Royal New Zealand Navy Discussions and Updates

[Todjaeger]

A quick replay, then I'll agree to disagree:
- your examples of current recruitment issues are yesterdays problems from the past 2 decades with a record low defence vote, old ships, unattractive terms of service, and a lack of political will to change policy
- to your list of auxiliary support boats that require personnel are Mine Warfare vessels; I'm not disagreeing they are important, but I am pointing out the real work of a fighting navy are the combat forces, which in our case is likely to remain FF based and the only NZ war fighting capability
- todays problem is rebuilding what is arguable a broken system (EG. HMNZS Manawanui); however, recently we have seen increases in expenditure, bipartisan recognition of our deteriorating strategic outlook, and some limited numbers of new equipment
- If the new FFGs are replaced ASAP with shiny boats, defence vote continues to increase, and service terms and conditions are restored, I belief that the recruiting mountain will come to Muhammad (IE. the youngsters will come flocking in)

I think your realist label is the current problem in NZGov, MFAT, and MoD/NZDF. The warriors have long gone (Our anti-nuclear policy has produced a warped assessment of our environment; RNZN strip mined; Army high intensity capability just not; RNZAF without air power) with positions staffed by brow beaten seat warmers. I'd argue that the above talk of Sea Captor and FFGs, which don't get me wrong is fascinating but ultimately similar to my J-10C v Rafale analogy, is pointless without allowing for our current and projected strategic situation.

Unlike the past few decades of 'peace' (for the lovies) we are now entering a period of having to resist CCP domination in both soft power (Magic Weapons) and realistically hard kinetic power. So that is my context for a 6 FFG RNZN over the next 15 years. I will understand if people reject this, or believe that the CCP are our mates (PM Clark and Key) but new NZGov and MoD policy has been consistently alarmed about our deteriorating strategic situation.

I tend to classify myself as a realist FWIW. With that in mind, I also do not see the RNZN being able to get to a six frigate navy in 15 years. Right now NZ might even find it hard to remain a two frigate navy over the next ten years.

There does seem to have been some movement in the right direction in terms of both funding and attitudes generally, but the big issue from my perspective has entirely to do with time. Who has designs which would be at least somewhat relevant and of interest to NZ? Out of these, who has production capacity (both of overall vessels as well as long lead time shipboard systems) available to start a build for NZ? From this now smaller list, who can produce a design which NZ could bring into service (which means not just the vessel itself, but have operators and maintainers familiar with and able to operate/maintain/support everything including spares & parts) within a decade from now?

With each iteration of question, the pool of potential candidates gets smaller and smaller. Two ships in ten years could be a problem, an additional four ships beyond that over the next five years is IMO even more of a problem. That is also before taking into account any issues with being able to crew and maintain a force of six frigates. The most junior officers and ratings could likely be taken in and trained fairly quickly to reach at least some of those numbers required. However the more senior ratings and officers take years of training and experience to be ready for important postings aboard frigate.

I had previously suggested that NZ might be able to get some ex-RAN frigates towards the end of the currently planned SEA 3000 build programme, but IF that were to happen, the frigates built in Japan would likely not be available until towards the end of the 2040's or early 2050's, which is more like 23 - 26 years from now, not 15.

Further thoughts. If NZ were to increase the size of the RNZN, then base infrastructure would also likely need to be improved/increased/expanded, which would also incur further cost increases atop those needed to increase the number of personnel and the number of vessels,

All of this is potentially achievable, but one cannot ignore the fact that NZ has shown a historical reluctance over the last 30+ years to resource Defence appropriately.

 

[Bluey 006]

AFAIK that is correct, however LockMart/Sikorsky still has versions of the S-70 in production and a customer has quite a very capability requirements which they can request so a new S-70 order could likely be spec'd to be an equivalent to a MH-60S.

It would be surprising if Lockheed Martin/Sikorsky hasn’t already developed and will eventually mass market a modernised utility variant based on the Romeo, given its widespread global adoption and proven naval capabilities. With many countries operating the MH-60R and, in the maritime domain at least, moving away from European platforms like the NH90, there is a clear and low-risk market opportunity for a utility-focused variant.

Something like a MH-60U or MH-60R Block III, offering modular cabin configurations for troop transport, SAR, special operations, maritime strike, medevac, mine warfare, drone control, and logistics support, all while using the same rugged, marinised, and familiar, ship-compatible airframe.

Such a variant would likely appeal to many U.S. allies seeking a high level of fleet commonality, simplified training, and reduced sustainment costs.

Meanwhile, the Future Vertical Lift (FVL-MS) program, though promising, remains uncertain and will likely face some further delays, especially for non-U.S. customers, who may not receive deliveries until well into the 2040s or 2050s, if at all. Even then the platform is expected to be very expensive, and may be out of reach for some.

In this context, an updated Romeo-derived utility variant could fill critical capability gaps in the 2030s/40s, aligning with global defence needs and budget constraints across the board. It could also complement FVL-MS in the broader U.S. fleet as part of a hi-lo mix.