Russian 10,000 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) shield
- Thread starter killbill2
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DoC_FouALieR
New Member
Moreover, a Brahmos being supersonic and flying at low altitude, it is going to be heard by lot of people due to supersonic bang, and since commercial and military jet are not allowed to travel at such a speed at low altitude....
On the other hand, a fighter guided by GCI can get closer to an JASSM, tomahawk or whatever subsonic cruise missile you want, and shoot it down...
On the other hand, a fighter guided by GCI can get closer to an JASSM, tomahawk or whatever subsonic cruise missile you want, and shoot it down...
Brahmos flys all the way supersonic. So Im not sure how mutch of a supersonic boom you will hear from a 300km distance. (I read somewhere 700 km variant is expected) + You will launch swarms of it (like CBG) and you will want it with nuclear warhead like Yakhont or Moskit.DoC_FouALieR said:Moreover, a Brahmos being supersonic and flying at low altitude, it is going to be heard by lot of people due to supersonic bang, and since commercial and military jet are not allowed to travel at such a speed at low altitude....
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DoC_FouALieR
New Member
...Brahmos flys all the way supersonic. So Im not sure how mutch of a supersonic boom you will hear from a 300km distance.
The missile has to overfly populated area, thus those people are going to wonder what happen when they hear a big "boom" caused by the supersonic flight of this missile...
Provided that media hear it and that people with a minimum of military knowledge are around, anybody will know that they were targeted by a supersonic cruise missile... perhaps after the strike.
And since there is not a lot of country employing supersonic cruise missiles, the attacker is thus spotted...
A subsonic cruise missile could easily be confused with a small turboprop tourism aircraft, and numerous are in service with an array of countries... (US and UK Tomahawk, Harpoon, French Storm Shadow -which is stealth-, Russian Kh-55, etc etc)
Brahmos/Yakhont/Moskit main task is CBG. (no town around it)DoC_FouALieR said:...
The missile has to overfly populated area, thus those people are going to wonder what happen when they hear a big "boom" caused by the supersonic flight of this missile...
Provided that media hear it and that people with a minimum of military knowledge are around, anybody will know that they were targeted by a supersonic cruise missile... perhaps after the strike.
And since there is not a lot of country employing supersonic cruise missiles, the attacker is thus spotted...
A subsonic cruise missile could easily be confused with a small turboprop tourism aircraft, and numerous are in service with an array of countries... (US and UK Tomahawk, Harpoon, French Storm Shadow -which is stealth-, Russian Kh-55, etc etc)
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #26
Well i clacualted renentry sppeds of ICBm warheads and witha max engagement altitude of 100,000 feet you only have 5 seconds to react and shoot down the warheads. Another thing I found out was All the radars combined can easily track all f our warheads. they could track 5,000 without supercomputers. they definetely have the bandwith to pull this off and their hardened radars are highly resistant to EMP so small yield nuclear tipped interceptors aren't a problem.
Do u think the US ICBM/SLBM force is still crdible???? I mean if 5700 warheads are coming at you and thos eradars can track allt hose warheads is 5 seconds enough to launcha llt he interceptos at once and neutralize thse warheads or no????
Do u think the US ICBM/SLBM force is still crdible???? I mean if 5700 warheads are coming at you and thos eradars can track allt hose warheads is 5 seconds enough to launcha llt he interceptos at once and neutralize thse warheads or no????
ICBMs are virtually impossible to be intercepted at Final Stages.killbill2 said:Well i clacualted renentry sppeds of ICBm warheads and witha max engagement altitude of 100,000 feet you only have 5 seconds to react and shoot down the warheads. Another thing I found out was All the radars combined can easily track all f our warheads. they could track 5,000 without supercomputers. they definetely have the bandwith to pull this off and their hardened radars are highly resistant to EMP so small yield nuclear tipped interceptors aren't a problem.
Do u think the US ICBM/SLBM force is still crdible???? I mean if 5700 warheads are coming at you and thos eradars can track allt hose warheads is 5 seconds enough to launcha llt he interceptos at once and neutralize thse warheads or no????
As you said their speeds will be way too high.
And they also deploy MIRVs with Countermeasures, Evasive maneuvers.
