Supplemental to what Lostfleet posted, I'm just a quick note to let you guys know that the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) has reduced its number of fighter squadrons from 7 to 5 over the past few years (currently 3x F-16C/D squadrons, 1x F-5T Squadron and 1x F-15SG Squadron), which means the fighter fleet numbers will be lower than what he posted.
There are also two figher detachments in CONUS:-
(i) a F-16C/D detachment at Luke ((Peace Carvin II - 425 FS); and
(ii) a F-15SG detachment at Mountain Home (Peace Carvin V - 428 FS).
(ii) a F-15SG detachment at Mountain Home (Peace Carvin V - 428 FS).
To further our discussion, below is a list of the top 4 SEA countries ranked by their defence spending to provide context to this discussion. The defence spending data is from SIPRI*, the Total Fighter Fleet** size data is extracted from Flight International's Dec 2009, "World Air Forces" (keep in mind that this is not the most accurate of sources) and the #No. of Troops (active/reserve) are extracted from the IISS' "The Military Balance 2010".
Doctrinally, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) does not intend to defend Singapore at the gates of the city, as it were and is capable and resourced for 'foward defence' of our country. Our thinking on defence is something that is not well understood by casual observers and often leads some misunderstanding. The SAF's declared mission statement is to "enhance Singapore’s peace and security through deterrence and diplomacy, and should these fail, to secure a swift and decisive victory over the aggressor". And I believe the SAF is resourced to carry out the mission statement. It is clear from this post that Singapore has some military power. However, our ability to be seen in exercising this power is constrained by current geo-political reality.
Q1: Why is Singapore so restrained in its use military power?
Ans: We use the SAF to achieve political ends but usually not to conduct war (because war in of itself is a blunt policy tool). The SAF is usually used by Singapore to win friends and influence other countries (and not to fight with them). The SAF has been consistent in our contributions at a time of crisis or help in policing the global commons, to see (be it in Afghanistan, Iraq, Timor Leste, CTF-151, the 2011 Christchurch earthquake and so on).
Singapore tries to maintain with the Indonesian defence establishment warm relations via the conduct of regular bilateral exercises and professional exchanges, which have strengthened the mutual understanding and friendship between the two armed forces (see this [nomedia="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_0kp2jUxVoM"]Republic of Singapore Air Force Video Exercise Elang Indopura 2010 - YouTube[/nomedia]). On the defence front, the SAF and the TNI have co-hosted an ASEAN Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HADR) exercise in 2011. The strong familiarity between both sides and the close personal ties, have allowed the SAF and TNI to work well together in times of emergency and need. Singaporeans will not forget how the TNI provided valuable assistance to Singapore in the search and rescue operations, following the Silkair MI-185 crash in Palembang in 1997. The SAF and the TNI have also worked closely together in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions, such as the relief efforts in Aceh following the Boxing Day Tsunami in 2004, Yogyakarta in 2006 and the Padang earthquake in 2009. BTW, somewhere between 50 and 70 TNI-AU pilots come to Singapore every year for simulator training (see DPM Mr Teo Chee Hean's remarks at the Indonesia Defence University in Dec 2010).
Further, the mere presence of the SAF deters potential aggressors from using force. So ironically, the presence of military power, may reduce the necessity of using military power.
Q2: Why does Singapore focus so much attention on air power?
Ans: Singapore lacks strategic depth and our forces cannot retreat from the city into the jungle. Therefore, it is crucial for us to at least maintain air parity, or if possible, win air superiority so that we can protect the city from aerial bombardment and employ our air power to our tactical advantage to enable us to establish local superiority in battles.
Q3: Why build the Singapore navy, when you have air power?
Ans: We are not self sufficient in food (over the long term) and we need trade to ensure that our city does not starve in a naval blockade. It is no good if we can defend Singapore island but cannot import food because of a naval blockage. In fact, just an increase in insurance rates will affect the price of goods imported into Singapore. Being able to defend Singapore island itself is meaningless if we cannot keep our SLOCs open. Further, air power can have a multiplier effect on the Republic of Singapore Navy's capabilities.
As WWII has shown, a good defence plan for Malaya (against the then external Japanese invasion from the north) from should start at the appropriate geographical choke point in Thai territory (see Appendix 2 for Map of the opening blows in the Pointer Monograph on page 64). The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) landed in Thai territory and proceed to march south. Likewise, in WWII, the Japanese attacked Malaya and Pearl Harbor almost at the same time. In a similar act of tactical brilliance and excellent command of operational art by the IJA, Singapore both fell faster than the IJA had hoped. There is also a Pointer Monograph on the mistakes in the Malayan Campaign, including a chapter on operational art shortcomings by LTC (NS) Singh.
