This Global Response Force is intended to ensure the UK’s ability to “get there first” in global conflict situations, in the words of one of the ministers responsible.
The paragraph in the DCP23 on the Global Response Force (GRF) is long on aspirations (and spin) and lacking in anything approaching reality. The proposed GRF appears to be a tri-service embellishment of the 2019 RN/RM centric Littoral Strike Groups (LSG). The LSG has itself been re scoped, rebranded and generally watered down since it was originally announced.
The RAF has just ceased C130J operations which removes around 14 airframes from their airlift fleet. The hoped for addition of extra A400M Atlas aircraft (between 4-6) has been killed off. The airlift fleet now consists of C-17 (8) and A400M (20) plus Voyager MRTT (9-14). The New Medium Helicopter (NMH) project is moving at glacial pace despite the OSD of the SA330 Puma commencing in 2027. The NMH project will see around 35 helicopters of 4 different types being replaced by as few as 20 new helicopters to provide battlefield lift.
The RN is likely to have to continue to use the extant amphibious warfare vessels (LPDs & LSDs) to deliver the LSGs. This situation is due to the originally proposed Littoral Strike Ship (LSS) being subsumed into the proposed Multi Role Support Ship (MRSS). Currently there is no project for the development and delivery of MRSS to replace the LPDs (2) and LSDs (3).
The LSG(N) covering the Arctic and high North was planned to consist of an LPD and an LSD. The LSG(S) was to cover the Gulf, Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean regions using a single LSD. This has now changed with the Aviation Support Ship (ASS) being extended in service until after 2030. RFA Argus, as the ASS, was built as a container ship in 1980 before being converted to its current configuration after serving in the Falklands War as a STUFT. LSG(N) lacks any vessels with permanent hangers for Merlin HC4/4A helicopters while LSG(S) can hangar 3-9 Merlin HC4/4A but lacks a well dock for LCU.
Despite the lofty aspirations and spin surrounding the GRF the state of the UK Defence Forces make it harder to envision the aspiration being achieved. Especially when both Ministers (Secretary of State and the Minister) state in the introduction that "....
in this document there are deliberately no new commitments on platforms at all – because on that we stand by what we published in 2021".