Strategies for overcoming VAST technological disadvantages?

[ahussains]

Sorry got confused with amateur artichoke acrobats.

 

[Reg Shoe]

In order to engage an aircraft at anything above low-level (which I'm defining as below 1k altitude), the aircraft will need to be in direct angle to where the Manpad is pointing.

Which is perfectly possible, particularly in a situation where the attacking aircraft are not expecting an attack.

I would think most of aircraft downed by IR are normally SA8/9 SAM types rather than manpads

Of the USAF losses above, MANPADS accounted for 4, i.e. about 1/3 of total SAM losses. Of the rest, 3 were IR (so, about equal in fact), 6 radar o radar/optical. Please, read the USAF report I referenced, it goes into a lot of interesting detail.

That said, MANPADS are a side issue. My main argument is that SAMs, be they SA-8/9 or MANPADS or something else, make a more effective defence against an attacking significantly-superior airforce than any other method, and the experience of the USAF quoted above (13 losses due to SAMs, 3 to AAA, none to aircraft) and the Soviets in Afghanistan, bears this out. Of course, in the case of the USAF, the number of losses compared to the missions flown is negligible, nonetheless SAMs are statistically the most effective defence against them.

Fighter pilots, in general, fear AAA more than SAMs.

Which would seem to be a mistake, given the statistics in the report I quoted above (only 3 of 17 losses due to AAA, the rest due to SAMs).

 

[Reg Shoe]

Remember that aircraft are used to achieve air superiority, while SAMs and AA are used to deny control of an area. The air superiority, and the ability to deny control, are not the same thing.

Quite so. I would argue, however, that in the scenario given at the beginning of the thread (defence against an invading superior air force) denial of control is the option we are looking at.

As I had mentioned before that a ground-based system wouldn't necessarily be cheaper, lower tech, or more effective than an air force.

I keep referring to the USAF report I referenced a few posts back, because it is very illuminating. Again, from that report: USAF combat losses 1990-2002: 13 due to SAMs, 3 due to AAA, 0 due to aircraft. In the same time frame, the USAF shot down 48 aircraft in air-to-air combat. The aircraft were there, just not effective. In the current Iraq conflict, there have been some 26 losses due to ground fire, again, none to aircraft. The numbers support the view that a ground-based system is more effective in the face of a superior air force. Cost and tech are harder to estimate, however I will note that in Desert Storm, a 1960s vintage SA-2 shot down an F-15, which is also the only missile to shoot down an F-15 to date.

The small radars that are mounted on some of the mobile SAM and AA platforms are insufficient to be used to detect incoming attacks being relatively low powered and short-range.

Mobile platforms caused 5 of the USAF losses, static sites 4 (MANPADS or AAA not included in either figure.)
.

In order to provide air defence over a nation without the use of aircraft, there would need to be an air defence unit every few miles all across a country. There would also need to be a way for the different units to communicate with each other to so that the progress attacking aircraft could be tracked.

The level of command and control needed for ground based air defences to significantly disrupt air attacks means that the nation possessing it already has a fairly high degree of technology.

There would be no need to provide air defence units 'every few miles' as likely targets can be predicted: cities, bases, industrial facilities. Nobody is going to attack farmers fields, lakes or deserts. Communication between air defence units has been done since the First World War (see Royal Observer Corps), and even without it the beauty of ground defences localised near likely targets is that they can be up and returning fire on their own initiative within seconds or minutes, unlike interceptors which need to scramble, gain height, and then be vectored in.

Finally, I maintain that the degree of organisation and infrastructure needed to run an airforce is at least equal to that required for a ground-based anti-aircraft defence. You can't keep aircraft in the air indefinately, they need to land to refuel and re-arm, so you need airfields and an (arguably even more complex) radar and control system to know when and where to send them.

It would be possible to go over the data for a suitable country which might expect air attack by a superior force (say, (ex-)Warsaw Pact or Mid East) and calculate the relative costs, but I don't have the time to do it. As weasel1962 said, the US is not a suitable example becuase they assume air superiority and operations not over their own territory,

 

[vivtho]

If the difference between my enemy and me were that *huge*, then I'd have to think different about how I'd want to attack him.

