The Royal Navy Discussions and Updates

battlensign

New Member
If the UK opts for two fully spec'd QE's then there is no rush for a replacement LHP. A single QE is more capable than two Invinciples and one Ocean put together. MARS, T23 CAMM upgrade, C1 & C2 are far more important. Plus the rest of Europe are 'breeding' LHP's like rabbits, so in a major conflab I'm sure the NATO fleet will have more than enough in tow to host JHF assets. Having 2 x Albions and 4 x Bays in service means you could realistically carry Helo's aboard a single dual-role QE and then cross-deck them to the Albion/Bays when the ARG crosses the exclusion zone.
I am curious as to why you use the acronym 'LHP' to refer to what appears to be, based on context, Landing Platforms (Helicopter)?

You seem to have been doing this for a while (at the very least posts: 2838, 2867, 2876, 2880, 2883, 2891 and 2899) and even seem to do so when posting a comment that quotes text from other user's posts that employ 'LPH' (as in post 2899 quoted above). I note your stated location as Singapore and i was wondering if there was a second type or method of classification being used that I am not aware of?

Curious....

Brett.
 

riksavage

Banned Member
The problem with this is that there will often be only one QE in service, & I don't buy the dual-role thing. It can't provide fixed-wing air support & amphibious lift at the same time.

Moving the helicopters over to the LPDs & LSDs won't work either. We chose to build LPDs & LSDs without hangars or helicopter support facilities, apart from a landing deck, & the former don't have anywhere to put a hangar or anything else. The whole LPD/LSD fleet combined can hold (not support) about half as many helicopters as Ocean carries. We'd have to operate some kind of shuttle from the carrier, interfering with fixed-wing operations, at just the time when they'd be most needed.

In order to provide any kind of heliborne assault capability while providing fixed wing air cover, we need a QE for the air cover, & a second ship for the helicopter assault. It isn't just about the capabilities of individual ships, but what functions they can perform at one time.

We also need to consider how many we'll actually have available at once. With 2 x QE, 1 x LPH, & 2 x LPD, we have the following combinations -

2 x QE + 2 x LPD
1 x QE + 1 x LPH + 2 x LPD
2 x QE + 1 x LPH + 1 x LPD
The Bays will be on a cycle aimed to provide maximum numbers when only 1 LPD is available.

Makes sense, doesn't it? We always have a carrier, plus a ship available for heliborne assault. But take away the LPH, & we're sometimes lacking that. We'd be down to -
2 x QE + 1 x LPD
1 x QE + 2 x LPD

BTW, if you put a dozen assault helicopters & 6 Lynx or AW159 (i.e. what Ocean carries) on a CVF, what does it do to the fixed-wing capacity? I'm assuming you'll do without the 800 troops (i.e. more than 2 LPD or LSD loads) & landing craft which Ocean would also bring to the party, or cram them into the LPDs & LSDs, by grossly overloading them. We'd also be losing a large proportion of our helicopter landing spots, reducing the maximum uplift considerably.

You see? With both QEs in service, no problem. But as soon as we're down to one, we're facing a very big drop in capability from the 1 QE + Ocean scenario.

As for NATO - yes, but we don't only do NATO stuff. The Falklands illustrated that, & I wouldn't want to rule out other surprises in the future. Also, nobody in Europe is building LPHs (BTW, why do you call them LHPs?): they're building LHDs & LPDs - with docks.
I should have said "LHD's breeding like rabbits", the RN is only one of a handful of Navies who have not opted for a well-deck for their helo carrier, this is probably due to the fact they already have well-decks in the Bay's and Albions.

Lets look at the role of a typical UK ARG minus LHP, but with an active QE. Once the ARG enters the exclusion zone set-up by the task force (defensive box dominated by friendly forces) the invasion of hostile territory will be undertaken in a phased manner, as follows:


  1. 1. SF units infiltrated early by SSN to recce enemy forces, identify suitable landing points and mark the approaches

    2. Strike Carrier utilises its fixed wing assets to hopefully secure air dominance 24-7 or at least during the landing phase

    3. Frigates & Destroyers (not assigned to picket duty) & fixed (F35B) and rotary wing (Apache) CAS provide naval gun support / suppressive fire / bombing runs to neutralize any forward positions close to the beachhead, or alternatively set-up diversionary attacks to draw the defenders away to a false opbjective.

