US Navy News and updates

StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
I don't think there is enough information in the public domain to comment.

There could have been technical issues, crewing issues, weather issues, other ships, coms issues.

The fact the captain was in his cabin on the starboard side and his cabin was completely destroyed by the impact would seem to indicate this is not a run of the mill scrape/collision.

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/18/world/asia/navy-uss-fitzgerald-japan.html

Most professionals say it is too early to assign blame. Certainly a lot of questions.

Certainly the situational awareness is an issue, as it would appear the collision alarm sounded late or not at all on either ship. Which implies to me it wasn't as simple as jumping on the CB.
 

spoz

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
People are overthinking this. One or other or (when in extremis) both of these ships messed up badly. It happens, people make mistakes, lose situational awareness, stick with an idee fixe , whatever - Evans, Voyager and dozens of other example litter history. It doesn't require a conspiracy; and sometimes the other ship appreciates there is a problem too late to either warn the burdened vessel or take action itself, remembering that stopping or significantly alterting the course of a large merchant ship (or CV, LHD, AKE whatever) travelling at speed takes a lot of time and space.

Warships and merchant ships are often in close company and don't collide, indeed don't end up in close quarters situations; if people do their jobs without making mistakes it just doesn't happen. Unfortunately people make mistakes and then it does. Channel 16 communication in such circumstances is often of the form "Vessel on my port bow, you appear to be on a steady bearing" without identifying the other ship; that usually causes everybody within VHF range to start urgently checking what's to starboard. And, I've rarely come across a mership whose OOWs don't have that much English, although it might deteriorate significantly when they try to excuse themselves.

Providing duties have been properly assigned then the number of people on watch in a warship won't contribute to the problem, it will lower the risk - more eyes and brains involved. That's not to say that bridge watches don't get distracted by goofers and the like, but at zero dark hundred? Unlikely. The people on watch on the bridge have duties to perform, they're not there for the enjoyment of the view.

But it's way too soon to try answering the "why" question; that is what the enquiry will eventually do; and guessing who was at fault either from a ship PoV or onboard individual ships at present is an exercise in futility.
 

ASSAIL

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
1) AIS isn't required for steaming in heavy traffic. Unless there is something magical I am missing about AIS, I'm not sure what extra value it would've added here. At the ranges involved, with the ships involved, they would have had plenty of time to either spot visually or by radar on either side.
2) International deck watch officer standards vary tremendously. The English language level on some merchant vessels I have encountered was absolutely terrible, and there would be a long delay...followed by a different voice with passable English.
3) The gCaptain article is moronic. Being a merchant mariner with a STCW license doesn't meet some kind of mythical special standard. He also demonstrates that he has very little knowledge of how a warship bridge functions. Perhaps that's part of the problem, warship and merchant ship counterparts do not really have a good understanding of how the other operates.
The value of AIS is that it shows the other vessel what you are doing and vice versa, it's not, by itself an anti collision tool but it should alert bridge watchkeepers as to the actions of other vessels in their vicinity so that other measures, bearings, VHF Comms and wheel and engine orders can be given/taken.
 

bd popeye

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
I don't think there is enough information in the public domain to comment.

There could have been technical issues, crewing issues, weather issues, other ships, coms issues.

The fact the captain was in his cabin on the starboard side and his cabin was completely destroyed by the impact would seem to indicate this is not a run of the mill scrape/collision.

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/18/world/asia/navy-uss-fitzgerald-japan.html

Most professionals say it is too early to assign blame. Certainly a lot of questions.

Certainly the situational awareness is an issue, as it would appear the collision alarm sounded late or not at all on either ship. Which implies to me it wasn't as simple as jumping on the CB.
Exactly..

In another forum this was posted;

Navy Begins Investigation Into USS Fitzgerald Collision
Navy Begins Investigation Into USS Fitzgerald Collision

How Could the Fitzgerald Collision Happen?
This isn't like a car crash—it's a whole different game at sea.

How Could the Fitzgerald Collision Happen?
the below was posted by me in response:

I really like the Chief of Naval Operations statement posted below. Anything else you read or speculate including my own statement is just a whole bunch of nuthin'.(speculation). We all are entitled to our own opinions.

Let us all wait and see what comes out of this investigation.


CNO Adm. John Richardson Statement on Recent Trip to Japan

Release Date: 6/22/2017

From Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

YOKOSUKA, Japan (NNS) -- On Tuesday MCPON (Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy) and I visited Japan where we attended the outbound dignified transfer of our seven fallen shipmates and spent time with [USS] Fitzgerald Sailors and families.