My first target would be his Early Warning and C&C Assets. A simple solution would be to send in a team of commandos near the airbase where his AWACS are based, and blow them out with a shoulder launched SAM during take-off and landing. These are the phases of flight where the pilot has little or no room to maneuver. Even if the airbase is heavily guarded, the landing path is kilometers long and will always have poorly guarded sections within the kill envelope of the SAM. I'd use similar tactics against their ground-based C&C centers with commandos launching bunker-buster weapons against them. These actions would have two effects (1) deny the enemy control of information, and (2) force the enemy to react to my tactics rather than act upon his own plans.

As for actual air combat, I'd spend the build-up to the war doing the following:
(1) Distributing and hiding my forces to make sure that a single strike will not destroy any significant fraction of my forces. This will also force the enemy to use his aircraft on reconnaissance missions, searching for targets, rather than forming strike packages.
(2) Increasing the training for my pilots and ground crew by an order of magnitude. With the lack of AWACS support, if my aircraft (no matter how obsolete) can get to within 5-10 km of their targets, the difference in techonology no longer matters, only the difference in training and pilot skill does. Similarly, a well trained ground crew will allow my aircraft to put my aircraft back into combat faster. A 50% reduction in aircraft turnaround time effectively doubles the strength of my fleet.
(3) Build up stocks of weapons and fuel. I would expect losses in the flow of war materials into my country, either in the form of sanctions, or in the form of the enemy interdicting my supply routes. I would build up enough stocks of weapons and fuel to last the conflict, or at the very least last long enough for diplomatic measures to take effect.
(4) Upgrades. Upgrade my combat systems to gain the maximum effectiveness for the minimum of cost and time. For example, if my MiG-17's were only capable of carrying the R-13 (AA-2) missile, which is virtually worthless in the modern scenario, I'd upgrade them to carry R-73s (AA-11). These are several generations ahead, and the only modifications needed are a change in the launch rail and possibly strengthening of the launch pylon (depending on the version of MiG-17 I'd have). I'd buy handheld GPS systems and helmet mounted IR sensors (sold for infantry or even paintball use!) for my pilots. They might not be as capable as the latest LANTIRN or Litening pods, but they are a worthwhile investment if they give me even 10% of their capability and give my pilots situational awareness which they lacked before.
(5) Force multipliers. Beg, borrow or steal as many of them as I could. These could range from inflight refueling tankers to AWACS or even to access to satellite imagery. Depending on my relationship to other countries, I might not even have to pay for them. For examply, a little known fact about the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war is that the USSR lent India the use of a Tu-126 'Moss' AEW aircraft (piloted and operated by Russians, but with Indian observers and aircraft controllers onboard).
(6) Defenses. To defend every city and key target, I'd use this simple plan. Besides the MANPADS missiles and radar-guided AA artillery, I'd buy several hundred IR sensors (as mentioned above) and give them to men stationed around the city armed with 'dumb' AA weapons like 23/30/57mm cannon. Place a man on every alternate rooftop with a machine gun (or more AA weapons if available). The guy with the IR sensor will fire at the target which he can see, the rest of 'blind' gunners around him would fire their guns in the direction of his tracers. The laws of probability guarantee that at least a few attacking aircraft would be damaged if not destroyed.

Once the war started I'd fight using 'asymmetrical warfare'. No problem if I don't have deep strike aircraft or cruise missiles. Infiltrate a group of commandos into enemy territory. They can either directly attack the enemy by launching mortar attacks against aircraft parking areas, fuel/ammunition dumps etc or indirectly like hitting bridges, railroads etc to deny their use to the enemy.

Just my two cents. What do you think?

 

[vivtho]

Ok, given your clarification, I would like to ask: Is anti-aircraft artillery really any sort of a threat to air craft that are flying at very high altitudes?

I was personally under the impression that anti-aircraft artillery had a range that was similar to Stinger missiles or SA-7s. Am I wrong about this?



Regardless, if someone could expand on the issue of anti-aircraft artillery and high flying aircraft, I would appreciate it.

You can decoy away a missile, but cannot do that with a shell. Even if your small/medium caliber AAA does not hit any aircraft, it forces aircraft to fly higher which exposes them to SAMs. This is precisely the tactic used by Syria in the 1973 Yom Kippur war.

 

[Reg Shoe]

Just my two cents. What do you think?

I think these are pretty much all excellent ideas; you've certainly fleshed out the details of how asymmetric warfare might look in such a scenario.