    4. Albion & Bulwark form the first phase of the landings using MK10 & MK 5 landing craft in waves drawn from the flooded decks of Albion and Bays (say eight of each). Both Albions have the surge capacity to hold 800 troops plus 4 x Mk 10's. The surge will come from troops crossdecked from the Bays using the MK10's. The Bays will remain offshore under the protection of the strike carrier and dedicated escorts. MK10's can carry 1 x Challenger and Viking plus troops. However I anticipate the first wave will be minus Challenger (32 can be stored in each Bay Class). First wave MK 10's will carry Viking / CVRT plus RM and MK5's will carry RM/assault engineers/FOO's etc..

    5. Beachhead secure - Bays will now leave the security of the strike carrier group and move close to shore and then use maxifloat to deploy Challenger / AS90 / Terrier and line Infantry units and begin establishing a logistics chain again via maxifloat.

    6. Should troops be required to move ashore using helo support then rotary wing elements can deploy from QE to Bays to start bringing in more resources, this will be done no more than say 4-hours prior to zero-hour removing the need to expose helo's on wind/spray covered decks for too long but allow for the QE deck to be cleared for fixed wing operations during the critical first phase of the landing.

Based on the fact that QE is a 65,000 tonne vessel and a USMC Wasp is a 40,000 plus tonne vessel (designed to carry both F35B, Osprey and support a USMC landing), I'm convinced the QE has the capacity to host enough strike and rotary for task in most circumstances whereby the UK will be requiured to act alone. An LHP would be nice, but if I had to choose between an LHP and investing in more C1 & C2 to screen the strike carrier, then I would go for the latter. The LHP could come later when the yards have capacity and more money becomes available.
 
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swerve

Super Moderator
Except that everything I've read suggests that the RMs preferred mode is to combine helicopter assault with beach landings in the first phase, or even begin with helicopter assault only & follow up from the LPDs, & would not consider launching an assault without helicopter support from the start, except in a dire emergency.

BTW, all this "cross-decking" suggests a vast amount of faffing around at sea, transferring troops from ship A to ship B by landing craft, then from ship B to land by landing craft. Why? Also, if the troops from the Bays transfer to the LPDs, who is left for the second wave? You've just redeployed the majority of them to the LPDs.

I see that you've discarded your previous idea of deploying helicopters from the carrier to the LPDs & LSDs, & dispensed with helicopter assault altogether. Sorry, the RMs won't like that. They want those 6 LPH landing spots, & enough onboard helicopters not to have to wait for the first wave to come back before launching the second lot. They also want to be able to then deploy the helicopters to the LPDs & LSDs to support the second wave without reducing the operational tempo of the fixed-wing air support.

You seem intent on re-writing British amphibious assault doctrine, arrived at through years of practice, some of it while being bombed & shot at.

As for the USN - remember they have CVNs, multiple LHAs/LHDs, & LPDs with their own helicopters. We don't. The STOVL aircraft from the LHAs can restrict their operations to windows when the deck is not needed for helicopter operations, by co-ordinating with the CVNs. The LPDs can launch heliborne assaults with their own helicopters. We don't have those luxuries.

BTW, Ocean pre-dates the Bays & current crop of LPDs.

PS. LPH, not LHP. Mexeflote, not maxifloat.
 

riksavage

Banned Member
QUOTE: BTW, all this "cross-decking" suggests a vast amount of faffing around at sea, transferring troops from ship A to ship B by landing craft, then from ship B to land by landing craft. Why? Also, if the troops from the Bays transfer to the LPDs, who is left for the second wave? You've just redeployed the majority of them to the LPDs.