The only easy chance is Boost Phase Interception. Any Ballistic missile is most vunerable at this Stage.
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #28
Well the Sprint missile had the same engagement altitude howevr I'm not sure how an ABM system around the whole country(10,000 interceptors) that used short range high acceleration missiles could perform against a full ICBM andSLBM attack. 5 seconds doesn't sound like much but you could intercept warheads.
No antimissile system in the world has the ability to kill ICBM.Well the Sprint missile had the same engagement altitude howevr I'm not sure how an ABM system around the whole country(10,000 interceptors) that used short range high acceleration missiles could perform against a full ICBM andSLBM attack. 5 seconds doesn't sound like much but you could intercept warheads.
Grand Danois
Entertainer
The GMD is supposed to. But that is also a midcourse interceptor, so it doesn't have to deal wit those ridicolous re-entry speeds.No antimissile system in the world has the ability to kill ICBM.
I dont know man - GMD had lots of failure tests - and because last two where successful does not mean system is operational like Americans do.The GMD is supposed to. But that is also a midcourse interceptor, so it doesn't have to deal wit those ridicolous re-entry speeds.
Besides system is not tested against ICBM with decoys not to mention manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle Russians are using on top of the Topol-M.
Grand Danois
Entertainer
True. I depends on the sophistication of the ICBM. The GMD is so far supposed to take down simple ICBM's with simple decoys, like those NK perhaps will have at some point. Not the TOPOL-M.I dont know man - GMD had lots of failure tests - and because last two where successful does not mean system is operational like Americans do.
Besides system is not tested against ICBM with decoys not to mention manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle Russians are using on top of the Topol-M.
The failures are of realibility of systems, not of the principle and what it will eventually be capable of.
Shooting down TOPOL-M's types may well be down the develpment path. But not because Russia have them, but because others do.
I have not read any decoys even simple ones where used during the test, so have any prof.True. I depends on the sophistication of the ICBM. The GMD is so far supposed to take down simple ICBM's with simple decoys, like those NK perhaps will have at some point. Not the TOPOL-M.
Besides have you any information on BM what was used to intercept during testing.
And realibility of the system is major thing on every piece of weapon - perhaps most important.The failures are of realibility of systems, not of the principle and what it will eventually be capable of.
Yes Topol-M is one hell of a thing and to make things even worse you can allways put manoeuvreable re-entry vehicle on top some older ICBM making it state of the art piece of equipment.Shooting down TOPOL-M's types may well be down the develpment path. But not because Russia have them, but because others do
Grand Danois
Entertainer
The latest (IFT-16) used what I presume to be a modified Patriot missile.I have not read any decoys even simple ones where used during the test, so have any prof.
Besides have you any information on BM what was used to intercept during testing.
That is at least 3,500 km. But anyhow, the GMD is designed to counter iCBM's.GBI from Vandenberg Successfully Intercepts Target Missile
September 1, 2006 :: The Missile Defense Agency :: News
The Missile Defense Agency today successfully intercepted a target ballistic missile over the Pacific in the widest test in 18 months of the Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) missile. The Patriot-As-A-Target missile was launched from Kodiak, Alaska, and followed a trajectory similar to the path a North Korean missile might follow in an attack on West Coast cities. It was successfully shot down by a GBI launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. The test was designed to collect large amounts of data rather than shoot down the target, although it accomplished both goals, the target warhead being destroyed. The test also marked the first time that a ground-based interceptor missile was launched from Vandenberg.
http://www.missilethreat.com/news/200609011332.html
As to decoy discrimination, they are not the primary focus of the GMD, though IFT-9 included 6 decoy ballons.
This link for decoys:
The Target Set for Missile Defense Test IFT-9
It seems that decoy discrimation testing is taking place elsewhere, than in the actual missile firings in the BMD programme. THAAD has done testing with balloon decoys too. Nonetheless, the challenge seems to be discrimination from the ground sensors rather than from the kill vehicle.
Yes, but the GMD is being operational and prototype tested at the same time. So malfunctions are to be expected. The crude problems are being corrected and support structure improved. It is an "operational test bed," if you will. It is not the engagement parameters that seems to be wrong, but mechanical failures.And realibility of the system is major thing on every piece of weapon - perhaps most important.