Q4: Beyond terrorism, what are the other potential threats to Singapore?
Ans: Currently, there is a possibility of a troubled peace with our immediate neighbours. This includes the possibility of some state and non-state actors not honouring signed agreements (and they have their stated willingness or intent to do so) so as to introduce sudden disruption to the economy of Singapore.
In fairness, Malaysia has NEVER cut off water supply to Singapore. However, during times of tension, or domestic political upheaval in Malaysia, often there would be calls by local Malaysian politicians to cut off the water supply in violation of international law. In fact, Singapore gets blamed for very imaginative things by Malaysian politicians including floods in Malaysia (which I would believe is caused by weather patterns. I also want to point out that:
(i) On 26 March 1991, four Pakistani terrorists, claiming to be members of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), hijacked SQ 117 from Subang Airport in Kuala Lumpur with 129 passengers and crew. On 27 March 1991, members of our Special Operations Force (SOF) stormed the plane, killing the four Pakistani hijackers and freeing all passengers and crew. The late Ms Benazir Bhutto issued a denial of PPP's involvement. However, it should be noted that Asif Ali Zardori, the husband of the late Ms Bhutto and current President of Pakistan was included among several Pakistani prisoners whom the hijackers of SQ117 wanted released. However, this is not the only terrorist related activity that is linked to events occurring in Malaysian territory - See this RSIS article. I'm not saying that the Malaysian Government has any thing to do with these events (rather that there are security events that occur on Malaysian soil and we need to work with their security agencies).
(ii) After the SQ117 hijack from Subang Airport in Kuala Lumpur on 26 March 1991 (instead of expressing sympathy, promising to tighten security or increasing security cooperation, as Malaysia had done with the US in the aftermath of Sept 11), the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) chose to conduct, an airborne assault exercise, codenamed Pukul Habis (Malay for 'Total Wipeout') on 9 August 1991, with a drop zone in southern Johor just 18km from Singapore. Singapore's response was measured and confident. We triggered an Open Mobilisation on the eve of Singapore's 26th National Day (and in context, not as harmless as Sturm represented in his post). This mobilization meant that many thousands of Singaporean families could not spend time together (by virtue of the fact that Singaporeans were reporting to camp) on a public holiday because our neighbours decided to saber rattle.
(iii) According to a senior Malaysian military officer, the MAF was put on alert in late 1998 as politicians on both sides of the Causeway argued over the status of a CIQ checkpoint. News articles from the period chronicle the public exchanges, but say nothing of the defence postures that the SAF and MAF adopted during this period (See this article by David Boey). Thankfully, Malaysia-Singapore relations are much improved since Dr. M left office.
(iv) Pedra Branca has been a source of bilateral tension between Singapore and Malaysia since 21 December 1979 (when Malaysia unilaterally redrew their maps and claimed Pedra Branca as their territory) and these incidents of tension have been documented by Prof. S. Jayakumar and Prof. Tommy Koh in a 2009 book called "Pedra Branca: The Road to the World Court". It is also a matter of ICJ court record that Malaysia which had in the past arrested Singapore's fishing vessels to increase tensions, including through the use of physical violence against Singapore fishermen in the vicinity of Pedra Branca. Further, at page 46 of the book, the two authors stated that:
The incidents quoted above are a clear indication of hostile intent by the Malaysian Government as they try to create 'alert fatigue' for the Singapore forces deployed there. The fact that incidents after 24 July 2003, made no legal sense at all (as that was the date both countries issued a joint notification to the Registrar of the ICJ, with regards to the agreement to adjudicate the dispute), is an indication of Malaysian hostility (which contributes to the bilateral trust deficit). Looking at the pattern of behaviour, it is clear that the Malaysians were potentially planning an incident if the ICJ ruling was unfavorable (but thankfully, UMNO were able to claim that the ICJ judgment was win-win, despite the fact that the ICJ ruled that Pedra Branca belongs to Singapore).
(ii) After the SQ117 hijack from Subang Airport in Kuala Lumpur on 26 March 1991 (instead of expressing sympathy, promising to tighten security or increasing security cooperation, as Malaysia had done with the US in the aftermath of Sept 11), the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) chose to conduct, an airborne assault exercise, codenamed Pukul Habis (Malay for 'Total Wipeout') on 9 August 1991, with a drop zone in southern Johor just 18km from Singapore. Singapore's response was measured and confident. We triggered an Open Mobilisation on the eve of Singapore's 26th National Day (and in context, not as harmless as Sturm represented in his post). This mobilization meant that many thousands of Singaporean families could not spend time together (by virtue of the fact that Singaporeans were reporting to camp) on a public holiday because our neighbours decided to saber rattle.