If you are involved in a long transit (say Falklands scenario), you will not max out the Albions or Bays manpower wise. They will typically move with approx 400 troops aboard. The Bays were always designed to be a second tier asset and would never approach the beachhead during the initial landings. The RM doctrine is to move assets over long distances in relative comfort and then once close to, or inside the exclusion zone the first wave assault troops would be cross-decked and crammed into the Albions (800 plus). Troops sitting on commercail ships chartered for the duration could then be cross-decked to the Bays to take part in the second wave. So which ever way you look at it there will be 'cross-decking', this mirrors what happened during the Falklands war with personnel being moved to Intrepid and Fearless for the assault.

The Bays are there to carry the heavy non amphibious kit, such as main-battle tanks, these will only come ashore one the first wave has secured the waterline. The amphibious Vikings will be carried in the first wave using the MK10's, if the MK10's can't drop their ramps right on the beach, then the Vikings can swim ashore, Chally's / AS90 can't.

Assuming there are two Albions on station, that's eight Mk10's going ashore, plus two extra deployed in reserve from two of the four Bays (bringing that to a total of 10). A further eight MK5's could be theoretically contained within the Bays. Each Bay can hold:
356 Troops normal load, 700 during surge conditions, plus 24 main-battle tanks (not 32)
2 x LCVP Mk5
1 x LCU Mk10
2 x Mexefloats
2 x Merlin landing points.

If the UK is forced to conduct a Falklands scenario with only one QE, but with a full compliment of Albions and Bays, then the trip down South will for the embarked marines/infantry will be undertaken using a mix of RN, RFA and Commercial shipping allowing for troops to live in relative comfort and have space to conduct limited training. As the task group approaches the exclusion zone the assault troops would crossdeck and max out the first wave Albions and second wave Bays (total: 4 x Bays = 2, 800, 2 x Albions = 1600 troops). Basically elements 3-Commando Brigade plus support. Heavy equipment would already be pre-positioned on the Bays/Albions, the only up-sizing being manpower from the chartered vessels who would only be carrying personal weapons, webbing and bergans (ammunition scales would be drawn once aboard the assualt/ Bay's).

RM doctrine does look at bringing in helo assualt troops to compliment the beach landings, this can still be achieved by using Seakings / Merlin based on the strike carrier, then flown to Bays to pick up the waiting troops. They can then either turn and burn on the decks or adopt a holding pattern further out to sea until they are given the get-go to coordinate their assault to tie in with the MK 10/5's hitting the beach. However lets not forget that the amount of manpower carried in a Merlin / Seaking does not compare to that carried by a MK10 - eight Merlin / Seaking carrying sixteen fully ladden troops each still only represents 128, not even a single rifle company! The landing force will not rely on helo's as a deal breaker during the assault, poor visibility could rule out a supporting helo element, but at the same time prove a bonus for a covert approach by landing craft utilising modern navigation and thermal technology (fitted to MK10's).

In a nutshell having a Ocean type vessel would be nice, but not having one won't prevent the RN conducting amphibious landings :D
 
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StevoJH

The Bunker Group
Except that embarking helicopters aboard a Strike Rolled CVF reduces its aircraft carrying potential massively, possibly to the point where it does not have enough aircraft to attain air superiority so that an assault can take place.

Plus on top of that Ocean can also carry a large number of additional troops. From memory the normal loadout for Ocean would be 12 or so Sea Kings plus 6 or so Apache or Lynx AH.7. However i've also seen images of Chinooks aboard.



In my opinion the Royal Marines should not be going into an Amphibious landing without a dedicated LPH with both troops and large numbers of Helicopters aboard. Troop carrying Merlin's, Chinnooks and Sea Kings along with AH.7 or AH.64 escorts.

An AW.101 can transport 24 fully equiped troops according to the RAF, so a full lift of 6 can transport 144 troops per assault wave, with two assault waves with a second wave of another 6 merlins ready to follow within minutes.

The RN lists the Sea King Mk.4 of being capable of transporting 27 troops, though it doesnt say if they are fully equiped, so for arguments sake lets say 18 troops, so thats 104 troops per assault wave, with another wave following within minutes.

Of Course HMS Ocean can also carry Chinooks (will they fit in her lifts?) which according to the RAF carry up to 55 troops each. So even with only three chinnooks, that is still 165 troops per lift.