The latest (IFT-16) used what I presume to be a modified Patriot missile.A capability-based approach relies on continuing and comprehensive assessments of the threat, available technology, and what can be built to do an acceptable job, and does not accommodate a hard requirement that may not be appropriate.
Perhaps the most telling difference between the two acquisition approaches is that our capabilities to perform are updated every four to eight months to reflect and accommodate the pace of our progress. We are no longer compelled to pursue a one hundred percent solution for every possible attack scenario before we can provide any defense at all. We are now able to develop and field a system that provides some capability that we do not have today with the knowledge that we will continue to improve that system over time. We call this evolutionary, capability-based development and acquisition.
[...]
When we put the midcourse elements (GMD and Aegis BMD) of the BMD system on alert, we will have a capability that we currently do not have. In my opinion, a capability against even a single reentry vehicle has significant military utility. Even that modest defensive capability will help reduce the more immediate threats to our security and enhance our ability to defend our interests abroad. We also may cause adversaries of the United States to rethink their investments in ballistic missiles. Because of this committee’s continued support we will have some capability this year against near-term
threats.
[...]
Last year, we made it clear that this initial capability would be very basic if it were used. We also emphasized that instead of building a test bed that might be used operationally, we would field more interceptors and have them available for use while we continue to test. Because the test bed provides the infrastructure for this initial capability,
the additional budget request for the twenty Block 2004 interceptors and associated support was about $1.5 billion in FY 2004 and FY 2005.
Forces to be placed on alert as part of the initial configuration include up to 20 ground-based interceptors at Fort Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg AFB, an upgraded Cobra Dane radar on Eareckson Air Station in Alaska, and an upgraded early warning radar in the United Kingdom. We are procuring equipment for three BMD-capable Aegis cruisers with up to ten SM-3 missiles to be available by the end of 2005. The Navy is working very closely with us on ship availability schedules to support that plan.
Additionally, ten Aegis destroyers will be modified with improved SPY-1 radars to provide flexible long-range surveillance and track capability of ICBM threats by the end of 2005, with an additional five destroyers with this capability by 2006, for a total of 15 Aegis BMD destroyers and three Aegis BMD cruisers.
[...]
Testing Missile Defenses—We Need To Build It To Test It
Another key question surrounds the nature of missile defense systems themselves. How do you realistically test an enormous and complex system, one that covers eight time zones and engages enemy warheads in space? The answer is that we have to build it as we would configure it for operations in order to test it. That is exactly what we are doing by building our test bed and putting it on alert this year.
By hooking it all up and putting what we have developed in the field, we will be in a better position to fine-tune the system and improve its performance.
Testing system operational capability in this program is, in many ways, different from operational testing involving more traditional weapon systems. All weapon systems should be tested in their operational environments or in environments that nearly approximate operational conditions. This is more readily accomplished for some systems, and is more difficult to do for others.
during testing.
That is at least 3,500 km. But anyhow, the GMD is designed to counter iCBM's.GBI from Vandenberg Successfully Intercepts Target Missile
September 1, 2006 :: The Missile Defense Agency :: News
The Missile Defense Agency today successfully intercepted a target ballistic missile over the Pacific in the widest test in 18 months of the Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) missile. The Patriot-As-A-Target missile was launched from Kodiak, Alaska, and followed a trajectory similar to the path a North Korean missile might follow in an attack on West Coast cities. It was successfully shot down by a GBI launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. The test was designed to collect large amounts of data rather than shoot down the target, although it accomplished both goals, the target warhead being destroyed. The test also marked the first time that a ground-based interceptor missile was launched from Vandenberg.
http://www.missilethreat.com/news/200609011332.html
As to decoy discrimination, they are not the primary focus of the GMD, though IFT-9 included 6 decoy ballons.
This link for decoys:
The Target Set for Missile Defense Test IFT-9
http://www.ucsusa.org/global_securi...target-set-for-missile-defense-test-ift9.html
It seems that decoy discrimation testing is taking place elsewhere, than in the actual missile firings in the BMD programme. THAAD has done testing with balloon decoys too. Nonetheless, the challenge seems to be discrimination from the ground sensors rather than at the kill vehicle.