The outpouring of support by the Yokosuka and broader community has been stunning. Everything from toothpaste and uniforms to financial assistance has been offered and we are very grateful to all who are helping this team get back to fighting trim.

We also met with supporting teams that were critical to the effort - the Yokosuka Port Operations, tug crews, divers and workers who were absolutely essential to recovering the ship. An amazingly selfless team of American and Japanese workers who made such a difference.

Very important was the chance to visit the leaders from the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force and Japanese Coast Guard. I personally thanked them for their assistance. Our partnership with the Japanese is very strong and growing stronger. They were deeply sorry for the losses suffered.

Our immediate focus is to do all we can to properly recognize our fallen shipmates, take care of the Fitz family and begin to put the ship back together.

There are multiple U.S. and Japanese investigations underway to determine the facts of the collision. Our goal is to learn all we can to prevent future accidents from occurring. This process will unfold as quickly as possible, but it's important to get this right. We need to protect the integrity of those proceedings. Speculation, rumors, hearsay or second guessing won't be helpful. Let the investigations run their courses.

Again, thanks to all for the thoughts and prayers and offers of support. It is good to see the Navy Team come together to help Fitz and others move forward.
 

colay1

Member
A key finding that there was apparently no one on the freighter's bridge when the collision occured. Now, surely that's a violation of some sort?

Freighter Was On Autopilot When It Hit US Destroyer

The deadly collision between a U.S. destroyer and a container ship June 17 took place while the freighter was on autopilot, according to Navy officials.

The Philippines-flagged cargo ship ACX Crystal was under control of a computerized navigation system that was steering and guiding the container vessel, according to officials familiar with preliminary results of an ongoing Navy investigation...

According to the officials who spoke on condition of anonymity, initial reports on the incident indicate no crew member was manning the controls in the pilot house of the Crystal when it hit the Fitzgerald.

After impact, the freighter's was not immediately aware that it had collided with anything and continued sailing. The ship's crew then realized it had been in a collision and sailed back to try to determine what had happened.
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Providing duties have been properly assigned then the number of people on watch in a warship won't contribute to the problem, it will lower the risk - more eyes and brains involved. That's not to say that bridge watches don't get distracted by goofers and the like, but at zero dark hundred? Unlikely. The people on watch on the bridge have duties to perform, they're not there for the enjoyment of the view.
either way, and in addition to and in spite any other evidence, at least 4 of the crew will potentially heading off to a hearing/court martial

Capt, XO, watch/deck, junior watch officer etc..... as they will still need to explain etc... (even if Capt was below deck, they will get pulled into this)
 

alexsa

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
A key finding that there was apparently no one on the freighter's bridge when the collision occured. Now, surely that's a violation of some sort?

Freighter Was On Autopilot When It Hit US Destroyer

The deadly collision between a U.S. destroyer and a container ship June 17 took place while the freighter was on autopilot, according to Navy officials.

The Philippines-flagged cargo ship ACX Crystal was under control of a computerized navigation system that was steering and guiding the container vessel, according to officials familiar with preliminary results of an ongoing Navy investigation...

According to the officials who spoke on condition of anonymity, initial reports on the incident indicate no crew member was manning the controls in the pilot house of the Crystal when it hit the Fitzgerald.

After impact, the freighter's was not immediately aware that it had collided with anything and continued sailing. The ship's crew then realized it had been in a collision and sailed back to try to determine what had happened.
It is a most uniformed report in so far as the operation of the autopilot is concerned. They appear to be suggesting the vessel was using an integrated navigation system but some of the content is inconsistent with that.

The ACX Crystal did make some really add alterations of the AIS track on the web is correct but this may have been after the event when she turned back after realizing there had been a collision. The first large alteration occurred at 1630Z16JUN17 which is about 0030 or 0130 local on 17 June (depending on what time zone you are looking at, Japan is +9 hours so that would be 0130 local). It is not helped by the fact that the AIS is not transmitting on the Fitzgerald so I am guessing.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4N1-_9SGQTI

The lack of awareness of the Crystal bridge crew will be an issues noting COLREGs, however, the use of the autopilot is normal and there is not a man on the wheel unless the traffic density is high.


Information on traffic density will be considered in the investigation, however, there are two sides to this ...... if there was high traffic that would necessitate the wheel of the Crystal being manned then the Captain of the DDG should have been on the bridge.