Plus helicopters unload troops much faster then landing craft, though not heavy equipment and don't make the amphibious assault ships vulnerable by making them dock down, reducing their speed to only a couple of knots.

In my opinion use the helicopters to unload the infantry and establish the initial foot hold, follow up with the landing craft carrying the heavier equipment.
 

StevoJH

The Bunker Group
Why are warships so expensive?

Any good explainations?
Most of the costs come from the Electronics, the radar's and missile systems. On top of that the hulls themselves are generally built to a higher standard then commercial ships, with the need for added damage control capability.
 

Sea Toby

New Member
Its not so much the steel. Recently, for example, New Zealand bought a MRV of 9000 tonnes displacement for NZ$ 180 million, whereas a few years before they bought an Anzac frigate of 3200 tonnes for NZ$ 470 million. The larger ship more than twice the size cost less than half the smaller warship. So, if it isn't so much the steel, it must have to do with the sensors and weapons systems, including the computerized weapons control systems.
 

StevoJH

The Bunker Group
Its not so much the steel. Recently, for example, New Zealand bought a MRV of 9000 tonnes displacement for NZ$ 180 million, whereas a few years before they bought an Anzac frigate of 3200 tonnes for NZ$ 470 million. The larger ship more than twice the size cost less than half the smaller warship. So, if it isn't so much the steel, it must have to do with the sensors and weapons systems, including the computerized weapons control systems.
I didn't mean so much the steel itself, but the differences in how it is used. For example, compartmentalisation etc.
 

kev 99

Member
I'm pretty sure some of the 'Nato' standard electrical components cost quite a lot more than those used in civilian vessels.
 

Palnatoke

Banned Member
StevoJH

Yes. The critical electronics and weapons are something that has it's price.
Though not all fancy "electronics" are critical and not all tech is better just because it's (re)developed for the specific use.


I believe, though, that we can save substancial amount of money by accepting "hulls" or "platforms", build to near-commercial standards and in that way open up for further savings by streamlining production, "off the shelf" and mass production (by conformity with items allready in, or could be, in widespread production)

We will be trading off some properties. Damage/Safty would be an issue. Though we can assume that the thinking enemy will do the little extra effort in adding in a sufficiently large warhead to anyway cause catastrophy, when hit. And we are loosing lives on the ground everyday to devices made up by fertilizer and wires. I don't think we would be putting sailors in greater peril than soldiers by accepting that *This* light switch will stop working when heated to 500 degrees celcius....

On the other hand maybe we can save lives by having enough "firepower"? enough equipment? By having equipment that doesn't need to be taken out and maintained for long periods, because it's throughly tested and made to last: Funny enough you don't see a commercial shipper taking out 1/3 of the fleet for maintenance all the time. When a shipper gets his new containership he expect it to sail almost everyday for the next 20-30 years, he does not expect his new ship to spend, say, 6 years out of the 20-30 years life, in a shipyard.

Simplicity is an engineering virtue, we should not forget that.

Some navy ships have been build to near commercial standards, it's my impression that these ships have performed well, often better, and they have been cheap.
 

Systems Adict

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Why are warships so expensive?

Any good explanations?
It's not ALL about equipment (although that does have some affect in total overall cost of the ship, especially in thru life for spares & maintenance), it's to do with how & where the ship is constructed, as well as the size & the materials. With a rather large dash of overheads, wages & manpower costs thrown in to the mix.

After all an OPV shouldn't cost as much as a destroyer (honest I'm not getting at LCS...)

Anyways, here's a link for a GREAT site to go & read some reports on costs of shipbuilding, shipbuilding techniques & the differences on how ships are built & costed across the globe.

RAND | Search on Shipbuilding

Hope this helps,

SA :dance3


PS Kev 99 is CORRECT in his post that NATO stock numbered parts ARE EXTREMELY expensive in comparison to COTS.
 
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Palnatoke

Banned Member
SA

Thanks for link, it looks great!

