I think we have some points of agreement and that both our posts are talking at cross purposes. I suspect that we have more in common in our analysis than is apparent.
Taken globally there is not denying that the US power is in elegant decline. And different countries will adopt different strategies to accommodate this change. However in air power terms, the USAF has no peer. In fact, the air power of the USN has no peer either.
I would expect that in areas which are unstable, the nations are increasing their airpower by some combination of introducing force multipliers, additional combat aircraft, or both into their respective air forces. Subject to availability of funding of course...
In some cases, for some countries, even as the total aircraft numbers (and number of squadrons) stay the same the introduction of new platforms and more capable force multipliers result in a significant gain in net usable air combat power. And that the obstacle to further growth in capabilities is not money alone.
I'll just give two illustrative examples. For small nations like Singapore, with a limited pilot talent pool, the greatest constraint is strangely not money (though it is a consideration). For a rogue state like Iran, their greatest constraint is access to technology - as very few countries are willing to be their supplier.
I personally do not entire agree that regional/area security (or a lack thereof) correlates to changes in aircraft numbers, positive or negative.
The India air force is an example where they are trying to increase both numbers and quality (in terms of force multipliers). They are in an action/reaction cycle with the developments in Pakistan and China.
The Indian approach is fundamentally different from that available to Japan and S. Korea. S. Korea is an example of a country that is significantly in force multipliers and in better platforms (and not by increasing numbers). I would comfortably group Australia and Singapore in this analytic category too.
What do you think?
This viewpoint IMO overlooks changes in doctrine, technology and equipment which can have an impact on the effectiveness of an air force (i.e. force multipliers)
The problem with our discussion thus far is that, we, as participants fail to identify the different strategies available to different air forces at different stages of development, which can lead to confusion in any analysis. Only when we overlay geo-politics with a discussion on air force capability maturity (and their access to technology) can we come to a meaningful understanding of current developments.
What might be something better to look at is the change in air power trends, instead of the numbers trends for combat aircraft.
For the purposes of analysis, I think you have hit the nail on the head here. However, please note that in my prior post, I was purely talking about numbers and that not all air forces were seeking to reduce their total numbers.
From a numbers perspective then, the US Air Force is weaker now, or was weaker in 1999, than it was in 1989.
Yes, numbers don't tell the whole story.
On occasion I may quibble with you over details. However, even as I do so, I still very much value your thoughts and appreciate the feedback.