Russia - General Discussion.

ngatimozart

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That would be a fairly dangerous Maskirovka. Russia already committed more forces than it can afford, near Ukraine. It left much of its other regions under-staffed. It would face a real danger from its other neighbors. It is possible Russia is banking on China to protect some of its interests, like the Kuril islands.
True, but the target doesn't have to be far from the Ukraine. I did think of the three Baltic States; Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, but all three are NATO members and that would automatically bring down a power of hurt on top of Putin.

But what about Belarus? Putin has been wanting to incorporate Belarus back into Mother Russia for years. However Lukashenko has so far resisted his overtures although remaining friendly with Putin. Lukashenko has been and is facing political problems at home and the last thing Putin would want is a pro western Belarus; another Ukraine, on his border. From Putin's point of view Belarussians are Russians and they should be protected from the evils and sinfulness of the wicked west.

How much pushback and blowback would he get from the west if he invaded and assimilated Belarus?

That's my 1 cents worth.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
True, but the target doesn't have to be far from the Ukraine. I did think of the three Baltic States; Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, but all three are NATO members and that would automatically bring down a power of hurt on top of Putin.

But what about Belarus? Putin has been wanting to incorporate Belarus back into Mother Russia for years. However Lukashenko has so far resisted his overtures although remaining friendly with Putin. Lukashenko has been and is facing political problems at home and the last thing Putin would want is a pro western Belarus; another Ukraine, on his border. From Putin's point of view Belarussians are Russians and they should be protected from the evils and sinfulness of the wicked west.

How much pushback and blowback would he get from the west if he invaded and assimilated Belarus?

That's my 1 cents worth.
But then, why not just assure everyone he is committed to a push mostly from the North, where Kiev is located?
The Belarussian armed forces are also quite small, under-equipped, under-trained, and under-funded. They could present no opposition to Russia if it came to that. Lukashenko is already a puppet, to an extent. There is a lot of leverage for Russia before needing a military. If anything, taking the military route vs Belarus would be a huge loss for Russia.
Much of its political gravitas derives from its narrative of strength - in every aspect. Action first - and decisive at that. Bureaucracy not required. Any military solution would significantly hurt this reputation.
Its only saving grace is that it trades and deals with countries that don't have much of a choice since they already oppose the west. But already its monopoly as an arms trader and sponsor is being shredded by new competitors.
 

ngatimozart

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But then, why not just assure everyone he is committed to a push mostly from the North, where Kiev is located?
The Belarussian armed forces are also quite small, under-equipped, under-trained, and under-funded. They could present no opposition to Russia if it came to that. Lukashenko is already a puppet, to an extent. There is a lot of leverage for Russia before needing a military. If anything, taking the military route vs Belarus would be a huge loss for Russia.
Much of its political gravitas derives from its narrative of strength - in every aspect. Action first - and decisive at that. Bureaucracy not required. Any military solution would significantly hurt this reputation.
Its only saving grace is that it trades and deals with countries that don't have much of a choice since they already oppose the west. But already its monopoly as an arms trader and sponsor is being shredded by new competitors.
Yep I know. I am playing devils advocate, but also something just doesn't smell quite right. I don't know what it is bit it doesn't smell right. I get this niggling impression at the back of my head that something else is at play here, but what?
 

Rob c

The Bunker Group
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Yep I know. I am playing devils advocate, but also something just doesn't smell quite right. I don't know what it is bit it doesn't smell right. I get this niggling impression at the back of my head that something else is at play here, but what?
I have the same feeling, as it all seems a little too heavily pre telegraphed in advance. That does not mean that the Ukrain is not a target, but what are the as yet unspoken gains for Putin. There will be something as he is not the most up front leader, by a long shot.
 
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Feanor

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An attack on DNR/LNR would be a double loss for Ukraine. It would waste what little valuable munitions it has, on an enemy that has the inherent defensive advantage, thus depleting its own forces before an engagement with Russia, which at that point would be assured.
Ukraine can defeat the rebels if Russia stays out. This is a reality. It's not a waste if it gets them Lugansk and Donetsk.

That would be a fairly dangerous Maskirovka. Russia already committed more forces than it can afford, near Ukraine. It left much of its other regions under-staffed. It would face a real danger from its other neighbors. It is possible Russia is banking on China to protect some of its interests, like the Kuril islands.
Mainly the Far East is understaffed and on ground forces. The threat in that theater is naval and air, not ground forces. There's still plenty of ground troops left there, and flying the jets back can be done relatively rapidly.

