
Problem with this argument is that it argues US could have not been involved in ME, which I don't see a way to make that happen. We've been heavily involved since the 80s; we're not going away.
IMO, the Iraqi war, version 2, was unnecessary whereas Afghanistan was necessary. The costs for the former along with all the resulting fallout would go along way to renewing US defence capabilities.

What follows on from DDG 1000 will be pretty cool, I hope (eg Future Surface Combatant). But that doesn't mean DDG 1000 itself will be cool/useful.
If rail guns work out the DDG1000 will be useful. Hopefully the IEP will prove itself and find its way into the FSC.
 

barney41

Member
The Navy is budgeting nearly a billion Dollars per FFG and FMG is entering the competition with a FREMM-based design. Do procurement policies allow a foreign entity likeFMG to be the prime contractor?

Fincantieri to offer FREMM based frigate for Navy's FFG (X) program



JANUARY 12, 2018 — Fincantieri Marine Group plans to compete for the U.S. Navy's next generation FFG(X) frigate program with a design based on the FREMM frigate, in service with the Italian Navy since 2012.

Fincantieri Marine Group is the shipbuilder for the Lockheed Martin led team that builds the Freedom variant LCS, so its choice of the FREMM as a parent craft design for the FFG (X) further underlines the fact that U.S. Navy is now looking for the FFG (X) to be a lot more than an upgunned LCS.

Fincantieri will lead an industry team that will include Gibbs & Cox (another member of the Lockheed Martine LCS team) and Trident Maritime Systems, to design and build the multi‐mission ships capable of conducting anti‐surface, antisubmarine, and electronic warfare and air defense
operations.

More...
 
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John Fedup

The Bunker Group
This link discusses the accountability issues from the string of USN mishaps. Admiral Rowden, surface fleet commander is the latest to go. As the article suggests, the political class makes all sorts of demands on the USN without the necessary funding and nothing is EVER their fault.

Vice ADM Rowden: Scapegoat?
 

CB90

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
The Navy is budgeting nearly a billion Dollars per FFG and FMG is entering the competition with a FREMM-based design. Do procurement policies allow a foreign entity likeFMG to be the prime contractor?

Fincantieri to offer FREMM based frigate for Navy's FFG (X) program
Yes, it is possible.

In many cases, they would line up a US partner to conduct the detailed design work (Gibbs & Cox is a notable US ship design firm).

The actual construction would have to be conducted in the US obviously, but FMG already has that with Marinette.

Political optics is a different challenge, but having a US partner/shipbuilding presence, that particular element would come down to the strengths of shipbuilder's home state Senators.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
The USS Little Rock is ice bound in Montreal until March. A good example of why both the US and Canada should be investing in heavy ice breakers although even "heavies" would be hard pressed getting this littoral ship through the Gulf of St. Lawrence at present. On a positive note, being stuck in Montreal for a couple of months makes for some entertaining shore leave.

USS Little Rock Stuck in Montreal, Ship Might Not Leave Until Spring - USNI News
 

barney41

Member
BAE's Type 26 Frigate may be too much ship for what the US Navy is willing to pay for. Also there are no operational examples
to evaluate. A pity.

BAE joins race for new US frigate with its Type 26 vessel

BAE joins race for new US frigate with its Type 26 vessel

LONDON ― BAE Systems is officially gunning for the U.S. Navy’s new frigate program with its new Type 26 frigate now in production in the U.K.

Company officials confirmed Thursday it had responded to the U.S. Navy’s request for information and were in talks with unspecified companies in the states about how it would build the ship for the FFG(X) program, according to a BAE official who spoke on background to discuss early developments.

“In terms of the technical requirements, its a good fit. ... We responded to the RFI and we’re confident its a pretty good fit,” the official said...

While the Type 26 incorporates or can adapt to virtually all the capabilities outlined in July’s RFI, including 36 vertical launching system cells and Mark 41 VLS launchers, the ship might be too rich for the Navy’s blood, according to Bryan Clark, an analyst with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and a former aid to former Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jon Greenert. “I think they‘re leaning to something with a little less capability that will be a bit more economical,” Clark said...

But the ship faces other headwinds as well, Clark said, because some of the competing designs already have ships they can show the Navy, whereas BAE Systems just cut steel for the first Type 26 this summer...“The Navy made a big deal in the rollout of the RFI that it was looking for ‘proven designs,’ which likely means they‘re looking for ships that already exist.”


 

Blackshoe

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
The USS Little Rock is ice bound in Montreal until March. A good example of why both the US and Canada should be investing in heavy ice breakers although even "heavies" would be hard pressed getting this littoral ship through the Gulf of St. Lawrence at present. On a positive note, being stuck in Montreal for a couple of months makes for some entertaining shore leave.

