Some talks around altering the Russian nuclear doctrine. Kommersant
talked to a few Russian experts on the subject and here is what they had to say, thought some may be interested. I used google translate for the descriptions of who the people are. The rest are summaries in my own words.
Alexey Arbatov
Head of the International Security Center of the National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations named after E. M. Primakov of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO RAS), Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences
- He says that while doctrine allows for different interpretations and debate around it, the current doctrine is the best they ever had. He is proposing only one rather boring change and that is to include the allies into it. In other words, Russia can use nuclear weapons when their allies are attacked with conventional weapons and the existence of their state is threatened. Basically the same “rule” they currently apply to Russia.
Grigory Berdennikov
Expert of the Center for Energy and Security, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, who oversaw non-proliferation and arms control issues, former Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and international organizations in Vienna
- This guy clearly had done some extensive work in the area. He thinks that in the current situation it would not be appropriate to have stricter restrictions than the Russian opponents have. He stresses, however, that there should be no obligation for the state to use nuclear weapons in any situation. In other words, the decision has to be made by the competent people, the highest power.
Furthermore, he is suggesting that Russia should align their nuclear doctrine with the agreements reached in 1995 (between Russia, USA, Great Britain, France, and China) where Russia agreed not to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states, unless those states attack Russia and are supported by another nuclear state. Here is drawing a parallel between Ukraine that is supported by the US (of course, France and the UK as well) and is currently attacking Russian territory. He suggests that drone attack on Kremlin and Kursk incursion would clearly fall under these circumstances. He further suggests that since this clause had already been agreed upon previously, the United States, UK, and France would have limited ability to criticize Russia for such a change.
Vasily Kashin
Director of the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies of the National Research University "Higher School of Economics", Senior Researcher of the Institute of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences
- His idea is that the situation from the military-technical perspective changed quite bit as there is now a wide availability of high-precision short- and medium-range weapons, including ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles, as well as the UAVs. At the same time, the level of contradiction between Russia and the West (he calls it between major powers) is equivalent to that of the early Cold War years. Russia is involved in the hybrid war with NATO, while United States is deploying short- and medium-range (and in the future hypersonic) missiles in Europe. In these dangerous circumstances, he argues, the doctrine has to be very specific and account for the potential conflict between Russia and NATO, including the Ukrainian issue.
So he proposes that the threshold for nuclear use should be lowered and the following should be added to the existing doctrine:
1) nuclear weapons can be used in the event of a naval blockade of Russia or a Russian region (Kaliningrad);
2) nuclear weapons will be used (note the choice of “will be used” here) in case of an attack on nuclear energy infrastructure or other hazardous industries, in the event of serious contamination of the area;
3) in response of an attempt to eliminate political leadership of Russia;
4) in response to a large-scale attack with conventional weapons on Russian populated areas (basically includes everywhere where people live, ie villages, towns, cities) and infrastructure.
I am assuming that “will be used” also applies to 3) and 4).
Nothing to do with the doctrine, but he also reiterates that it is imperative to abandon the initiative of 1991 to deploy nuclear weapons in central storage facilities, and urgently start production and deployment of short- and medium-range missile systems.
Vasily Lata
Chief Researcher of the Military Academy of Strategic Missile Forces, retired Lieutenant General, Board Member of the PIR Center
- He says he had limited participation in the development of the current doctrine, where amid disagreements between the MoD and Minister of Foreign Affairs, MoFA’s soft version was adopted, where Russia would not use the nukes first. The idea, according to him, was that all disagreements would be sorted diplomatically. Later they added “existential threat” to the doctrine. Despite the soft version, he says, the purpose of nuclear weapons is deterrence.
However, in his opinion, the rules of international relations have changed and keep changing, and not for the better. The Western elites and political leadership, as well as their satellites, have lost the sense of fear and the thresholds agreed earlier are forgotten and no longer working. Thus, he is suggesting to define new thresholds of when the nuclear weapons
will be used without any ambiguity. Russia should also abandon the “non-use of nuclear weapons first” and gradually increase the nuclear readiness and then inflict “demonstration and de-escalations strikes” with tactical and strategic nuclear weapons in a situation where there is infringement on Russian national interests and state security.
Now that is a little nutty (that’s from me, lol, not from the guy, in case it isn’t clear).
Sergey Rogov
Scientific Director of the Institute of the United States and Canada of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Member of the Russian Council for International Affairs
- Along the same line of some previous comments, the current doctrine had served its purpose well, but the situation is now different. He says that the United States has set the goal to defeat both Russia and China, which is a departure from the recognition that there could be no winners in a nuclear conflict. Some words about the new US doctrine, which isn’t published, but includes the possibility of use of tactical nuclear weapons in the regions where NATO doesn’t have overwhelming numerical superiority over conventional Russian Forces (ie, Baltic States), as well as previously mentioned recognition of deployment of the American missiles in Germany that can reach European parts of Russia. He also talks about the threat to St Petersburg and Murmansk posed by the accession of Finland into the ranks of NATO and mentions the Ukrainian strikes on the Russian airfields with strategic bombers and early detection radars, threats to Zaporozhie and Kursk nuclear power plants.
Having said that, he considers it would be wrong for Russia to reserve the right to preemptively strike first, but some specific formulations and measures that would demonstrate that Russia can react to such threats must be taken. He didn’t specify further.
Dmitry Trenin
Professor-researcher of the National Research University "Higher School of Economics", leading researcher of the Center for International Security of the National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations named after E. M. Primakov of the Russian Academy of Sciences
- A proxy war of the collective west with and an attempt to inflict a “strategic defeat” to Russia, using Ukraine as tool, is forcing Russia to adjust its nuclear doctrine. He thinks that the following would be the most urgent and important changes:
1) the current threshold of use of nuclear weapons (existential threat) is too high and should be reduced to ‘threat to most important strategic interests of Russia”;
2) it should be made clear that Russia is willing to use nukes in the circumstances described above;
3) since NATO is a nuclear alliance and considering the collective nature of the threat created by the West, he would advise to provide for a possibility of nuclear strike on a non-nuclear NATO state.
Trenin is obviously an all out nuts, but those who follow are probably aware.
Lately, I saw the discussion of this subject taking place and today saw a few people talking about this particular article. Thought some here would be interested and I would provide some context and a bit more detailed summary, which I think is beneficial. Of course, this has nothing to do with the practical changes to the doctrine, but it surely shows different points of view and where the wind blows.