But then, why not just assure everyone he is committed to a push mostly from the North, where Kiev is located?
The Belarussian armed forces are also quite small, under-equipped, under-trained, and under-funded. They could present no opposition to Russia if it came to that. Lukashenko is already a puppet, to an extent. There is a lot of leverage for Russia before needing a military. If anything, taking the military route vs Belarus would be a huge loss for Russia.
Much of its political gravitas derives from its narrative of strength - in every aspect. Action first - and decisive at that. Bureaucracy not required. Any military solution would significantly hurt this reputation.
Its only saving grace is that it trades and deals with countries that don't have much of a choice since they already oppose the west. But already its monopoly as an arms trader and sponsor is being shredded by new competitors.
I'm really wondering what's planned for the referendum on the 27th. It's a move that's supposed to prevent the issues he faced after the recent elections, and he's undoubtedly under pressure from Russia to move down the path of implementing an actual union state with Russia. It might not be an actual military takeover, but it might be a referendum where Belarus votes or ("votes" as the case may be) for far greater integration with Russia.
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
If anything, taking the military route vs Belarus would be a huge loss for Russia.
It's a much more risky undertaking. It exposes the Belarus to sanctions, would lead to NATO increasing its presence in Poland and would require the Russian military to conduct a protracted and messy urban operation in Kiev. It might also not solve Russia's problems in the eastern Ukraine.

From a military perspective a drive from the north conducted simultaneously with one from the east would make sense, with Russian troops in the north withdrawing after national objectives in the east have been accomplish. Problem is two drives conducted simultaneously would require a major logistical effort and are there even enough troops and assets in place?

On the part of the Ukrainians, relying on the terrain, prepared defensive positions and certain tactics can on paper mount an effective defence in the east but confronted with Russian drives in the north and east, would be overwhelmed.

is possible Russia is banking on China to protect some of its interests, like the Kuril islands.
China would not want to place itself in such a position, irrespective of certain shared interests with the Russians and we can safely rule out the possibility of Japan making a grab for the Kuriles. It would lead to war with Russia and have much wider implications.
 
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Feanor

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@Feanor What if the Ukraine isn't the target? What if the public moves around the Ukrainian borders are maskirovka? What else would be of as equal or greater value to Putin at the moment?
Belarus would be of equal or greater value. This is why I'm wondering about the upcoming referendum. And consider just how many of out-of-theater troops are in Belarus, and not on the Ukrainian border.
 

Goknub

Active Member
It could well be an attempt to convince the Belarus people they are better off in the protective arms of mother Russia. What better way than to have tensions high as every goes to the polls. Although I'd assumed Luk would just announce himself winner regardless.
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
Surely if the invasion does happen the breakaway region in Moldova will be included in the operation.
What makes you so sure? If the objective is an invasion of the eastern Ukraine and a corridor to the Crimea the Russians won't necessarily have to.include Moldova.

As it stands, despite all the estimates and predictions on the part of governments, think tanks and independent experts the only person who knows how the script will play out is Putin.

 
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ngatimozart

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Belarus would be of equal or greater value. This is why I'm wondering about the upcoming referendum. And consider just how many of out-of-theater troops are in Belarus, and not on the Ukrainian border.
I hadn't taken notice of the Belarus referendum, but it appears to be ensuring Lukashenka's grip on power and ending Belarussian neutrality by amending the constitution allowing Russia to base nuclear weapons in Belarus. This would enable Putin to base nuclear weapons close to the Polish border which would upset the Poles.



Source: https://i1.wp.com/www.russia-briefing.com/news/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Baltic_Sea-Map.png?fit=742,649&ssl=1

Take this thought one step further, if Feanor is correct and Putin manages to reunite Belarus with Mother Russia. The Poles already have concerns about the Russian Kaliningrad enclave and will have a bigger problem with at least half their border being with Russia, if Putin manages to incorporate Belarus. From there begins the pressure on both Poland and Lithuania for a Russian land corridor to the enclave, similar to the Polish corridor to the Baltic between 1919 and 1939, that split Prussia in Germany. It would also have the benefit of physically cutting off Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia from Poland and the rest the EU and NATO, hindering the movement of ground forces between them. That could be the desired endgame and would be the greater outcome than a successful invasion of Ukraine.
 

ngatimozart

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It could well be an attempt to convince the Belarus people they are better off in the protective arms of mother Russia. What better way than to have tensions high as every goes to the polls. Although I'd assumed Luk would just announce himself winner regardless.
He could and most likely would, but he's facing greater domestic opposition and his KGB can't send people to the gulags. He also owes Putin but he doesn't want to be seen by his people as a traitor selling out to Putin. He's already done that by going on Russian TV and promising to allow Russian nuclear weapons to be based in Belarus. He has a slight problem because he can't do that without changing the constitution. That's hidden in the referendum. See my post above.
Surely if the invasion does happen the breakaway region in Moldova will be included in the operation.
But what's in it for Russia? Really. What strategic gain would Putin get?
 

swerve

Super Moderator
Surely if the invasion does happen the breakaway region in Moldova will be included in the operation.
Why? It can't be argued Transnistria is historic Russian territory or mainly populated by Russians. According to its own census, only 29% of the population identify as ethnic Russians, 0.5% more than Moldovans, & 23% are Ukrainian. Allowing for the 14% who didn't specify an ethnicity it's estimated to be 34% Russian, 33% Moldovan & 27% Ukrainian.

Seizing it would necessitate grabbing a lot of mostly Ukrainian-populated land in Ukraine. Look at a map. It's a few hundred km long but very narrow, <10 km wide in places.