My only real quibble would be with the tracer-directed AAA fire; using tracers would reveal those gun positions very quickly, and they would be hit with guided munitions. In any case, because guns need to be aimed at a point ahead of the aircraft to allow for shell flight time, aiming at the tracer fire of another gun wouldn't be very effective unless the guns were very close together. My guess is that if suitable targetting equipment wasn't available for every gun, then just blanketing the entire sky with fire in a barrage would be just as effective and safer for the guns.

Great post, overall.

 

[Reg Shoe]

You can decoy away a missile, but cannot do that with a shell. Even if your small/medium caliber AAA does not hit any aircraft, it forces aircraft to fly higher which exposes them to SAMs. This is precisely the tactic used by Syria in the 1973 Yom Kippur war.

THis might be of interest, the book is also available as a PDF:

http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/catalog/books/Werrell_B28.htm

 

[vivtho]

I downloaded that and read the entire book.

One interesting observation the author makes is that missiles have a secondary role in scaring aircraft into flying lower... right into the kill zone of AAA.

I would say that SAMs and AAA are comlementary to each other and help cancel out each other's advantages.

 

[Reg Shoe]

II would say that SAMs and AAA are comlementary to each other and help cancel out each other's advantages.

Indeed.

 

[dioditto]

Strategy to overcome vastly technological superior opponents?

A: Strategy of asymmetrical warfare.

You only have to play this game : "Command and Conquery Generals" a few times online and you will immediately understand it... all the answers are there...

 

[stud40111]

Strategy to overcome vastly technological superior opponents?

A: Strategy of asymmetrical warfare.

You only have to play this game : "Command and Conquery Generals" a few times online and you will immediately understand it... all the answers are there...

Are you serious?

 

[BilalK]

I do not think there are many air forces in this world who have neighbours so powerful that the technological gap is as vast as MiG-15 and F-16 Block 52. The issue is more like air forces possessing aircraft in the generation of the Mirage III/V, F-4 Phantom II, etc as well as early F-16s and MiG-29s against very modern air forces. One way to combat these disadvantages is to perhaps give your older aircraft a massive upgrade - allowing them to use similar systems as newer aircraft. Example, giving the Mirage III and Phantom II BVR capability, give MiG-21 a good HMS and WVR combo - try to exploit certain advantages as much as one can, if possible.

 

[Todjaeger]

I do not think there are many air forces in this world who have neighbours so powerful that the technological gap is as vast as MiG-15 and F-16 Block 52. The issue is more like air forces possessing aircraft in the generation of the Mirage III/V, F-4 Phantom II, etc as well as early F-16s and MiG-29s against very modern air forces. One way to combat these disadvantages is to perhaps give your older aircraft a massive upgrade - allowing them to use similar systems as newer aircraft. Example, giving the Mirage III and Phantom II BVR capability, give MiG-21 a good HMS and WVR combo - try to exploit certain advantages as much as one can, if possible.

I'd say there are a fair number of nations that could fall under this category. Keep in mind though it isn't just necessarily a gap in technology, but also capability. There are a number of nations around the world, that for a number of different reasons, political, economic, etc. lack a modern, fighting air force. Take a look at the different developing nations around the world, not all of them have aircraft, never mind modern fighters or bombers. There are nations, even developed ones, that would need to engage in asymetric warfare to counter air threats, since modern transports like the C-130J despite being high tech, are not capable of bringing down a MiG-15.

I do agree though, not many nations would bother fielding equipment as old at the MiG-15. By now something like that would have been retired and either replaced with something more advanced or the capability would have been given up altogether. Just keep in mind though it was intended to illustrate a gap.

 

[Reg Shoe]

... There are a number of nations around the world, that for a number of different reasons, political, economic, etc. lack a modern, fighting air force. ...

To throw in some examples, Israel, South Africa and China are (or were) all countries which for mostly political reasons had difficulty obtaining modern weapons systems at various times, and developed indigenous upgrades of existing aircraft to compensate. The South African Atlas Cheetah rebuild of the Mirage III is a good example; the upgrades were significant and included aerodynamics as well as systems, giving an aircraft comparable to F-15E / F-16 in many respects.

That said, these three countries have the economic, industrial and research base to do it. The potential would be much less for a developing country, or a reasonably developed country without the industrial base (such as one of the recently-independent states in the Balkans or ex-USSR).