Yes, but the GMD is being operational and prototype tested at the same time. So malfunctions are to be expected. The crude problems are being corrected and support structure improved. It is an "operational test bed," if you will. It is not the engagement parameters that seems to be wrong, but mechanical failures.And realibility of the system is major thing on every piece of weapon - perhaps most important.
A capability-based approach relies on continuing and comprehensive assessments of the threat, available technology, and what can be built to do an acceptable job, and does not accommodate a hard requirement that may not be appropriate.
Perhaps the most telling difference between the two acquisition approaches is that our capabilities to perform are updated every four to eight months to reflect and accommodate the pace of our progress. We are no longer compelled to pursue a one hundred percent solution for every possible attack scenario before we can provide any defense at all. We are now able to develop and field a system that provides some capability that we do not have today with the knowledge that we will continue to improve that system over time. We call this evolutionary, capability-based development and acquisition.
[...]
When we put the midcourse elements (GMD and Aegis BMD) of the BMD system on alert, we will have a capability that we currently do not have. In my opinion, a capability against even a single reentry vehicle has significant military utility. Even that modest defensive capability will help reduce the more immediate threats to our security and enhance our ability to defend our interests abroad. We also may cause adversaries of the United States to rethink their investments in ballistic missiles. Because of this committee’s continued support we will have some capability this year against near-term
threats.
[...]
Last year, we made it clear that this initial capability would be very basic if it were used. We also emphasized that instead of building a test bed that might be used operationally, we would field more interceptors and have them available for use while we continue to test. Because the test bed provides the infrastructure for this initial capability,
the additional budget request for the twenty Block 2004 interceptors and associated support was about $1.5 billion in FY 2004 and FY 2005.
Forces to be placed on alert as part of the initial configuration include up to 20 ground-based interceptors at Fort Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg AFB, an upgraded Cobra Dane radar on Eareckson Air Station in Alaska, and an upgraded early warning radar in the United Kingdom. We are procuring equipment for three BMD-capable Aegis cruisers with up to ten SM-3 missiles to be available by the end of 2005. The Navy is working very closely with us on ship availability schedules to support that plan.
Additionally, ten Aegis destroyers will be modified with improved SPY-1 radars to provide flexible long-range surveillance and track capability of ICBM threats by the end of 2005, with an additional five destroyers with this capability by 2006, for a total of 15 Aegis BMD destroyers and three Aegis BMD cruisers.
[...]
Testing Missile Defenses—We Need To Build It To Test It
Another key question surrounds the nature of missile defense systems themselves. How do you realistically test an enormous and complex system, one that covers eight time zones and engages enemy warheads in space? The answer is that we have to build it as we would configure it for operations in order to test it. That is exactly what we are doing by building our test bed and putting it on alert this year.
By hooking it all up and putting what we have developed in the field, we will be in a better position to fine-tune the system and improve its performance.
Testing system operational capability in this program is, in many ways, different from operational testing involving more traditional weapon systems. All weapon systems should be tested in their operational environments or in environments that nearly approximate operational conditions. This is more readily accomplished for some systems, and is more difficult to do for others.
As to the future:Yes Topol-M is one hell of a thing and to make things even worse you can allways put manoeuvreable re-entry vehicle on top some older ICBM making it state of the art piece of equipment.
We also have several Science and Technology initiatives to increase BMD system firepower and sensor capability and extend the engagement battle space of terminal elements. One of our main efforts is to increase BMD system effectiveness in the midcourse phase by placing Multiple Kill Vehicles on a single booster, thus reducing the discrimination burden on BMD sensors.
We also are conducting important work on advanced systems to develop laser technology and laser radar, advanced discrimination, improved focal plane arrays, and a high-altitude airship for improved surveillance, communication, and early warning.
Lieutenant General Ronald T. Kadish, USAF
Director, Missile Defense Agency
Missile Defense Program and Fiscal Year 2005 Budget
Before the
Senate Armed Services Committee
March 11, 2004
An answer to one of my own questions earlier in the thread.
We also must think beyond the initial defensive capability if we are to meet our key national security objective of defending our friends and allies from missile attack. In Block 2006, we are preparing to move forward when appropriate to build a third GBI site at a location outside the United States.