Clearly we can't compare a warship with a simple commercial ship ton for ton. A warship has, as mentioned above by many, lots of equipment expensive machinery and f.ex. has to accomodate a large crew. A containership is in essense "just" a steel box with an engine plus a dozen hotelrooms strapped on the back. On the otherhand some special commercial ships are more like warships, not armed or filled with millitary sensor suites, ofcourse, but with f.e.x. large crew accomodation, large engines, specialized equipment etc. So, in my mind, there should be a grey zone, as long as we talk about the "platform" (ship minus war specific "gadgets").


I suggest that the price of a warship is bloated by:

A)
A sub-optimal organisation of the industry.
In most leading warship-building nations (say, US,UK,Fr,Gr) most ships are builded by few yards, who specializes in warships and (perhaps with the exception of germany) has one major customer (the MoD of the respective country). Further more f.ex. in the cases of UK or US* these warship builders are infact the only (or at least dominating) ship builders left. Leaving a picture of an ENTIRE industry (not just warship building, but shipbuilding in general) secluded and isolated from competition, except on it's own terms.
(Note* US got a substancial commercial shipbuilding industry left, but it's protected and hugely uncompetiative)

B)
Because of the isolation and lack of competition, ship designs becomes driven by: "What we can build", "What we like to build", "How we usually build" instead of "What we need to build".
In other words, instead of having "satisfying the customer" as number one priority, the ship builder satisfies himself (f.ex. by building a technically great ship). Because of this all sorts of spurious standards and antiquated practices pile up into elaborate and cumbersome work processes motivated by "That's how we usually do", "That's how it should be done". There is no or little room for innovation, because there is no incentiative for innovation (because of isolation from competition).

C)
A completely mad idea, that a warship has to made up by the most cutting edge tech that a given country's industry can develop. Popular speaking, If a warship is "tainted" by something from "yesterday" it's probably because it's a low budget, k-mart ship that probably don't work.
F.ex. Nuclear instead of traditional conventional propulsion. Diesel-electric instead of diesel-diesel or CODLAG/CODAG. I bet my hat that the operative differences are minor between these types of machines but the differences in risc during development and construction, not to mention operationg new, untested machinery, is HUGE.
There are exceptions to this- The area air defense technology of the Type45 is a cabability jump, worth every penny. One doesn't have to go cheap on the core cabability, the very reason of the new ship. Though I suggest that the RN would probably have been equally pleased with a ship, made with a lot more traditional and low risc solutions, but still having the same area air defense cabability...?

D) Those who buy and pay the ship are not those who will use it.
 
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Systems Adict

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
SA

Thanks for link, it looks great!

Clearly we can't compare a warship with a simple commercial ship ton for ton. A warship has, as mentioned above by many, lots of equipment expensive machinery and f.ex. has to accommodate a large crew. A container ship is in essence "just" a steel box with an engine plus a dozen hotel rooms strapped on the back. On the other hand some special commercial ships are more like warships, not armed or filled with military sensor suites, of course, but with f.e.x. large crew accommodation, large engines, specialized equipment etc. So, in my mind, there should be a grey zone, as long as we talk about the "platform" (ship minus war specific "gadgets").


I suggest that the price of a warship is bloated by:

A)
A sub-optimal organisation of the industry.
In most leading warship-building nations (say, US,UK,Fr,Gr) most ships are built by few yards, who specializes in warships and (perhaps with the exception of Germany) has one major customer (the MoD of the respective country). Further more f.ex. in the cases of UK or US* these warship builders are in fact the only (or at least dominating) ship builders left. Leaving a picture of an ENTIRE industry (not just warship building, but shipbuilding in general) secluded and isolated from competition, except on it's own terms.
(Note* US got a substantial commercial shipbuilding industry left, but it's protected and hugely uncompetitive)

B)
Because of the isolation and lack of competition, ship designs becomes driven by: "What we can build", "What we like to build", "How we usually build" instead of "What we need to build".
In other words, instead of having "satisfying the customer" as number one priority, the ship builder satisfies himself (f.ex. by building a technically great ship). Because of this all sorts of spurious standards and antiquated practices pile up into elaborate and cumbersome work processes motivated by "That's how we usually do", "That's how it should be done". There is no or little room for innovation, because there is no incentive for innovation (because of isolation from competition).