(iii) According to a senior Malaysian military officer, the MAF was put on alert in late 1998 as politicians on both sides of the Causeway argued over the status of a CIQ checkpoint. News articles from the period chronicle the public exchanges, but say nothing of the defence postures that the SAF and MAF adopted during this period (See this article by David Boey). Thankfully, Malaysia-Singapore relations are much improved since Dr. M left office.
(iv) Pedra Branca has been a source of bilateral tension between Singapore and Malaysia since 21 December 1979 (when Malaysia unilaterally redrew their maps and claimed Pedra Branca as their territory) and these incidents of tension have been documented by Prof. S. Jayakumar and Prof. Tommy Koh in a 2009 book called "Pedra Branca: The Road to the World Court". It is also a matter of ICJ court record that Malaysia which had in the past arrested Singapore's fishing vessels to increase tensions, including through the use of physical violence against Singapore fishermen in the vicinity of Pedra Branca. Further, at page 46 of the book, the two authors stated that:
"Of particular concern was a marked increase in the number of intrusions of Malaysian Government vessels in the waters around Pedra Branca. For example, from the period 1990-2000, there were some 64 incidents. However, in the next eight years from the period 2000-2008, there were a total of 563 recorded intrusions with the highest number of incidents (167) in 2007 alone. These Malaysian actions did not make any sense to us because the Court would take into account only the conduct and activities of both sides prior to the critical date."
The incidents quoted above are a clear indication of hostile intent by the Malaysian Government as they try to create 'alert fatigue' for the Singapore forces deployed there. The fact that incidents after 24 July 2003, made no legal sense at all (as that was the date both countries issued a joint notification to the Registrar of the ICJ, with regards to the agreement to adjudicate the dispute), is an indication of Malaysian hostility (which contributes to the bilateral trust deficit). Looking at the pattern of behaviour, it is clear that the Malaysians were potentially planning an incident if the ICJ ruling was unfavorable (but thankfully, UMNO were able to claim that the ICJ judgment was win-win, despite the fact that the ICJ ruled that Pedra Branca belongs to Singapore).
Indonesia also suddenly cut-off the supply of sand to Singapore in Feb 2007. This was recognized as having an adverse economic impact on Singapore and we have since found other sources of sand supply. Further, in May 2008, the Regional Indonesian Assembly of Batam threatened to block ConocoPhilips' ability to supply natural gas to Singapore (under a 20 year long term sales contract), as the some gas supplied to Singapore passes through Batam via the Grissik-Batam-Singapore Pipeline (as Batam at that time was suffering from alternate power cuts and who can blame them for being upset). BTW ConocoPhilips earns more revenue by selling natural gas to Singapore, as we buy at a higher price. Batam on the other hand buys at lower prices and are also not committed to a long term contract.
While the disputes with the Indonesian navy (over the sand and granite issues) and their local authorities (over natural gas supplies for power generation) are not immediate causes for war, they are potentially disruptive to Singapore's economy. You could also argue that given the more interdependent nature of the economies of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, there is less incentive to go to war. Over the last 40 years, intra-ASEAN trade has grown, enriching our peoples, which has helped set the stage for the possibility of greater geo-strategic stability. The current problem is more related to the uneven distribution of wealth.
There are no permanent fighter RSAF detachments in Australia or Taiwan. The Singapore army still maintains bases in Taiwan but the SAF is very low key about our presence and about our unilateral exercises in Taiwan.
However, there are RSAF aircraft housed at two locations in Australia:
(i) RAAF Base Pearce is home to the RSAF's 130 Squadron, which uses the Pilatus PC-21 trainer; and
(ii) a Super Puma detachment is based at the Australian Army Aviation Centre in Oakey, Queensland.
(ii) a Super Puma detachment is based at the Australian Army Aviation Centre in Oakey, Queensland.
Many thanks to the Australians for hosting the SAF and RSAF at various locations over the decade. There are also frequent joint and multi-national air force exercises with the ADF. There is even an annual unilateral SAF armour exerise, with air-land integration training (65 day Exercise Wallaby @Shoalwater Bay, which hosts about 5,500 SAF personnel and over 400 SAF assets).
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