1. If I may, I would like to clarify that Indonesia needs both a counter-insurgency strategy (hearts & minds campaign) and a counter-terrorism strategy. The return of ISIS fighters to South East Asia increases the threat level. Increasingly, it will be more common to see fidayeen attacks like:
(i) the 26 Nov 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai; and
(ii) the 21 Sep 2013 attack Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya.
These attacks demonstrate the use of bold, complex, terror tactics to target civilians in mass casualty events (see this 2016 RSIS article:
Cities under siege). In both cases, the response was slow, piecemeal, and confused. The various agencies involved in responding to the terrorist assault were unable to coordinate with one another. Moreover, the police units that initially responded were simply outgunned due to inadequate training and lack of requisite firearms. The Badak is a good protected platform for the TNI to augment any police response during a fidayeen attack (or urban suicide attack).
2. Further, on 13 Nov 2015, eight IS operatives divided into three teams attacked seven different locations in Paris, murdering at least 130 and wounding at least 352 in less than 60 minutes. The attacks targeting a stadium, multiple restaurants, and a concert hall in Paris demonstrated a great degree of coordination and use of multiple tactics, resulting in higher casualties. The attackers were equipped with assault rifles and explosive-laden suicide belts, and operated in a manner reflecting prior training. They maintained a high degree of operational security. The attack was planned in Belgium, giving the terrorists opportunities to discuss operational details free of surveillance by French intelligence, which despite its failures in thwarting the terrorist operation is large, more proactive. During a terrorist commando assault of the 3 incidents mentioned, there is no intent by the attackers to take hostages or negotiate with law enforcement. The longer the attackers remain operational, the more victims will be killed or injured in the attack. Rapid response by available law enforcement and security forces, even if disorganised as seen in the initial response in both Nairobi and Mumbai, saves lives during the early phase of an active shooter attack.
3. What the TNI lacks is a command and control system that is tightly integrated with the police (and other civil defence related agencies), so that the army can act in concert with the rest of the government when called upon.
- For contrast, the SAF’s Special Operations Command Centre (SOCC) is able to process information from multiple sources including Whole-of-Government sensors, the SAF's internal sources and last-mile surveillance assets such as drones to collate a synchronised situation picture. The integrated structure allows seamless access and sharing of information between the counter-terrorism shooters and other government agencies, strengthening cooperation during joint operations.
- Unlike the TNI, Singapore’s SOCC is also linked with homeland security, the Police and other civil defence related agencies, so that the country can act in concert with the rest of the government when called upon. The networked centre leverages technology to support operational planning and coordination, that includes the cyber domain for improving sense-making for better situational awareness.
4. This means cordon operations by using protected mobility vehicle to prevent further movement of the terrorists and to gather intelligence for clean-up operations by special forces.