C)
A completely mad idea, that a warship has to made up by the most cutting edge tech that a given country's industry can develop. Popular speaking, If a warship is "tainted" by something from "yesterday" it's probably because it's a low budget, k-mart ship that probably don't work.
F.ex. Nuclear instead of traditional conventional propulsion. Diesel-electric instead of diesel-diesel or CODLAG/CODAG. I bet my hat that the operative differences are minor between these types of machines but the differences in risk during development and construction, not to mention operating new, untested machinery, is HUGE.
There are exceptions to this- The area air defense technology of the Type 45 is a capability jump, worth every penny. One doesn't have to go cheap on the core capability, the very reason of the new ship. Though I suggest that the RN would probably have been equally pleased with a ship, made with a lot more traditional and low risk solutions, but still having the same area air defense cabability...?

D) Those who buy and pay the ship are not those who will use it.
Mmm...

You have some STRANGE thoughts on this subject. Lets look at your comments & see if we can't start a reasonable 'discussion'....

Point A.

Sub-optimal Industrial organisation. Shipbuilding is a HEAVY Industry & society has an opinion that we are in the golden age of computer technology. This belief has stripped the Industry across the globe of many things from Funding, to the need of specialist skills. Political factors regarding budgets have also driven the industry into a corner.

The UK govt's idea of creating something that is, in effect, a single supplier is a prime example, of how we have ended up. It is not so much industries fault, but that of those in government, who have forced the companies to ' adapt or die'.

Point B

Spurious Standards & Antiquated Practices.

Shipbuilding has a history of technical Innovation & has been at the centre of global transport, trading & economics since the beginning of recorded history !
It is a behemoth that has built empires & reduced the planet to the size of a big blue marble. In doing so it has created 'rules' that are true when designing & building ships, no matter the material used. To frivolously disregard such things puts lives & profits in danger, & to a certain respect the planet (especially if transporting dangerous chemicals or Nuclear components).
As for Modern Shipbuilder's, they often look at commercial enterprises, how things have improved on land & examine the use of lighter & stronger materials, to help reduce overall costs throughout the life of the ship. Yes, there is an old phrase that states 'If it ain't broke, don't fix it', but sometimes when it comes down to perfecting techniques or materials used, the old ways are the best, as we sometimes can't improve on perfection !

Point C

Type 45's design & capability.

Now lets look at history, again...
If Nation 'a', can't develop equipment to combat nation 'b', then it could be over run & tyrannically ruled.
Navies have relied on that ideology since we 1st learned to sail the seas, & here we are in the 21st century, still doing the same thing.

Now do you seriously believe that a 1960's designed destroyer could match, never mind beat Type 45 ? Go on pick anything, from top speed, distance that the ship can cover on 1 tank of fuel, to the distance weapons can travel. She wins hands down. Why ?

The advances in technology & design.

Yes, we could wax lyrically about how T-45 started as CNGF, then Horizon, etc. But the reality is that she's substantially different from that. & even now, if you were to ask senior officials in the RN about designing a destroyer, they may use T-45 as a base line, but the end product would be different again. It is the nature of the beast.

Point D...

Never a truer word spoken. Then again, when it comes to the RN, changing your posting every 3 years does mean that those who are responsible for the state of the RN have moved on to other things, washing their hands of their mistakes & leaving the 'new guy' to pick up the pieces.

Add to that a hierarchical system where an individual has to perform (in the eyes of their peers) & often does so by choosing to undo the things that their predecessor has done.

....& you thought that politicians where the ones to blame !


But moving on, with something to ponder.

Navies will ALWAYS want the best. The best they can afford is more often what they receive nowadays, so they 'make do & mend'. So if that means cutting the size of your fleet, so that it remains sustainable & active, vs large & antiquated, which option would YOU choose ??