Not only will this site add synergy to the overall BMD system by protecting the United States, but it will put us in a better position to defend our allies and friends and troops overseas against long-range ballistic missiles.
For the cost of ten GBIs and associated infrastructure, we will be able to demonstrate in the most convincing way possible our commitment to this critical mission objective. The location of this site is still subject to negotiation with no final architecture defined nor investment committed until FY 2006.
Lieutenant General Ronald T. Kadish, USAF
Director, Missile Defense Agency
Missile Defense Program and Fiscal Year 2005 Budget
Before the
Senate Armed Services Committee
March 11, 2004
As to the future:Yes Topol-M is one hell of a thing and to make things even worse you can allways put manoeuvreable re-entry vehicle on top some older ICBM making it state of the art piece of equipment.
We also have several Science and Technology initiatives to increase BMD system firepower and sensor capability and extend the engagement battle space of terminal elements. One of our main efforts is to increase BMD system effectiveness in the midcourse phase by placing Multiple Kill Vehicles on a single booster, thus reducing the discrimination burden on BMD sensors.
We also are conducting important work on advanced systems to develop laser technology and laser radar, advanced discrimination, improved focal plane arrays, and a high-altitude airship for improved surveillance, communication, and early warning.
Lieutenant General Ronald T. Kadish, USAF
Director, Missile Defense Agency
Missile Defense Program and Fiscal Year 2005 Budget
Before the
Senate Armed Services Committee
March 11, 2004
An answer to one of my own questions earlier in the thread.
So, we are talking GMD interceptors for somewhere in central Europe...We also must think beyond the initial defensive capability if we are to meet our key national security objective of defending our friends and allies from missile attack. In Block 2006, we are preparing to move forward when appropriate to build a third GBI site at a location outside the United States.
Not only will this site add synergy to the overall BMD system by protecting the United States, but it will put us in a better position to defend our allies and friends and troops overseas against long-range ballistic missiles.
For the cost of ten GBIs and associated infrastructure, we will be able to demonstrate in the most convincing way possible our commitment to this critical mission objective. The location of this site is still subject to negotiation with no final architecture defined nor investment committed until FY 2006.
Lieutenant General Ronald T. Kadish, USAF
Director, Missile Defense Agency
Missile Defense Program and Fiscal Year 2005 Budget
Before the
Senate Armed Services Committee
March 11, 2004
I think your all forgetting the reason why the U.S. is using ballistic system instead of nuclear system of ABM systems. Radiation is why the U.S. doesn't use their old systems anymore, especially in this day where the likelihood of a full nuclear exchange is extremely low. When the worry is rouge missile launch, a nuclear ABM system is flawed because if it is successful you will rain down radiation down on your own country. That was Russia and the area needs is another nuclear disaster!
You will get extremely, and i mean EXTREMELY low radiation from a small high-alt nuclear explosion. So its more like a public radio-phobia than a legitimate concern.I think your all forgetting the reason why the U.S. is using ballistic system instead of nuclear system of ABM systems. Radiation is why the U.S. doesn't use their old systems anymore, especially in this day where the likelihood of a full nuclear exchange is extremely low. When the worry is rouge missile launch, a nuclear ABM system is flawed because if it is successful you will rain down radiation down on your own country. That was Russia and the area needs is another nuclear disaster!
Have You thought of what a bunch of Virginia class would do to that radar system: Loosening cruise missiles from the Northern Russian Coast and the Gotland Depth (about 280 m) in the Baltic? I seem to recall a certain german studen that flew low level and landed on the red square.
Naw... Not in this lifetime, and probably not in the next either. And it wouldnt matter if such a package had dummies or course evasion either. We would have a hard enough time with a few coming over let alone a full attack package. Course the ABM isnt meant to dissolve the concept of MAD with the Russians, just as their small ABM system was never meant to. Lets face it, were all going to finish our lives needing to retain the "20 min of pleasure before they hit" plan. Heck, when I was a kid we were still doing duck and cover.Do u think the US ICBM/SLBM force is still crdible???? I mean if 5700 warheads are coming at you and thos eradars can track allt hose warheads is 5 seconds enough to launcha llt he interceptos at once and neutralize thse warheads or no????
Course any country that tried such an attack would probably suffer less casualties if they just shot their missiles at themselves.