It has the makings of a classic lack of awareness on both sides .... however ... we should not jump to conclusions pending a proper investigation.
 
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ASSAIL

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Exclusive: U.S. warship stayed on deadly collision course despite warning - container ship captain
Also, it's the SOP for a warship to be "darkened" i.e. with no lights that can be visible from outside, starting before sunset, so the other ship probably was not even aware of it from a safer distance. I doubt that the DDG had its navigation lights up before the collision.
It's definitely not SOP for any warship from any country to transit a busy shipping lane without navigation lights showing. All vessels both civilian and military are required to be lit according to COLREGS.
The only exceptions would be during a tactical exercise in a gazetted area.
 

AegisFC

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Also, it's the SOP for a warship to be "darkened" i.e. with no lights that can be visible from outside, starting before sunset, so the other ship probably was not even aware of it from a safer distance. I doubt that the DDG had its navigation lights up before the collision.
No it's not.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
The US Congress is funding a study into whether or not the USN should acquire and operate light carriers. The idea is to have both light and super carriers. It will be interesting to see what the study comes up with. Are Light Carriers Poised to Make a Comeback?

EDIT: I've fixed the link.
 
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MrConservative

Super Moderator
Staff member
The US Congress is funding a study into whether or not the USN should acquire and operate light carriers. The idea is to have both light and super carriers. It will be interesting to see what the study comes up with. Are Light Carriers Poised to Make a Comeback?
NG. The link is not working.

I am assuming that this is coming from the Sen McCain's alternative White Paper he put out earlier in the year based on tarting up the America Class.
 

Ranger25

Active Member
Staff member
NG. The link is not working.

I am assuming that this is coming from the Sen McCain's alternative White Paper he put out earlier in the year based on tarting up the America Class.
Correct on the McCain White Paper "Restoring American Power". He recommends not only smaller carriers (Specifically Modified America Class).

The goal should be a future fleet and air wing comprised of larger numbers of smaller and relatively cheaper systems that can operate in denied environments, rather than smaller numbers of larger and more expensive systems that our adversaries can increasingly locate and target,” he wrote.
 
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John Fedup

The Bunker Group
There are several articles discussing the idea of smaller carriers. I think it is fair to say people in both the Congress and USN are divided on the merits. NG's link outlines some of the issues. Assuming the Ford class production price drops to 11 billion, that amount gets almost 4 America ships in their current design configuration. These ships are designed to operate with 12 B variant JSFs. STOVL sortie rates won't match a CATOBAR carrier. This will likely put pressure on for a modified America class or possibly a new conventional CATOBAR carrier. The death spiral will then start. How big does a new conventional carrier need to be, sixty, or seventy thousand tons? The almost 70 thousand ton QE class carrier STOVL costs about 4 billion US. (too bad the CATOBAR conversion never happened). I think any acceptable new conventional CATOBAR carrier would exceed 4 billion so that won't fly. A few more America class ships along with 10 Fords.
 

FormerDirtDart

Well-Known Member
There are several articles discussing the idea of smaller carriers. I think it is fair to say people in both the Congress and USN are divided on the merits. NG's link outlines some of the issues. Assuming the Ford class production price drops to 11 billion, that amount gets almost 4 America ships in their current design configuration. These ships are designed to operate with 12 B variant JSFs. STOVL sortie rates won't match a CATOBAR carrier. This will likely put pressure on for a modified America class or possibly a new conventional CATOBAR carrier. The death spiral will then start. How big does a new conventional carrier need to be, sixty, or seventy thousand tons? The almost 70 thousand ton QE class carrier STOVL costs about 4 billion US. (too bad the CATOBAR conversion never happened). I think any acceptable new conventional CATOBAR carrier would exceed 4 billion so that won't fly. A few more America class ships along with 10 Fords.
As I pointed out in post #2235 the Navy reccommendations in McCain's White Paper come from the CSBA's report.