USS Little Rock Stuck in Montreal, Ship Might Not Leave Until Spring - USNI News
Ice Breakers wouldn't be enough is my understanding.

On the plus side, if the RCN wants to look at the LCS for, I don't know, whatever reason, you've got one available for tours for a long time in Montreal!
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
Ice Breakers wouldn't be enough is my understanding.

On the plus side, if the RCN wants to look at the LCS for, I don't know, whatever reason, you've got one available for tours for a long time in Montreal!
The proposed heavy ice breaker Diefenbaker should be capable but the cost to escort a single ship out would be huge. The bigger problem is the Diefenbaker will probably never get built!
 

Blackshoe

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
The proposed heavy ice breaker Diefenbaker should be capable but the cost to escort a single ship out would be huge. The bigger problem is the Diefenbaker will probably never get built!
Like I said...it's not about ice breakers. There are limitations out there on LCS itself that would prevent her from moving out.

Re: your post on Rowden as a scapegoat. I'm sympathetic to that idea to a point because the problems are not all his fault. That's 100% true. And it's not like we can drag Timmy and Terry back and court-martial them (I mean, I guess we could, but not going to happen). And sequestration kicked in right as people started noticing how bad things were, ending any chance of really fixing it.

However...

Rowden has been heavily involved in the Surface Warfare Enterprise for a long, long time now. He was N96 (or whatever it's called) before he became SURFOR. He wrote the requirements for submission to Congress (or at least to the CNO). He has or should have been very aware of just how bad things were in the Surface Fleet. From my tiny viewpoint, he did not seem to be. His tone seemed to be "It may be bad, but it's still manageable". That and "Here are some Watchstanding Principles I borrowed from the Nuke Navy, just apply them to yourselves and you'll be fine!" Also, "We'll make some more inspections, that will fix it! This time, I promise!". Re-arranging deck chairs on the Titanic, from the deckplate perspective.

Of all the SURFORs I served under since Etnyre, only one of them seemed to be willing to sound the alarm and try and right the ship. That was Copeman. I'll give Hunt a pass since he was in the seat a pretty short amount of time. Curtis? If I never hear "Back to Basics" again, it'll be too soon. For both Curtis and Rowden, their biggest sin was that the message that was received was "You guys (eg the unit-level) suck, and if you just didn't suck so much, you'd be fine! Quit complaining about all these 'shortages' you guys think are there!" The emphasis seemed entirely on blame falling on the COs for decisions made long before or far above their level, and conveniently ignoring their own role in making the very problems.
http://www.public.navy.mil/surfor/Pages/PastLeadership.aspx#.WmVrSzdG2Uk
I met Rowden as a boot ensign w/less than 30 days commissioned when he embarked USS FIRSTSHIP for a fairly high viz port visit when he was COMDESRON 60. I was impressed with his intelligence and energy. I met him again when was at OPNAV, and was very disappointed by what I saw as a different attitude that seemed to be hallmarks of how larger staffs view the Fleet itself.
 

CB90

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Rowden has been heavily involved in the Surface Warfare Enterprise for a long, long time now. He was N96 (or whatever it's called) before he became SURFOR. He wrote the requirements for submission to Congress (or at least to the CNO). He has or should have been very aware of just how bad things were in the Surface Fleet. From my tiny viewpoint, he did not seem to be. His tone seemed to be "It may be bad, but it's still manageable". That and "Here are some Watchstanding Principles I borrowed from the Nuke Navy, just apply them to yourselves and you'll be fine!" Also, "We'll make some more inspections, that will fix it! This time, I promise!". Re-arranging deck chairs on the Titanic, from the deckplate perspective.
I met Rowden as a boot ensign w/less than 30 days commissioned when he embarked USS FIRSTSHIP for a fairly high viz port visit when he was COMDESRON 60. I was impressed with his intelligence and energy. I met him again when was at OPNAV, and was very disappointed by what I saw as a different attitude that seemed to be hallmarks of how larger staffs view the Fleet itself.
To be fair to the man, I'll lead off by saying that I think he was instrumental in a few very positive and real changes I have seen under his leadership as a Flag Officer:
1) Better JO training. Don't recall if it was mainly his initiative, but I think he certainly helped move it along, and really should pay dividends as JO's trained better move up.
2) Warfighting Focus. Starting up SMWDC and SWATT was big. I'm a critic of WTI's in practice, but the overall concept of both was IMO a very necessary change.

