But you wouldn't call the Dein Bein Phu a successful fort?I reckon the Khe Sanh Combat Base during the Vetnam war could be considered a successful fortress. It managed to hold out against superior besieging enemy forces, and inflicted heavy losses upon them, during the Tet Offensive.
Waylander are you familiar with the defence tactical laser. It has been proven to be able to destroy missiles, mortor, and artillery in the sky. In fack the laser has even been know to be able to shoot down multiple projectiles. If multiple defence systems were set up it could defend the valley from those threats.No, thinking that building such a fortress in a valley with all supplies coming by air while hoping that the Viet Minh isn't able to bring artillery and AAA onto the surrounding hills wasn't very clever to begin with.
France had more tanks than Germany, & planned a mobile war in Belgium, with their right flank anchored on the Maginot line. That was what it was for. They knew the Germans wouldn't launch their main attack against it, but try to go round. I don't know where you get the idea that the French hoped the Germans would bleed themselves dry asaulting the Maginot line. Why would they ignore the possibility of the Germans coming through Belgium - AGAIN?The Maginot line had a deep impact upon French doctrine to the point where their entire military thinking was built around a linear fixed asset. All their prewar TEWT's and field exercises revolved around the concept of static defence. The French high-command literally retreated into their protected shell hoping that the enemy would bleed itself dry throwing wave after wave against fixed positions. If they had spent the same amount of money, time and effort on new tank divisions, infantry divisions and more fighter-aircraft instead of wasting human resources on manning a white elephant then Germany's advance into France would not have been so swift. .
I reckon supporting fire and aerial resupply matter more to a successful fort in modern times than actual fortifications. The ARVN and US Marines could call upon massive air-support, including carpet bombings from B-52s to hold back the NVA. The French did not have these advantages in Dein Bein Phu.But you wouldn't call the Dein Bein Phu a successful fort?
Control was the main failure. The French didn't get their army into gear to react to the southern incursion. If they had, they could probably have easily cut off the "spearhead", trapping a good amount of German troops in France.But more important were German tactics, & command & control, which were greatly superior.
... no it hasn't. For either sentence. Actually for all of it.It has been proven to be able to destroy missiles, mortor, and artillery in the sky. In fack the laser has even been know to be able to shoot down multiple projectiles.
The Tunguska, Pantsyr, and Tor systems all have the capability. Upgraded Shilka and Osa variants could do so under a limited set of circumstances.Neither unguided artillery rockets nor UAVs nor pseudo-IEDs* are "missiles, mortor, and artillery in the sky". There are only two systems proven to have intercepted such, and those are Phalanx C-RAM and Skyshield Mantis NBS.
And DES isn't a single program, it's the whole Directed Energy Systems branch of Boeing (projects are among others: ABL, ATL, HELTD, TRMS).
*- those explosives weren't even buried.
I wasn't arguing with you, just providing a minor correction. In the sense of the capability, what he's talking about is not new and has been around for a long time. Lasers might not be a viable means of doing it, but point-SAM/SPAAG units are.Sure, but have they proven it under battlefield conditions against live targets?
(Phalanx did so in Iraq, Mantis pulled live intercepts in Putlos and Turkey in preparation for its deployment to Afghanistan)
Regarding Tor - in theory you could probably bring down an artillery rocket with a good old I-Hawk if you're really desperate.
I think the analogy is accurate Bonza. A fortress is simply a position which has been heavily fortified to aid in its defense. One of the reasons for such a thing would be to defend what was inside. While the discussion here is definitely focused on the physical, your thought is an interesting one. Many aspects of war have changed so much in recent history, perhaps a new conception of what a "fortress" is, or could be, should be explored.Do you think an argument could be made for secured information networks being a modern-day "fortress" analogue, even if primarily in a non-physical sense?
From my perspective the digital fortress is becoming increasingly important considering the growing scope of cyberwarfare and importance of information control in modern warfare... or maybe I'm just rambling. Don't really know enough to know if the analogy is accurate, just throwing it out there.