SA :?'
 

riksavage

Banned Member
Navy vessels have a much higher focus on built-in redundancy, the ability to monitor and switch to alternate systems in the event of failure/damage. Greater emphasis is now placed on automated fire suppression and flood/fire monitoring systems instead of inert armouring (WWI & II) and labour intensive damage control crews - this must add cost in the development phase when benchmarked against a civi ship. I understand a lot more time, money and effort is spent on computer modeling to predict the impact of a wide array of weapons/missile systems (blast and propellent fire damage), which greatly influences compartmentalisation (leading to an increased number of bulkheads) and critical asset allocation. Also I understand that composite amour will also be used (QE Class) to spall-line critical areas such as the command and control facilities, weapons bays etc.

Most civi ship designs are pretty box standard (super tankers, bulk containers, LPG carriers) and are focused on maximum automation tied to minimum crewing levels. This cannot be said for a modern warship, where a large proportion of the manpower will be assigned to fighting, not driving or navigating the vessel, Just look at the man-power needed on the bridge compared to that in the main operations room where the captain and his chief weapons officers & controllers are located. Every time a new class of warship is built we tend to witness a whole new generation of systems and weapons, these have to have their development costs accounted for, hence the first batch tends to be more expensive than the last.

I think we will see warship designers looking more seriously at trying to reduce costs. BVT have stated that C1, C2 & C3 will be designed for the export market and adapted for the RN, not the other way around. CAMM is designed to be integrated into as many different ship platforms as possible and aligned to a wide array of existing tracking & surveillance systems, onus being on the warheads ability to track after launch rather than slaving itself to the ships radar. All this is being done to make the system more marketable, thus hopefully increasing sales and reducing cost.
 
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Sea Toby

New Member
Navy vessels have a much higher focus on built-in redundancy, the ability to monitor and switch to alternate systems in the event of failure/damage. Greater emphasis is now placed on automated fire suppression and flood/fire monitoring systems instead of inert armouring (WWI & II) and labour intensive damage control crews - this must add cost in the development phase when benchmarked against a civi ship. I understand a lot more time, money and effort is spent on computer modeling to predict the impact of a wide array of weapons/missile systems (blast and propellent fire damage), which greatly influences compartmentalisation (leading to an increased number of bulkheads) and critical asset allocation. Also I understand that composite amour will also be used (QE Class) to spall-line critical areas such as the command and control facilities, weapons bays etc.

Most civi ship designs are pretty box standard (super tankers, bulk containers, LPG carriers) and are focused on maximum automation tied to minimum crewing levels. This cannot be said for a modern warship, where a large proportion of the manpower will be assigned to fighting, not driving or navigating the vessel, Just look at the man-power needed on the bridge compared to that in the main operations room where the captain and his chief weapons officers & controllers are located. Every time a new class of warship is built we tend to witness a whole new generation of systems and weapons, these have to have their development costs accounted for, hence the first batch tends to be more expensive than the last.

I think we will see warship designers looking more seriously at trying to reduce costs. BVT have stated that C1, C2 & C3 will be designed for the export market and adapted for the RN, not the other way around. CAMM is designed to be integrated into as many different ship platforms as possible and aligned to a wide array of existence tracking & surveillance systems, onus being on the warheads ability to track after launch rather than slaving itself to the ships radar. All this is being done to make the system more marketable, thus hopefully increasing sales and reducing cost.
This is BMT's Venator design for the C3. A great looking small ship....

[ame=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_m81ede8b9g]YouTube - Ship fires missile[/ame]

[ame="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i14CeDEq-e8&feature=related"]YouTube- BMT Venator ® MCM Configuration[/ame]
 

Palnatoke

Banned Member
SA

I am not saying that any new, say, european frigate/destroyer is a bad ship or that older ships are better. But I am saying that they appears to be very expensive, and what I am trying to, is to get a better understanding of the "why".
Let's make the following assumption: european nations are arming, or realigning themselves for a new world order, or a new place in an old world order - what ever. I think most will agree with me that the effect of this assumed re-armament/re-alignment will also be a function of the cost of the re-armament/re-alignment. The "cost" question is important.


If we take my above Point A.

What I am implying is that, f.ex. because of the bad shape of much european and american shipbuilding the industry has evolved, or rather degenerated, into an industry that is hugely inefficient.