Having said that, I and several others I know echo your general impressions with him as a Flag Officer...lots of enthusiasm, but what appears to be little delivered in terms of additional resources.
I think the disconnect happens as higher echelon Flag Officers are unable to get a good sense of how things really are in the Surface Fleet.
Not directly their fault (other than the fact they "own" aspects of the Fleet) but I don't think we collect metrics right.
We either can't get the right data, or we interpret it wrong, or we simply look at the wrong things.
Admittedly just gut feeling on my part, but operating at an intermediate level, I've seen too many disconnects between ship's actual condition (as found through SME performed assessments), reported condition off ship via various databases, and how the Flag's staffs interpret that information.

With lack of actual actionable information (e.g. to the level of detail of a continously running Balisle or Ault report), they can't make the right decisions, no matter how energetic they are...and so they default to "You guys suck" when shit happens.
Just a guess...but I don't think I'm too far off the mark.
 

vonnoobie

Well-Known Member
The USN will be conducting a Port Call with the Carl Vinson in Da Nang. Will be the largest visit since the end of the Vietnsm war. Interesting to watch a growing relationship between the Two Nations as tension between Vietnam and the PRC grow with their SCS disputes.



U.S. Plans to Send Aircraft Carrier Vinson to Vietnam - USNI News
If only we (The West) didnt back the French post WWII relations could have been even better. As is relations with Vietnam will always be good as they hate the Chinese and it effectively becomes a case of the enemy of my enemy is my friend.
 

Blackshoe

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
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Blackshoe

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
I think the disconnect happens as higher echelon Flag Officers are unable to get a good sense of how things really are in the Surface Fleet.
Not directly their fault (other than the fact they "own" aspects of the Fleet) but I don't think we collect metrics right.
We either can't get the right data, or we interpret it wrong, or we simply look at the wrong things.
Admittedly just gut feeling on my part, but operating at an intermediate level, I've seen too many disconnects between ship's actual condition (as found through SME performed assessments), reported condition off ship via various databases, and how the Flag's staffs interpret that information.

With lack of actual actionable information (e.g. to the level of detail of a continously running Balisle or Ault report), they can't make the right decisions, no matter how energetic they are...and so they default to "You guys suck" when shit happens.
Just a guess...but I don't think I'm too far off the mark.
Wholeheartedly agree. I do agree with you about JO training and the WTI program (in concept).
I think I'd go even farther and say that as Navy wide, the various levels of staffs have a major problem at being able to get ground truth out of the fleet (for aviation world, see the Mutiny of IPs that it took to get the OBOGS system worked on). I'd say that by their very function and organization, staffs serve to obfuscate and hide readiness issues in favor of generating "readiness". I don't know that I'd be willing to go far enough to attribute this to malevolence rather than normal pressures, but I do believe we have to admit we have no ability to actually transmit our readiness up through the chain of command with any hope that ground truth will be received.

I think I've used this example here before, but the best example of this was SECNAV/CNO/MCPON removing the rates. I can get why SECNAV made that decision (because I get who the stakeholders he was trying to please were, and they weren't in the Navy), but for CNO/MCPON to go along with and then be shocked at the outrage on the deckplate level is inconceivable for me...unless they genuinely have no clue what is happening at the deckplate level. And I think that same process happens a lot across our enterprises.
 

barney41

Member
It's classified as Medium Displacement Unmanned Surface Vessel (MDUSV). I'm looking forward to a notional LDUSV and what roles it could fill.
 

the concerned

Active Member
People on here might know would it be possible to adapt a ssn to deploy a rail gun when they are operational. I was just wondering if one equippd with it could sneak up on a target pop up just enough to use the gun fire half a dozen rounds and disappear again.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
People on here might know would it be possible to adapt a ssn to deploy a rail gun when they are operational. I was just wondering if one equippd with it could sneak up on a target pop up just enough to use the gun fire half a dozen rounds and disappear again.
I somehow doubt that would be viable. During WWII subs had deck guns but they have been deleted since then once it was realized that the deck gun impacts how the water flows around the hull and the acoustic signature of a sub.

For an SSN to mount a rail gun which could be used, the gun would either need to be able to retract into the hull for submergence, or be contained within the hull and have a 'gun port' of some sort which would be closed while submerged. Going the 'gun port' route would like lead to very limited fire arcs unless the entire sub was re-positioned. Then there would also be the question of what range would the rail gun have, and what the time and rate of indiscretion would be in order for a sub to carrier out a strike or bombardment. As it stands now, a SSN or SSGN armed with LACM's can launch a strike at targets up to ~1,000 miles away from the launch site. I doubt a rail gun could be developed any time soon which would match that kind of strike package, never mind also fitting it onto a sub in a usable fashion.
 
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