It'd add Romania to the list of fervent enemies of Russia & make union with Romania far more popular in Moldova. That'd be an own goal, like driving Finland & Sweden into joining NATO.

PS. I presumed that you meant seizing only Transnistria, not all of Moldova. That'd mean taking 2.5 million more people, over 90% of who would object, plus another two million or so abroad who'd be very unhappy & many of who would lobby the governments of the countries (mostly in the EU) where they live to do something. With Transnistria, Moldova has 3 million residents of who only 270,000 identify as Russian. Even in Transnistria, over half the population has a Moldovan passport.
 

Feanor

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Why? It can't be argued Transnistria is historic Russian territory or mainly populated by Russians. According to its own census, only 29% of the population identify as ethnic Russians, 0.5% more than Moldovans, & 23% are Ukrainian. Allowing for the 14% who didn't specify an ethnicity it's estimated to be 34% Russian, 33% Moldovan & 27% Ukrainian.

Seizing it would necessitate grabbing a lot of mostly Ukrainian-populated land in Ukraine. Look at a map. It's a few hundred km long but very narrow, <10 km wide in places.

It'd add Romania to the list of fervent enemies of Russia & make union with Romania far more popular in Moldova. That'd be an own goal, like driving Finland & Sweden into joining NATO.

PS. I presumed that you meant seizing only Transnistria, not all of Moldova. That'd mean taking 2.5 million more people, over 90% of who would object, plus another two million or so abroad who'd be very unhappy & many of who would lobby the governments of the countries (mostly in the EU) where they live to do something. With Transnistria, Moldova has 3 million residents of who only 270,000 identify as Russian. Even in Transnistria, over half the population has a Moldovan passport.
In my opinion the Moldovans handled their breakaway region extremely well compared to pretty much everyone else. There's no war, there's no nationalism-fueled hatred across the internal border, and there's very little difference between the people living inside Transnestria and the rest of Moldova. This is why the only thing really keeping Transnestria separate is their breakaway government with Russian peacekeepers, and political inertia. It's highly likely that, unless there is a huge shift in the overall situation in Eastern Europe, they will eventually be able to simply retake the territory with minimum fuss. I suspect the locals (the population that is, not the government) would be happy with regional status for Russian and Ukrainian languages, and some minor political autonomy.
 

STURM

Well-Known Member

Interesting points in this talk. Points/opinions made by the speakers include,

- Why diplomacy saved the day and prevented the superpowers going to war in 1962 with [the Soviets and the U.S over Cuba] and 1973 [over the Arab/Israeli war] but for various reasons has not been decisive in this current crisis.

- Differences in opinion amongst various NATO members with the U,.S. has actually prevented a conflict with Putin able to take advantage of this; rather than going for a military option.


Meanwhile the Ukraine has indicated it's willing to drop the idea of a future NATO membership.

''But Ukraine's ambassador in London, Vadym Prystaiko, has told the BBC his country might be willing to drop its ambition to join Nato to avert war, saying Ukraine could be "flexible".

Asked if Kiyv was considering shelving its plans to pursue Nato membership, despite it being written into the Ukrainian constitution, he replied: "We might - especially being threatened like that, blackmailed by that, and pushed to it."
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group

Interesting points in this talk. Points/opinions made by the speakers include,

- Why diplomacy saved the day and prevented the superpowers going to war in 1962 with [the Soviets and the U.S over Cuba] and 1973 [over the Arab/Israeli war] but for various reasons has not been decisive in this current crisis.

- Differences in opinion amongst various NATO members with the U,.S. has actually prevented a conflict with Putin able to take advantage of this; rather than going for a military option.


Meanwhile the Ukraine has indicated it's willing to drop the idea of a future NATO membership.

''But Ukraine's ambassador in London, Vadym Prystaiko, has told the BBC his country might be willing to drop its ambition to join Nato to avert war, saying Ukraine could be "flexible".

Asked if Kiyv was considering shelving its plans to pursue Nato membership, despite it being written into the Ukrainian constitution, he replied: "We might - especially being threatened like that, blackmailed by that, and pushed to it."
If the Internet existed in 1962 or 1973, would the diplomacy route have been more difficult?
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
If the Internet existed in 1962 or 1973, would the diplomacy route have been more difficult?
No idea but the key difference in 1962 and 1973 IMO is that both sides; despite sabre rattling and the need to be seen as tough; were willing to make compromises to avoid the possibility of a nuclear exchange which if it only had effected the U.S. and Russia would have been one thing; problem is it would have effected the whole world.

 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
I've always understood another diffeence is that the leaders and politicians on both side in 1962 (and possibly 1973) had personally experienced WW2. They knew what war was and wanted to avoid it.
That certainly is the case for 1962. Also the numerous atmospheric bomb tests were still a recent unpleasant memory. The Cuban missile crisis was the more significant risk. Soviet missiles could not be detected quickly enough when launching from Cuba so retaliation capability was at risk.
 
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