To give a picture; UK, the proud shipbuilding nation, builds perhaps 1-2 larger commercial ships a year (Not "behemuths", just "larger ships"). It is so that British shipbuilding more or less equals the demand of the MoD - The MoD is the only customer.
France, another proud shipbuilding nation, has maintained some commercial shipbuilding activity, but the ships are almost exclusively very specialized ships: Passenger- and cruiseships. Much of french shipbuilding is also dominated by a single customer: The french MoD (what ever it's called).
Germany and Holland still have some real commercial shipbuilding activity, again the ships are mostly specialized ships (though the german and dutch profile is more diverse than the french).
Spain and Itally runs large yards still, though, as implyed, these are state owned yards and nobody knows the real state of affairs should these, as required by the EU, be privatized.
Lindø of Denmark is closing and the last large swedish yard (Krockums(?)) has shutdown it's main commmercial activities. I don't mention the closure of Lindø because I happen to be a dane, but because Lindø was one of the last and one of the most important european commercial yards cabable of building "big" left and was not subsidized (neither directly nor indirectly) - which says a lot about the sorry state of European shipbuilding...


Commercially, if we disregard Holland, German yards are better off than French yards and French yards are better off than british yards. This translates, imho, directly to the navial export activities, where germany do best, followed by France and it's a long time ago when british yards even tried to compete on an millitary export market, as I understand it.

What "we", disrespecting germany, do instead, is that our respective MoDs nurses elected yards attempting to maintain the cababillity not only to develop and design the systems and ships but also to maintain the know-how and skill base required to actually build the damn things. This is not only expensive, it's also a loosing game. The value and volumne of commercial shipbuilding activities are far greater than domestic millitary activities (This goes also for the US, but it's even more striking when we look at the smaller european countries). This means that "our" yards are not competing in the major leaque where the money is and thus the money for innovation and improvement of the core shipbuilding activity.

It is safe to assume that these yards are inefficient (If you disagree, consider the negative: If our yards were efficient, we wouldn't need to nurse them, and they would function on an open market and in open competition).

My point B
Elaborates (Or "attempts" - I am not a great writer) on the state of inefficiency, which, imho, is not only inefficiency in "piecing the ship together", but it is also inefficiency in the know-how, the skill base, the industrial knowledge on how to design and build this thing as cheap and effectively as possible. F.ex. What's necessary, What's not and what could be done in an alternative and better/cheaper way. Such, let's call them optimization processes, occours naturally in a healthy non-marginal buisness subjected to competion. That's how buisnesses stay competiative.

A couple of examples:

A large commercial ship builded under the "Jones act" (I think that law is called) cost 2-3 times as much as a comparable ship builded "internationally" (read: In asia). The quilty? Inefficient yards protected by trade barriers.

Lindø yard is/has been building frigates for the danish navy. this is a special thing, because Lindø is/was a commercial yard in open international competition, the interesting thing here is that these frigates are thus builded by a yard that we can assume to be "efficient", unlike most other european/US frigates. The two completed ships, the absalon class, are classified as "command and surport ships" though are large long range 6.6k+ tons frigates armed and intended to fullfill many of the roles of a frigate. The pricetag, sans helicopters and the missiles, was 133M euros (2005 prices) each. The ships were delivered on schedule and on budget.
The derived class, which is in construction, Hvitfeldt, are large long range area air defense frigates (6k+ tons). Their primary weapon system will be a combination of ESSM, SM2 and guns tied together with a sensor suite that includes the Thales APAR Smart-L configuration plus a helicopter, the frigates will be comparable in cababilities to other new european Area air defense frigates.
The pricetag is around 530M euros for all 3 ships (sans helicopters and missiles). If we view the two projects as one, Lindø in coorperation with the "material command" of the danish defense and importantly with foreign sub-contractors(!) has builded a small, cabable, modern, bluewater navy for a pricetag of about 800M euros, which is less than the unit price of certain frigates/destroyers.
The point here is not the danish navy or lindø: one is small and the other is closing. The point is what you can get for taxpayers money IF you choose your "buisness model" advantageously.
 
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