The basis of the plan is not replacing CVNs with CVL, but replacing the LHA in the ARG with a CVL & an extra LSD/LX(R). So, the cost break between CVNs and CVLs is really not as relevant as the additional cost related to replacing a LHA with a CVL + an additional LSD/LX(R)

It's not really Senator McCain's plan. Sen. McCain has voiced support (Big Wars, Small Ships: CSBA’s Alternative Navy Praised By Sen. McCain) for the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments(CSBA) plan

Restoring American Seapower: A New Fleet Architecture for the United States Navy

The plan doesn't call for replacing any number of CVNs with CVLs. But, replacing all LHA/Ds with CVLs. And growing the gator (Small Deck Amphibious Ships) fleet (LPD, LSD/LX(R)) to support transporting the Marines & rolling stock that won't be carried by the new CVLs.
So, the typical makeup of the Amphibious Ready Group would go from:
1x LHA, 1x LPD, 1x LSD; to 1x LHA, 1x LPD, 2x LSD/LX(R).
LHA/Ds would serve as interim CVLs until purpose built ships (with catapult & arresting gear) are acquired.
...
The CSBA's report addresses the eventual size of the CVL and it's aircraft load out in a few places, including on page 72:
The proposed fleet architecture adds to today’s CVNs smaller conventionally powered CVLs of 40,000 to 60,000 tons that would be incorporated into ARGs as part of the Deterrence Force. CVLs would provide power projection and sea control capabilities at the scale needed for day-to-day operations and for SUW, strike, and CAS as part of initial combat, freeing CVNs to focus on high-end integrated multi-carrier operations as part of the Maneuver Force or the Northern Europe Deterrence Force.

In the near-term, existing LHA/LHD amphibious assault ships would be employed as CVLs using a loadout of twenty to twenty-five F-35B aircraft. As they reach the end of their service life, LHA/LHD-derived CVLs would be replaced by purpose-built CVLs with a displacement similar to a Cold War-era Midway-class aircraft carrier and equipped with catapults and arresting gear. As a result, CVL air wings would be able to become slightly larger and incorporate airborne electronic attack (AEA) and airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft that are catapult-launched and require an arrested landing.

Further discussed is the changes to current LHA led ARG to the "CVL ARG" on pag 81:
As described in Chapter 5, the proposed fleet architecture replaces today’s 3-ship ARG consisting of an LHA/LHD, an LPD, and a dock landing ship (LSD) with a 4-ship package composed of a CVL, an LPD, and two LX(R)s. Some USMC rotary aviation and rolling stock will move from the CVL to the third small deck amphibious ship to make room for additional F-35Bs and associated equipment. The proposed architecture calls for ten CVLs, which is about the size of the current LHA/LHD fleet

And, beginning on pg 97 addresses the "CVL Air Wing" and it's dispersal across the ARG:
The ACE on today’s LHA/LHDs will evolve to be an air wing with its own Marine Corps command structure and organization. CVL air wings will consist of about twenty F-35Bs, which can provide ISR, AEA, and targeting for the small-scale CAS, SUW, and strike attacks it will need to undertake as part of the Deterrence Force. This number of F-35Bs can be supported by the Marine Corps’ planned procurement of F-35Bs. It would impact the number available for shore-based operations under the Unit Deployment Program (UDP), but UDP operations could be supported by ARGs that are in the region, which would also increase the flexibility of the ARG ACE, since it would have multiple airfields ashore from which it could operate.

For AEW and C2, LHA/LHD air wings will rely on shore-based maritime patrol aircraft and E-2Ds. Variations possible in the ACE associated with the proposed 4-ship ARG are shown in Figure 45.

As the Navy builds CVLs with catapults and arresting gear, the CVL air wing will evolve to add one to two UCAVs, one to two utility/tanker unmanned vehicles, one to two AEW aircraft, and AEA aircraft needed for the threat environment. This evolution will require Navy-Marine Corps air wing integration, as is done today in CVN CVWs.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
There are several articles discussing the idea of smaller carriers. I think it is fair to say people in both the Congress and USN are divided on the merits. NG's link outlines some of the issues. Assuming the Ford class production price drops to 11 billion, that amount gets almost 4 America ships in their current design configuration. These ships are designed to operate with 12 B variant JSFs. STOVL sortie rates won't match a CATOBAR carrier. This will likely put pressure on for a modified America class or possibly a new conventional CATOBAR carrier. The death spiral will then start. How big does a new conventional carrier need to be, sixty, or seventy thousand tons? The almost 70 thousand ton QE class carrier STOVL costs about 4 billion US. (too bad the CATOBAR conversion never happened). I think any acceptable new conventional CATOBAR carrier would exceed 4 billion so that won't fly. A few more America class ships along with 10 Fords.
My understanding, and I believe Abe has stated this previously, is that one of the advantages of STOVL naval combat aircraft is they generate significantly higher sortie rates that CTOL. Also it is my understanding that the cats and traps on the modified LHA/CVL with be to permit the operation of CTOL UAVs and support types and that the ships themselves will retain an axil deck configuration.
 
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